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CONFIDENTIAL.

Part III.

Further Correspondence respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.

No. 1.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, May* 13, 1876, 5 P.M.

THE Chancellors have agreed on the following points, for which they claim the approval and co-operation of Her Majesty's Government:—

To insist at Constantinople on an armistice of two months, and facilitate direct negotiations between the Porte and the insurgents on the following basis:—

1. To furnish materials for the reconstruction of the houses and churches, and provide food until the refugees can provide for themselves.

2. The distribution of relief to be directed by a Turkish Commissary, who would concert with the Mixed Commissions mentioned in Count Andrassy's note.

The Commission to be presided over by a Christian Herzegovinian, and composed of Christian natives representing both religions in the province, who would be elected after the suspension of hostilities.

3. To avoid collisions, the Porte to be advised to concentrate her troops on some place to be settled hereafter.

4. The Christians to keep their arms as well as the Turks.

5. The Consuls or delegates of the Powers to watch over the application of reforms and return of population.

Should these measures fail to bring about a pacification after expiration of the armistice, the three Powers hold that it would be necessary to add to their diplomatic action the sanction of an accord, with a view to taking more efficacious measures as may be necessary in the interest of peace.

I received this communication *ad referendum*.

The Chancellors will wait in Berlin till Monday in the hope of an answer from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 1*.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 204.) *Berlin, May* 13, 1876.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED a letter from Prince Bismarck, of which the inclosed is a copy, asking me to call on him to-day, together with the Ambassadors of France and Italy, to meet the Chancellors of Austria and Russia.

I did so, and found that M. de Bülow and Baron Jomini were equally present.

After a few preliminary words from Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortchakow and Count Andrassy, confirming the cordial understanding which exists between them,

* Repeated to Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Rome.

and expressing their sincere hope and anxious desire that the Governments of England, France, and Italy, who have given their moral support to the attempted pacification of the Herzegovinians, will equally agree to support the further attempts they have now met to concert, in consequence of the alarming state of affairs in Turkey.

Baron Jomini was then invited to read the inclosed document to us, which embodies the views the Chancellors wished to communicate to us, and the proposal to which they solicit the co-operation of the other Great Powers.

On receiving a copy of this document for transmission to your Lordship, I said that in the absence of special instructions I did so *ad referendum*.

Prince Gortchakow observed that he and Count Andrassy would remain till Monday at Berlin, and that they hoped the Governments of England, France, and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the telegraphic summary of their proposal before they left.

The departure of the messenger to London compels me to close this report without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1*.

Prince Bismarck to Lord Odo Russell.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Berlin, le 12 Mai*, 1876.

Je vous serai très obligé de vouloir bien passer chez moi demain, Samedi, 13 Mai, à 1 heure. J'adresse la même invitation à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Italie. Vous trouverez chez moi mes deux collègues d'Autriche et de Russie.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1*.

LES nouvelles alarmantes venant de la Turquie sont de nature à engager les Cabinets à resserrer leur entente.

Les trois Cours Impériales se sont cru appelées à se concerter entre elles pour parer aux dangers de la situation, avec le concours des autres grandes Puissances Chrétiennes.

Dans leur pensée, l'état présent des choses en Turquie réclame une double série de mesures. Il leur paraît avant tout urgent que l'Europe avise aux moyens généraux de prévenir le retour d'événements, tels que ceux qui viennent d'éclater à Salonique et qui menacent de se reproduire à Smyrne et à Constantinople. A cet effet les Grandes Puissances devraient, à leur avis, se concerter sur les dispositions à prendre, pour préserver la sécurité de leurs nationaux et celles des habitants Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman, sur tous les points où elle se trouve compromise.

Ce but semblerait pouvoir être atteint par un accord général concernant l'envoi des bâtiments de guerre sur les points menacés, et l'adoption d'instructions combinées aux commandants de ces navires pour les cas où les circonstances exigeraient de leur part une co-opération armée en vue du maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité.

Toutefois ce but ne serait qu'imparfaitement atteint si la cause première de ces agitations n'était point écartée par la prompte pacification de la Bosnie et de l'Herzegovine.

Les Grandes Puissances se sont déjà réunies dans cette pensée sur l'initiative prise dans la dépêche du 30 Décembre dernier, afin d'obtenir une amélioration effective du sort des populations de ces contrées, sans porter atteinte au *statu quo* politique.

Elles ont demandé à la Porte un programme de réformes destinées à répondre à ce double but. La Porte, déférant à cette demande, s'est déclarée fermement résolue à mettre ces réformes à exécution et l'a officiellement communiqué aux Cabinets.

Il en est résulté pour ceux-ci un droit moral, celui de veiller à l'accomplissement de cette promesse, et une obligation, celle d'insister pour que les insurgés et les réfugiés secondent cette œuvre d'apaisement en cessant la lutte et en rentrant dans leurs foyers.

Cependant, ce programme de pacification, bien qu'accepté en principe par toutes les parties, a rencontré un double écueil.

Les insurgés ont déclaré que l'expérience du passé leur défendait de se lier aux promesses de la Porte, à moins d'une garantie matérielle positive de l'Europe.

La Porte a déclaré de son côté qu'aussi longtemps que les insurgés parcouraient le pays en armes, et que les réfugiés ne se rapatriaient pas, il lui était matériellement impossible de procéder à la nouvelle organisation du pays.

En attendant les hostilités ont repris leur cours. L'agitation entretenue par cette lutte de huit mois s'est étendue à d'autres parties de la Turquie. Les populations Musulmanes ont dû en conclure que la Porte n'avait déféré qu'en apparence à l'action diplomatique de l'Europe, et qu'au fond elle n'avait pas l'intention d'appliquer sérieusement les réformes promises. De là un reveil des passions religieuses et politiques, qui a contribué à amener les déplorables événements de Salonique et la surexcitation menaçante qui se manifeste sur d'autres points de l'Europe Ottoman.

Il n'est pas douteux non plus qu'à son tour cette explosion du fanaticisme réagit sur la situation des esprits en Bosnie et en Herzegovine, comme dans les Principautés voisines.

Car les Chrétiens de ces contrées ont dû être vivement impressionnés par le fait du massacre de Consols Européens, en plein jour, dans une ville paisible, sous les yeux des autorités impuissantes, alors qu'on les engage à se confier au bon vouloir des Turcs irrités par une lutte longue et acharnée.

Si cette situation se prolongeait on risquerait ainsi de voir s'allumer l'incendie générale que la médiation des Grandes Puissances avait précisément en vue de conjurer.

Il est donc de toute nécessité d'établir certaines garanties de nature à mettre hors de doute l'application loyale et complète des mesures arrêtées entre les Puissances et la Porte. Plus que jamais il est urgent de peser sur le Gouvernement du Sultan pour se décider à se mettre sérieusement à l'œuvre afin de remplir les engagements contractés par lui envers l'Europe.

Comme premier pas à faire dans cette voie, les trois Cours Impériales proposent d'insister auprès de la Porte, avec toute l'énergie que doit avoir la voix unie des Grandes Puissances, afin de l'amener à une suspension d'armes pour le terme de deux mois.

Ce délai permettrait d'agir à la fois sur les insurgés et les réfugiés, pour leur donner confiance dans la sollicitude vigilante de l'Europe, sur les Principautés voisines, pour les exhorter à ne pas entraver cette tentative de conciliation, et enfin sur le Gouvernement Ottoman, pour le mettre en demeure d'accomplir ses promesses. On pourrait ainsi ouvrir la voie à des pourparlers directs entre la Porte et les délégués Bosniques et Herzégoviniens, sur la base des vœux que ceux-ci ont formulés et qui ont été jugés aptes à servir de points de départ à une discussion.

Ces points sont les suivants :—

1. Les matériaux pour la reconstruction des maisons et églises seraient fournis aux réfugiés rentrants, leur subsistance serait assurée jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent vivre de leur travail.

En tant que la distribution des secours relèverait du Commissaire Turc, celui-ci devrait s'entendre sur les mesures à prendre avec la Commission Mixte, mentionnée dans la note du 30 Décembre, afin de garantir l'application sérieuse des réformes et d'en contrôler l'exécution. Cette Commission serait présidée par un Herzégovinien Chrétien, composée d'indigènes représentant fidèlement les deux religions du pays; ils seraient élus dès que l'armistice aura suspendu les hostilités.

3. A l'effet d'éviter toute collision, le conseil serait donné à Constantinople de concentrer les troupes Turques, au moins jusqu'à l'apaisement des esprits, sur quelques points à convenir.

4. Les Chrétiens garderaient les armes comme les Musulmans.

5. Les Consuls ou délégués des Puissances exerceront leur surveillance sur l'application des réformes en général et sur les faits relatifs au rapatriement en particulier.

Si avec l'appui bienveillant et chaleureux des Grandes Puissances et à la faveur de l'armistice, un arrangement pouvait être conclu sur ces bases, et mis immédiatement en œuvre par la rentrée des réfugiés et l'élection de la Commission Mixte, un pas considérable aurait été fait vers la pacification.

Si, cependant, l'armistice s'écoulait sans que les efforts des Puissances réussissent à atteindre le but qu'elles ont en vue, les trois Cours Impériales sont d'avis qu'il deviendrait nécessaire d'ajouter à leur action diplomatique la sanction d'une entente, en vue des mesures efficaces qui paraîtraient réclamées dans l'intérêt de la paix générale, pour arrêter le mal et en empêcher le développement.

No. 2.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 31. Political. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, May 5, 1876.*

A RUSSIAN newspaper correspondent and Confidential Agent of the Russian Consulate-General at Ragusa, M. de Monteverde by name, arrived here on the 2nd instant direct from the scene of last week's fighting. Since he came M. Yonine's language respecting the results of the fighting has been considerably modified. He owns that the telegrams which he received from Cettigné were incorrect, and that the provisioning of Nichsich was really effected by Moukhtar himself, and not by a sortie of the garrison. Also, he does not now deny that Moukhtar may have passed one whole night at Nichsich, and that the insurgents were handsomely beaten ("bien battus"). He is also ready to agree to the high opinion entertained by M. de Monteverde (himself an ex-officer of the Russian army) of Moukhtar Pasha's energy, courage, determination, and military talents.

The insurgents counted upon a victory, and they, and all those who sympathize with them, are terribly disappointed at this reverse.

I refrain from any attempt at estimating the numbers engaged on either side, or the respective losses. As usual the accounts are utterly irreconcilable.

A considerable number of Crivoscians, and of the inhabitants of the Bocche di Cattaro, did certainly on this occasion reinforce the ranks of the insurgents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 3.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 14, 1876, 6·45 P.M.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that after having taken the orders of the President, and called a Council of the Cabinet, he has instructed the French Ambassador at Berlin that the French Government are ready to approve generally the propositions presented by Russia at the meeting of Representatives at Berlin yesterday. As time presses, and as from his report he concluded that Her Majesty's Government were of the same opinion, he had not consulted them previously. He writes to French Ambassador in London to-night.

No. 4.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 183.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1876.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of the 28th of April early yesterday morning.

It being the Emperor's birthday a Court of felicitation was held at the Palace, at which the Corps Diplomatique was present, and I was consequently unable to call on Prince Gortchakow.

As the question was one of urgency, and it was desirable that no delay should take place in communicating to Prince Gortchakow the opinions expressed by your Lordship, I addressed a private letter to his Highness (of which I annex a copy), in which I embodied the substance of your Lordship's telegram.

I received a note from his Highness this morning requesting me to call upon him. I waited on his Highness at the hour named.

He immediately referred to the subject of my private letter. His Highness stated that the Turkish Ambassador had also communicated to him, and left a copy of a circular telegram which had been addressed to the Turkish Representatives at the European Courts, which had probably given rise to your Lordship's communication, the general purport of which was to appeal to the European Powers to secure the neutrality of Montenegro in the impending conflict between the Turkish troops and the insurgents.

His Highness told me that he had replied to Kabouli Pasha that what he had read to him "n'était qu'un roman tandis qu'il demandait de l'histoire."

He observed that Russia and Austria had hitherto successfully exercised their influence to restrain both Montenegro and Servia from taking part in the contest; that, up to the present moment, all that the Powers had received from the Porte had been a written promise to carry out reforms, not one of which had as yet received the semblance of execution; and that the Porte, at the time when efforts were being made by Austria and the other Powers to bring about an armistice and a pacification, had appealed to arms.

His Highness informed Kabouli Pasha that he had no answer to give to his communication.

Prince Gortchakow then informed me, in reference to the communication I had made, that, under the circumstances he had related to me, and in view of the menacing attitude which the Porte still continued to observe towards Montenegro, he could take no further steps in regard to inducing the Prince of Montenegro to maintain his neutrality, nor indeed could he answer that the Prince of Montenegro may not be forced by circumstances into action.

His Highness said that he considered, on the contrary, the gravity of the situation required that the European Powers should hold the most energetic language to the Porte, with a view to the adoption of such concessions as will reasonably satisfy the insurgents, and thereby give peace to her disaffected subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchak w.

Mon Prince, *Ambassade d'Angleterre, St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{17}{29}$ Avril, 1876.*

N'AYANT pas l'espoir de trouver votre Altesse aujourd'hui, et ayant reçu une communication de la part du Comte Derby qui n'admet pas de délai, je le crois de mon devoir de la communiquer à votre Altesse par écrit.

Le Comte Derby m'informe que l'Ambassadeur de Turquie lui a communiqué un télégramme de son Gouvernement annonçant que Moukhtar Pacha a reçu les ordres de partir de Gatzko avec des forces suffisants pour ravitailler Niksich, et que la Porte avait reçu des informations que le Prince de Monténégro concentre ses troupes dans cette direction et se propose à prendre part au combat qui peut avoir lieu au passage du Douga.

La Porte représente qu'ayant déférée aux conseils des Puissances, elle est à même d'espérer qu'elles useraient de leur influence auprès du Prince de Monténégro pour le détourner de tout projet de ce genre, et de le décider à garder une stricte neutralité.

Le Gouvernement de la Reine considère cette demande de la Porte comme juste et raisonnable, et il espère que les autres Gouvernements partageront cette opinion et conseilleront au Prince de suivre strictement cette voie.

La Porte ayant désavoué toute intention d'attaquer le Monténégro, le Comte Derby est d'avis qu'on devrait également inviter le Prince de Monténégro à garder une neutralité effective.

En priant votre Altesse de vouloir bien me communiquer son opinion sur ce qui précède, je profite, &c.

(Signé) A. LOFTUS.

No. 5.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1876.*

I AM privately informed that on the initiative of the Emperor Alexander, and by His Majesty's order, Prince Gortchakow has invited Count Andrassy to meet him at Berlin, on the 11th proximo, in order to confer with him and Prince Bismarck on Eastern affairs.

My informant stated that with a view to the maintenance of the European concert, and in harmony with the wish of the Emperor Alexander that the affairs of the East should be treated in common by the Great Powers, and not solely by the Three Allied Empires, the Representatives of England, France, and Italy at Berlin, would probably, likewise, be invited to confer with the three Imperial Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

He also hinted that this embryo of an European Conference might possibly, during the residence of Prince Gortchakow in Germany, be the prelude to a more formally convened Conference of the Six Powers at Berlin, or some other central point, if circumstances should require it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 6.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 185. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1876.*

IN the course of conversation this day with Prince Gortchakow, his Highness, who was much irritated against the Porte, spoke in terms of disapproval of the orders sent to the Turkish Commander-in-chief to march on Nichsich at the very moment when Austria was using her best efforts to bring about an armistice and the revictualling of that fort by the Prince of Montenegro; and he foresees from this action of the Porte a great increase of popular indignation on the part of the insurgents, and in lieu of appeasement, an extension of the insurrection.

From certain expressions which fell from Prince Gortchakow I have reason to think that his Highness has strongly urged on Count Andrassy the necessity of closing the port of Klek, and of preventing it from being utilized by the Porte as a basis of military operations.

It is not the first time that Prince Gortchakow has spoken to me in this sense. On the present occasion his Highness observed that as Austria had closed her frontier against the insurgents, the access to Klek should be equally closed to the Porte for military purposes.

Prince Gortchakow stated that he held strictly to the principle of material non-intervention. He had some years ago put forward that principle in regard to the affairs of Turkey, and had conformed to it. If, therefore, the efforts of the European Powers to effect a pacification between the Porte and the insurgents should prove to be unavailing, although he will do nothing to incite Servia and Montenegro, he can no longer restrain them from action.

There can be no doubt, said his Highness, that in such an event the insurrection would assume much larger proportions, and a flame would be kindled in Bulgaria, Epirus, Thessaly, and Albania, which the Porte, with its weakened resources, would be unable to extinguish; and the Christian Powers of Europe, awakened by public opinion to the call of humanity, will have to interpose to arrest the effusion of blood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 7.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 194. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 9, 1876.*

I AM informed, although not officially, that it is the intention of Prince Gortchakow to propose that the Ambassadors of England, France, and Italy shall be invited to co-operate with the Representatives of the three Northern Empires in the deliberations which will take place at Berlin during the presence there of His Highness and Count Andrassy.

At the interview I had with Prince Gortchakow yesterday morning, his Highness was reserved as to the proposals which may be submitted for deliberation at Berlin.

He was evidently indisposed to compromise himself by enunciating his views previous to an exchange of opinions with Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy, but he told me that he hoped to have the pleasure of seeing Lord Odo Russell, with whom he would communicate freely.

As far as I am informed of the views of Prince Gortchakow, his programme will be based on the following conditions:—

1st. The maintenance of the *status quo* territorial.

2nd. The strict fulfilment of the reforms contained in Count Andrassy's note which have been accepted by the Porte, with the addition of certain guarantees based on the counter proposals submitted by the insurgents.

It is not improbable that further eventualities may be discussed between the Imperial Ministers, in conjunction with the Representatives of the other three Powers, and that among them that of a future military intervention in case that the necessity may arise to require it; but I have reason to believe that, even in this extreme case, a military intervention would only be agreed to upon condition that it bore an European character, and that it was carried out under European supervision.

Prince Gortchakow is fully aware that Count Andrassy is strongly opposed to any such obligation being imposed on Austria, and, further, how difficult it would be for Austria, in view of her different Slav nationalities, and their rivality with Hungary, to carry out safely for herself any such measure.

I am further convinced that Prince Gortchakow will scrupulously avoid submitting any proposal distasteful to Count Andrassy, or that would be in any way discordant with his views, as it is the first object of the Russian Chancellor to cement the good understanding existing between Austria and Russia, and to abstain from any step which could produce dissension between them.

I feel persuaded that the predominant wish of the Emperor Alexander is to maintain peace, and that his policy in regard to Eastern affairs is perfectly disinterested, and that his sole object is to aid in pacifying the insurgent provinces of Turkey and in maintaining the Ottoman Empire. I am also convinced that Prince Gortchakow aspires to no exclusive advantages for Russia in the course he is pursuing.

In my telegram of this day, I ventured to suggest that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin should be prepared to attend a Conference of the six Powers should he receive a formal invitation to do so, and I have reason to believe that my French colleague has addressed a similar suggestion to his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 8.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 467.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 4, 1876.*

INFORMATION has been received of an insurrectionary movement which has broken out at the village of Otlonkeni, not far from Philippopoli, which lies on the railway beyond Adrianople.

It was known that revolutionary agents were working actively among the Bulgarians, and that arms and ammunition have latterly been introduced in considerable quantities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 9.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 467.)
Constantinople, May 7, 1876.

My Lord,

IT is impossible to be blind to the fact that the irritation of the Turkish populations has reached a pitch at which little is required to place the Christians in many parts of the Empire in a position of the greatest jeopardy.

The unpopularity of the Sultan and of Mahmoud Pasha, coupled with universal distress, arising from the financial state of the country, has given rise to deep-seated and general discontent.

The effect of the long-continued insurrection is felt by every class of the community, whether Christian or Mussulman; but the latter regard themselves as sufferers from a Christian movement for supremacy countenanced by the Christian Powers, which have allowed every kind of assistance to be given to the insurgents, while the Porte has been prevented from adopting the measures considered necessary to put it down by attacking it at its source.

The Salonica catastrophe cannot fail to increase the prevailing uneasiness; and, as the Porte has shown a readiness to do all that the Representatives can suggest in reference to it, it is essential to avoid everything likely to add to the excitement.

If at the meeting between Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortchakow, and Count Andrassy, about to take place at Berlin, it is proposed to come to some decision with regard to the Herzegovina, it is much to be hoped that nothing will be insisted upon to which the Porte will not be able to consent or to engage to carry out.

The European Governments could, no doubt, enforce any decisions they might arrive at, but they could not do so without imminent risk to the lives of the Christian populations, if their proposals were such that the public opinion of the Mussulmans forced the Porte to resist them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 10.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 468.)
Constantinople, May 7, 1876.

My Lord,

WE had no Consular Agent nearer than Adrianople to the scene of the movement among the Bulgarians, which occurred at a village not far from Tatar Bazarjik, beyond Philippopoli, and I am still unable to give your Lordship more than the vague information that I have obtained from some of my colleagues.

Count Zichy tells me that the Austrian Consular Agent at Philippopoli reports that five villages have been burned by the insurgents.

General Ignatiew considers that the movement has no political character whatever, it having, he says, been got up by the workmen (among whom are many foreigners, especially Italians), employed on the railway, who are in arrears of pay.

He considers that too much importance should not be attached to the movement.

About 5,000 troops have been despatched from here; and, far from sharing the opinion of General Ignatiew, I believe that no exertion should be spared for assuring the immediate suppression of a movement which, if allowed to extend, will became extremely serious.

The Russian Vice-Consul at Philippopoli is himself a Bulgarian, long supposed to be connected with, and an active agent of, the revolutionary committees, and he belongs, I am told, precisely to that part of the country where the present movement has occurred.

Justly or unjustly the conviction that Russia is at the bottom of it is universal among both Turks and Christians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 11.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 473.)
Constantinople, May 9, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Dupuis, reporting the particulars which had reached him respecting the Bulgarian movement beyond Philippopoli.

There is, I believe, no doubt of the correctness of what Mr. Dupuis states of the leaders in the affair at Otlonkeni, where the disturbance commenced, being Servians or other emissaries of the revolutionary committees.

The Bulgarian population itself has hitherto taken little part, but it appears from Mr. Dupuis' report, and from what I have myself been told at the Porte, that the organizers of the movements pursue the same atrocious policy as was followed in the Herzegovina, by burning and ravaging all villages, whether Mussulman or Christian, if the inhabitants refuse to join them.

The accounts which had been received at the Porte yesterday were satisfactory, the telegraph line and postal communication having been re-established, and it was hoped that the movement would not spread.

There is, however, one danger greatly to be apprehended.

Outrages committed upon the peaceful Mussulmans, and especially upon the women and children, may provoke among the Mahomedans a spirit of fanaticism and revenge likely to lead to similar acts of retaliation, which it may be very difficult to restrain, although the Government declare their determination to do all in their power to prevent it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Adrianople, May 6, 1876.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency other items of intelligence from various parts of this province, which, without pretending to an accuracy in details so difficult under the present excitable state of the country, seem, nevertheless, to indicate a degree of uneasiness and disquietude to the popular mind hitherto unknown.

It was said yesterday that disturbances had occurred at Karabounar between Yanboli and Eski-Jagon, and also at Koulefi Bourgas.

At Tatar Bazardjik complete panic seems to have seized the place, and the fears of a general massacre appear to have been so great that the whole of the Christian population betook themselves to their churches, where they passed the whole of Wednesday night last, while the Turks were parading the streets fully armed.

With regard to the occurrence at Otlonkeni last week, an eye-witness, a Polish gentleman in the service of the Porte, who returned last night from Tatar Bazardjik, and whose account of the state of affairs there I have no reason to doubt, told me that on reaching that place he found it completely abandoned, all the shops and houses shut up, the inhabitants fled or hid away, and complete disorganization among the railway servants.

The local authorities, on hearing of the massacre at Otlonkeni of five Zaptiehs and an employé of the Konak by insurgents, and fearing an attack on Tatar Bazardjik, collected together an armed force of the Mussulman inhabitants and started in pursuit of the murderers, who immediately fled to the mountains. On the arrival of military reinforcements, however, from this on Thursday last further apprehensions were calmed, and order and tranquillity restored.

I am further informed that the insurgents in the affair at Otlonkeni were mostly Bulgarians, led by Servians, who set on fire the villages of peaceful Bulgarians who refused to take part in the rising. In this manner some twenty small villages have been burnt and the inhabitants driven away.

From these circumstances it does not appear that the Turks are committing any acts of violence against peaceful Christians, but rather a warfare is urged among the Bulgarians themselves.

At Saroubez, a village between Tatar Bazardjik and Samakov, four or five Zaptiehs were killed by these insurgents, who also committed acts of incendiarism and cut the telegraph wires.

It is conjectured, and probably not without reason, that these partial and desultory risings throughout this province are the following out of a plan of action adopted by the enemies of Turkey, not only to distract and harass the Porte by the carrying on of a guerilla warfare, but also to divide the attention and weaken military operations in the Herzegovina.

Much activity is displayed here in calling out the Redifs of the provinces and dispatching them to the seat of the disturbances, while troops are continually arriving from Constantinople for the same destination.

Another assault was, I hear, made on the railway junction at Koukeli Bourgas on the main line by persons said to be brigands in connection with some Italian workmen, who carried off the whole of the cash found at the station.

A deputation of Bulgarian Poherludjis, I was informed yesterday, was expected from Philippopoli to wait on the Governor-General of Adrianople, but for what purpose does not transpire.

This state of affairs certainly does not indicate tranquillity, but not to worry your Excellency with vague, exaggerated, and unauthentic rumours of all kinds, I will briefly mention that it was reported attempts were made last week to set on fire the town of Philippopoli in three different places, and an extensive conflagration happening here about the same time, inquiries are being held on the possibility of its having been the work of incendiaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HUTTON DUGUID.

No. 12.

Lord Tenterden to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Very Confidential.)

Foreign Office, May 15, 1876.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Earl of Derby to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying extract of a note addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin by the German Government,* respecting the protection by a naval force of the subjects of foreign Powers and the Christian population at Salonica and other places.

I am, &c.
(Signed) TENTERDEN.

No. 13.

Rashid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, May* 15.)

Constantinople, le 14 *Mai*, 1876.

(Télégraphique.)

VOUS avez appris par la voie des journaux que des troubles ont eu lieu dernièrement du côté de Tatar Pazardjik, district de Philippopoli. Quoique ces troubles fussent loin d'avoir l'importance que la malveillance a essayé de leur attribuer en les présentant dans la presse comme une insurrection Bulgare, le Gouvernement s'est empressé néanmoins de prendre, dès le début, des mesures énergiques et efficaces, appropriées à la circonstance. Ces mesures ont, heureusement, produit le résultat qu'on était en droit d'en attendre. Les troubles ont été circonscrits tout d'abord, et maintenant ils tendent à s'apaiser; nos dernières informations sont satisfaisantes; elles portent qu'un grand nombre d'insurgés rentrent dans leurs foyers et les autres ne tarderont pas à les suivre.

Veuillez communiquer ce qui précède à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

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* No. 14.

No. 14.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 365.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 15, 1876.

THE German Ambassador called upon me to-day, and I spoke to him on the subject of the plan proposed by the Three Powers at Berlin, as stated in the Memorandum contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 204, of the 13th instant, for the pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I remarked that, in the first place, it appeared to me that there should be some security for the reality and faithful observance of the contemplated armistice by both sides. The Turks might engage to maintain it, and would no doubt do so, but what reliance could be placed on the insurgents observing it? I conceived that before any plan founded on an armistice is discussed, it should be clearly understood that Servia and Montenegro must be warned, and, if necessary, compelled to refrain from assisting in fomenting the insurrection, or taking other active measures in support of the insurgents during its continuance.

Even then I could not say that the plan seemed to be likely to be successful. Article 1 provided that materials should be furnished for the reconstruction of the churches and houses of the returning refugees, and that their subsistence should be assured for some time to come; but from what we knew of the matter, it seemed likely that this would cost a large sum of money, which the Porte did not possess, and could not borrow.

Moreover, it was questionable whether in justice the Porte should be made responsible for repairing destruction which had been in the main the work of the insurgents themselves.

I passed over the 2nd Article as being one of detail, into which it was not necessary now to enter.

With regard to the 3rd Article, I said that I did not see how peace was to be preserved between the Christian and Mahometan populations if the Turkish troops were to be concentrated as proposed, or how the Turkish Government could be held responsible for the maintenance of order, if the only disciplined force in the country were thus withdrawn. The 4th Article showed this conclusively, since if the insurgents were to return armed to meet the Mussulmans, also retaining their arms, a collision would be inevitable.

I did not lay any stress on the fifth Article, as it might mean much or little, according to the interpretation which might be given to the duties of surveillance by the Consuls or Delegates entrusted with them.

I could not, however, but remark that the intimation contained in the last paragraph of the Memorandum, seemed to leave the disposal of events wholly with the insurgents. It almost amounted to an invitation to them to refuse to entertain any terms that were likely or possible to be offered, since it gave them to understand that by continuing the insurrection they would secure further intervention on their behalf.

I added that these were merely my first impressions, and that it would be necessary for Her Majesty's Government to examine the proposals carefully before returning any definite answer.

Count Münster listened to my observations with attention, and promised to report to his Government what I had said.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 15.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 209.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 15, 1876.

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon to discuss with me the proposals which have been drawn up at Berlin for a further attempt at the pacification of the Herzegovina.

I mentioned to Count Schouvaloff the same objections to the scheme which I had already stated to Count Münster, as reported in my despatch to Lord Odo Russell, No. 365, of this day's date, of which your Excellency will receive a copy.

Count Schouvaloff admitted that the proposals, as they stood, seemed open to objections in points of detail. He thought, however, that most, if not all of these, might

be obviated by separating the scheme into two parts, and keeping the plan of a renewed armistice distinct from the ulterior negotiations.

If we could once succeed, he said, in getting an armistice of two months agreed to, on such a basis as to give substantial security that peace would be kept, there would be time to consider at leisure the means of arriving at a permanent settlement, and the Powers would be freed from the necessity of committing themselves at once to the details of the project as it now stood.

I did not understand from him that he had instructions to make this suggestion, but that from his knowledge of the views of his Government he thought it not unlikely to be acceptable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 16.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 15.)

Rome, May 15, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Berlin Memorandum about Herzegovina has not yet reached Rome; but from what has been reported of it telegraphically by Italian Ambassador, the Italian Government is disposed to adhere to the proposals it contains.

No. 17.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby [1].—(*Received May* 15.)

Berlin, May 15, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

FRENCH and Italian Governments have agreed to support the new propositions of the Northern Powers at Constantinople, which I communicated to your Lordship the day before yesterday.

No. 18.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1876, 5·40 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

NO decision on the plan of the three Powers possible till Cabinet has been consulted on Tuesday.

No. 19.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1876, 9·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government wish to have your opinion as soon as possible by telegraph on the proposals made at Berlin, repeated to you yesterday.

No. 20.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 16.)

(No. 13.)

Mostar, May 5, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, dated to-day, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, regarding the relief of Nichsich, and giving a sketch of the popular idea of the present political position of the parties interested in the revolt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Elliot.

Mostar, May 5, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Moukhtar Pasha reached Nichsich on the 29th April, and succeeded in revictualling the garrison there. He only left Gatzko on the 27th, so that he evidently met little opposition on the march. It is said, however, that, in returning, he had some sharp fighting, and that he inflicted very severe losses on the insurgents. Ali Pasha thinks that he was allowed to reach Nichsich, but that it was hoped to annihilate his force on its return. From various other sources, however, I learn that the opinion prevails that Montenegro and her advisers desire nothing more than that the struggle should be indefinitely prolonged, whereas any crushing disaster to the Turkish arms would bring on an inconvenient crisis, which would inevitably result in war with Montenegro, or European intervention, and therefore the Turks were allowed to pass.

It may, perhaps, be of some use to give your Excellency a slight sketch of what seems to be the prevailing opinion in these regions as to the present political position of most of the parties concerned in this almost incomprehensible disturbance, in which every one seems to profess precisely what he fails to practise. Montenegro professes neutrality, but has really been the most active partisan and supporter of the insurrection. The Prince is supposed to be a mere tool in the hands of Russia, and if the Principality has as yet gained nothing else, it has received immense sums of money from Russia and other quarters, ostensibly for the use of the poor and wounded insurgents, but of which the greater part finds its way into the pockets of the Prince and his senators. Of this there is no doubt, and therefore Montenegro is quite content that the present state of affairs, so profitable to herself, may be prolonged. In the meantime she is prepared for war, and imagines that in such a case she will find friends and support; but it is not thought the Prince desires war.

As to Austria, no one seems to entertain a doubt as to the sincerity of the professions of Count Andrassy and his Government, but it is said that there is a party, headed by the Archduke Albert, with Baron Rodich and other Slavs, which is almost more powerful than the Government. Its dream has always been to make Austria a Slav Power and to deprive Russia of her influence over that people. That Count Andrassy is powerless to carry out his desires is proved by the fact, which is not to be denied, that, in spite of all orders to the contrary, every kind of assistance is still afforded by Dalmatia to the insurrection. Nothing has been changed since the acceptance of the Andrassy note beyond a show of severity. A few individuals have been arrested and parcels of provisions or materials of war stopped on one road, but immediately afterwards allowed to proceed by another less public. My information on this head is too general to admit of a doubt of its truth.

As to Russia, also, the sincerity of Prince Gortchakow and the Government is not questioned, but it is said that, as in Austria, so in Russia, there is a powerful party headed by the heir to the Throne and seconded by General Ignatiew and his agents, and also by the Slav Committees and the thousands who contribute money to keep up the revolt. Their desire is said to be a wish to destroy the strength and credit of Turkey, and to embroil Austria in hopeless internal difficulties, for ulterior designs not yet quite apparent.

As to Servia, no one seems to attribute much importance to her conduct, whatever it may be.

With regard to Turkey, I believe that her most capable statesmen feel that, up to the present moment, owing to the intrigues and insincerity of those who pretend to be her friends, she has been playing a losing game. She has accepted their advice, and finds herself at the present moment in a state of bankruptcy, with her credit gone, and her strength failing. Doubtless the incapacity of many of her statesmen has greatly contributed to this result, but she feels she can scarcely hold her own much longer, and believes that her only chance of safety is to make a supreme effort to strike at the root of the evil and declare war with Montenegro. This is, at least, the idea of the authorities here; it is also the popular idea, and, I think, of many of the foremost men in the Empire. It would, at all events, force a crisis, and bring all parties face to face. The insurrection of 1860-61 was only terminated by war with Montenegro, and what succeeded then, it is believed may succeed now.

I had hoped, on hearing of the Turkish success at Nichsich, that it had been sufficiently marked to discourage the insurgents, and might induce pacification, but all my subsequent information tends to show that it was a preconcerted affair on the part of

Montenegro and the chiefs of the insurgents. It was said before that, on Moukhtar Pasha's retreat after his first attempt, his force might have been annihilated, but for the reasons already mentioned, he was allowed to escape. But, supposing this to be untrue, what advantage after all has been gained? Nichsich has been saved for the moment, and perhaps a rather unusual number of insurgents slain. In a month or two all will have to be recommenced, and all the garrisons revictualled under the same arduous circumstances. Meanwhile the rebellion continues, and Turkey is being exhausted in every possible manner—morally, financially, and materially.

Lastly, as to the insurrection and the people of this country. The insurrection is, as it always has been, confined to some 5,000 or 6,000 individuals and their chiefs, the greater part of whom had nothing whatever to complain of, as they were practically independent, as I have often explained. The few among them who are really from the Herzegovina properly speaking, after having been forced to rise, have been taught to fight, and now, being well furnished with money and provisions, seem to take pleasure in their lawless life. The chiefs find themselves wealthy, and they and their followers will not lay down their arms as long as they find it so much to their advantage to maintain their present position, caring really no more for their fellow countrymen, for Turkish reforms, justice, and all the griefs which they have put forward than if they never existed. But the thousands of people who were forced to rise, but who were indisposed to fight, and immediately sought escape from coercion, and refuge wherever they could obtain it for themselves and families—who have from the beginning earnestly desired, and do still desire, to return to their homes, but who could not do so because those who called themselves their chiefs had destroyed their houses and menaced and ill-treated them if they spoke of returning—who have not participated in the slightest degree in the wealth that has been scattered broadcast among these chiefs and their armed followers, mere tools in the hands of others—who have been for months in a state of semi-starvation, and who know that for years to come they cannot hope to obtain the simplest comforts of existence which they have lost,—these, together with numberless families of respectable Mussulmans who have lost their all, are the victims to be pitied, and who have suffered by the detestable political intrigues which caused the outbreak.

I believe that Moukhtar Pasha intends now to attack the insurgents in Banjani, Zupci, and other places, but I have no hope that anything he can do will change the position of affairs.

If the insurgents do not care to meet him, they will simply retire into Montenegro or some other part of the country, and leave the troops to march back again.

There seems to me to be no further interest in the military operations in the Herzegovina, for, unless the position of the Porte with regard to Montenegro be changed, they can lead to no important result. It will continue to be the old story of endeavours to revictual the different garrisons, in which the troops will always be attacked, and always taken at a disadvantage by the so-called insurgents, until there is no further money, and the troops become thoroughly demoralized.

Your Excellency will recollect that after my visit to the insurgents, I said that the course pursued seemed to be of a nature eventually to necessitate a foreign armed intervention. At present, if peace is to be restored here, I see this more strongly than ever, unless the Turks, as a last resource, are permitted to declare war with Montenegro, and are able to carry it to a successful conclusion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 21.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 32. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, May 8, 1876.*

M. LEON JOURNAULT, a Member of the French Chamber of Deputies, and a moderate Republican in politics, has been visiting Dalmatia. He passed through Ragusa last week, and went also to Cattaro, but not to Cettigné. I am told that he expressed himself strongly as to the effect of Russian diplomacy in the question of the Herzegovina; that he regretted the incapacity of France to do anything to gain that influence in Montenegro and in the Councils of the Prince to which there are many who think that His Highness and a portion of his subjects would not be loath to submit themselves; and that he declared his intention of exerting his best

efforts to prevent M. Gambetta from advocating in the Chamber the claims of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to complete independence.

He also gave it to be understood that he should at once propose the conversion of the French Vice-Consulate at Ragusa into a Consulate, and the nomination of a competent person in the place of the Comte de Joufroy d'Abbans, who now represents French interests here in a manner which does not seem to have given satisfaction to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 22.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 33. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, May 9, 1876.*

AT half-past five o'clock yesterday afternoon, I had the honour to address to Sir Andrew Buchanan, for communication to your Lordship, a telegram in the following words:—

"Demonstration of refugees occurred this morning before the Russian Consulate. About a hundred women collected, demanded assistance on pretext that the Government had ceased to issue allowance. Russian Consul declined interference. Police dispersed the assemblage."

I saw M. Yonine in the afternoon, and he told me that he did not himself speak to the women, but charged his Cavass to explain to them that he could do nothing for them, and that they must apply to the local authorities. He professed to think that this demonstration had been got up by some one who desired to cause him embarrassment, whereas, of course, the Turkish Consul-General has jumped to the conclusion that M. Yonine had prearranged the affair himself.

I am not as yet in possession of information as to the exact reasons which led the authorities to stop the issue of the allowances; but I have been assured this morning that the refugees will continue to receive them as heretofore, so that there is no danger of any further disturbance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 23.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 34. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, May 9, 1876.*

BOTH M. Yonine and M. de Montoverde, the correspondent of the "Ruski Mir," assured me yesterday that in the late battles the Turks had made use of explosive, or rather of laminated, bullets; which, instead of fulminate, contained a piece of wood, calculated upon impact to make the bullet split into fragments. Patients treated by the Russian ambulance had been found suffering from wounds caused by explosive bullets; and specimens of the bullets themselves, or of fragments of them, had been brought away, and would be submitted to the inspection of the parties to the Geneva Convention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 24.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 16, 8·50 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1876, 11·55 P.M.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram informing me of the Berlin proposals did not reach me till this afternoon, and I have had no opportunity as yet of ascertaining the views of the new Grand Vizier on the Herzegovina question.

I should not, however, anticipate any decided objection from the Porte, except, perhaps, to the composition of the Commission proposed in the second clause, and certainly to the Consular supervision imposed by the fifth.

The latter difficulty might possibly be overcome by the insurgents being informed that the Consuls would be instructed to report to their Governments upon the application of the reforms, without asking the direct consent of the Porte to a proposal greatly in excess of original Andrassy note.

No. 25.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.[*]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 16, 1876, 4·20 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government see grave objections to the plan put forward by the Three Powers, and are not prepared to press its adoption on the Porte.

No. 26.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 16, 1876.

THE Turkish Ambassador spoke to me to-day respecting the plan for the pacification of the insurgent Provinces proposed by the Three Powers at Berlin, and I expressed to him my views on the subject in the same sense as I had spoken to Count Münster and Count Schouvaloff as stated in my despatch to Lord O. Russell and Lord A. Loftus, of which copies are inclosed in my despatch No. 304 of the 16th instant.

The Turkish Ambassador laid great stress on the unfavourable effect which an armistice would have on the military operations of the Porte, but said that he had not received instructions to express any opinion on the proposed plan.

I gave his Excellency to understand that it was unlikely that Her Majesty's Government would join in pressing the adoption of the proposals on the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 27.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 16, *at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, May* 16, 1876, 11 P.M.

AM I to communicate rejection by Her Majesty's Government of the plan put forward by the three Powers officially to the German Government?

The consequences may be very serious.

No. 28.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 330.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 16, 1876.

THE Duc Decazes spoke to me on the 14th instant respecting the points on the Turkish question which Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortchakow, and Count Andrassay had submitted to the Representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy, at Berlin, the previous day.

These points are mentioned in your Lordship's telegram to me of 2·30 P.M. on the 14th instant.

The Duc Decazes said that as time pressed, he had not waited to consult Her Majesty's Government, concluding them to be of a similar opinion, but that having

[*] Similar telegrams were sent to Constantinople, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and Rome.

taken the orders of the Marshal President, and after a Council of the Cabinet had been held, he had telegraphed to M. de Goutant Biron that the French Government concurred generally in the points proposed, and that he had written to the French Ambassador in London to inform Her Majesty's Government thereof.

I telegraphed this information to your Lordship at 6·45 P.M. the same day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 29.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 209. Secret.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May* 15, 1876.

AFTER the Conference on Saturday was over, of which I sent your Lordship the result in my despatch No. 204 of the 13th instant, both Prince Gortchakow and Count Andrassy asked me privately and separately to come and see them on the following day.

I called first on Count Andrassy at the Austrian Embassy. He showed me the last telegrams he had received from Count Zichy at Constantinople. They contained the same information exactly as those your Lordship has received from Sir Henry Elliot and communicated to me;

Indeed Count Zichy says in one of them that he entirely shares the views taken by Sir Henry Elliot of recent events, and thinks those held by General Ignatiew exaggerated and personal.

Count Andrassy observed that he had not himself always been able, to his regret, to agree with Sir Henry Elliot, but that he fully agreed in the present instance with Count Zichy and Sir Henry, and thought General Ignatiew's spirit of intrigue had had a mischievous influence at Constantinople.

He would tell me in strict confidence that he had not concealed his opinion from Prince Gortchakow and had proposed to him to recall Count Zichy and send a new Ambassador, if he would do the same and recall General Ignatiew; but Prince Gortchakow would not agree, and he had, therefore, not thought himself in a position to speak of this proposition to the Czar.

He was, however, still convinced that the removal of General Ignatiew would tend largely to simplify matters at Constantinople.

General Ignatiew, he said, had never forgiven him for refusing to receive him as Ambassador at Vienna, and for having asked for M. de Novikoff in preference, who was an honest, truthful Agent, with whom he was able to entertain the most intimate and satisfactory relations.

Count Andrassy then went on to repeat most of the statements he had recently made to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna on the subject of the insurrection, the attitude of Montenegro, the weakness of the Porte, and the secret pretensions of the King of Greece, all of which appear in Sir Andrew Buchanan's reports to your Lordship. He asserted his conviction that the principles laid down in his note of the 30th December, which had met with the support of the European Powers, would, with time and patience, be carried out, and would finally bring about the desired pacification, whilst any attempt at autonomy or redistribution of territory would only awaken national passions more likely to increase than to quell the excitement it was the object of the Northern Powers to extinguish in the interest of the Christians, the Turks, and humanity in general.

The occupation of Herzegovina or Bosnia by a foreign Power he looked upon as a temporary measure, but not as a solution to the question, and, as far as he was concerned, he would never consent to it.

The result of his conferences with Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortchakow, which had been communicated to us yesterday, would facilitate the carrying out by the Porte of the principles of his note of the 30th December, and he most sincerely hoped it would meet with the approval and support of Her Majesty's Government.

I said that Her Majesty's Government would always be ready to support peace and the integrity of the Turkish Empire; but that there was a passage in the memorandum the Conference had communicated to us which, in my opinion, was somewhat obscure, and required explanation.

I alluded to the last sentence, which said that if the armistice expired without

having brought about the desired result, "les trois Cours Impériales sont d'avis qu'il deviendrait nécessaire d'ajouter à leur action diplomatique la sanction d'une entente, en vue des mesures efficaces qui paraîtraient réclamées dans l'intérêt de la paix générale pour arrêter le mal et en empêcher le développement."

Count Andrassy replied that it simply meant that if the proposed measures failed other ones would become necessary.

What measures? I asked.

After a moment's hesitation, Count Andrassy replied that circumstances might so alter the situation of affairs that it was impossible to foretell what measures might be thought necessary by the Guaranteeing Powers two months hence; he therefore preferred not to enter upon conjectures and speculations for the present.

Count Andrassy then changed the subject, and spoke in the highest praise of his friend Lord Lytton, and of the pleasure with which he had heard of his appointment as Governor-General of India. After some further general conversation I took my leave, and called on Prince Gortchakow, at the Russian Embassy.

Prince Gortchakow received me with his usual demonstrations of benevolent friendliness, and then read me his last telegrams from General Ignatiew.

They recounted the same events as Sir H. Elliot's and Count Zichy's telegrams, but in very sensational language, and dwelt on the great danger to which he, General Ignatiew, was personally exposed at the hands of the enemies of Russia in Stamboul.

Prince Gortchakow said that Turkey was a powder magazine, which a spark might blow up; anything and everything might occur at Constantinople, and we must be prepared for surprises. He certainly did not wish Turkey to break up, and the present Conferences, which he had asked for, proved his sincere desire to maintain peace and the territorial *status quo*, but recent events led him to fear that the Turkish Empire was weaker and further advanced in general decay than he had himself believed possible. We stood before the unknown ("l'inconnu"), and the united action, based on a cordial and intimate understanding and agreement of the Great Powers, alone could save Turkey from crumbling to pieces. No doubt all that could be done was a mere replastering ("replâtrage"), but if it made the edifice last a few years longer our efforts would be well repaid.

For this reason he attached the greatest importance to the support of England and the other great Powers, France and Italy. He had all along insisted on an "entente à six et pas seulement à trois," and then, lowering his voice, Prince Gortchakow added: "more so than my allies, who do not see the importance of it as I do."

The Russian Chancellor then explained that the measures submitted by the Conference to the approval of Her Majesty's Government—for he was anxious for your Lordship's opinion and advice—were very mild, perhaps too mild; but it was essential at this moment not to propose anything that the Porte in her present difficulties could not at once accept, and all the Guaranteeing Powers subscribe to without hesitation. If the Porte were asked too much, and if the Great Powers could not at once cordially agree, time would be wasted in discussion. In a crisis like the present one every hour was precious to prevent bloodshed and the spread of religious fanaticism.

He took a very serious view of the impending danger, far more so than Count Andrassy, who was an optimist. He had told him so, and had showed him General Ignatiew's reports, which had evidently made an impression on the Count, and had opened his eyes to the calamities which threatened Turkey, and which he had not before sufficiently realized, from an innate tendency to believe that things settled themselves by leaving them alone.

I repeated the same question to Prince Gortchakow which I had put to Count Andrassy respecting the last sentence of the Memorandum communicated to us by the Conference, and said I did not understand what future measures were alluded to.

Prince Gortchakow also replied that they were measures to be concerted by all the Guaranteeing Powers according to the requirements of the moment. A measure, for instance, which had occurred to him as useful would be to station ships in all the ports of Turkey, and agree that in the event of the Turkish authorities demanding assistance against an outburst of fanaticism, a portion of the crew should be allowed to land to support the authority of the Turkish Governors in case of need.

The ships of all nations would become temples of refuge for the persecuted Christians in the East sailing under the Red Cross of Geneva. Time, of course, would show what was required. What he asked for was unity in thought and purpose on the part of the six Guaranteeing Powers, so as to compel the Turkish Government to do what was necessary for their own salvation.

In the further course of conversation, Prince Gortchakow said he was not a Pan-

slavist (which was a Republican idea) but a Russian, which was the embodiment of peace, progress and order. He further said that he would remain at Ems with the Czar, and would go to Wildbad while His Majesty was at Jugenheim, so as to be within call if wanted.

I took my leave, and as Prince Bismarck was not visible, I called on Herr von Bülow. He said that the German Government had great confidence in Count Andrassy's knowledge of Eastern affairs, and that they thought the practical measures proposed by him for the pacification of the Herzegovina would lead finally, though perhaps slowly, to the desired end. The co-operation of France and Italy was already promised, and that of England was anxiously and most sincerely hoped for.

His Excellency further said that a portion of the German fleet would be sent to Salonica, and a second gunboat to Constantinople, for the protection of the German residents in case of need.

On my asking him how he interpreted the last sentence of the Memorandum of the Conference, and what measures were alluded to, he replied that it simply meant that the Northern Powers would invite the other Great Powers to join in a general Conference to discuss the best means of giving renewed vitality to the Turkish Empire, and of improving the condition of the Christians in the Herzegovina.

That is all I have been able to learn from the members of the Berlin Conference.

The impression prevailing among persons who are generally well-informed is, that Prince Gortchakow had a plan of his own for dealing with the question which he could not prevail upon his colleagues to accept, Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy having met previously and determined to resist any policy suggested by General Ignatiew. Be that as it may, no one can say what Prince Gortchakow's plan may have been.

Certain it is that he must have expected the Conferences to last longer than they did, as well as the treatment of subjects which do not appear to have been discussed at all; for he had sent for M. de Novikoff, and one of his Secretaries from Vienna, for M. Wassilitz, the Herzegovinian Agent, for the Russian Consul-General from Ragusa, and for the Senator Petrovich from Montenegro, as well as for several Cabinet messengers, to await his orders in Berlin.

M. de Novikoff found nothing to do, M. Wassilitz was never consulted, the Consul-General arrived too late, and the Senator Petrovich was telegraphed to, to remain at Vienna.

Of the messengers, only one was sent to Constantinople. Prince Bismarck was never alluded to in conversation with me either by the Russian or the Austrian Chancellor, and during the Conference he was unusually reserved and serious.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 30.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 211.) *Berlin, May 14, 1876.*

My Lord,

AS was to be expected, the French and Italian Governments have at once telegraphed their readiness to support at Constantinople the new propositions of the Northern Powers, which I had the honour of communicating to your Lordship on Saturday.

The Chancellors had hoped for a similar telegraphic reply from Her Majesty's Government, but I took occasion to explain that it could not be expected before next week, because of the intervening Sunday.

Your Lordship, I said, would not be able to consult the other members of Her Majesty's Government before Monday, and the decision come to could not possibly be telegraphed to Berlin before Monday night or Tuesday morning early.

As the labours of the Berlin Conference were otherwise accomplished, and the support of France and Italy acquired, Prince Gortchakow and Count Andrassy resolved to leave Berlin to-morrow morning,—the former for Ems, the latter to Buda-Pesth, and begged that the answer of Her Majesty's Government, which they sincerely hoped would be as favourable as those of France and Italy, might be communicated to them through Prince Bismarck.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 31.

*Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received May 17, at night.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 17, 1876, 3·50 P.M.*

AT an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning I communicated to his Excellency the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the Berlin proposals, observing that I had expected it, as I thought your Lordship would consider the clause respecting foreign delegates objectionable, and the provision for future Conferences an encouragement to the insurgents to put forward new pretensions on the expiration of the armistice.

His Excellency said Count Beust had prepared him for my communication, and having read a telegram from London reporting some of your Lordship's objections to the plan, he said that the Porte had already engaged to furnish the materials and food for the refugees, of whom some hundred families had returned; that as it was impossible to disarm the Turkish population, who wore arms from their childhood, equality between the races required that the Christians should retain theirs; and he defended the action of foreign delegates as the only means of ensuring a result equally necessary for the interests of the Porte and European peace. He appeared, however, to share your Lordship's opinion that Montenegro cannot be secured against aggression, except on the condition of its strict neutrality. After these expressions he expressed a hope that Her Majesty's Government would at least recommend the Porte to grant the proposed armistice, and that if they could not support the other proposals, they would not encourage the Porte to reject them.

I said you had already once, at his Excellency's invitation, recommended at Constantinople a suspension of hostilities, and had approved confidential advice which I had given to the Turkish Ambassador with a view to the same object, after the recent military success at Nichsich. Count Beust will be instructed to ask Her Majesty's Government for the limited support above indicated.

No. 32.

*Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received May 17.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 17, 1876.*

(Most Confidential.)

DURING my conversation with Count Andrassy to-day, reported in another telegram, his Excellency spoke of a rejection by the Porte of the Berlin proposals as likely to have dangerous consequences, and he gave me to understand that he had some difficulty in keeping within the limits which he hoped could be supported by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 33.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 17, 1876, 5·25 P.M.*

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, please state what are the serious consequences you apprehend from a refusal of the Government to join in the proposals of the three Powers.

No. 34.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 17, 1876, 5·10 P.M.*

YOU may communicate decision of Her Majesty's Government to Prince Bismarck, expressing, at the same time, our sincere desire to act, as far as possible, with the German Government. I have given full explanations to Count Münster.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 35.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 18.*)

(No. 35. Political.) *Ragusa, May 10, 1876.*

My Lord,

THE President of the Montenegrin Senate, who is, I believe, cousin to Prince Nikita, arrived here yesterday, on his way to Vienna. M. Yonine, the Russian Consul-General, received yesterday morning a telegram, ordering him to start at once for the same place, and he accordingly left Ragusa in the afternoon, in company with the Montenegrin senator. These gentlemen took passage in the "Fiume" steamer, and should arrive in Vienna on the evening of the 12th instant.

M. Yonine did not send to inform me that he was going till after I had posted my despatches of yesterday; and he was very anxious that the fact of his departure should be kept a secret as long as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 36.

Telegram, communicated by Count Beust to the Earl of Derby, May 18, 1876.

NOUS regrettons beaucoup d'apprendre que le Gouvernement Anglais a de fortes objections. Si l'Angleterre ne peut pas se décider à soutenir notre action nous espérons au moins qu'elle s'abstiendra de la contrarier. Avec un armistice de deux mois on gagnerait beaucoup. Tâchez d'obtenir que le Gouvernement Britannique insiste pour que la Porte s'y prête.

No. 37.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 18.*)

Berlin, May 18, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE serious consequences I apprehend from the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to join in the proposal of the three Powers:—

The encouragement it may give Porte to a policy of resistance or inaction.

The difficulty of supporting with success a policy of resistance or inaction.

The difficulty of supporting with success a policy in Turkey in opposition to the three Powers.

The more energetic action in Turkey it may in consequence necessitate on the part of the three Powers.

The tendency it may thereby create to hasten on events it would appear desirable to postpone in the East.

The alarm it will produce in the commercial world.

No. 38.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 224.) *Foreign Office, May 18, 1876.*

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and read to me a telegram, of which the substance was as follows:—

"The Austrian Government much regretted to learn that Her Majesty's Government entertained strong objections to the plan drawn up at Berlin for the pacification of the Herzegovina. They hoped that if England could not undertake to support the action of the three Powers, she would at all events abstain from opposing it. A two months' armistice would be a considerable gain, and Count Beust was to endeavour to induce the British Government to press its acceptance on the Porte."

Count Beust, acting on this telegram, inquired whether Her Majesty's Government

were prepared to support the proposition of an armistice alone, apart from any question of the terms on which a future pacification might be brought about.

I said, in reply, that in considering the question of an armistice, it was necessary to look at its effect in a military and political point of view. Unless the armistice suggested were accompanied by proposals that seemed to hold out a reasonable expectation of the re-establishment of peace, I doubted whether the Porte was likely to accept it, for three reasons.

In the first place, I said, an armed insurrection always gained strength by the mere fact of continuing to exist. The longer it lasts, the smaller is the chance of its being ultimately put down. In the next place, the cost of maintaining a Turkish army of not less than 50,000 men on the frontier could not but press heavily on an exhausted exchequer, while the insurgents, fighting among their own mountains, incurred but little expense, and it was impossible that the troops should not become more or less disorganized by being kept inactive in the face of an enemy. Thirdly, What real guarantee could be given for the maintenance of the armistice? On the Turkish side, there was an organized Government to deal with, and the generals of the Porte would not venture to break engagements into which they had been ordered to enter; but could the same thing be said of the insurgents? Had they recognized Chiefs capable of enforcing obedience along the whole frontier? and if they had, could those Chiefs be relied on? These were considerations which the Government of the Sultan could not overlook.

Count Beust then pressed me to say that if I gave no support to the proposal, I would at least abstain from opposing it.

To this I answered that I was quite aware of the responsibility that would be incurred by any Government that should urge, or even encourage, the Porte to reject advice supported by so general an agreement of the Continental Powers. I should not press my view, nor did I say that the objections which I had suggested might not be got over; but, if asked, I could only state them for what they might be worth.

Some further conversation followed, in the course of which I told Count Beust that I had no plan to propose, but that it seemed to me idle to talk of putting an end to the war as long as the Prince and people of Montenegro were allowed to give it active support and assistance, as they were doing now, being at the same time guarded by the intervention of the Powers from all fear of retribution on the part of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 39.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 18.)

Constantinople, May 18, 1876, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

RASCHID PASHA speaks with indignation of the resolutions come to at Berlin.

He says that the Powers deliberately render nugatory the advantages which had been obtained by revictualling of fortresses, and by the disposition of the insurgents to return to their homes.

He declares that it would be absurd to expect the insurgents to accept present conditions, when it is known that at the end of a two months' armistice the Powers intend to consider what is to be done in the event of no agreement being come to.

The insurgents will perfectly understand that this can only mean either that new concessions will be demanded of the Porte or that there will a foreign intervention.

No. 40.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 18.)

Constantinople, May 18, 1876, 11·15 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

ALTHOUGH no fear is now felt here of an attack upon the Christians, a further political movement is very probable.

The students of the Koran and many leading men seem bent on obtaining a modified constitution.

It has been whispered for some days past that the Sultan's next heir and his brothers have been placed in strict confinement, and the report, whether true or false, is beginning to produce additional irritation against His Majesty.

No. 41.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 445.)

Constantinople, April 30, 1876.

My Lord,

ACCORDING to the report of Caboulí Pasha, the language of Prince Gortchakow, upon the circular communication of the Porte, asking the Powers to urge Montenegro to remain strictly neutral, was far from encouraging.

He said that Russia had already done more than could be expected from her in causing Servia and Montenegro to remain true to the neutrality which they have hitherto observed.

If the Porte really desired the pacification of the insurgent provinces, it depended upon itself to show a better disposition to make reasonable concessions to the inhabitants.

Caboulí Pasha further states that Prince Gortchakow gave him to understand that Russia would not allow the Porte to attack Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 42.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 447. Confidential.)

Constantinople, May 1, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Stuart's despatches to your Lordship respecting the presence of a Servian Agent at Athens, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have been informed in great confidence by the Greek Minister that the object of his mission was to obtain the renewal of the offensive and defensive alliance against Turkey, which was agreed to between the two Governments during the Cretan insurrection.

The King, having asked M. Coundouriotti's opinion in reference to this proposal, he recommended His Majesty to have nothing to do with it, and the Agent left Athens without having obtained anything, and without, as M. Coundouriotti believes, having had any communication with the Greek Ministers.

It is, however, to be remembered that when the Treaty was signed in 1868 it was while M. Commoundouros was, as now, at the head of the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 43.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 453.)

Constantinople, May 2, 1876.

My Lord,

IT appears from Lord Augustus Loftus' reports to your Lordship that Prince Gortchakow is much irritated with the Porte for having, as he represents, refused the armistice proposed by Austria.

The statement is, however, wholly inaccurate, for as a matter of fact, no proposal for an armistice was made to, or rejected by the Porte, which was only informed that an attempt was being made to induce the insurgents to consent to one.

Had either the Austrian or Russian Ambassador been able to engage that it would be promptly agreed to by the insurgents, so that the arrival of provisions from Scutari could be safely calculated upon, the Porte would certainly have acceded readily to that mode of revictualling the place; but as they were unable to give any assurance upon

that point, it became an absolute necessity to order Moukhtar Pasha to relieve it before it should be forced to capitulate.

I have already stated to your Lordship, and I must again repeat, that the persistence shown by General Ignatiew in representing that the Prince of Montenegro could not be responsible for anything that occurred to a convoy of provisions coming from Scutari after it had once left his territories was a principal cause of the abandonment of the plan for revictualling Nichsich from that direction, and of the order for the advance of Moukhtar Pasha from Gatchko.

I have, &c
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 44.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 455.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 2, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a telegram published this evening by the Porte, from Moukhtar Pasha, giving the details of his last operations.

Nothing can be more explicit than his statement respecting the revictualling of Nichsich, into which, he says, the convoys of provisions were victoriously introduced on Friday last, the 28th April.

If any reliance is to be placed upon his calculation that the reinforcements received by the insurgents brought their force to above 16,000 men, it is not possible to account for the fact otherwise than by the supposition that a very large proportion of them must have come from Montenegro.

No estimate that I have ever heard given of the numbers of the insurgents, independently of the foreign sympathizers, has placed them at much more than a quarter of the force by which Moukhtar Pasha represents himself to have been opposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Supplement to "La Turquie" of May 2, 1876.

Dépêche adressée à la Sublime Porte par son Excellence Ahmed Moukhtar Pasha, en date du 19 Avril (v.s.), ou 1 Mai (n.s.)

JE suis parti de Gatchko Jeudi dernier, avec les troupes Impériales à destination de Niksitch. Jusqu'à Izlastop, où nous avons passé la nuit, nous n'avons pas rencontré d'insurgés.

Le lendemain, Vendredi, nous nous sommes mis en marche pour Niksitch. Les insurgés avaient barré le chemin entre Gornopol et Preshika par des amas de pierres; la plupart d'entr'eux se trouvaient en embuscade dans des plis de terrain. D'après nos renseignements, ils avaient élevé du côté de Sepaelma des retranchements pour servir de refuge et de points d'appui; et une grande partie des insurgés se trouvait dans ces retranchements.

Nous avons envoyé inopinément, avant l'arrivée des insurgés, une partie d'une brigade au point où se croisent les routes de Preshika et de Petnoberto. Cet endroit qui est la clef de la position, est propre à faciliter les opérations derrière les embuscades et l'occupation des points faibles de ces retranchements. Dans l'espace d'une heure nos troupes ont occupé une hauteur, et de là elles ont tourné les insurgés placés en embuscade ainsi que leurs retranchements.

Une autre division ayant opéré sa marche par la prairie de Col-Aghassi, les troupes Impériales ainsi ont dirigé leurs attaques sur deux colonnes.

Les ennemis, sortis de leurs embuscades, se sont empressés de se réfugier dans leurs retranchements; mais comme ils étaient exposés à notre feu, ils ont immédiatement occupé une nouvelle position. A la fin, ne pouvant tenir nulle part et après

un combat de quatre heures, ils sont dispersés, laissant sur le terrain beaucoup des leurs.

Le même jour, à 8 heures, les convois de vivres ont été conduits victorieusement à Niksitch.

Samedi, à notre retour de bon matin à Preshika, les insurgés ayant reçu des renforts pendant la nuit, nous ont attaqués.

Le combat a duré jusqu'au soir.

Les insurgés n'ayant pu résister aux attaques des troupes Impériales, ont pris la fuite, en laissant sur le terrain un grand nombre de morts.

L'armée Impériale a campé la nuit à Preshika.

Nous avons été informés que les insurgés, qui avaient reçu de nouveaux renforts, s'étaient fortifiés avec toutes leurs forces dans les forêts sises entre Nozra et Preshika, du côté de Piva, pour tenir tête aux attaques de nos troupes. Ils avaient l'intention de couper nos lignes de retraite. En conséquence, Dimanche, de bon matin, à quelque distance de Preshika, nous avons attaqué la première embuscade. Dans notre marche, de ce dernier point jusqu'à Nozra, nous avons engagé des combats sanglants et plus sérieux que tous les engagements qui avaient eu lieu jusqu'à ce moment. Ces combats ont duré pendant huit heures sans interruption.

Grâce à Dieu, nous avons eu une victoire glorieuse, les insurgés ont été mis en déroute avec des pertes sans précédents pendant l'insurrection.

Nous avons passé la nuit à Izlastop avec les troupes Impériales.

De Nozra à Gatchko, où nous sommes arrivés aujourd'hui, à 9 heures, nous n'avons rencontré aucun insurgé sur notre route.

Dans chacun des combats et surtout dans le dernier, les troupes Impériales ont remporté de grands succès. La victoire a été complète et Niksitsch a été ravitaillé.

Le premier jour, les insurgés étaient au nombre de 8,500; le second jour, leur nombre s'était élevé à 13,500 par suite des renforts qui leur étaient parvenus. Hier, le troisième jour, le chiffre des insurgés était de plus de 16,000 hommes.

Ainsi les forces totales des insurgés s'élevaient à ce nombre. Mais ignorant le jour de départ de Gatchko des troupes Impériales, ils ne se sont concentrés qu'à des intervalles divers.

Il est évident que, même si leur nombre eut dépassé 20,000 hommes, grâce aux manœuvres opérées par les troupes Impériales, ils auraient été mis en déroute complète.

Quant à leurs pertes, dans le premier et le second engagement, comme ils avaient pris précipitamment la fuite, leur morts et blessés ont atteint le chiffre de 300 à 400.

Mais, dans le troisième engagement, dont le résultat a été définitif, les insurgés ont perdu mille hommes en morts et blessés. Comme la forêt était très-épaisse, nous n'avons pas pu distinguer à quel chiffre s'élevait le nombre des Monténégrins qui se trouvaient parmi les insurgés.

Si les deux bataillons envoyés dans la forêt avaient continué la poursuite, les insurgés auraient indubitablement subi des pertes immenses. Mais ainsi que je l'ai dit, la forêt étant très épaisse, j'ai renoncé à la poursuite des insurgés, parce qu'il était possible que les troupes Impériales qui étaient entrées dans la forêt et celles qui se trouvaient dans différents points n'eussent pu se reconnaître, ce qui aurait occasionné des accidents.

Nous avons pris une grande quantité d'armes appartenant aux insurgés.

Dans tous ces combats, les pertes des troupes Impériales consistent en 58 morts, dont 4 officiers et 54 soldats, et 161 blessés, dont 7 officiers et 154 soldats.

Je vais soumettre incessamment à votre Altesse les noms des officiers qui ont les premiers attaqué les insurgés dans leurs retranchements, et qui méritent des distinctions pour leur vaillante conduite.

No. 45.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 477.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 10, 1876.*

ON the receipt of Mr. Acting-Consul Freeman's despatches of the 21st and 28th ultimo, reporting fresh insurrectionary movements in Bosnia, I communicated their substance to Rasehid Pasha, who on each occasion stated that the Porte had no knowledge of anything of the kind and read me the reports from the Governor-General stating that everything was quiet.

The inclosed official notification of an engagement between the troops in Bosnia and the insurgents has, however, now been published, and proves the accuracy of Mr. Freeman's information, as well as the lamentable state of ignorance in which the Porte is kept by its subordinates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Télégramme adressé à la Sublime Porte par le Gouverneur-Général de Bosnie, en date du 25 Avril (v.s.)

LE Gouverneur de Bekhé vient de m'informer que le Général de Division Veli Pacha, en route pour Bekhé, a rencontré dans le défilé de Tchorolovitza, dans le cazn de Nevessil, une bande composée à peu près de 1,500 insurgés, qui, dès deux côtés du défilé, rendu encore plus inaccessible par les retranchements qu'ils avaient élevés, guettaient le passage des troupes Impériales. Un combat qui a duré quatre heures s'engagea avec les insurgés. Ces derniers ont subi une défaite complète. Les troupes se sont emparées des positions occupées par les insurgés.

Dans cet engagement les rebelles ont perdu plus de soixante morts et un grand nombre d'armes et de munitions sont tombées entre les mains de nos troupes. Veli Pacha, qui se trouve actuellement à Petrofiza, partira aujourd'hui pour Bekhé.

No. 46.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 488.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 12, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, the copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Dupuis respecting the recent outbreak in Bulgaria, and also the copy of a report addressed to him from Eski Zagra by his Dragoman.

As soon as a Government is formed here, to which I can present representations, I shall not fail to communicate to it Mr. Kyriatzi's report, and to point out the danger of allowing the local authorities to act as those of Eski Zagra have apparently been doing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Adrianople, May 9, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that telegrams received yesterday at the Konak announce a more reassuring state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Tatar-Pazadjik, and that the insurgents having been all driven away from the plains and taken refuge to the mountains, the Commander-in-chief asks for re-inforcements to follow up the insurgents.

I am not in a position to be able to judge, but, from what I learn, it seems that, rightly or wrongly, the authorities here blame Aziz Pasha, the Mutessarif of Philippopoli, for the sudden outbreak at Ottonkeni, by attributing to him incapacity as a functionary, and Slav sympathies in not calling attention in time to the state of things in that part of the country; on the other hand, I also learn that the Mutessarif came to Adrianople some twenty days ago and gave timely warning of a projected organised rising of the Bulgarians, and urged the necessity of despatching troops without delay.

The state of affairs was at once brought to the knowledge of the authorities at Constantinople by Akif Pasha, the Governor-General, but that Dervish Pasha, the late Minister of War, either not crediting the report, or attaching little importance to it, neglected forwarding the reinforcements asked for, until the matter was laid before

Izzidin Effendi, the Sultan's son; of course I do not vouch for the truth of this latter statement, and I only repeat it to your Excellency as I heard it.

It is surmised that the rising was planned to take place on the 5th of this month (the festival of the Greek St. George), but that matters were precipitated, some say by the conduct of a Government *employé*, who abused the daughter of a Christian Tchubadji, others that some Bulgarians, on being called upon by the collectors, refused to pay the sheep tax.

I have no further intelligence respecting the state of affairs in Philippopoli beyond what I reported to your Excellency in my despatch of the 7th instant. I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the panic has somewhat ceased, and that the presence of the military has reassured the people.

In this city the anxiety and uneasiness of the popular mind, strained during the last few days by all kinds of rumours of pillage, massacre, and firing the town by Turks or insurgents, finds some relief in the announcements telegraphed from the scene of the outbreak, still as nobody can tell what may be the next move, valuables are being packed and stored in places of safety, and families preparing to quit the place; among the latter I may mention the family of my Russian colleague.

As a measure of precaution against a possible disturbance of the public peace strong military pickets are stationed at the various quarters of the city, and the patrols doubled during the night.

Considerable anxiety is also being displayed in the manufacture of bullets and cartridges, and in the making of biscuits for the troops.

In conclusion, I may inform your Excellency that the last Overland mail for England, viâ Belgrade, came back from Sofia last night, as it was found impracticable to proceed further, owing to the military occupation of the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DUPUIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

M. Kyriatzi to Vice-Consul Dupuis.

(Traduction.)
M. le Consul, *Eski Zagarra, le* $\frac{29 \text{ Avril}}{11 \text{ Mai}}$, 1876.

PAR ma présente je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance l'actuel état politique de ces localités.

Le Gouverneur-Général du vilayet a télégraphié au Caimacam de Zagara à plusieurs reprises afin d'armer tous les Musulmans et de les faire parcourir la ville pendant toute la nuit, pour prévenir toute attaque à craindre de la part des Bulgares. Sur vingt Bachi-bozouks (bandes irrégulières) on a mis deux Bulgares. Quant aux villages d'alentour on a expédiés deux ex-gardiens de bois (couroudjis), brigands fameux et hommes de la plus mauvaise conduite, nommés Ciradjos Ismail et Ibiche Moulazim, pour parcourir les villages. Ces fameux brigands, par leur conduite honteuse, et par leurs abus, ne feront autre chose que d'aggraver la situation actuelle, et de provoquer des affaires qui, pour le moment, grâce à Dieu, n'existent pas, parce que les villages sont en tranquillité, et les villageois ne pensent à d'autres choses qu'à la culture de leurs champs.

Je crois remplir un devoir en vous traçant ces lignes, et en attirant votre attention sur les mesures imprudentes prises par le Gouvernement pour armer tous les Musulmans, qui dans ces endroits étant d'une férocité connue, feront des abus de mille espèces, et peut-être ils troubleront la tranquillité actuelle du pays. Veuillez donc, M. le Consul, d'en faire part à qui de droit et d'agir pour le désarmement des Bachi-bozouks et l'expédition immédiate de troupes régulières afin de prévenir les dangers qui menacent le pays.

(Signé) A. D. X. KYRIATZI.

No. 47.

Vice-Consul Biliotti to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 4. Political.)
My Lord, *Trebizond, May 4, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to report that within the last eight days eight battalions of Redifs have been embarked on this coast for Constantinople, two at Kijeh, three at

Trebizond, one at Tripoli, and two at Kerasond. One of the battalions in the latter port, and the three in this, were shipped on board the Imperial yacht "Sultanieh," and the others on board the postal Turkish steamers, and one of the Azijieh Company sent on purpose from Constantinople. Two of these battalions belong to the Province of Sivas, and six to that of Trebizond.

To recruit the latter the authorities of this vilayet have been exerting themselves for nearly two months, so unpopular was the present levy.

Many of the peasants fled from their homes to evade conscription; a good number of those who were brought here were followed by their mothers or wives (an occurrence without precedent here), who, by their cries and lamentations, protested against their sons or husbands being enrolled; and several of the recruits deserted after their arrival in this town.

All those who could afford to do so paid for substitutes; they number 350, and as they belong, nearly all, to the Sandjak (district) of Trebizond, from which two battalions were recruited, they stand in the proportion of about 25 per cent. on these two battalions.

The Redifs were given to understand, it would seem, that they were enrolled for service in this province only; therefore, when it was known quite lately that a steamer had been dispatched from Constantinople to embark them, fresh desertions, stated by some to number 200, or nearly 10 per cent., took place. However, the Pasha assures me that most of the latter had returned by themselves at the last moment, they having run up to say a last farewell to their families; but I rather think that most of those who returned were captured by the force sent after them.

I was present at the embarkation of the Redifs, and must say that they did not appear much cast down, although the countenance of the Mussulman population, hundreds of which accompanied them to the sea shore, was very mournful. A disturbance was even apprehended, and the Pasha had taken measures to meet an emergency of this description; but as, with the exception of 50 or 60 policemen, and about 100 gunners, there is no other force at his command, it is doubtful whether he could have succeeded to overcome an outbreak, if it had occurred.

The country seems to be drained of men, as it is of money. However, the Pasha informs me that more than ten battalions can be recruited, besides 4,000 or 5,000 men of the maritime contingent, who have not yet been called to serve.

I know from the Pasha that, on a fresh levy taking place, even those who paid for substitutes would be compelled to serve personally; as they belong to the rich and influential families, their enrolment may be attended with greater difficulties, and, perhaps, more serious demonstrations than those encountered on the part of the lower classes.

Should a crisis occur in this quarter, the forementioned are all the forces on which the Turks can reckon in the vilayet of Trebizond, and they are no match for regular troops.

On the Russian side there are no great signs of mobilization, but I know from a source in which I have all confidence, and the Pasha knows as much, that the Russian forces in the Caucasus are so organized at this moment that they can be across the frontier at a few days' notice. The number of these forces is differently stated to amount from 80,000 to 120,000 men.

It is obvious, therefore, so far, at all events, as this vilayet is concerned, that no opposition can be offered to the Russians whenever they choose to take possession of Batoum and, perhaps, of Trebizond and the corresponding frontier line, with a view, also, to isolate Persia by their commanding the two only routes leading to it through the Black Sea.

The Pasha is confident that, should the Russians advance in Anatolia, the populations will rise as a man to fight against them and keep them in check until the fifth corps d'armée, now at Aleppo, and which, in an emergency of this description, is to proceed here, comes to the rescue. But a general rise to arms is quite hypothetical, and the resistance which the populations can offer is alike problematical.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALFRED BILIOTTI.

No. 48.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 19.*)

(No. 2. Political.)

Rustchuk, May 13, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith inclosed copy of a despatch I addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte on the 9th instant.

Since its dispatch nothing has occurred here to disturb the tranquillity of the vilayet.

I shall not fail to immediately report to your Lordship and Her Majesty's Ambassador whatever may come to my knowledge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. READE.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Consul Reade to Sir H. Elliot.

Rustchuk, May 9, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE recently heard various rumours here respecting one part or another of this Province, but they were so conflicting that I thought I might be able to give some correct and useful information at the fair which opens annually on St. George's day (the 5th May) at Eski Djuma, a town about seven hours distant from this, and about four west by south from Shumla.

I accordingly proceeded there on Wednesday last, and returned on Saturday.

During my two days' stay there I managed to converse with people from almost every direction of the vilayet, but in every case, whilst discontent was certainly expressed, I perceived a decided determination to avoid anything like a rising against the Government.

I found much discontent at the fair from another cause; and that was the general refusal of the merchants to grant the usual credit to the villagers and small shopkeepers, and which was attributed to the uncertainty in the minds of the merchants from the present political and financial state of the Empire. The consequence is that the present fair is a decided failure compared with those of preceding years. For instance, the average number of pieces of cotton manufacture brought to the fair for sale has hitherto been about 180,000; this year only 15,000 have been conveyed there; and hitherto almost every magazine of the fair has been occupied; this year about one-third are closed.

On my return from Eski Djumin I had an interview with the Governor-General, in order to ascertain what he had to say on the state of the vilayet.

His Excellency said that for the moment he had nothing to fear except in that portion bordering on the north-western part of the Sandjak of Philippopoli, which might be affected by what had occurred in the latter, and which he had heard was as follows:—

It appears that some Servian secret emissaries had been found in the village, or rather town, of Avratalan, and orders were sent for their arrest, which, on being put into execution, were resisted by the inhabitants, supported by those of the adjacent large village, Otluk-Keui.

A collision ensued, resulting, as the Pasha has heard, in the death of three gendarmes and the wounding of one of the mudirs.

Up to this the Pasha has only heard the foregoing, but as it is to be feared that two other neighbouring large places called Akdje-Kissé and Kurlova may join the other two, he has ordered the Governor of Sofia to send to the spot what force he can spare to assist others that are said to have been dispatched also there from the other side. The four places named contain altogether about 8,000 houses.

His Excellency said that notwithstanding all the vigilance of the authorities under his superintendence secret emissaries have possibly managed to enter the vilayet, and, therefore, if the affair of Avratalan is not speedily arrested, disturbances may break out in other quarters and within his jurisdiction.

Until, however, he receives further intelligence he cannot say any more on the subject than that he is taking every precaution at every suspected point.

His Excellency also informed me that a few days ago a small Servian steamer

had been seen towing down the Danube, near Widdin, a barge, said to contain several thousand rifles. On this report reaching him, he ordered the gunboats, between this and Widdin, to closely watch these vessels, which, perceiving that they were discovered, disappeared in the direction of Servia.

Since writing the foregoing I have perused a letter from Lom Palouku, between this and Widdin, stating that a quantity of arms and ammunition had arrived there for distribution amongst the Mussulmans, and I have just ascertained that yesterday a considerable number of cases containing similar arms arrived here from Constantinople, and were immediately sent on to Tirnova to be deposited there for distribution in case of need.

The inhabitants of Gabrova at the foot of and on this side the Balkans have petitioned the Governor-General for some troops to be quartered there, and his Excellency has just ordered a battalion to the spot.

All this would tend to show that something serious is apprehended, but as there are now all round and within easy distance of the disturbed quarter about eighteen or twenty battalions of troops, those here capable of judging thereon do not think that there is really anything to fear for the present.

Troops are on their way from Nish to Sofia, and others, as I said before, are going to the spot from the other side.

I have also just heard of an event said to have occurred near Avratalan which, if true, may bring on serious complications. It is said that a Circassian village in that vicinity has been burnt; if so, the Circassians, generally a lawless set, are sure to take their revenge, and this may severely tax the Government to put down when once commenced.

This report is based on what I have heard in generally reliable quarters. On this side the Balkans I am persuaded that there will be nothing to apprehend if the disturbances I have mentioned are speedily put down; but if the flame is allowed to spread, it will then be difficult to say when it will be arrested.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

No. 49.

Consul Zohrab to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 8.)
My Lord, *Erzeroom, April 28, 1876.*

I HAVE just been informed that orders have been received here to call 20,000 Redifs (reserves) under arms for immediate service. These orders are kept secret.

Nafiz Pasha, President of the Court of Justice here, who seems to be much superior to the general run of employés, and who evidently appreciates the critical condition of the country, told me a few days since, in talking of the condition of the district of Moosh, of which he was lately Governor, that the Government had no power at all over the Mussulmans there, and, as an example, he cited the conduct of the men enrolled as Redifs. He said they would not submit to military control; and that, though the number of registered Redifs for the district was 10,000, at no time could more than 600 men be collected for the annual exercises; and these men were obtained from the towns where a shadow of authority still existed, but from the villages not a man could be induced to join. He also assured me that if the Redifs were called out for duty from that district not 150 men would respond, and if any attempt at compulsion were made, the whole district would be up in arms.

The order has come, and it remains to be seen if Nafiz Pasha's prediction will be realized. Other sources of information lead me to apprehend that Nafiz Pasha is correct in his estimate; and I fear that, if serious efforts are made to carry out the order just received, not Moosh alone, but the whole of Koordistan will resist, and rise in arms against the Sultan.

The endeavours of the Porte to prevent the real condition of affairs in Bosnia becoming known have failed. The details of victories daily gained by the troops are not credited, and the Mussulmans are disposed to regard the position of affairs as being, if it is possible to do so, more critical than they are.

The upper classes are well acquainted with the way in which events are shaping their course in Roumelia, and they know that while the Government is bankrupt, the Sultan is going on adding to his wealth; this, indeed, is a common topic of conversation.

The peasant classes, failing to get any intelligence whatever of the relatives and

friends who have been sent to fight (for no letters from Bosnia written by soldiers are permitted to reach their destination), are anxious and irritated, and they certainly do not manifest a disposition to uphold a Government which has beggared them, and is now taking their sons and brothers to what they regard certain death.

From officials, from officers, and from many respectable Turks, I have of late heard expressions which tend to show that the Sultan has no longer any hold on the affections or allegiance of a great number of his subjects, and I am led to believe that his death would be regarded by the majority of the Mussulmans as a happy event for the nation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. ZOHRAB.

No. 50.

Mr. Vivian to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 47. Political. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, May 6, 1876.*

THE accompanying details respecting the Russian force upon the Bessarabian frontier have been furnished to me by a Pole, formerly an officer in the Turkish contingent during the Crimean war, who is under some obligation to me for assistance I have rendered to him here.

The information was carefully collected during a recent tour along the frontier, which his employment here allowed him to make without attracting suspicion, and he assures me that it is accurate. He has promised me further details respecting the exact positions of the various regiments, the names of their commanding officers, &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. VIVIAN.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Report upon the Russian Forces on the Bessarabian Frontier.

"L'ANNEE passée eut lieu en Bessarabie la revue de l'armée Russe. Après la revue 20,000 chevaux de la Cavalerie Légère restèrent et on les casern par compagnie dans les villages sur le bord du Dniestr. Ce n'est que dans une seule colonie, Antchikrak, sise entre Belgrade et Akerman, qu'est stationné un régiment entier de Cavalerie avec son état-major.

"Le 10 Février de l'année courante est entré en Bessarabie une brigade du Général Lubolf, composée d'un régiment d'Infanterie nommé 'Régiment d'Odessa,' de deux batteries d'Infanterie à Cheval, et de 3,000 Cosaques d'Amour (qui savent très-peu le Russe).

"Les forces de l'armée Russe sont donc en ce moment :—

	Hommes.
La garnison habituelle, c'est-à-dire, une division de l'infanterie placée à Hotelu, Beliz, Benderi et Kischeneff	12,000
Trois régiments de Cosaques d'Oural	3,000
La cavalerie de l'année passée	20,000
La brigade du Général Lubolf	6,000
Artillerie, Service Sanitaire, Train, et Gardes Frontières	6,000
Total	47,000

"Le 10 Mars est arrivé à Kischeneff Général d'Artillerie Lebedeef, un tout jeune homme, qui a fait les manœuvres dans les environs de Kischeneff, commandant cinq régiments de la Cavalerie, un régiment d'Infanterie, et quatre batteries d'Artillerie.

"L'Artillerie tirait à la cible par élévation, et la Cavalerie et l'Infanterie devaient passer sous la courbe décrite par les projectiles.

"Le premier jour des manœuvres le Général Lebedeef a découvert est resté près de la cible en montrant avec le drapeau la justesse du tir. Son exemple a été suivi par les autres officiers. A ces manœuvres a assisté un certain Hadyi Vasili Bulgari, de Belgrade.

"Tous les officiers de Bessarabie reçurent l'ordre d'étudier sérieusement la topographie de la Turquie d'Europe.

"Le Gouvernement Russe a fait un contrat avec un Bulgare pour la fourniture de 30,000 têtes de bœufs, et avec un autre pour la construction des casernes sur la frontière Roumaine pour loger dans chaque caserne 200 hommes à cheval.

"Les wagons pour le transport de l'armée sont fait à vis, de sorte qu'ils peuvent être adapté à toutes les lignes de chemins de fer en Europe.

"J'ai envoyé un homme sûr, qui dans tout au plus dix jours d'ici me fournira les noms du Commandant-en-chef, des officiers supérieurs, et de leur cantonnements."

No. 51.

Mr. Vivian to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 49. Political.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, May* 8, 1876.

MR. DIMOS, the British Vice-Consul at Crajova, has just sent me a report, of which the inclosed is an extract, based upon information he received from some Servian officers during a recent tour on the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. VIVIAN.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Extract from Vice-Consul Dimo's Report upon the Servian Armaments.

L'ARMEE Serbe se trouve comme à la veille d'entrer en campagne, tellement les ordres succèdent jour par jour du Gouvernement; tantôt pour avoir chaque homme armé dans vingt-quatre heures, et pourvu d'une quantité nécessaire de charpie, toile cirée, d'un fichu pour pansement; tantôt pour préparer des approvisionnements de bouche pour quatre jours. Ensuite viennent d'autres ordres pour tenir prêt une somme d'argent destinée pour l'achat de provisions, et qui doit être versée à la Caisse Publique sur une requisition du Gouvernement.

L'armée est divisée en deux corps principaux et quelques détachements dispersées, formant en tout une force d'environ 60,000 hommes (sans compter une forte réserve), bien armés et approvisionnés, placés non loin de la frontière, dans la direction d'Alexinatz et Nisch; le Prince (qui promet de se mettre à la tête de son armée) a déjà choisi, non loin des campements de l'armée, l'endroit où il établira son quartier général.

Outre la force ci-dessus il s'est formé en Serbie un corps de Bulgares volontaires, de plus de 6,000 hommes. Les armes sont fournies par la Serbie, et il est organisé de manière à opérer en Bulgarie, dès que les hostilités commenceront entre la Turquie et la Serbie, dans le double sens tant pour faire une diversion à l'armée Turque que pour forcer la Bulgarie, par des moyens coërcitifs, de se soulever.

J'ai posé la question, quels sont les motifs pour lesquels la Serbie cherche la guerre à la Turquie? La Serbie, me dirent-ils, n'aurait pas bougé si la question du chemin-de-fer, qu'elle était en train de régler avec la Turquie, n'eut été éludée à la suite des intrigues Autrichiennes, car l'Autriche a conçu l'idée que dès que la Serbie réussissait dans un délai plus ou moins rapproché à se créer par des arrangements avec la Turquie des voies de communication dans l'Adriatique par Scutari, ou dans la Méditerranée par Thessalonie, et pouvoir se mettre en contact direct avec le commerce de l'Angleterre et de la France, en un mot, avec le commerce de l'Occident, l'Autriche perdrait un des bras les plus forts de son débouché industriel; elle ne s'attendait pas à ce que son œuvre en Herzégovine prouve la tournure telle qu'aujourd'hui; elle a sur que par là elle redoublerait des avantages qu'elle s'imaginait réaliser; mais ses œuvres en Herzégovine et Bosnie ont retenti ailleurs et ont fait contrecarrer les buts et vues Autrichiennes.

L'esprit de la formation de l'ancien Royaume Serbe (de l'an 1020, 1187, et 1229) se reveille; une rivalité clandestine se germe entre le Monténégro et la Serbie. Voilà en peu des mots la source d'où vient le mal; qui sait comment et de quelle manière il finira.

Si les Puissances Occidentalles qui n'ont aucun but de conquête dans ces contrées prenaient la direction d'un arrangement du mouvement des populations aujourd'hui en

jeu, le tout rentrerait dans une voie paisible; autrement ce qui sera aujourd'hui, la force du temps le reveillera, la repoussera, le germe étant jeté.

Crajova, le 6 *Mai*, 1876.

No. 52.

Consul-General Stanley to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 4. Political. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Odessa, May* 4, 1876.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatches, Political, Nos. 1 and 2, and my despatch to your Lordship No. 2 of 5th March, Political, I have the honour to state that I have ascertained there are in the whole of Bessarabia only two divisions of infantry, each consisting of four regiments of the peace strength of 1,000 men each; one regiment of cavalry of 1,000 men; and the usual artillery in the fortress of Bender.

This information agrees with what I believed to be the case.

My last informant was a Russian staff officer, and I feel sure, from the manner the subject was introduced and discussed, that he was speaking without reserve.

I see no unusual preparations here, nor any military movement, except the usual training of recruits at this season.

An uneasy feeling, however, certainly has taken hold of the commerce of this town.

The population sympathise intensely with the Herzegovinian insurgents, and fully believe that Russia must assist them, and that such assistance would bring on complications with Austria.

I do not think it my duty to report to your Lordship the numerous and positive warlike rumours constantly repeated here, especially as, on inquiry, I invariably find them to be without foundation.

I may perhaps mention, however, as being more reliable than the general town gossip, that a near relative of the Prince of Servia, resident here, and who is in constant correspondence with the Prince and Princess, states that His Highness complains bitterly of Russia's pressure in preventing him from openly assisting the insurgents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. E. STANLEY.

P.S.—I would add that the explanation given, and I believe a true one, for the presence since October of cavalry in Bessarabia, where they had not been quartered for many years, is that in the district where they were previously quartered there was no forage, whereas in Bessarabia it was abundant.

No. 53.

Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 97.)
My Lord, *Athens, May* 11, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith articles which have appeared in the two last numbers of the "Messager d'Athènes" upon the Eastern question, showing the uneasiness which prevails here on account of the continuance of the insurrection in Herzegovina.

There seems to be a vague fear that events may be impending, in which Greece is not yet prepared to take the part to which she aspires; and it is, therefore, felt that the maintenance of the *status quo* for some time longer would be advantageous to her interests, provided that the Greek populations of Turkey are admitted to participate in any concession which may be extorted from the Porte in favour of the Herzegovinian insurgents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. STUART.

No. 54.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 270.)
Vienna, May 9, 1876.

My Lord,

AS there was no probability of my being able to see Count Andrassy before he leaves to-day for Berlin, I addressed last night to his Excellency the letter of which the inclosure is a copy, communicating to him a Memorandum containing the substance of Sir Henry Elliot's telegram of the 7th instant, respecting the danger to which the Christians in Turkey would be exposed by any decisions which may be taken at Berlin of a nature to increase the irritation at present existing among the Mussulman population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Sir A. Buchanan to Count Andrassy.

Vienna, May 8, 1876.

Dear Count Andrassy,

LORD DERBY having sent me a telegram from Sir H. Elliot dated yesterday, expressing his opinion as to the danger to which the Christians in Turkey would be exposed by any measures of a nature to increase the irritation at present existing among the Mussulman population, I inclose it herewith, as I think it expedient that you should be acquainted with Sir Henry's opinions, though Count Zichy may have expressed similar apprehensions as to the present critical position of affairs.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 55.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 292: Confidential.)
Vienna, May 15, 1876.

My Lord,

COUNT ANDRASSY having been very unwell for some days before he left Vienna for Berlin, I could not expect him to receive me if I called upon him. I, therefore, drew up a short Memorandum of the statements contained in Mr. Monson's and Major Gonne's reports after their visit to Mostar, and I forwarded it to his Excellency in a private letter, as it appeared to me expedient that, before his visit to Berlin, he should be made acquainted with the opinions of more impartial observers respecting the state of affairs in the Herzegovina than Austrian and Russian agents have hitherto proved to be.

I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information a copy of my letter to his Excellency and its inclosure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

Sir A. Buchanan to Count Andrassy.

(Private.)
Vienna, May 7, 1876.

Dear Count Andrassy,

I DID not ask to see you yesterday as I was sorry to hear that you were unwell, and as I am not likely to do so before you leave to-morrow for Berlin, I inclose for your confidential information a memorandum which I have drawn up from letters which I have received from Mr. Monson and from Major Gonne, who lately made an excursion to Mostar at the invitation of Ali Pasha.

The inclosure may interest you as coming from impartial observers, who merely

report what they saw and heard, without any party feeling on the questions at issue with Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

Memorandum from Reports of Mr. Monson and Major Gonne, dated April 30, after having visited Mostar.

MOUKHTAR PASHA having summoned every available man to join him in the second expedition for the relief of Nichsich, Wassa Effendi complained that this concentration of troops was a serious hindrance in arranging for the return of the refugees, as a small military force is indispensable for their protection. Both he and Ali Pasha consider that at least two-thirds of the Province are in their normal state of cultivation, and that it is dread of the vengeance of the insurgents which prevents a general repatriation of the emigrants.

Wassa Effendi said that he believed he had done some good at Mostar, in causing justice to be more equitably administered, and in reforming the gaol system. He makes a weekly inspection of the prisons in person.

"Major Gonne states that the Turkish army has made a very favourable impression on him, and he considers the Turkish soldiers in the Herzegovina to be physically the finest in Europe, while they possess qualities which others cannot claim.

"The Turkish soldier requires no tent, can live on rice and grease, will undergo any hardship, and has no fear of death, provided he is sure of his relatives receiving his hard-earned pay, and full pay was therefore sent up to date to Moukhtar Pasha for seventeen battalions, in order to ensure good will in the operations now going on. With good officers and artillery he believes the Turks would render a good account of the best Continental army. Nor would this result, he says, falsify tradition, for against what other infantry was it ever found necessary to raise *chevaux-de-frise* in the open field?"

"Ali Pasha states that the existing battalions are to be made up at once to 600 strong, but that more men are required in order to scour the country with flying columns." In estimating from the number of battalions the exact numerical strength available to put down the insurgents, it is necessary to know how many Redif battalions are included, as they are little short of 1,000 strong. The one in Nichsich, for instance, is still 900 strong.

There seems good ground, he says, for believing that the agrarian question is at the root of Herzegovinian and Bosnian discontent, and that religious liberty is a mere excuse. With reference to the return of the refugees Ali Pasha stated that the autumn seed has been sown in a great part of the Herzegovina, which accounts for a number of the fugitives wishing to return. They require two things, however, 1st, protection from the violence of their own countrymen, and, 2nd, money or food in kind to start with.

The Turkish Government perfectly understand that if the insurrection on the Montenegrin frontier could be suppressed it would not reappear elsewhere, and it is on this account that all the troops have been collected for the relief of Nichsich. If the Turks had been able to take the road to Nichsich which passes through Montenegro, the operation would have been less difficult, and by an advance from Seutari and Spuz they could have taken the manufactory of arms at Rieka, and have prevented the insurgents being supplied with ammunition; and it would have been much better for them to have had in Montenegro an open instead of a disguised enemy.

There are grounds for believing that the Montenegrins with the insurgent army allowed the convoy of provisions to reach Nichsich, as if the fort capitulated at present the Herzegovinians would be its masters, which is not the Russo-Montenegrin intention. However this may be, there is no doubt, though it may have been at a considerable loss of men, that the Turks have gained their object, and 200 casualties in the insurgent bands is comparatively as great a loss as 3,000 in the Turkish army.

It is stated by a person who left the insurgent camp on Sunday, the 30th April, for the frontier of Montenegro, that he met 600 Montenegrins under their captains marching to the scene of action. This person also reported that the insurgent camp was well supplied with fresh meat, ham, and bread, a loaf of the latter costing 40 soldi, about 10*d*.

There were four Russians and two Italians present.

The ammunition on the insurgent side ran short, but on Friday the Krivoscians brought up a supply.

On the Turkish side the best troops were Albanian Redif, who greatly distinguished themselves, and will be heard of again if the war continues.

There is reason to believe that a battery of mountain guns will shortly find its way through Montenegro to the insurgents, to be worked by foreigners now at Cetigné. These light guns are of little use against the insurgents, but it by no means follows that they will not be useful against the Turkish battalions, and by their means isolated forts and blockhouses may change hands.

No. 56.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 286.) *Vienna, May 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, to your Lordship, the inclosed despatch, which has been addressed to me by the Naval and Military Attachés to this Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 56.

Captain Howard, R.N., to Sir A. Buchanan.

British Embassy, Vienna, May 15, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the Austrian Navy List of 15th February, 1876. This book has replaced the "Jahrbuch des kaiserlichen Marine," last published in 1874, and does not contain so much detail of ships as formerly.

2. I find little or no change in the dockyard at Pola beyond a moderate progress with the second dry-dock at Olive Island, the outer concrete foundations of which are level with the water, and a large quantity of stone is prepared; but it will still take two or three years to complete.

The vote for the dock was reduced this year from 500,000 fl. to 250,000 fl., and that for the bridge to connect Olive Island and the Main was erased altogether from the Estimates.

Some coal stores have been built and the quays improved, but only small vessels can come alongside. Over 200 men have recently been discharged from the yard for want of funds. At Trieste there is no change except that two new ships, the "Tegetthoff" and "Taurus," are to be built by the Stabilimento Technico in the place of the "Don Juan" and "Kaiser Max," recently launched.

3. The Krupp gun is definitely established in the Austrian navy, the heaviest of which afloat is the 26-centim. of 17½ tons, the "Custozza" carrying eight, but some of the older ships are still armed with Armstrongs.

The only novelty I noticed was in the carriages of the Krupp guns for the corvette "Donau" and narrow ships, in which the slide does not project beyond the rear of the carriage, which is supported by a broad brass roller running on the deck. Since the experiments at Dülmen, it is considered necessary to introduce electric firing. It is to be fitted on board the frigate "Laudon" with an arrangement to fire only when on an even keel. The officers did not seem satisfied with its working.

The Gatlin gun is almost decided on as the naval mitrailleuse, to be mounted on the poop, forecastle, or bridge. The No. 2 was on board the "Custozza" for trial. Experiments are to be made shortly with shell charged with nitro-glycerine, from which good results are anticipated. It is probably something similar to what the French are working at.

4. I was not allowed to see anything of the torpedos, but am inclined to think there is not much to disclose. Experiments have been made with fixed mines against a vessel built for the purpose, and she was sunk, but is to be raised shortly for a further series. I heard also a trial had been made with the "Seehund," Whitehead torpedo vessel (the only one with a tube), against a similar vessel armed with Hervy's torpedo, resulting only in failure on both sides. They have not yet ventured to start

a loaded Whitehead. The "Custozza" is fitted with the Hervy torpedo in tumblers on the quarters, and other ships will be. One of Thornycroft's spar torpedo boats has recently arrived at Pola.

I give an account of the main items of torpedo expenditure as published in the Naval Estimates in the remarks column of my Inclosure No. 2.

5. I inclose a Table I have drawn up with the principal items of the Navy Estimates for 1875 and 1876. Taking the florin at 11·50 to the pound sterling, the total for 1876 amounts to the small sum of 861,980*l.*, showing a reduction on 1875 of 7,052*l.* Those for 1877, now coming under discussion at Pesth, are estimated at about the same as 1876, but I am told will probably suffer a reduction of 1,500,000 fl. or 140,434*l.* Votes were proposed for the construction of two ironclads, "Archduke Carl" and "Drache," similar to the "Tegetthoff," but they were not sanctioned this year.

I have appended a Table showing the date of launching, armament (which I have found correct), and cost, of the steamships of the fleet.

6. The Mediterranean squadron consists of four ships, viz., "Custozza," ironclad, "Radetzky," frigate, a corvette, and a schooner. There are two corvettes on foreign stations, and five or six small vessels are in commission, besides training-ships. The "Maros" and "Latha," Danube monitors, with 1¾-inch armour and two 15-centim. guns, have lately had crews sent to them, and I have just heard that, in consequence of recent events, the "Radetzky" has been sent to Salonica, to be followed by the "Custozza," as soon as undocked after cleaning her bottom, also that the "Salamander," a small ironclad, is to be commissioned at once.

7. I submit the following remarks on the ships composing the fleet:—

"Tegetthoff."—This ship is fully described by Mr. Read at the United Service Institution, a report of whose paper I find in the "Engineer" of April 7, 1876, so that I have little to add. The armour is to be 14 inches on the battery and belt, the latter tapering to 13 inches forward and aft, and the inclined part under the battery will be 11 inches. She will have six small 10-centim. guns directly over the six 28-centim.; three masts, square-rigged on the foremast only.

"Custozza."—Flag-ship of the squadron under Admiral Barry, who gives a very good account of her behaviour and handiness under steam, but she has not been much under sail. The dimensions I gave in my despatch of December 1874 were, I believe, in Austrian feet, and should be in English: length, 302 feet 3½ inches; breadth, 58 feet 1 inch; draft 22 feet 4½ inches and 20 feet 0½ inches.

"Lissa" and "Kaiser."—Wood-built ships with iron topsides. They are probably well known, but I give a slight sketch of the disposition of the batteries, which are similar, but the "Lissa" has Krupp guns, and two more on the main deck. She is said to go 13·5 knots, and the "Kaiser" not now more than 11. The forecastle comes aft to the blockhouse.

"Albrecht."—The engines are now satisfactory.

"Don Juan" and "Kaiser Max."—Both now in the water, and the former probably already sent to Pola to receive engines, &c. They have two streaks of new armour at the water-line of 6 inches, which are fastened by bolts, but on the battery the 4½-inch plates of the old ships are used, reinforced by 1½ inches fitted to the back, and they are fastened as before with wood screws. I find they have a partial double bottom, but barely reaching the turn of the bilge. I gave their dimensions in Vienna feet.

"Prinz Eugen."—At Pola, is advanced about 45 per cent. She will, I am told, have now armour all over. All the fittings of the old ships are used in the new ones—bulkheads, bitts, hawsepipes, and engines. I inclose a paper Mr. Romako has given me of the dimensions of these ships, and of the "Saida" and "Taurus," which he requested might not be published or given away.

"Ferdinand Maximilian."—Has undergone extensive repairs on the slip at Pola, much of the parts covered by armour having been renewed. She is now nearly ready for launching again. Her armament remains unchanged—fourteen 7-inch Armstrong broadsides.

"Salamander."—Just commissioned.

"Drache."—Condemned and about to have engines removed, and will probably be broken up.

"Radetzky."—Composite frigate. In consequence of the thick teak planking (two layers of, I believe, 5 and 3 inches), Mr. Romako says they have no complaints of corrosion. Her actual draft is 23 feet 4 inches aft.

"Laudon."—The engines are now satisfactory, but the speed does not equal that

of the "Radetzky." They say she goes 13·5 knots. She will probably relieve that ship soon.

"Donau."—This ship's dimensions were also in Austrian measure, I believe, which would make the length 233 feet 1½ inches English; breadth, 40 feet 6 inches; draft, 17 feet 5½ inches and 18 feet 10 inches; coal, 280 tons. See "Révue Maritime," March 1876.

"Saida."—Covered battery corvette to be laid down at Pola. She will be similar to the "Donau," but with about 1½ feet more beam on the same mid-section, and, therefore, a more rising floor.

"Reka" is, I am told, condemned, but she may have extensive repairs like the "Huni," now on the patent slip nearly finished.

"Taurus" is, I understand, for service at the mouth of the Danube.

8. I propose now to proceed to Berlin with your approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ED. H. HOWARD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.

Austrian Naval Estimates, 1875 and 1876.

Chapter.		1875. Ordinary.	1875. Extra-ordinary.	1876. Ordinary.	1876. Extra-ordinary.
		£	£	£	£
I.	Salaries of Officers, employés, &c.	94,261	..	94,870	..
II.	Wages, &c., clothing	90,000	2,609	90,000	..
III.	Service on shore	38,948	..	39,130	..
IV.	Service afloat	100,870	..	103,087	..
V.	Naval Establishments	23,725	368	23,998	1,150
	A. Hydrographic Bureau	2,289	604	2,377	1,063
	B. Naval Academy	10,043	125	10,141	..
	C. Professional Elementary School	948	..	922	..
	D. Primary and Secondary Schools	716	49	784	87
	E. Hospitals	9,726	90	9,774	..
VI.	Construction, repairs, &c., of ships	340,683	50,013	330,961	76,068
	A & B. Stores, wages of workmen, police, &c.	130,748	..	135,965	..
	C. Ship-building contracts, &c., for—				
	Corvette "Donau"	18,652	..	..	..
	Ironclad "Prinz Eugen"	14,782	..	14,782	..
	" "Kaiser Max"	43,478	..	47,913	..
	" "Don Juan"	43,478	..	47,913	..
	" "Ferdinand Max," repairs	15,174	..	..	..
	Reserve boilers	19,478	..	15,044	..
	Sundries	6,958	..	..	..
	Corvette "Saida"	..	..	11,587	..
	Paddle-steamer "Taurus"	..	..	11,044	..
	Ironclad "Tegetthoff"	..	24,522	..	59,757
	Armour for ditto and "Prinz Eugen"	..	6,403	..	..
	Repair of Floating Dock, Pola	..	7,826	..	..
	Purchase of teak	..	5,217	..	..
	Torpedos	..	5,840	..	7,311
	D. Coal, 16,000 tons at £1 19s. 1½d.	31,304	..	31,304	..
	E. Stores bought abroad by ships	4,218	..	4,478	..
	F. Small expenses of ditto in commission	5,500	..	5,017	..
	G. Sundries	5,913	..	5,913	..

Remarks on Estimates for 1876.

I.—1,085 employés, of whom 329 executive officers and 154 cadets.
II.—Wages of 6,286 persons, of whom 4,271 are seamen and 400 boys.

VI.—C. Estimated cost, not including artillery, of—

	£
"Prinz Eugen"	44,348
"Kaiser Max"	127,365
"Don Juan"	127,365
"Saida," hull, 2,312 tons, 400 nominal horse-power	40,870
" engines	82,174
"Taurus," iron, paddle, 700 tons, hull	13,652
" engines, 150 nominal horse-power	9,043
"Tegetthoff," 7,390 tons, iron and steel, hull	173,426
" engines, 1,200 nominal horse-power	82,600
" armour, 2,243 tons, 14-inch	120,522
" fixing armour and fittings	56,313
Total, except artillery	432,261

Reserve boilers are for—

	£
"Fasana"	5,217
"Zrini"	3,304
"Dalmat"	3,044
"Gemse"	4,217
"Möve"	782
"Fantazie"	4,479

Torpedos—
Expenditure of 7,311*l.* is for 1 40-ton steam crane pontoon, 1 large boat, 2 4-oar boats, 8 2-oar boats, 1 cable boat or lighter, 1 large lighter, and 1 small lighter.

D. Government coal stores, besides Pola, are at Combur, 1,000 tons; Lissa, 660 tons; and Gravosa, 9,000 tons.

Chapter.		1875. Ordinary.	1875. Extra-ordinary.	1876. Ordinary.	1876. Extra-ordinary.
		£	£	£	£
VII.	Artillery, cannon, small arms, munitions	18,795	6,407	18,316	6,407
	Torpedos	104	2,553	287	2,998
VIII.	Buildings, engineering works, &c.	15,565	55,014	19,495	32,346
	Dry Dock, Pola (3rd and 4th annuity)	..	30,435	..	21,740
	Total estimate, 173,913*l.*; expended 1873-74, 56,523*l.*				
	Enlargement of reservoir, Pola	..	9,740	..	..
	New quays, Pola	..	678	..	..
	New storehouses, Pola	..	3,017	..	..
	Plantation of trees	..	261	..	261
	Construction of small basin for boats of Naval Academy, Fiume	..	217	..	..
	Workmen's dwellings	..	2,174	..	..
	Buildings for torpedo service	..	6,532	..	8,087
	Sundries	..	..	..	2,258
IX.	Diversionpoints	18,493	348	18,491	468
X.	Pensions, retirements, &c.	18,714	..	19,723	..
		760,135	116,190	758,860	110,433
	Less Naval revenue	7,304		7,304	
		752,851		751,556	
	Add extraordinary expenditure	116,190		110,433	
	Grand total	969,041		961,989	

Remarks on Estimates for 1876.

VII.—Torpedo expenditure in 1876 of 2,998*l.*:—

	Total Cost.	Required in 1876. No.	Required in 1876. Cost.
	Florins.		Florins.
(1) Observation mines, at 380 fl.	29,120	31	11,780
" securing gear, at 30 fl.	..	31	930
(2) Observation apparatus, 5 at 200 fl.	1,000	3	600
(3) 70 sea miles of 3-strand cable, with copper core, at 2,950 fl.	206,500	5 miles	14,750
(4) Lighting mirrors, 5 at	..	..	..
" apparatus, 5 at 1,200 fl.	6,000	3	3,600
Firing (1,000) apparatus, 7 at 100 fl.	2,800	3	1,200
Telegraph apparatus, 11 at 200 fl.	2,800	8	1,600
(5) For 12 instrument boxes, at 60 fl.	720	..	..
(6) 1,100 fathoms rutta percha thread	440	..	..
(7) Furnishing tools, &c.	4,750	..	..
(8) 475 cwt. dynamite, at 150 fl.	71,250	..	..
(9) 665 cwt. gunpowder, at 62 fl.	41,230	..	..
(10) Conclusion of experiments with heavily-loaded deep observation mines	16,000	..	..
	381,010		34,460
20 offensive torpedos	110,000		

Note.—Exchange, 11·50 florins equal £1.

Ship's Name.	Date of Launch.	Armament.		Cost when new.	
		Heavy. A.—Armstrong. K.—Krupp.	Light.	Hull, Engine, and Fittings.	Artillery and its Fittings.
				Florins.	Florins.
Custozza	1872	8 K., 26 centim. ..	6, 10 centim. 2, 7 „	3,890,000	585,000
Lissa	1869	12 K., 24 „ ..	4, 10 „ 2, 7 „	3,424,000	703,000
Erzherzog Albrecht ..	1872	8 K., 24 „ ..	6, 10 „ 2, 7 „	3,420,000	417,000
Kaiser	1872	10 A., 23 „ ..	6, 10 „ 2, 7 „	2,875,000	429,000
Don Juan	1875	8 K., 21 „ ..	4, 10 „ 2, 7 „	2,535,700 estimated	212,000
Kaiser Max	1875	Ditto	Ditto	ditto	212,000
Prinz Eugen	..	Ditto	Ditto	2,535,870	212,000
Ferdinand Max ..	1865	14 A., 16 centim. ..	Ditto	2,404,600	460,000
Habsburg	1865	Ditto	Ditto	2,404,600	460,000
Salamander	1861	10 A., 18 centim. ..	Ditto	1,474,000	176,000
Radetzky	1872	15 K., 15 centim. ..	2, 7 centim.	1,560,000	212,000
Laudon	1873	Ditto	Ditto	1,560,000	212,000
Novara	1850	3 pivot, 30 broadside, 15 centim.; cast-iron breech-loaders	Ditto	933,000	74,000
Donau	1874	13 K., 15 centim. ..	1, 7 centim.	959,500	184,000
Dandolo	1858	2 pivot, 12 broadside, 15 centim.; cast-iron breech-loaders	Ditto	569,000	47,500
Erzherzog Friedrich ..	1857	Ditto	Ditto	479,000	47,500
Fasana	1870	2 K., 21 centim. ..	4, 10 centim. 1, 7 „	857,000	71,000
Helgoland	1867	2 A., 18 centim. ..	Ditto	630,000	41,000
Trinyi	1871	4 pivot, 15 centim., cast-iron breech-loaders	1, 7 centim.	627,000	15,000
Frundsberg	1872	4 ditto	Ditto	627,000	15,000
Aurora	1873	4 ditto	Ditto	627,000	15,000
Reka	1861	4 ditto	Ditto	358,000	13,900
Vilebich	1861	4 ditto	Ditto	358,000	13,900
Dalmat	1861	4 ditto	Ditto	358,000	13,900
Hum	1861	4 ditto	Ditto	358,000	13,900
Sansego	1861	2 ditto	..	134,000	6,800
Nautilus	1873	2 ditto	1, 7 centim.	280,000	6,800
Albatross	1873	2 ditto	Ditto	280,000	6,800
Kerka	1860	2 ditto	Ditto	216,000	6,800
Narenta	1860	2 ditto	Ditto	216,000	6,800
Möve	1858	2 ditto	Ditto	137,000	6,800
Andreas Hofer ..	1872	1 ditto	2, 8 centim 1, 7 „	329,000	7,200
Fiume	1858	.. ..	4, 8 „	187,000	2,100
Taurus	..				
Miramar	1872	.. ..	2, 10 „	847,000	1,100
Kaiserin Elizabeth ..	1864	1 pivot, 15 centim. ..	4, 10 „ 1, 7 „	514,000	10,300
Cyclop	1871	.. ..	2	485,000	1,100
Seehund	1861	2 pivot, 15 centim. ..	1, 7 centim.	340,000	6,800
Greif	1857	.. ..	2	463,000	1,000
Fantasie	1858	.. ..	..	180,000	..
Muros	1870	2 pivot, 15 centim. ..	..	195,500	6,900
Leitha	1871	Ditto	..	210,500	6,900
Total	..	258 heavy guns	122	44,564,300	4,940,900

Inclosure 3 in No. 56.

Dimensions of "Don Juan," "Saida," and "Taurus."

All Dimensions in English Measures.

	Iron-clads—"Kaiser Max," "Don Juan," and "Prinz Eugen."	Corvette—"Saida."	Paddle-steamer—"Taurus."
Length between the perpendiculars	297 ft. 6 in.	232 ft. 10 in.	172 ft. 2 in.
Extreme moulding—breadth	49 ft. 9¾ in.	42 ft.	25 ft. 11 in.
Extreme breadth to the outside of planking or armour	50 ft. ¾ in.	43 ft. 1½ in.	over paddle-box, 46 ft. 2 in.
Draught of water for construction—forward	18 ft. 4 in.	16 ft. 10½ in.	8 ft. 3½ in.
" aft	21 ft. 9½ in.	20 ft. 8½ in.	13 ft. 5½ in.
Depth of hold to gun deck	20 ft. 11½ in.	21 ft. 9½ in.	
Height of port-sills above water	8 ft. 9½ in.	9 ft. 4 in.	
Displacement in tons (moulding)	3,520 tons	2,327·5 tons	552·4 tons
Area of midship section	759·1 sq. ft.	531·7 sq. ft.	182·4 sq. ft.
Area of waterline	9,120·3 sq. ft.	7,310·8 sq. ft.	
Area of sails	13,515 sq. ft.	19,989 sq. ft.	
Horse-power	650 nominal, 2,000 effective	400 nominal, 2,000 effective	150 nominal, 600 effective.
Diameter of cylinder	74 in.	66½ in.	46 in.
Number of cylinders	2	2	2
Length of stroke	3 ft. 3 in.	3 ft. 3 in.	4 ft. 2 in.
Screw-propeller (in the last case paddle-wheel), diameter	18 ft. 6 in.	17 ft. 6 in.	Paddle-wheel, 17 ft. 4 in. over all.
Screw-propeller, pitch	21 ft.	17 ft. 6 in.	Paddle, 5 ft. long, 2 ft. 4 in. broad.
Revolutions per minute	60	62	34½
Area of fire-grate	495 sq. ft.	320 sq. ft.	108 sq. ft.
" heating surface	11,950 sq. ft.	8,050 sq. ft.	3,625 sq. ft.
" superheating	1,130 sq. ft.	600 sq. ft.	220 sq. ft.
Pressure of steam	28 pounds	30 pounds	30 pounds.
Estimated mean speed	14 knots	12 knots	12 knots.
	Built of iron with 8 in. [illegible]	Built of wood, with iron deck-beams.	Built of iron.

The armament of the three iron-clads, "Kaiser Max," "Don Juan," and "Prinz Eugen," consists of eight 5-inch Krupp guns (21 centim.), four 8-pounder (10 centim.), and two 3-pounder (7 centim.), the former breech-loaders, the latter muzzle-loaders.

The armament of the corvette "Saida" consists of thirteen 6-inch (15 centim.) Krupp breech-loaders; and the paddle-steamer "Taurus" is armed with one 6-inch (15 centim.) Krupp, and two 8-pounders (10 centim.).

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

Belgrade, May 11, 1876.

Sir,

IN order that the necessary alteration may be made in Captain Cook's careful description of the Servian army at the Intelligence Office, I shall have the honour of submitting a translation of the revised organization scheme, dated January 1876, and I take this opportunity of calling attention to the valuable services of the above-named officer, who has been well said to "take the bread out of the Military Attaché's mouth." I find Captain Cook's works very accurate, and of incalculable use.

The Servian army and militia fall far short of their theoretical promise.

In the last Budget pay was drawn for—

1 Minister of War.
1 Commander-in-Chief.
26 Staff officers.
2,091 Infantry, privates and non-commissioned officers and officers.
276 Cavalry, " " " "
1,583 Artillery, " " " "
750 Engineers.
108 Sanitary Corps.
38 Medical officers, including Veterinary.
[illegible] " Intendance.
49 Bandsmen.
or 316 officers and 4,095 privates.

The actual strength of the standing army at this moment reaches 4,500 privates, but one fatal error has been permitted, viz., that families destined by lot to furnish soldiers may nominate a member who is usually the male least able to gain a living by work.

Service in the standing army is limited to two in place of three years. As might be expected, I find the army consists of men inferior in physique and quite untrained.

The more important duty of rifle practice gives way to parade drill in squads, and the officers are unpractised in handling bodies of troops of any numerical strength. As regards the "first line" of militia, say 67,000 men, though not actually called out, they are called upon to drill after work in their villages, and in certain districts they are at this moment assembled for the purpose of throwing up earthworks.*

The most important works in progress are—

1. At Alexsinac, a town on the high road from Nies (Turkish), covered by twelve detached works, called forts, which mount 120 guns.

2. Deligrad, a plateau, difficult of approach by nature from the Turkish side, and which has been recently pronounced by foreign officers a far safer and more important position than No. 1.

3. In the construction of a fortified camp at Cuprin—the central and head-quarter strategical position aiding in the defence of the arsenal at Kragujevac.

4. The passes through the hills opposite Widdin.

These works, which are purely defensive, do not secure undivided attention, as a sufficient number of pontoons are being shipped to the Drina to enable an army to pass into Bosnia.

Prince Milan was condescending enough to speak with me for an hour on military matters, and explained his position very clearly. He acknowledged that, in an open country like Servia, his army could not hope to fight with success against the Turks. He expressed doubts as to whether he could hold his position at Alexsinac, but thought Deligrad could be rendered impregnable. He acknowledged that his arms,† especially artillery, were inferior to those of the Turks; that, in fact, he had everything to lose by war; still, he added, "if Turkey declares war against Montenegro, I have no option, but must march against her."

As regards the possible occupation of the insurgent provinces by Austria, the Prince said "Austria must also occupy Servia and Montenegro."‡ In my own mind I do not think it probable that the Austrian policy will be changed by the Berlin Conference, but if so, I shall quite expect a Servian army to find its way into Bosnia over the Drina in advance of the Austrian troops, notwithstanding that Prince Milan has no intendance, and that General Mollinary has his plans ready for occupation. With General Mollinary I conversed at Agram, he explained the danger of a Slav Confederation to Austria as being (1st) the ever increasing need such a Power would feel for a "sea board"; and secondly, that the greater part of the inhabitants of the military frontier of Croatia are not only Slav by sentiment but even Bosnians who have escaped from the Turks year after year and taken the place of the male population recruited in the Austrian army.§ As in Dalmatia the military instinct was for occupation, but the Government policy in no way encouraged the idea. There were no troops on the frontier in addition to those of peace time, but as in Dalmatia also I found stores of every kind ready to hand, the only want being baggage animals.

But to return to Servia. The one great need was money, 7,000*l.* had been raised in Belgrade, 2,000*l.* being money belonging to the school fund,‖ and the rest raised by a property tax. This last will lead to some question, as certain foreign traders had been called upon to pay for two years, in which circumstances had not called for a requisition.

By the law of the land, a tax of this nature may be levied throughout the land in war, so that the mere declaration of war would place money in the Government chest.

The country people are averse to fighting the Turks, but are ready to subscribe to buy them into their interest.

There is no denying that every nerve is being stretched in immediate warlike preparation, but I am of opinion the sound sense of the young Prince will prevail. If unpopular in the towns he is not so with the majority in the country.

The Prince, as a leader of Slavs, is most anxious not to let an opportunity of gaining a hold in Bosnia escape, so with a hint from the Russian Consul he may be expected to take action even at the risk of provoking Austria. His position is far more independent than that of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, still, the influence which makes and unmakes Ministries is Russian; and as I left Belgrade a Russian

* In plain clothes.

† The rifle is the Peabody converted. The metal seemed soft and the work rough.

‡ "If a precedent were established by Austria holding Bosnia, the Russians might with reason do likewise in Bulgaria. Six battalions and a battery from Nies, and a like force from Adrianople, had been sent by the Turks to Bulgaria."—Prince Milan.

§ Reported in despatch of May 6.

‖ Children attending schools pay nothing, but there is a school tax.

ex-General of renown was about to join the chief of the staff in an official military inspection.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. GONNE,
Major, 17th Lancers, Military Attaché.

The six military commands of Servia are now as follows:—

	Head-quarters.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Train.
		Battalions.	Squadrons.		Battalion.	
I. Drina Save	Valjevo	13	5	2 8-gun field batteries 3 4-gun mountain batteries	1	Each Division has its Train, Ammunition Column, Post, &c.
III. Southwestern Morava	Chachak	13	5	3 8-gun field batteries 2 4-gun mountain batteries	1	
II. South Morava	Chuprin	12	5	3 " "	1	
IV. Timok	Zaitzar	13	6	3 " "	1	
V. Danube	Passarewitz	14	6	3 " "	1	
VI. [illegible]	Kragujevatz	15	7	3 " "	1	

Note.—In addition each division has a Militia field battery.
Each division has its own permanent staff.
Each battalion consists of two corps of 200 men.
As regards artillery the home-made guns are not considered a success. The first purchase of a field battery from Krupp was not a success, the iron carriages do not suit the roads and are too heavy.
The "Percheron" breed of horses was introduced and failed as requiring too much grain.
The Cavalry is a failure, and the few horsemen are only fit for scouts and orderlies.

(Signed) THOMAS GONNE, *Military Attaché.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 56.

"*Rangs-und Eintheilungs-List S.M.; Kriegs-Marine. Richtig gestellt bis 15 Februar*, 1876."

Inclosure 6 in No. 56.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

Vienna, May 15, 1876.

Sir,

ON my departure from Vienna I had the honour of submitting to your Excellency my preconceived notion of political events affected by the insurrection of certain Slav provinces against Turkish rule; and now, after visiting the scene of revolt, I think it my duty to inform you to what extent my views have undergone modification, premising that my experience is still very limited.

From what I have seen and heard, my humble opinion is, that Turkey could have reduced her subjects to their normal condition, had it been possible to carry out the military orders issued immediately after the Andrassy Reform Note by Austria. The military commanders might doubtless have held the frontier "cordon" and stopped the passage of supplies had their functions been simply military; it seems, however, that diplomatic tact formed an important feature in their *modus operandi*. It was difficult to say where the exact frontier line should be drawn. Members of one family might be some on one side and some on the other side of an invisible line, and as the whole male population carried arms as a necessary portion of every day dress, without offence to a whole race it was not an easy task to disarm the disaffected. It thus happened, and perhaps unavoidably, that the "cordon" was nominal till the third month of the present year. When the "cordon" existed in fact, the insurgent bands were forced to operate in the neighbourhood of Montenegro, where no pretence was made to interfere with a frontier; therefore, I am of opinion that the Turks would have gained the upper hand at this period even, had Montenegro remained strictly neutral. On the

* General Chrouref, who held a command at the taking of Tashkend.

contrary, Montenegro supplied arms, ammunition, money, food, and men, as well as an hospital and asylum. Thanks to Montenegro the insurgents have been able to keep the Turkish army (which might otherwise have scoured the whole disturbed region in flying columns) in constant sickening mountain warfare round the fortifications of Nichsich. The absence of Turkish troops throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered the return of fugitives impossible; meantime the arable land in Bosnia is unsown, and more than one-third of Herzegovina is in the same deplorable state, whilst the bulk of the cattle has been driven into Austria and sold at nominal prices.

That Montenegro, which is a military camp, fortified by nature, with insufficient acreage to supply its population with grain, did not possess the means of giving subsistence and warlike stores to the insurgents, is self-evident. Whence came the funds? The answer is, from committees distributing the charity of crusaders. But I think that my despatches have proved that the insurrection had a more reliable friend in the Russian Government.

That Russia could at any moment have caused the Prince of Montenegro to cut off supplies is beyond a doubt. My impression that Russia was seeking popularity amongst the Slavs, and drawing life's blood out of the Turks has undergone no modification.

That Austria dreads, and will not allow a Slav Confederation around Servia, is also obvious. It is equally sure that the Christians now rising are uncivilized, and quite incapable of governing themselves.

If the Berlin Conference ends in Russia obtaining for Montenegro an increase of territory to make the country self-subsistent, and thus bribes the warrior race to grant their traditional enemies the Turks a truce; and if Russia at the same time instructs her agents in other Turkish Provinces, Bulgaria, Albania, &c., to stay their work of stirring up rebellion, the Turks will be able to misrule Bosnia and Herzegovina a year or so longer; but those who know the Slavs, and the perilous position of Austria from the ever-increasing power of the Slav element, will say that procrastination will be of short duration.

How long will the Magyar keep the Slav in subjection in the Austro-Hungarian Government? How long will the Slav provinces of Austria call in vain for home rule? How long will the German element in Austria yearn in vain for union with the "Vaterland?" How long will Poland prefer the uncertain, precarious principle of Government at Vienna to the yoke of a crowned King of Poland (the Czar)? I quite believe that Austria is at this moment as near falling to pieces as Turkey.

If the Turks could be induced to accept tribute, and give up the government of the insurgent provinces, she might with economical reform retain a strong position, and the real Eastern question would not be at issue. The Turkish troops are of far more value than the world supposes. She could well hold Bulgaria and Albania where the disturbances are artificial, or result from contagion. In the year 1876 Austria will not consent to a joint effort in this direction; probably she will depart from her declared policy only as regards an amelioration of the *status quo*.

I may here aptly quote the Slav opinion expressed both in Croatia and Dalmatia:—"No reform note can be of value which does not institute Christian schools." The Mahomedans teach nothing but the Koran and prayers. It probably is as easy to induce the Turks to leave Bosnia as to grant this notion of religious liberty.

I have hitherto spoken only of the weakness of the power hostile to Slav progress south of the Danube; but in the loyal fidelity and discipline of her army Austria shows most formidable strength. Except in the highest ranks I have not heard an officer take part in political argument, nor have I reason to suppose that the men in this heterogeneous armed force are other than portions of a machine obedient to the Imperial will.

The strength of Slav influence is of course outside the Turkish dominion, and the leaders of the race say that they are drawn towards Russia only because Russia affords them sympathy—*i.e.*, tangible and not merely sentimental sympathy. In sentiment sympathy extends through 80,000,000 of human beings.

It is worth while to note the progress made by Slav populations passing from Eastern to Western civilization.

Croatia is on a par with Hungary, but in Agram I heard more advanced opinions than elsewhere. In Dalmatia the Italian element, and the fact that Italian has been the language taught in schools, and encouraged by Government, has till now kept the Slavs in the background. Now, however, a reaction is setting in, and the numerical strength and energy of the coming race begins to tell. The Slav language is being

introduced; Eastern civilization has been driven out of Montenegro by Western; and ten years, the period during which schools have existed, have wrought a miraculous change. Still Montenegro has no written code of law, and the struggle has been made under most unfavourable circumstances. The revenue of the country is about 12,000*l.*, and the population about 120,000; whilst the insecurity of property from destruction at the hands of the Turks militates against the idea of permanence. Montenegro not only lives from hand to mouth, but is, so to say, dependent on charity. Still the progress made is an astounding proof of what the race is capable of, and what might be expected of Herzegovina and Bosnia under other than Turkish rule.

Servia has enjoyed Western ideas of civilization, say forty years, but, enjoying more local and natural advantages, her progress has assumed a permanent character. With a Constitutional Government she enjoys advantages which may well unsteady the minds of neighbours writhing in bondage, and blighted by the brutalizing influence of Ottoman indolence and oppression.

If the present crisis were to result in the Turks being driven from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more safely established in Bulgaria and Albania; and if they took a lesson from their loss of dominion, and also received a tribute, I imagine the British Government would have little cause to complain. The Slavs are such jealous home-rulers, and so proud of their individuality, that there is little reason to suppose they would be sooner or later incorporated by Russia. Rather would a Slav Federation form a limit to the advance of the Russian boundary.

If, on the other hand, war continues, and the Bulgarians share in the general discontent, the day is not far distant when Russia will occupy a stepping-stone towards Constantinople, although Austria does wisely abstain from making a precedent by indulging the desire of her military chiefs now watching the frontiers of devastated Slav provinces.

A few days will now inform the world what step is to be taken; but I am so impressed with a belief that Slav ambition now fully roused is not to be put down by cautious and procrastinating counsel, that as long as the Turks are in Bosnia I shall expect the peace of Europe to be precarious. As your Excellency is aware I have formed a very high estimate of the fighting power of Turkey; but the movement on foot has for its motive power the aspiration of a race destined to dominate, not only the portion of a race within a given territorial circle, but of a race covering a substantial portion of Europe.

I am told that the policy of Russia is obedient to a Slav aspiration. I have heard the views of Austrian Slavs in a like sense; and though my opinion is nothing worth, I will venture to express it once, viz., that Turkish armed strength and the advice of three Emperors will not maintain the scandal of Ottoman rule in the country I have just visited.

From this moment I return to my legitimate function of Military Attaché to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. GONNE,
Major, 17th Lancers, Military Attaché.

No. 57.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 207.) *Vienna, May 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

COUNT ANDRASSY returned here last night and will proceed to Buda Pesth to-morrow. I called at the Foreign Office to-day, but was unable to see him, as he was about to proceed to the palace to have an audience of the Emperor. I saw Baron Hofmann for an instant, who had returned from Pesth to meet his Excellency; and I mentioned to him that the Cabinet would only meet to-day, at which a decision would be taken on the proposals of the three Northern Powers to Her Majesty's Government on the affairs of the Herzegovina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 57[a].

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 215.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May 17, 1876.*

M. B. PETROVICH NJEGOSCH, the President of the Senate of Montenegro, called on me to-day and asked me to forward the inclosed letter to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 57[a].

Mémoire adressé par Son Altesse le Prince de Monténégro au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique.

DEPUIS des années la province d'Herzégovine a été le théâtre de désordres continuels, et la position de la majorité Chrétienne des habitants a été rendue intolérable. Les réformes et garanties accordées, à plusieurs reprises, par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, avec une bonne foi que nous sommes loin de suspecter, n'ont pas atteint leur but, parce que, là, comme malheureusement partout, les autorités chargées de les appliquer ont pris à tâche d'en annuler l'effet, en quoi elles ont été activement aidées par la minorité Mahométane. Celle-ci, de concert avec les magistrats civils et judiciaires, comme avec les chefs militaires, n'a jamais manqué, après la publication à grand fracas des décrets de la Porte, d'en faire une lettre morte, même avant que l'application en eût été tentée. Les vexations et les déni de justice, dans les grandes comme dans les petites choses, continuaient, comme par le passé, et le Rayas n'avait, pas plus qu'auparavant, une heure de sécurité pour sa personne, sa famille et ses biens. Une situation pareille exaspérerait les populations les plus douces; à plus forte raison ne pouvait-on pas attendre une patience sans bornes d'un peuple soustrait à toute influence civilisatrice et auquel ses maîtres mêmes donnaient l'exemple du mépris des lois. La vie même était devenue insupportable; or, quand un peuple en est réduit là, on sait ce qui arrive.

Une preuve frappante du désespoir, auquel les Herzégovinens étaient réduits, est la confraternité parfaite à laquelle la souffrance de tous les jours a amené deux religions ennemies. Pour qui connaît la haine qui divise partout en Orient les Catholiques Romains et les Orthodoxes du rite Grec, il y a là un fait qui parle de lui-même. A l'heure qu'il est, des prêtres Catholiques et des popes Grecs combattent confondus dans les mêmes rangs.

Dans le courant de l'année 1874, la misère des Chrétiens étant arrivée à son apogée, il y eut, dans diverses parties de la province, des mouvements précurseurs d'un soulèvement, auxquels les autorités répondirent par un redoublement de rigueurs et par l'incarcération comminatoire d'un certain nombre de notables. D'autres, échappant aux recherches, se réfugièrent au Monténégro, demandant au Prince de leur donner un asyle, et, même, de les aider à secouer le joug.

Le Prince Nicolas, fidèle aux lois internationales, refusa d'écouter cette dernière demande; mais, connaissant bien quel était l'état des choses qui avait nécessité la fuite

de ses hôtes, il fit tout ce qu'il put pour leur rendre possible leur retour en sûreté dans leurs foyers. Il porta, en même temps, à la connaissance des Puissances la situation où se trouvaient les territoires avoisinant les siens, par une Mémoire en date du mois d'Avril, 1875.

Alors, comme toutes les fois qu'il s'est agi d'une œuvre bienfaisante, il eut le bonheur d'obtenir le puissant concours du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, qui voulut bien se faire à Constantinople l'intermédiaire des vœux de Son Altesse. Grâce à cet appui, la Porte accorda une amnistie pour les faits d'agitation et pour le départ illégal des notables. En outre, elle institua une Commission de fonctionnaires, chargée de recevoir les réclamations des Herzégoviniens et d'y faire droit. Les émigrés une fois rentrés et la Commission installée, il arriva ce qui est toujours arrivé en Turquie, depuis que les Sultans ont entrepris les réformes; les nouveaux Décrets ont été laissés inexécutés comme les précédents et les Délégués ne firent que commencer, pour la forme, l'enquête dont ils étaient chargés. Les indigènes Musulmans, irrités, redoublèrent de violences et de vexations, sous les yeux de la Commission impuissante ou complice; et les Chrétiens, à bout de patience, n'écoutèrent plus que leur désespoir.

C'est ainsi que l'insurrection actuelle éclata, sans entente préalable et sans préparation quelconque.

Il est bien inutile de faire l'historique de cette guerre de détail, de surprises, de petits combats, qui n'a été signalée que par l'acharnement des deux parties et par les vengeances exercées, sans distinctions, sur des districts entiers par les Turcs.

Dès le début de cette crise, les Puissances Chrétiennes désireuses, comme de juste, de circonscrire le foyer de l'incendie, pour l'empêcher de devenir par degrés une conflagration générale, s'adressèrent au Prince de Monténégro, dont l'action pouvait déterminer ou empêcher les complications les plus graves. Entrant sans hésitation dans leurs vues et mû par les mêmes sentiments d'ordre et de paix, le Prince donna sa promesse d'observer la neutralité et il est heureux de pouvoir dire qu'il a tenu cet engagement. Il tient même à faire remarquer, en passant, qu'il a donné une preuve frappante, à la fois, de sa fidélité à ses engagements et de son pouvoir sur son peuple, en empêchant celui-ci de se jeter aveuglement dans la lutte, comme il l'eût fait autrefois. Ce fait montre, comme il n'est pas inutile de l'observer, quels progrès le pays a fait dans la voie de l'ordre et du respect des lois, pendant le dernier quart de siècle.

Passant sous silence les incidents de la guerre, nous pouvons en venir à la tentative pacifique fait, d'un commun accord, par les Grandes Puissances et résumée dans la note bien connue de son Excellence M. le Comte Andrassy. Les principes posés par cette note ayant été acceptés par la Sublime Porte, celle-ci chargea une Commission Spéciale d'en préparer l'application. Ce que ces Commissaires ont fait est exprimé par un seul mot: Rien.

Pendant que ces délégués continuaient à Mostar la politique négative suivie par tous leurs prédécesseurs, l'Autriche, prenant au sérieux sa mission de paix, chargeait son Gouverneur-Général en Dalmatie, M. le Baron de Rodich, de s'aboucher avec les insurgés et d'obtenir d'eux l'acceptation des réformes proposées par M. le Comte Andrassy. L'assistance du Prince de Monténégro fut demandée pour cela et donnée sans réserve. Grâce à son interposition active et à celle de l'Autriche, un armistice de douze jours fût conclu, pour donner aux chefs le temps de s'entretenir avec M. le Baron de Rodich. On sait que la condition indispensable de cette suspension d'armes, le ravitaillement de Nikchich, fut résolue, grâce à l'autorisation du passage des convois Turcs par le territoire Monténégrin. La quantité des vivres, la route à suivre pour leur transport, le lieu de l'entrevue projetée, la date de la trêve (du 1 au 12 Avril) tout fut réglé d'avance avec le plus grand soin, le Prince poussant même la sollicitude jusqu'à faire prévenir les Turcs qu'ils devaient envoyer des bêtes de somme au port de débarquement, le pays ne pouvant en fournir qu'un très petit nombre.

On sait ce qui est résulté de l'entrevue de Soutorina: les chefs, après avoir reçu de M. le Gouverneur de la Dalmatie communication du projet de M. le Comte Andrassy et en avoir délibéré, remirent un Mémorandum où étaient énumérées diverses conditions, qu'ils désiraient voir ajoutées, pour compléter les réformes projetées et, surtout, en assurer la mise en pratique sérieuse. La justice de ces demandes, quant au fond, nous paraît évidente. Sans révoquer en doute les intentions réparatrices de la Porte, on doit reconnaître (tous les faits sans exception le prouvent) qu'elle est toujours impuissante à obtenir de ses agents qu'ils s'y conforment. Il est de toute nécessité que les réparations offertes soient stipulées et garanties de telle façon qu'il n'y ait pas moyen de les éluder ou même de les atténuer. Les demandes des

insurgés, dans leur esprit, si non dans leur forme un peu trop péremptoire, nous semblent mériter, à ce point de vue, d'être prises en très sérieuse et favorable considération.

Les événements se chargèrent de prouver immédiatement combien les insurgés avaient raison dans leur défiance et à quel point les Chefs Ottomans avaient peu à cœur l'issue pacifique des négociations. Ceux-ci firent eux-mêmes, en négligeant de réunir les moyens de transport nécessaires, échouer le ravitaillement de Nikchich et, pendant que les chefs insurgés, confiants dans la suspension d'armes, qui comportait celle des mouvements de troupes, étaient en conférence à Soutorina, Mouktar Pacha profitait du répit qui lui était donné pour préparer un retour offensif. Ayant, grâce à ce manque de foi, pû rassembler ses forces, il se mit en marche dès le 13 Avril, pour forcer le passage vers Nikchich. On sait ce qui en résulta: les Commandants Herzégoviniens, revenus à la hâte avec les hommes à leur portée, lui barrèrent le chemin et, après une série d'engagements sanglants, le rejetèrent sur Gatsko, sa base d'opérations.

Suivant une tactique ordinaire chez certains généraux vaincus, le Général-en-chef Turc chercha alors à attribuer son échec à des causes imaginaires, surtout à la co-opération donnée aux insurgés par un corps nombreux de Monténégrins: il osa même articuler le chiffre fabuleux de 7,000, et accuser le Prince Nicolas d'avoir, lui même, envoyé ce renfort. Malgré l'improbabilité évidente d'une pareille assertion, il n'est peut être pas inutile de la démentir catégoriquement; c'est ce que le Prince a fait et fait encore sans hésitation.

Sans doute, il ne peut pas empêcher tous ses sujets de se dérober individuellement à ses ordres et de franchir en armes la frontière; mais il s'est assuré du nombre de ceux qui lui avaient désobéi (deux ou trois centaines) et a fait punir chacun d'eux selon toute la rigueur des lois.

Après cette suite de journées sanglantes, le Prince de Monténégro, ne perdant pas courage dans ses tentatives d'apaisement, s'associait de toutes ses forces aux tentatives nouvelles éssayées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche. Pendant que ce dernier faisait entendre à Constantinople des conseils pacifiques, le Prince accueillait une adresse des insurgés, par laquelle ceux-ci remettaient leurs pouvoirs entre ses mains, pour négocier en leur lieu et place avec les Puissances et, éventuellement, avec la Porte elle-même. Il ne se dissimule pas la grave responsabilité qu'il assume, en établissant ainsi, tacitement il est vrai, sa solidarité avec ceux qui se mettent sous sa protection; mais, quels que soient les risques qui peuvent résulter de cet acte, l'humanité ne lui permettait pas de s'y soustraire. L'Europe, il en est sur, ne songera pas à l'en blâmer.

Durant plusieurs jours, les correspondances les plus actives furent échangées entre Vienne, Constantinople et Cettinje pour la reprise des négociations, dont une nouvelle trêve devait être le prélude. Continuant à donner des preuves de son bon vouloir, le Prince de Monténégro offrait spontanément d'assurer le passage des vivres pour Nikchich, par une nouvelle route traversant le cœur de son territoire, et donnait des ordres pour que ce transport se fit sans obstacle. La Sublime Porte, par l'intermédiaire de l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, donnait les assurances les plus favorables, et Mouktar Pacha, de son côté, déclarait à M. le Gouverneur de la Dalmatie qu'il était prêt à conclure un armistice, pourvu que Nikchich fut approvisionné.

L'événement vient de prouver combien ces apparences étaient trompeuses. Il ne nous appartient pas de juger de l'impression qu'ont pu en recevoir les Puissances; mais nous ne craignons pas de dire tout haut que nous avons été joués et que ce qui est bien plus pénible, nous avons servi à tromper les Herzégoviniens, au moment même où ils venaient de nous confier la défense de leurs intérêts. Les pourparlers, qui les ont mis hors de leur garde, n'étaient qu'une feinte pour faciliter une seconde surprise et c'est, paraît-il, de Constantinople même que sont partis les ordres formels pour une nouvelle attaque. Celle-ci a réussi, en partie du moins, à atteindre le but principal, le ravitaillement de Nikchich. Mouktar Pacha est parvenu, en effet, le 26 Avril à couvrir l'entrée d'une portion de son convoi, les insurgés ne se trouvant pas en nombre pour l'en empêcher. Le lendemain et le surlendemain, il est vrai, renforcés par l'arrivée de plusieurs de leurs corps, ils lui firent éprouver des pertes considérables et lui fermèrent presque sa retraite sur Gatsko. Quelques milliers de morts et de blessés et l'approvisionnement d'une place pour quelques jours sont les seuls résultats d'une manœuvre diplomatique, dont nous laissons la qualification au jugement de l'Europe. Il n'y a encore aucune apparence que l'insurrection en soit affaiblie; les Herzégoviniens sont au contraire plus animés que jamais.

Cette lutte, sans cesse renaissante, place le Monténégro dans une position

intolérable, que son Souverain soumet avec instances à l'urgente et sérieuse considération des Grandes Puissances.

Ses sujets, si habitués qu'ils le soient devenus à obéir aux lois, ne peuvent oublier que les Herzégoviniens sont leurs frères de race et de religion, qu'ils sont en fait une partie de la même nation, divisée par une ligne de démarcation purement politique. L'histoire récente des nations les plus policées montre que, avec les moyens d'action les mieux organisés, de grands Gouvernements peuvent se trouver impuissants à comprimer longtemps l'explosion du sentiment national surexcité. Pour sauver l'ordre, ils ont dû, bon-gré, mal-gré, céder à l'entraînement de l'opinion publique, et encore celle-ci n'a-t-elle été nulle part exaspérée par le spectacle d'horreurs et de dévastations comme celles dont le Monténégro est le témoin, pour ainsi dire oculaire.

Son territoire est rempli de familles réfugiées, dont les demeures ont été détruites et les moyens d'existence anéantis. Il faut les avoir vues pour se figurer un état de misère pareil. La charité de l'Europe et la générosité des Empereurs d'Autriche et de Russie ont fortement contribué à l'entretien de ces malheureux, mais la plus forte part de cette œuvre quotidienne n'en tombe pas moins à la charge du Monténégro. Ce peuple, petit et pauvre, partage ce qu'il a avec des exilés, dont le nombre, déjà égal à peu près à la moitié du sien, semble augmenter chaque jour. Ce qu'il fait, il le fait de grand cœur et sans regret ; mais le moment approche où il ne pourra matériellement plus rien faire ; il ne lui restera rien à partager.

La configuration même de nos frontières mal définies et irrégulières est une source inévitable de conflits, dont on ne doit pas atténuer la gravité possible dans les circonstances actuelles.

Enfin, les villages Chrétiens, dans les districts Herzégoviniens de Piva, Baniani, Gatsko et Zubzi, que leur situation met en dehors de la zone occupée par les troupes Turques, abritent une population de familles réfugiées, comme celle qui s'est enfuie chez nous, dénuée de tout comme celle-ci et entretenue, tant bien que mal, par les mêmes ressources. Les mouvements en avant de l'armée Ottomane menacent ces localités ; or l'occupation par elle signifie simplement le pillage, l'incendie et le massacre, surtout depuis qu'elle a été renforcée d'Arabes et de Bachi-bozouks, dont la réputation n'est pas à faire au point de vue de l'indiscipline et de la férocité. Tout récemment, par exemple, les irréguliers Albanais se sont détournés de leur route pour saccager et brûler le village Chrétien de Golia. L'Europe n'attend certainement pas de nous que nous laissions commettre de tels ravages à nos portes mêmes, sans chercher à les empêcher.

Ce sont là seulement quelques uns des traits de la situation, telle qu'elle se présente du côté de l'Herzégovine ; ils sont certes suffisants pour inspirer les plus sérieuses appréhensions. Ils ne représentent pourtant qu'une partie des dangers qui menacent la paix.

Pendant l'intervalle de vaines négociations, qui a séparé les deux opérations de Moukhtar Pacha, le bruit se répandit tout-à-coup que la Porte, irritée par les allégations de ce dernier, allait déclarer la guerre au Monténégro. Interpellée à ce sujet par plusieurs Puissances et mise en présence de nos dénégations formelles, elle déclara qu'elle n'avait pas cette intention ; mais, dans ses communications à quelques Ambassadeurs, au sujet de l'armistice projeté alors, elle ne se fit pas faute de parler un langage menaçant pour nous. Si nous ne savions pas déjà parfaitement quelles dispositions hostiles à notre égard règnent dans certaines régions du pouvoir à Constantinople, ce qui se passe sur territoire Turc, tout autour de nous, suffirait pour que nous nous sentissions menacés.

Tandis que le Général-en-chef en Herzégovine et ses officiers ne font pas mystère de leurs intentions contre nous, nous voyons s'accumuler sur notre frontière méridionale les préparatifs d'une action aggressive. Les forces Turques en Albanie s'augmentent considérablement, et font des mouvements significatifs ; la flotille armée sur le Lac de Scutari a été renforcée et pousse ses reconnaissances jusque dans nos eaux ; la côte d'Antivari, par laquelle se fait le commerce de quelques uns de nos districts les plus prospères, est strictement bloquée par les croiseurs Ottomans, sous prétexte de contrebande d'armes ; enfin, ce qui est extrêmement grave pour nous, la sortie des grains pour le Monténégro a été prohibée, et même, depuis quelque temps, le passage des personnes a été interdit sur la frontière, dans un sens et dans l'autre.

A ces indices d'une mauvaise intention évidente, dont le dernier est presque une mesure de guerre, viennent se joindre des faits qui montrent que les Gouverneurs Turcs, privés par notre modération de motifs de querelle, cherchent, par leurs vexations, à faire éclater des troubles dans les cantons limitrophes des nôtres, dans l'espoir d'y impliquer nos ressortissants et nous-mêmes ensuite.

La frontière Albanaise du Monténégro est celle par laquelle, en maintes occasion, il a été envahi par les armées de son puissant voisin, même sans déclaration de guerre préalable. Sa configuration même, qui fait faire aux terres du Sultan une saillie, protégée par deux forteresses, dans la partie la plus accessible du pays, est, à elle seule, une cause permanente de danger. On ne sera donc pas étonné que tout ce qui se prépare de ce côté soit pour nous l'objet d'une vigilance défiante.

Le peuple Monténégrin, après avoir été atteint dans les sources de sa prospérité par les charges écrasantes qui pesent sur lui, après avoir souffert dans ses sentiments les plus naturels et les plus chers par les calamités qui accablent ses frères de race et de foi, après avoir été dénoncé à l'Europe par des calomnies gratuites, peut se voir d'un moment à l'autre forcé à une lutte désespérée pour son existence même. Avant que cette crise suprême vienne l'éprouver, c'est le devoir de son Prince de la conjurer, s'il le peut, en faisant appel aux Puissances Chrétiennes.

Il vient donc les prier instamment de s'entendre pour faire de la situation qu'il leur expose l'objet de délibérations communes, plutôt que de laisser la guerre continuer ses ravages, qui ne résolvent aucune question, ni dans le présent, ni dans l'avenir. Dans le but d'invoquer leur intervention, il s'adresse à elles, bien convaincu qu'elles ne resteront pas insensibles aux misères et aux dangers de populations entières. Elles voudront certainement combiner leurs efforts, pour mettre un terme à des luttes séculaires, sans cesse renaissantes et toujours plus acharnées.

Mais, pendant qu'elles préparent leur entente, il est urgent de prendre certaines mesures préliminaires, non seulement pour arrêter une inutile effusion de sang, mais pour empêcher les troubles de gagner du terrain dans la Péninsule du Balkan.

En ce qui concerne la guerre d'Herzégovine, il faudrait qu'il fût conclu une suspension d'armes d'une longueur suffisante, pendant laquelle il serait interdit aux Turcs de recevoir aucuns renforts, aux insurgés de se recruter d'adhérents du dehors, aux deux partis de faire d'autres mouvements militaires que ceux de concentration sur des points à désigner. Les Turcs évacueraient les localités en dehors de celles assignées pour leurs cantonnements et les chefs Herzégoviniens s'engageraient à faire respecter les personnes et les propriétés des sujets Mahométans, le Prince de Monténégro se portant garant de cet engagement. Il propose que la zone neutre, mise ainsi sous sa garantie, se compose des districts de Zoubzi, Baniani, Nikchich, Piva, et Rouchine, avec la partie orientale de ceux de Gatsko et de Trebigné.

En ce qui concerne la sûreté du Monténégro du côté du sud, il serait stipulé que la Turquie ne pourrait réunir en Albanie, en général, et dans les places frontières, en particulier, des forces supérieures aux garnisons ordinaires, la flotille sur le Lac de Scutari serait remise sur le pied de paix, le blocus d'Antivari serait levé, et la libre circulation des personnes et des marchandises rétablie sur la frontière.

Les Puissances comprennent certainement l'importance de stipuler une suspension d'armes, mais il n'est pas superflu de leur signaler l'urgence extrême d'imposer à la Porte les conditions qui précèdent. S'il lui est permis de suivre sa tactique constante, elle ne manquera pas d'amuser l'Europe par des déclarations pacifiques et des pourparlers. Pendant ce temps, elle concentrera des forces sur tous les points, amènera de ses provinces reculées des hordes d'irréguliers, fera occuper toutes les positions stratégiques et, une fois prête, elle jettera le masque et lancera ses bandes, non seulement sur ses sujets insurgés, mais sur tous les Chrétiens et, surtout, sur le Monténégro. Celui-ci se prépare à se défendre énergiquement, mais il est faible et il se trouvera réduit aux expédients les plus désespérés et les plus dangereux pour les pays voisins, par ce que son Prince, cédant aux désirs des Puissances, a renoncé à profiter à temps opportun de la faiblesse de son ennemie.

Il n'y a pas d'illusion à se faire. Sa Majesté le Sultan ne demande pas mieux, sans doute, que de faire justice égale à tous ses sujets, mais l'a-t-il jamais pu et le pourra-t-il jamais ? La force des choses ne l'a-t-elle pas toujours emporté, et ne l'emportera-t-elle pas toujours sur ses bonnes intentions, tant que celles-ci ne seront pas soutenues par la volonté formelle de l'Europe réunie ? La position morale et matérielle de son Empire lui permet-elle d'exercer l'action régulière d'un Souverain sur son administration, son armée et ses coreligionnaires ? Ses sujets appartenant à d'autres races sont perpétuellement, les uns en révolte ouverte, les autres contenus par la force seules, attendant le moment de secouer le joug. L'exemple et le voisinage de peuples affranchis sont une excitation inévitable à la rebellion. Le Gouvernement Turc ne peut compter que sur la population Musulmane et, encore, ne peut-il mettre celle-ci en mouvement qu'en faisant appel à son fanatisme. Ses finances ruinées le mettent hors d'état de payer la solde de ses troupes régulières, qui, pour subsister, sont réduits au pillage ; faute de pouvoir les renforcer de bataillons disciplinés, il

doit faire entrer en ligne des levées d'irréguliers sans discipline et sans miséricorde. Ses agents de tous degrés, mêmes ceux qui voudraient être justes, ne peuvent vivre que d'exactions. Ses conseillers les plus élevés, sans cesse brisés pour n'avoir pas qui accomplir l'impossible, ne savent jamais combien de jours ils auront pour exécuter leurs plans les mieux combinés, et les promesses faites par les uns sont chaque jour retirées par les autres.

Dans la dislocation générale, la nation Turque, malgré l'admirable patience qui la caractérise, réduite au désespoir, ne peut manquer de faire appel à son courage pour tirer, autant qu'elle le pourra, une vengeance atroce de ses rivaux, avant d'accepter la ruine de sa domination.

La crise qui se prépare, si l'on ne saisit pas ce dernier moment pour le conjurer, ne pourra pas être circonscrite; toute la Péninsule du Balkan y sera enveloppée. Il ne nous appartient pas de traiter ce qui concerne la Bosnie, la Serbie, et la Bulgarie; mais nous ne pouvons fermer les yeux à l'évidente connexité de tout ce qui se passe dans la Turquie d'Europe. Les Musulmans, de leur côté, ne feront pas de distinctions; tous les Chrétiens, quelles que soient leur race et leur église, sont fatalement compris dans le nombre des ennemis à immoler. Nous savons parfaitement, et tout le monde doit le savoir avec nous, que, comme centre séculaire d'indépendance, notre petit Etat est, tout particulièrement, désigné à des vengeances implacables; aussi ne trouvera-t-on pas extraordinaire que, tout en nous préparant de notre mieux à défendre notre existence, nous prenions, malgré la modeste place que nous occupons sur la carte, l'initiative d'un appel à l'Europe.

Nous n'avons pas la prétention d'indiquer quel mode de négociations, Congrès, Conférences, ou correspondances entre les Gouvernements, convient le mieux pour le but à atteindre, et encore moins celle de mettre sur le tapis des questions qui n'intéressent pas notre pays seul ou les Provinces qui l'entourent. Mais nous prions instamment les Puissances de ne pas perdre de vue que la Sublime Porte ne veut pas, ne peut pas, et même au point de vue Musulman, ne doit pas avoir des projets sérieux de réparation et de justice à l'égard de ses sujets Chrétiens; que, eut-elle ces projets, elle est impuissante pour les exécuter; que la crise suprême et inévitable éclatera, d'elle-même et par la force des choses, malgré les notes diplomatiques et les belles promesses du Divan.

L'Europe seule, agissant de concert, avec promptitude et détermination, peut encore, en interposant sa volonté, empêcher les malheurs d'une guerre d'extermination.

Le Prince de Monténégro,
(Signé) NICOLAS.

Cettigné, le 8 Mai / 26 Avril 1876.

No. 58.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 386.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the Memorandum of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 204 of the 13th instant, containing the proposals of the Governments Austria, Germany, and Russia for the pacification of the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

These proposals had been agreed upon by Count Andrassy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakow at a meeting at Berlin, and your Excellency was requested to communicate them to Her Majesty's Government with the hope that Her Majesty's Government would accede to them and express their opinion at once upon the telegraphic summary furnished by your Excellency.

I informed your Excellency on the 15th instant that it would be necessary for me to consult my colleagues, and that I could not give any reply until after the proposals of the three Governments had been considered by the Cabinet.

I have now to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government regret to find themselves unable to co-operate in the policy which the three Governments have invited them to pursue. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the advantage of concerted action by the Powers in all that relates to the questions arising out of the insurrection, but they cannot consent to join in proposals, which they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the pacification which all the Powers desire to see attained.

The proposals contained in the Memorandum are directed to pressing upon the Porte the establishment of an armistice for two months, with a view to direct negotiations between the Porte and the delegates of the insurgents on the basis of the wishes which the latter have expressed, and which have been thought fit to serve as points of departure for discussion.

In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without knowing whether the military situation admitted of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their position and recruiting their forces and obtaining arms and supplies. The mere fact of the insurrection remaining unsuppressed would be likely to give it additional vitality, and the result of an armistice might, therefore, be to lead to a rejection of any demands which the Porte might fairly be expected to concede, and thus hinder rather than advance the prospects of pacification.

At the same time Her Majesty's Government would not advise the Porte against acceding to an armistice should the Turkish Government consider that the political and military position admitted of it, and its result would be likely to be beneficial, although in view of the objections which I have mentioned, and others of a similar character which will readily occur to your Excellency, Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance.

In my despatch No. 365 of the 15th instant I have informed your Excellency of some of the objections which I stated to Count Münster had occurred to me in regard to the five points which were proposed as a basis for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents, a further consideration of the proposals has not led to any modification of the opinion I then expressed.

Her Majesty's Government doubt whether the Porte has the means of providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees. If Her Majesty's Government are rightly informed the cost would be very heavy, and the Porte has not the requisite funds at its disposal.

The distribution of relief by such a Commission as is contemplated would be little better than a system of indiscriminate almsgiving. It would probably be beyond the power of the Porte to adopt, and if adopted, would prove utterly demoralizing to any country.

Her Majesty's Government do not mean to say that the Porte would not be wise in affording any practicable facilities and inducements for the return of the population who have quitted, or been driven from, their homes owing to the insurrection, but they do not

consider that they can urge upon the Porte to undertake engagements the observance of which would be beyond its power.

The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms.

The "Consular supervision" would remove the authority of the Sultan to nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible.

Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty's Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the Memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification from the Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further.

Regarded in this light the proposal of an armistice seems to Her Majesty's Government to be illusory.

There is another point not referred to in your Excellency's telegraphic summary, but to which it is necessary for me to advert, viz., the proposal in the third paragraph of the Memorandum that the Powers should agree upon the measures to be taken by their respective naval forces for the safety of foreigners and of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire at Salonica and other places where it might be threatened.

Her Majesty's Government have already desired that Her Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" should proceed to Salonica, and that Admiral Drummond, with three other vessels of war, should go to Besika Bay, where he will be in ready communication with Her Majesty's Embassy, and an additional vessel of small size has been placed in attendance at Constantinople at Sir H. Elliot's request.

They have heard that other Powers have reinforced their squadrons in Turkish waters, and that there is a considerable naval force assembled at Salonica.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the measures thus taken will have had a good effect in affording confidence to the subjects of Great Britain and other Powers at Salonica and elsewhere; and they will readily give instructions to Admiral Drummond and the Captains of Her Majesty's ships under his orders, to give any protection and assistance which may be necessary for the preservation of the lives and properties of foreign subjects should they unhappily be in immediate danger, either in concert with the commanding officers of the ships of the other Powers, or, in the absence of any such ships, on their own responsibility. Her Majesty's Government do not, however, at present apprehend any necessity for such measures, and they are of opinion that care should be taken that the naval forces of foreign Powers are not employed in any manner contrary to the Treaty rights of the Porte or subversive of the Sultan's authority.

Your Excellency is authorized to read this despatch to Prince Bismarck, and to leave a copy with his Excellency, should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 59.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(No. 313.) *Foreign Office, May 19, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 299 of the 15th instant, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Odo Russell, informing him of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the Memorandum containing the proposals of the Austrian, German, and Russian Governments for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts.

I have to request your Excellency to read this despatch to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to give him a copy of it should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* Similar instructions were addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris Vienna, Constantinople, and Rome.

No. 60.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.**

(No. 307. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, May 19, 1876.*

My Lord,

IN the despatch which I have addressed to your Excellency on the 19th instant, I have stated that Her Majesty's Government are unable to give their assent to the proposals which the three Governments desire should be urged upon the Porte, and have mentioned the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to refrain from doing so.

Those proposals take the shape of certain defined points for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents, coupled with an armistice and an intimation of an intention to take further measures should the negotiation be unsuccessful. None of these proposals had previously been discussed with Her Majesty's Government, or, so far as they are aware, with the other Powers signatories of the Treaty of Paris; and the inconvenience has consequently arisen again, as in the case of Count Andrassy's note, of a set of Articles being submitted for the acceptance of Great Britain without any opportunity having been afforded for a preliminary consideration of their details by Her Majesty's Government, or for the possible objections of Her Majesty's Government to be considered by the three Governments concerned.

Her Majesty's Government attach little importance to forms in matters of this kind, and would have readily accepted the present proposals had they appeared to them to afford a feasible plan for the pacification of the insurgent districts; but they cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted, and which they do not believe calculated to effect the object with which they are informed it has been framed.

I leave it to your Excellency's discretion how far it may be desirable that you should indicate the views of Her Majesty's Government in this respect in your communications with the German Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 61.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.†

(No. 308.) *Foreign Office, May 19, 1876.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 307 of this day's date, inclosing a copy of the despatch which I have addressed to Lord Odo Russell, containing the answer of Her Majesty's Government to the proposals of the three Powers for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts, I have to point out to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, deprecated the diplomatic intervention of other Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

They agreed, at the instance of the Porte, to take part in the Consular Commission established in August last, although they felt little confidence in any good results arising from it. They also, at the request of the Porte, took part in the concert of the Powers in regard to Count Andrassy's note, although with certain reservations. They scarcely suppose that the Porte will again appeal to them to join the other Powers on the present occasion; and, even if the Porte were to do so, they would not be able to comply, since they feel that they cannot conscientiously advise the Porte to accept conditions which they cannot recommend as politic or feasible.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government do not desire to counsel the Porte to resist any advice or proposals which the Porte may consider to be practicable and advantageous.

They cannot conceal from themselves that the gravity of the situation has arisen, in a great measure, from the weakness and apathy of the Porte in dealing with the insurrection in its earlier stages, and from the want of confidence in Turkish states-

* Similar instructions were addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Copies were sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople, Paris and Rome.

† Copies sent confidentially to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

ascendancy and powers of government, shown by the state of financial, military, and administrative collapse into which the country has been allowed to fall. The responsibility of this condition of affairs must rest with the Sultan and his Government, and all that can be done by the Government of Her Majesty is to give such friendly counsel as circumstances may require. They cannot control events to which the neglect of ordinary principles of good government may expose the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 62.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 19, 1876.*

SIR A. Buchanan's telegram of the 17th just received.

The provision for future Conferences alluded to by him is, as I informed you yesterday, the condition most likely to insure rejection of the proposals by the Porte.

If, instead of giving this intimation, the Powers were to say that, should the armistice expire without an arrangement being come to, they would send agents to Montenegro to see whether the Principality observes neutrality, Porte might be less disinclined to entertain proposals with some necessary modifications.

The suggestion is purely personal, and I have not mentioned it to Rashid Pasha.

No. 63.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 19, at night.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 19, 1875, 9·15 P.M.*

WITH reference to the proposal that the troops in the Herzegovina should be confined to some particular places, while the Mussulmans and the Christians are to remain armed, Rashid Pasha asks how the Powers can believe that such a step would not be likely to lead to sanguinary collisions.

No. 64.

Consul Sir C. Scbright to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 2. Political. Confidential.) *Corfu, May 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the mail of last week from hence to Joannina, by the usual route of St. Quaranta, was intercepted by a party of armed men who contented themselves with taking possession of a packet of despatches addressed to the Russian Consul at Joanina, after which the Courier was allowed to proceed on his way unmolested.

The Turks seem to have awoke at last—too late I fear.

On the strength of reliable information from Prevesa, I have further to state that fears are entertained in that quarter of a revolt among the troops in garrison, and a consequent massacre of the Christian inhabitants.

The garrison is composed of 1,200 men of the Rediff natives of Upper Albania and thorough soldiers, but fanatics in religion, and bitter enemies to the Christian name. Their pay is eight months in arrear, and this alone would form a plausible pretext for the dreaded mutiny.

The same state of things occurred in 1854, at the time of the Epirus Raid. The invaders, commanded by Generals Grivas and Tsavella, were marching on the town when the garrison mutinied and declared their determination not to fight unless their arrears were paid up. The Government could not raise a farthing, and the worst would no doubt have happened; had not our Consul, Mr. Saunders, come to the rescue by giving his personal guarantee to the local capitalists, who, thereupon, advanced the necessary funds. There is no Mr. Saunders at Prevesa now.

I should like much to have an English ship of war on the station, but I hesitate to apply direct to Admiral Drummond for one knowing that he has but few small vessels at his disposal. But I shall not hesitate to apply for naval aid should matters become more threatening in the immediate vicinity of Corfu.

Several English families are expected here to-day from Constantinople, and quarters are already engaged for them at the hotels in town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES SEBRIGHT.

No. 65.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 207.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 16, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a précis by Mr. Michell of two articles from the "Moscow Gazette" and "Golos,"—the former on the present condition of the Turkish Empire, the latter on the Diplomatic Conference at Berlin and the present political state of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Précis of Article from the "Moscow Gazette" of $\frac{\text{April}}{\text{May}}$ 2, 1876.

THE "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{\text{April}}{\text{May}}$ 1876, contains a leading article on the present condition of the Turkish Empire, with special reference to the recent outrage at Salonica.

This occurrence, it observes, is not an accidental episode, but is the result of the same abnormal condition of things that has brought about the insurrection in the Herzegovina. Throughout all the provinces of Turkey the same force is in operation, which is destroying the existence of the Ottoman Empire—a force actively at work in spite of the wishes of the Powers to arrest the inevitable process of decay.

This destructive principle, the "Gazette" affirms, springs from the inequality of religious rights of the populations of Turkey, and from the absolute subjection of a Christian majority to a moribund Mussulman minority, which latter becomes more furious and exasperated as it foresees the termination of its ascendancy.

The "Gazette" further remarks that in view of the wide-spread feeling of animosity entertained by the Moslems against the Christians, and the growing proportions which the insurrection is assuming, the Eastern question remains suppressed only owing to the disinclination of Europe to deal with it.

The Turkish Empire, according to the "Gazette," is not a "sick man" but a dead one. Europe, however, is not yet prepared to recognize the fact. Owing to a fortunate combination of circumstances, the unanimity which prevails between the Great Powers on the subject of Turkey, prevents the possibility of any collision between them.

But, says the "Gazette," the interests of Europe require that the rotten fabric of the Ottoman Empire should not be allowed to fall to pieces at once. The dangers of such an event would be equally great to all, and this is fully recognized by the Great Powers.

In the opinion of the Moscow organ, the renovation of the structure is utterly impracticable, and English architects have given up their attempts in this direction in despair. All that can be done is to insure it for a time. Europe, including Russia, wishes to do this; but then every insurance inevitably limits all rights of possession, and subjects them to the fulfilment of certain obligations.

The Turkish edifice can only be insured in one way, and that is at its summit, which for Europe is the sole consideration of importance. The supports are giving way, and they must be replaced by others. The Turkish Empire in Europe is only possible under the supreme power of the Sultan in principle, but not practically in the shape of a domination of Turk over Christian.

The article asserts that the Powers must insist on a complete equality of rights

between all the subjects of the Sultan, but considers that as this is impossible under Turkish administration, self-government of the provinces becomes inevitable.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Précis of Article from the "Golos" of $\frac{\text{April 23}}{\text{May 5}}$ 1876.

THE "Golos" of the $\frac{\text{24th April}}{\text{6th May}}$ comments in a leading article on the Diplomatic Conference at Berlin and the present political state of Europe. The first portion of the article dwells at length on the existing commercial and industrial stagnation prevailing in almost every country in Western Europe, and this condition of things the "Golos" is inclined to attribute chiefly to the conflict now raging in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and which imperils the peace of the whole of Europe. This state of stagnation in industrial and commercial enterprise may lead to serious disturbances among the working classes. The "Golos" therefore urges prompt diplomatic action on the part of the Great Powers to arrest the spread of the rebellion in the Balkan peninsula, which is the main cause of all the evil.

It observes, however, that the task of the negotiators at Berlin, will consist not alone in devising means for putting an end to the warfare in Herzegovina and Bosnia, but likewise in adjusting the political balance of Europe and consolidating the mutual relations of its political forces. For the peace and the balance of Europe, and for the satisfactory settlement of the Eastern question, it considers that it is highly desirable that the weight and power of the States taking part in the Berlin Conference should be correctly estimated.

As regards Russia, her strength consists in her internal cohesion and in the unity of the elements which enter into the composition of her internal political life. In this respect England alone can vie with her. Almost all the other States of Europe are weakened by internal political dissensions which threaten serious domestic commotions, especially in the event of an outbreak of war. Russia, however, the "Golos" affirms, is not a prey to any such internal differences, in spite of anything that pseudo-patriots and pseudo-conservatives may say as to the results of the reforms introduced in the Empire during the present reign.

No. 66

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 20.)

Belgrade, May $\frac{\text{15}}{\text{}}$, 1876.

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

THE new Servian Ministers are hitherto continuing the work of their predecessors in office.

They are proceeding to carry out the repartition of a forced loan for 500,000*l.* by means of Exchequer Bonds bearing 8 per cent. per annum, to which all the more wealthy taxpayers of the county will have to subscribe.

This loan had been projected for some time, and was referred to in my previous despatches.

The different military stores are being completed, and it is expected that Servia will consider herself sufficiently prepared for war in two or three weeks hence, though her capacity to enter the field against a regular and well trained army must be doubted by anyone more or less acquainted with the modern system of military operations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 67.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 21.)

Rome, May $\frac{\text{15}}{\text{}}$, 1876.

(No. 177.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I called yesterday upon M. Melegari to inform him that Her Majesty's Government saw grave objections to the plan put forward at Berlin with the view of bringing about a pacification of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, and consequently were not prepared to urge its adoption on the Porte.

His Excellency had already received this information from Count Menabrea, who, he said, seems to share the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the steps proposed to be taken were not likely to be productive of the desired result.

M. Melegari added that he regretted the decision of Her Majesty's Government not to unite with the other Powers on this occasion. His Excellency considered that united action between all the Powers was the surest means of securing the maintenance of peace, and that, by associating themselves with the policy of the three Imperial Cabinets in the present instance, the Western Powers would be in a better position to exercise an influence over subsequent proceedings, should the measures now proposed fail to realize the hoped for pacification. These were the motives which had determined the Italian Government to support the new proposals. In his reply to the memorandum of the Chancellors, M. Melegari said that he had laid great stress upon the importance which the Italian Government attaches to no fresh proceedings being adopted without a previous agreement being established between the Powers as to their character.

I asked M. Melegari, with reference to a paragraph taken from the "Neue Freie Fresse," which I had lately seen, whether the idea of a joint occupation of the insurgent provinces by Italian and Austrian troops had ever been brought before him. His Excellency stated in the most positive terms that, except through the newspapers, he had never heard a word on the subject. He seemed fully to appreciate how impossible it would be for Austria to agree to such an arrangement, and said that it was one which, in their desire for a good understanding between all the Powers, the Italian Government could never entertain, even if it should be brought forward, which he thought very unlikely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 68.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 14. Political.)

Bosna Serai, May 12, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Commission of Control, under the presidency of Haidar Effendi, has at last commenced its sittings. The subjects which chiefly occupy its attention at present are said to be the future mode of collection of the tithe or agricultural produce, the institution of "Takhoildars," or tax-gatherers, and the equable distribution of the "bedel-i-askerieh," or tax in lieu of military service.

No important military movements or encounters with the insurgents are reported from the north-west districts; but I am informed that Vely Pasha, the Commander of the forces, has found complete anarchy reigning in many parts of the country, and the Bashi-Bozouks terrorizing the people. At Chazin, near Biluch, especially, the confusion and disorder were so great that he placed the Kaimakam, a Bosnian Mussulman, under arrest. More than 200 armed Turks, however, shortly congregated and demanded his release, and Vely Pasha was forced by threats and intimidation to accede to their demand and to withdraw from the place.

On Tuesday last the Governor-General, Ibrahim Pasha, was informed by the Grand Vizier of the murder of the French and German Consuls at Salonica, and was instructed to redouble his vigilance in the interests of tranquillity and to take every precaution to ensure the safety of the lives of all Europeans and Christians. I am happy to be able to state that the news of this sad event has been received here by Mussulmans as well as Christians with the greatest indignation; but if the perpetrators of the deed be brought to condign punishment, I would suggest that the fact should be published in the official newspaper of this province.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

No. 69.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 36. Political.) *Ragusa, May 12, 1876.*

My Lord,

THE steamship "Calypso," of the Austrian Lloyd service, arrived at Gravosa yesterday, with a cargo of 61,678 kilog. (or 23,049 sacks), of grain, on account of the Turkish Government.

I am informed that 1,200 more Ottoman troops have disembarked at Klek.

Moukhtar Pasha is at Mostar. The Turks say that he has provisioned Goransko; but the Russian Consulate and the Slavs dispute the assertion.

It is understood here that the recall of Ali Pasha is the result of the intrigues for the dismissal of Moukhtar Pasha, with whom the Governor-General of the Herzegovina was not agreed in respect of certain details of present policy. Whatever be the reason, I cannot help thinking that the change is most unfortunate. Ali Pasha may not be a first-rate administrator, but he is honest and conciliatory, and on the best of terms with Wassa Effendi, the President of the Reform Commission. Public confidence too requires strengthening by the maintenance in power of the Supreme Provincial Official; and a fresh example of the insecurity of tenure in high places cannot but have a discouraging effect. It is utterly useless to hope for any practical result from the appointment of well-intentioned administrators, as long as no reliance can be placed on their continuance in office.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 70.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 37. Political.) *Ragusa, May 14, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITHIN the last day or two the eighty insurgents who were interned by the Austrian authorities in the Island of Curzola have succeeded in escaping; and having landed at Ombla, near Ragusa, crossed the frontier into the Herzegovina.

The Island of Curzola is in sight of Ragusa. The Turks of course declare that the Podesta, who is said to be very Slavophil, connived at the escape.

Another fracas between Austrian subjects and Turkish troops occurred yesterday near the fort of Zarnia, on the road to Trebigné, within sight of this town. The occasion was the straying of some sheep across the frontier. Shots were exchanged, and one Turkish soldier was wounded.

Several battalions which were engaged in the Douga battles have returned to Trebigné, and have received a certain amount of their arrears of pay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 71.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 301. Confidential.) *Vienna, May 17, 1876.*

My Lord,

I RECEIVED last night your Lordship's telegram of the same date, informing me that as the plan put forward by the three Northern Powers for the pacification of the Herzegovina appeared to Her Majesty's Government to have grave objections, they were not prepared to press the Porte to adopt it; and I called this morning, by appointment, on Count Andrassy, and communicated to his Excellency the decision of Her Majesty's Government, as stated above, on the proposal which had been made to them from Berlin.

I said that I had not expected Her Majesty's Government to comply with the wishes of the three Powers, as they would probably consider the employment of

European Consular Delegates to superintend the arrangements for affording assistance to returning refugees objectionable, and as the provision for ulterior measures, should the pacification of the insurgent provinces not be accomplished before the expiration of the proposed armistice, might prove an encouragement to the insurgents to put forward new pretensions.

His Excellency answered that the employment of Consuls or their delegates to watch over the execution of the proposed arrangements had been agreed upon at Berlin as absolutely necessary to insure a result which was equally desirable with a view to the interests of Turkey and to the maintenance of the peace of Europe; and he thought that a Government would assume a very serious responsibility were it to encourage the Porte to reject the terms on which it is proposed to re-establish tranquillity in the insurgent provinces, as their rejection might have dangerous consequences.

With respect to the provision for the further consideration of the question, should the measures now proposed not be attended with the desired result, he said he could not see why it should be objected to, as it merely arranged that whatever further action might be necessary should be taken in concert with all the Powers.

He then read a letter or telegram from Count Beust, in which it is alleged that your Lordship was offended at Her Majesty's Government being called upon to give an immediate answer to the proposals of the three Powers, and as Count Andrassy disclaimed having fixed any time for the transmission of an answer, I replied that, whether Count Beust had represented correctly your Lordship's feelings or not, Lord Odo Russell's telegram had certainly stated that his Excellency and Prince Gortchakow would remain at Berlin till Monday last, in the hope of receiving in the meanwhile the decision of the other three Powers; and I added, that I was surprised to find that the French Government, without waiting for fuller information in writing, had apparently agreed to support at Constantinople so complicated a series of important measures upon a mere telegraphic summary of their character and objects.

Count Beust having also reported your Lordship to consider that to call upon the Porte to provide materials for the rebuilding of churches and houses, and food for returning emigrants, would be asking what the financial position of the Turkish Government would not enable it to perform, Count Andrassy observed, in reply, that it would, however, be only urging the complete fulfilment of an engagement which the Porte has already entered into, and is now partially carrying out, as some hundred families have returned to their homes, and are now receiving assistance from the Turkish authorities.

Count Beust having also stated that your Lordship disapproved the proposal that the Christians should retain their arms, his Excellency answered that the Christians would prefer the disarming of the Mussulmans, but, as it would be impossible, without serious disturbance, to apply such a measure to men who had been accustomed to wear arms from their childhood, the only way of establishing equality between the two populations would be to extend the right to do so to the Christians; and, in answer to an inquiry on my part as to the practice of carrying arms in Dalmatia, he said the male inhabitants of the Bocche di Cattaro all did so.

Count Beust having likewise reported an observation of your Lordship's on the unfairness of expecting the Porte to abstain from attacking Montenegro unless the Principality remained strictly neutral, his Excellency said that, as he concurred in that opinion, he could not object to Her Majesty's Government expressing it, and requiring that it should be acted upon, although he himself believed that Montenegro would fulfil its duty as a neutral State.

After these observations, his Excellency said, if Her Majesty's Government would not urge the Porte to adopt the entire programme agreed to at Berlin, he hoped at all events they would not encourage the Turkish Government to reject it, and that they would recommend the conclusion of the proposed armistice as an essential preliminary to any arrangement whatever. I said that if Her Majesty's Government did so, they would only be repeating advice which they had already given to the Porte at his Excellency's invitation before the late military operations in the Dugo Pass, and which your Lordship had approved of my having also given to the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna, on the successful termination of these operations, but which Anvil Pasha said had probably not been attended to at Constantinople, in consequence of the recent occurrences there and at Salonica.

His Excellency continued that, though he regretted that the whole programme had not obtained the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, which he considered would have been an important factor in promoting its success, he still trusted that they

would not withhold their co-operation to such parts of it as might appear to them free from objection, and he would, therefore, immediately instruct Count Beust to endeavour to induce your Lordship to give it, at least, such a limited support; and he gave me to understand that it had been not without difficulty that he succeeded in Berlin in resisting proposals less in harmony with his previously expressed views as to the concessions which should be granted to the insurgents, and with what, he hoped, would meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government and the Porte would be willing to adopt.

His Excellency also stated that the recent occurrences at Salonica had exercised a very unfavourable influence on the question. The incident had not, he said, caused him much alarm, and he was ready to admit, as I suggested that, however deplorable it should be looked upon as the consequence of popular assault, which arose from the Christians being guilty of what the Turks considered a gross outrage on a Mahometan woman. The matter, however, he said, was not treated so lightly at Berlin, where it was held to be a proof that the safety of the Christians throughout the Turkish Empire is in serious danger from the fanaticism and excitement now prevailing among the Mussulman population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 72.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 219.) *Berlin, May* 18, 1876.

My Lord,

ON receiving your Lordship's telegram last night I wrote a private note to Prince Bismarck, stating that Her Majesty's Government saw grave objections to the plan put forward by the three Imperial Governments, and were not prepared to press its adoption on the Porte; and I expressed at the same time, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, the sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to act as far as possible with the German Government.

When I called to-day at the Foreign Office on Herr von Bülow, Prince Bismarck was attending the debates in the "Herren" House. His Excellency told me that the Prince had already spoken to him on the subject, and that Count Münster had equally telegraphed the decision of Her Majesty's Government yesterday to the Chancellor.

The German Government, Herr von Bülow said, could not but regret that the policy of the three Northern Powers would not have the advantage of the support of Her Majesty's Government at Constantinople, as it would have the support of the Governments of France and Italy; but they hoped Her Majesty's Government would, nevertheless, contribute otherwise towards the work of pacification in Turkey.

I inclose, in French translation, an article on the subject of the late Conferences which has appeared in the "Provinzial Correspondenz."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Extract from the "Provinzial Correspondenz." *Berlin, 19 Mai.*

ON lit dans la "Correspondance Provinciale":—

"Les délibérations diplomatiques, tenues, la semaine dernière, à Berlin, et coïncidant avec la visite de l'Empereur Alexandre de Russie à la Cour Impériale d'Allemagne, ont amené une nouvelle et complète entente pour décider les mesures que nécessite l'état des choses en Turquie.

"Le Chancelier de l'Empire Russe et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Austro-Hongrois ayant eu, depuis Jeudi, plusieurs conférences avec le Chancelier de l'Empire d'Allemagne, les trois Puissances Impériales se sont trouvées parfaitement d'accord, dès Samedi, sur toutes les mesures à prendre pour rétablir et assurer la paix en Turquie et pour y protéger les sujets d'Etats Européens, en sorte que les vues et les propositions communes ont pu être immédiatement communiquées aux Ambassadeurs

d'Angleterre, de France, et d'Italie, pour qu'ils demandassent l'adhésion de leurs Gouvernements.

"Si l'on n'a pas dû porter encore à la connaissance du public des détails précis sur l'action commune qui se prépare, cependant le sentiment politique général aura trouvé, avant tout, une satisfaction dans ce fait incontestable que la dernière entrevue des souverains et de leurs hommes d'Etat a donné de nouvelles garanties pour la paix Européenne, et que même la question d'Orient, si difficile, si compliquée qu'elle paraisse, et si menaçante en tout temps pour les relations des Grandes Puissances, grâce à cette union résolument pacifique, maintenant établie au centre de l'Europe, ne doit pas troubler la paix générale.

"Aussitôt après son arrivée, l'Empereur Alexandre, en rappelant quelle était la force unie des trois Empires, a témoigné encore une fois sa ferme volonté de se tenir à cette base d'une puissante politique de paix, et cette volonté que partageaient et affirmaient avec une égale résolution les deux autres Puissances, a fait surmonter, par une prompte et amicale condescendance entre alliés, les graves difficultés des questions nettement pendantes.

"Au premier moment, lorsque fut conclue l'alliance pacifique des trois Empereurs, peut-être a-t-on pu la railler, de plus d'un côté, en disant qu'à cette union manquait toute base d'un accord ou d'un Traité précis et obligatoires; on croyait que l'alliance des trois Empereurs, bien intentionnée sans doute, mais n'ayant pas un objet positif, ne représentait qu'un acte politique d'une importance passagère. Cependant la force de l'alliance pacifique s'est affirmée de plus en plus, d'année en année, précisément par cela même qu'elle n'était pas une alliance conclue dans un but particulier et précis, mais bien l'union de sincères et communs efforts pour le maintien de la paix, l'union ayant pour but un accord intime et permanent sur les intérêts de la paix Européenne.

"Tandis que des alliances contractées dans un but particulier, nettement déterminé, se dissolvent d'ordinaire après avoir atteint ce but, et font place souvent à des unions contraires, il est dans la nature même de l'alliance actuelle pour la paix que, par chaque succès obtenu en commun, elle doive se resserrer d'une manière plus ferme et plus intime encore.

"Chaque année, effectivement, de cette politique des trois Empereurs, chaque nouvelle entrevue de ceux qui en sont les chefs et les soutiens, a fortifié et élevé le sentiment de son importance salutaire non pas seulement pour les peuples Etats des trois souverains, unis pour l'Europe entière; et, en ce sens, on attribuera tout particulièrement à la récente visite de l'Empereur Alexandre, une haute importance pour le développement pacifique de l'Europe."

No. 73.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 22.)

(No. 221.) *Berlin, May* 20, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Queen's messenger having been delayed by an insufficiency of water in Calais harbour, which prevented the steampacket landing passengers in time to catch the through train to Brussels and Cologne, I only received your Lordship's despatch No. 365 of the 15th instant late last night; and as I shall probably not be able to see the Foreign Secretary before the Queen's messenger from Vienna leaves for London to-day, I must reserve my report in reply until next week.

Herr von Bülow told me, however, the last time we met that Count Münster had already telegraphed to Berlin the observations made to him on the 15th by your Lordship, and recorded in the above-named despatch respecting the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the plan proposed by the three Imperial Powers for the pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and explained in the Memorandum inclosed in my despatch No. 201 of the 13th instant to your Lordship.

A similar communication had also been telegraphed, his Excellency said, to Vienna by Count Beust, and by Count Schouvaloff to Ems; and the German Government were still expecting an interchange of views with the Governments of Austria and Russia on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 74.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 22.*)

(No. 222.) *Berlin, May 20, 1870.*

My Lord,

ON the evening of the 16th instant I had the honour to receive from your Lordship a telegram stating that "Her Majesty's Government saw grave objections to the plan put forward by the three Powers, and were not prepared to press its adoption on the Porte."

As the opinion of Her Majesty's Government was not accompanied by any instructions, I thought myself justified in asking your Lordship by telegraph "whether I was to communicate the rejection by Her Majesty's Government of the plan put forward by the three northern Powers officially to the German Government," the consequences of which I thought might be serious.

On the following day I received your Lordship's orders to communicate the decision of Her Majesty's Government to Prince Bismarck, expressing, at the same time, your sincere desire to act, as far as possible, with the German Government.

Your Lordship also requested me to state what were the serious consequences I apprehended from a refusal of Her Majesty's Government to join in the proposals of the three northern Powers.

In consequence I replied by telegraph that the serious consequences I apprehended from the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to join in the proposal of the three Powers were:—

1. The encouragement it might give the Porte to follow a policy of resistance or inaction.

2. The difficulty of supporting with success a policy in Turkey in opposition to the three Powers.

3. The more energetic action in Turkey it might in consequence necessitate on the part of the three Powers.

4. The tendency it might create to hasten on events it would appear desirable to postpone in the East.

5. The alarm it would produce in the commercial world.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 75.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 22.*)

(No. 224. Confidential.) *Berlin, May 20, 1870.*

My Lord,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 221 of this day's date, I have seen the Chancellor, and read to his Highness in part your Lordship's despatch No. 365 of the 15th instant, respecting the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the plan of pacification proposed by the three Northern Powers.

Prince Bismarck had already been made acquainted with your Lordship's views through the German Ambassador in London, and his Highness said that he had instructed Count Münster to communicate his detailed reply to your Lordship.

Prince Bismarck admitted that the several Articles of the Memorandum were open to discussion and might be modified according to circumstances, and that he for one, would willingly entertain any improvement Her Majesty's Government might have to propose, but he greatly regretted that Her Majesty's Government had not felt able to give a general support to the principle of the plan submitted to them by the Northern Powers, and agreed to by France and Italy, and had felt obliged to withdraw from the cordial understanding so happily established between the six Great Powers in regard to the pacification of the Herzegovina. He hoped, however, that the attitude assumed by Her Majesty's Government would remain a secret, and as regard to the action of the five Great Powers at Constantinople; and he felt convinced that Her Majesty's Government would do nothing that could encourage the resistance

of the Turkish Government to their combined efforts in the interest of a speedy settlement of the difficulties they had undertaken to grapple with.

I replied that I would report what he had said to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 70.

*Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received May 23.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, May 22, 1870.*

THE Italian Government is most anxious that Her Majesty's Government should at least support at Constantinople demand for armistice, and if they cannot advise adoption of the other measures, that they [will not advise] the Porte to reject them.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Russia, wishing to have the merit of bringing about the pacification, will, he is sure, make a point of securing submission of insurgents, if the present terms are accepted by the Sultan's Government.

Count Menabrea, in common with the Representatives of other Powers, has been instructed to urge these points, but the Minister wished me to telegraph also. He says that if the present proposals are rejected more decided measures will become necessary, as the five Powers cannot submit to having their advice disregarded. I replied that in urging armistice Her Majesty's Government might perhaps think that they would be advising course prejudicial to Turks, and in regard to other points they would probably advise them to do what they thought best for their own interests.

No. 77.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received May 22.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 22, 1870.*

I HAVE read to Duc Decazes, and given him a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 285, to Lord O. Russell.

He made observations and objections, similar to those contained in a despatch which the French Ambassador at London is instructed to read to your Lordship.

He is most uneasy at non-adhesion of Her Majesty's Government, and implores them to reconsider their decision, to consent to an armistice, however short, in order that some ground may be found for a general concert of the Six Powers.

He considers the abstention of England would be a public calamity.

The Russian Government having proposed that the new proposals should be presented at Constantinople by Five Powers instead of Six, he has declared that although Italy has agreed, France will wait with hope that England may not be isolated.

I send my messenger this evening.

No. 76.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 23.*)

(No. 390.) *Constantinople, May 12, 1870.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of last night, I have the honour to inform you that my colleagues are unanimously of opinion that the Embassies are entitled to have two "stationnaires" each at Constantinople, and that the Treaties contain nothing to prevent one of them being a gun-boat.

Most of the Embassies have at one time or another had gunboats here, and no objection was raised to the presence during the winter of Her Majesty's ship "Rapid." A larger ship than that ought not, however, to be sent.

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Rome.
† Repeated to Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Rome, and Constantinople.

A Russian gun-boat is on the way here, and other Governments are; I believe, sending one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

P. S. *May* 11.—A Russian corvette and a Greek gun-boat arrived here to-day.

No. 79.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 23.)

(No. 492.) *Constantinople, May* 12, 1876.
My Lord,

AN immediate and marked improvement took place in the aspect of things here upon the announcement of the change of Grand Viziers, and comparative confidence was restored.

Many circumstances which have come to my knowledge have fully confirmed me in the conviction I had already conveyed to your Lordship, that the demonstration was directed against the Sultan and Mahmoud Pasha, and that no hostile design was entertained against the Christians.

But, although the objects of the organizers of the movement were political, and neither social nor religious, it is not to be doubted that the Christians would have been exposed to imminent danger in the event of a popular tumult.

The visible leaders of the movement were the Softas, or students of the Koran, a determined and energetic body of men, numbering, as far as I can ascertain, between 5,000 and 6,000, who are, however, able to exercise influence over many others.

It appears that on the 10th instant a large assemblage of them met Prince Izeddin when on his way to the Seraskerat in Stamboul, and stopping him, bade him return and inform the Sultan of their demands, viz., the dismissal of the Sheikl-ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier.

His Majesty, on receiving the message, sent his Secretary to the Mosque, where upwards of 2,000 were assembled, in order to ascertain more precisely what it was they wanted, and by the next day at noon both their wishes had been complied with.

From what I can learn of the ulterior designs of these men I gather that they evidently, under an able leader, intend before long to require the Sultan to modify his prerogative, and to grant a representative and constitutional form of Government, the main object of this demand being to ensure an efficient control over the finance of the State.

Although Mehemet Ruschdi Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, is universally respected, the appointment of Midhat Pasha may not improbably still be insisted upon, and they are all the more confident that their requests will meet with consideration, that they feel convinced that no armed force will ever be prevailed upon to act against them.

There being, for the present, no fanatical element in this movement, its leaders appear ready to share with the Christians the right of representation, and thus to insure to them the attainment of political equality with the Moslem, which has been so often though vainly promised.

The programme of the Softas bears so much resemblance to that which is known to be advocated by Midhat Pasha, that it is not surprising that many persons should regard His Highness, if not as the head, at least as one of the principal members of this remarkable organization.

Although not, I believe, included in the written petition to the Sultan, a demand that his Majesty should ask the Emperor of Russia to recall his Ambassador is known to have been among the pretentions of the Softas, and in putting it forward they have the almost unanimous support of their countrymen of all religions, and I may add, of the foreigners also, the presence of General Ignatiew being now regarded as a confirmed danger to the public tranquillity.

Although the present movement has for the moment passed off quietly, its importance and possible future consequences are not to be overlooked.

The Softas have learned their own strength, and having once succeeded in intimidating the Sovereign, may be tempted to renew the experiment.

I do not myself entertain a doubt that the only safe course now to follow is the one which I myself suggested to the Sultan some months ago by the regular adoption of some measure of constitutional control over the action of the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 80.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 23.)

(No. 496.) *Constantinople, May* 15, 1876.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit the further reports from Vice-Consul Dupuis upon the progress of the insurrection in Western Roumelia and the coming and enrolment of Bashi-Bozouks in its neighbourhood.

In Mr. Dupuis' despatch No. 17 your Lordship will no doubt be struck that, whereas the Russian Consuls at Adrianople and Philippopoli dared not show themselves in public, the Greeks at the latter place waited with the Turks to repel any attack from the Bulgarians.

I have also the honour to inclose a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bourgas, reporting the spread of the insurrection among the highlands of the Balkans, and the existence of a considerable supply of arms and ammunition in the insurgent districts.

The information, on the other hand, which I received yesterday from the Porte was of a more reassuring character, and the railway bridges which had been destroyed by the insurgents were being reconstructed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Adrianople, May 12, 1876.
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the authorities at the Konak yesterday published in Turkish, Greek, and Bulgarian, a telegram from Hafous Pasha, the Commander of the troops at Tatarpazardjik, a translation of which is as follows:—

"On the 7th instant, the village of Strjelitza was taken by a battalion of cavalry, who behaved heroically under my command. The insurgents had two killed and five wounded; the rest fled to Avratalan, in the Balkans. The guns and ammunition which fell into my hands, as well as 177 Turkish pounds found on the prisoners, I have sent to Tatarpazardjik. I then withdrew to the village of Aivaly, where, having made preparations, I start this morning for Strjelitza to join the army and pursue the enemy. Avratalan is four hours from Strjelitza and three from Ofienkeni. As soon as I reach Ofienkeni, I intend to push a reconnaissance, and continue operations against the insurgents. The insurgents are concentrated at the two aforesaid villages."

Intelligence having been received the day before yesterday, and since confirmed, that the railway station at Bellova was burnt down by insurgents, and two railway bridges between Sarambey and Tatarpazardjik also burnt, and the line between the latter places torn up, I telegraphed to your Excellency to that effect last night.

Among other items of intelligence, I learn that some twenty Bulgarian prisoners, including four priests brought from Philippopoli, as well as the individuals on whom insurgent correspondence was discovered, as I telegraphed on the 7th instant, were forwarded to Constantinople yesterday, heavily chained.

I likewise inform your Excellency that the local authorities, as well as the Turkish Begs here, are displaying great activity in the enrolment and equipment of Bashi-Bazouks, and other volunteers, and hatches of Turkish peasantry are continually arriving from the surrounding villages to be supplied with arms and ammunition.

The Governor-General, in reply to my inquiries on the subject of the enrolment of these irregular troops, told me that they would only be used to guard the railway line. Nevertheless, the presence of such troops, and the fact that the Mussulman

inhabitants have been provided with arms and ammunition by the authorities, continues to cause serious apprehensions lest the public peace should be disturbed.

In the meanwhile, I hear that, in consequence of the disorders said to have been committed by the Bashi-Bazouks, the bazaars and shops in Philippopoli and Tatar-pazardjik are closed, and the inhabitants leaving in numbers. Inclosed, I beg to transmit copy of a letter from Mr. Milcoff, from which your Excellency may judge the state of the panic existing there. Mr. Milcoff, who is a naturalized British subject, applied to me in a previous letter to be allowed to hoist the English flag over his house. In answer, I informed him that I could not authorize him to do so, without referring to Her Majesty's Embassy.

Aziz Pasha, the Mutessarif of Philippopoli, has since my last report been dismissed, and Hamdi Pasha appointed in his stead.

My Polish friend, in the service of the Porte, having accompanied one of the Sultan's Aides-de-camp to Tatarpazardjik, returned last night. He tells me that the state of the country between Philippopoli, Bellova and Otlonkeui is deplorable to behold, that villages are burning in all directions of the compass; that in consequence of ignorance and apathy on the part of the Turkish functionaries, the greatest disorder and confusion prevails there.

The burning of Bellova seems to have been attended with horrible cruelties to the small Turkish guard in charge of the place, which, being overpowered, was hacked to pieces by the Bulgarians.

My informant adds that shortly after this occurrence a party of about 150 well-mounted and equipped insurgents, led by the priests, presented itself in the village, declaring, with crucifixes in hand, that that was the way to exterminate Islamism.

Fears are meanwhile entertained for the safety of the Yamboli Lizi and the surrounding country, for should the insurrection spread along the Balkans, and Shumla fall into the hands of the insurgents, even Constantinople will be menaced.

I am assured that Hafons Pasha's telegram of the doings of the troops under his command are entirely false, that he has never once come upon the insurgents, and that, whilst their whereabouts is known, for some reason or another he avoids engaging them. According to other accounts the whole of the country is being laid waste by Bashi-Bozouks and the troops under his orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DUPUIS.

P.S.—It is reported, that while gunpowder is being openly sold to the Turkish inhabitants in this city, it is refused to Christians.

J. H. D.

Inclosure 2 in No. 80.

M. Milcoff to Vice-Consul Dupuis.

Philippopoli, May 10, 1876.

Sir,

AS I wrote you in my last letter, my family are in great fear and anxiety. Be kind enough, please, to let me know by telegraph what I must do; shall I stay here or leave at once for your town? If I stay here I must have some protection and security, so you will oblige me to get me from your Vali Pasha an Emirnamé to our Governor—in my case, to get some protection and security. The day before I called on the Governor here, and asked him to give me a guard. They told me that they had not any to spare. What must I do, and my family, who are in great fear and anxiety? I shall wait your advice with anxiety.

(Signed) M. MILCOFF.

Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Adrianople, May 13, 1876.

Sir,

ALTHOUGH I have the satisfaction to announce to your Excellency that the public tranquillity continues undisturbed in this city, and that I fail to discover any motive so far from apprehending the contrary state of things, still I think it my duty

to acquaint your Excellency that a sort of stillness seems to pervade all classes of society—a stillness and quiet almost felt, so to say, as if every one was living in a state of uncertainty and expectancy of some impending or menacing event.

Conflicting rumours of all kinds are going the rounds respecting the attitude of the Turks; and I am positively assured that whilst the Mussulman inhabitants are not only permitted to circulate the streets armed with pistols and zatiguns, but even to monopolize the sale of gunpowder to their countrymen, Christians are forbidden to make purchases of that nature.

On the other hand, I hear that both the people and the Bashi-Bozouks have been summoned to the Konak to deliver up their arms, which will be restored on their being ordered off for active duty, either in guarding the railway, or against the insurgents.

Hadji Achmet Aga, Rasim Bey, and other Turks of note here, are showing patriotism by arming and maintaining, at their own expense, a corps of 200 Bashi-Bozouks, each for operations in the Balkans.

Independent of a few Zaptiehs, the garrison of Adrianople consists of about two and a-half battalions of Redifs, since 200 artillerymen, and 1 guns; but I believe other troops are expected.

It was given out a day or two ago, that the Russian Consul of Philippopoli had been insulted; this, however, has been contradicted; but it is nevertheless true that both he and the Russian Consul here are afraid to show themselves in the public streets.

I have it from my Greek colleague, as a remarkable circumstance, and probably not without some signification, that the Greeks in Philippopoli united with the Turkish guards to maintain order, and to repel any attempt against the place by the Bulgarians.

I have just heard that Hafons Pasha, instead of attacking with his troops a body of 200 insurgents, near Ottonkeni, contented himself with dispersing them from a distance with artillery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DUPUIS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 80.

Vice-Consul Brophy to Sir H. Elliot.

Bourgas, May 13, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to express to your Excellency my belief that the Bulgarian insurrectionary movement commenced in the Caza of Philippopoli will not be confined to that district. I have some reason for thinking that the plans of the insurgents embrace six centres of revolt, most of them in the High Balkan (Kodja Balkan, Stari Planina), in each of which localities depôts of arms—rifles, revolvers, &c.—ammunition, and provisions are hidden. The authorities of this vilayet have received notice that arms have been landed at Sizopoli and Vassilikos, small towns on the coast between Bourgas and Constantinople, and an "avviso" has been sent here. This information I believe to be incorrect, the inhabitants of the coast being Greek Rayahs, between whom and the Bulgarians any concerted action or, indeed, any kind of fusion appears to me impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. BROPHY.

No. 81.

Rashid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha. May 23.)

Constantinople, le 21 *Mai*, 1876.

(Télégraphique.)

ON nous informe que, dans l'entrevue de Berlin, il a été question de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine; que les Ministres des trois Empires ont arrêté les bases d'un projet de pacification. D'après ce projet, on voudrait nous amener à consentir à une suspension d'armes de deux mois pendant lesquels des pourparlers seraient engagés entre la Sublime Porte et les Délégués Bosniens et Herzégoviniens sur la base des vœux formulés par eux et jugés propres à servir de point de départ à une discussion. Le projet en question se résumerait en cinq points principaux, à savoir:—Reconstruction

des églises et des maisons des réfugiés qui rentrent, le Gouvernement devant fournir les matériaux et assurer à ces derniers leur subsistance jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent vivre de leur travail; nomination d'un Président Chrétien Herzégovinien pour la Commission exécutive des réformes; cantonnement des troupes jusqu'à l'apaisement des esprits sur quelques points à convenir; faculté laissée aux Musulmans comme aux Chrétiens de garder les armes; surveillance exercée par les Consuls des Puissances sur l'application des réformes et sur les faits relatifs au rapatriement. Enfin, et la suite de ces cinq points, le projet aurait eu soin de prévoir une éventualité, celle de l'expiration du délai de deux mois sans que les efforts des Puissances aboutissent au but désiré. Dans ce cas, les trois Cours Impériales prendraient les mesures efficaces qui paraîtraient réclamées dans l'intérêt de la paix générale. Tel serait en substance ce document. Quoique son existence ne soit pas officiellement connue de tous, les points susdits sont trop importants, ils font naître de trop légitimes préoccupations pour que je ne doive pas dès à présent même, et ne fût-ce que sur de simples renseignements, vous faire connaître en quelques mots l'impression que la nouvelle du projet et des démarches en question a produite sur nous, les réfutations qu'elles nous suggèrent, et les considérations auxquelles elles donnent lieu.

Avant tout, et surtout, le résultat, tel qu'il est connu des Conférences de Berlin, a provoqué en nous un sentiment de profond regret, je dirai presque de découragement amer, et cela n'étonnera personne si l'on examine les faits et la situation sans prévention et avec une impartiale équité. On reconnaîtra aisément que ce que nous devons déplorer le plus, c'est la coïncidence si malheureuse pour l'œuvre de la pacification des propositions formulées avec les circonstances actuelles favorables, et combien ce projet, évidemment inspiré par le désir général d'amener la paix et la tranquillité en Bosnie et en Herzégovine, mis en avant aujourd'hui, ira à l'encontre du but proposé, paralysera les efforts, détruira les résultats satisfaisants déjà acquis au prix de tant de sacrifices. Dans cette ordre d'idées, et sans entamer ici une discussion à fond qui trouvera sa place ailleurs, je vous dirais que le projet élaboré à Berlin surgit au milieu d'un état de choses qui, examiné sans parti pris, constitue pour ainsi dire une des dernières étapes vers l'apaisement; qu'il arrive le lendemain d'un grand succès militaire, remporté par Mukhtar Pacha, succès dont l'obtention nous a été toujours indiquée, et que nous tenons, comme devant hâter la pacification. Ce projet, enfin, se produit lorsque les insurgés, battus et défaits à Douga, sont aux abois, qu'ils ont fait des pertes énormes, que leurs bandes sont dispersées, qu'ils sont démoralisés, que, ne pouvant tenir la campagne, ils se sont réfugiés sur les montagnes, et que des milliers de familles réfugiées commencent à rentrer dans leurs foyers. Dès lors, il est facile de voir l'effet que va produire sur ces bonnes dispositions le résultat des Conférences de Berlin, qui semble mettre tout en question, et quelle regrettable diversion il va produire.

Pour nous, qui voyons et jugeons les choses de près, nous pensons et nous sommes convaincus que ce résultat arrêtera le retour de l'émigration, réveillera un espoir chimérique chez les insurgés découragés, les entraînera fatalement à la résistance, et, en rayant par là l'action de l'autorité, compromettra gravement l'opération de la pacification. Certes, les responsabilités inhérentes à une telle conséquence sont trop graves pour que le Gouvernement Impérial ne croie pas de son devoir de les écarter dès à présent.

Dans de telles conditions, et dans de telles circonstances, pourrions-nous, sans méconnaître ouvertement nos devoirs, nous faire bon marché des avantages obtenus jusqu'à présent au prix de tant de sang versé, consentir à la trêve proposée de deux mois? En le faisant, nous contribuerions non-seulement à rendre encore plus pénibles les charges déjà si lourdes occasionnées au Trésor par cette malheureuse insurrection, mais nous consacrerions, d'une part, la démoralisation de l'armée, et nous fournirions, de l'autre, aux insurgés le répit si nécessaire et le temps si précieux à une pareille occurrence pour réparer leurs pertes, se réorganiser, grossir leurs rangs; enfin, pour recommencer la lutte peut-être avec quelque chance de succès, et cela précisément le lendemain de l'expérience de la dernière trêve dont les combats sanglants de Douga se sont chargé d'expliquer les conséquences.

Pour ce qui est de la reconstruction des églises et des maisons, et des subsides à accorder aux émigrés rentrant jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent vivre de leur travail, votre Excellence sait que le Gouvernement Impérial a promis, indépendamment des autres faveurs, de donner toutes les facilités nécessaires pour ces constructions et d'accorder des subsides aux nécessiteux pour un terme indiqué. Mais de là à ce qui nous serait proposé il y a loin, et nous croyons n'être pas contestés en disant qu'assurer la subsistance de ces gens pendant un temps indéterminé qui ne prendrait fin que selon leur bon plaisir, ce serait non-seulement créer une charge ruineuse pour le fisc, mais encore

donner publiquement une prime à l'insurrection, un encouragement à la paresse, et favoriser indirectement ce que l'on avait en vue de prévenir.

Nous nous demandons également si c'est dans un but d'apaisement et de conciliation qu'on voudrait laisser leurs armes aux Musulmans et aux Chrétiens; tout en cantonnant les troupes sur certains points. La plus simple réflexion suffit pour faire voir que, dans l'état actuel des choses et des esprits, un tel mode de procéder équivaudrait à laisser libre carrière à tous les mauvais instincts et à éterniser les conflits, puisqu'on éloigne, qu'on isole, qu'on neutralise la seule force capable de contenir les passions, d'apaiser les haines, de prévenir et d'empêcher les luttes.

Nous avons de la peine à comprendre la coëxistence de la présidence de la Commission par un Herzégovinien Chrétien, et de la surintendance à exercer par les Consuls; car, si la première proposition est formulée comme une preuve de confiance et une garantie d'exécution, la seconde n'est rien moins qu'une manifestation destructive de cette confiance, indépendamment de ce qu'elle a de blessant, au premier chef, pour la dignité du Gouvernement et pour le prestige de l'autorité.

Enfin, et pour clore cette énumération, je dirais que la simple énonciation par le projet de l'éventualité d'une entente à établir si le délai de deux mois expire sans qu'une solution intervienne, suffit à elle seule pour rendre tout effort infructueux, et entièrement stérile l'œuvre même préconisée par la Conférence.

En un mot, le résumé de nos réflexions est que le Gouvernement Impérial, qui a été jusqu'à accepter les propositions contenues dans la note du Comte Andrassy uniquement par déférence pour les conseils des Puissances, et sur les assurances formelles qu'elles ont bien voulu lui donner comme quoi l'application des mesures suggérées amènerait la pacification à laquelle elles contribueraient; d'ailleurs, moralement et d'une façon efficace, ne saurait aujourd'hui sortir des limites tracées par ces propositions, approuvées par toute l'Europe et acceptées par nous.

Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considérations ci-dessus esquissées dans l'entretien que vous auriez à ce sujet avec M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

No. 82.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 315.)

Paris, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 515, of the 19th instant, instructing me to read to the Duc Decazes the despatch (a copy of which was therein inclosed) which your Lordship had addressed to Lord Odo Russell the same day, informing that Ambassador of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the memorandum containing the proposals of the Austrian, German, and Russian Governments for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts.

I attended at the reception at the French Foreign Office yesterday evening, and I informed the Duke Decazes of your Lordship's instructions, and asked for an early interview.

His Excellency observed that he had been both surprised and grieved at the decision of Her Majesty's Government, which had been communicated to him, not to adhere to the new proposals of the three Imperial Courts. He said that he had written to the French Ambassador in London a despatch on this subject, which would be read to your Lordship, and he begged me to call upon him this morning to execute my instructions.

I have accordingly communicated to the Duke your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, and at his Excellency's desire I placed a copy of it in his hands.

On leaving his Excellency I telegraphed to your Lordship, stating particularly his extreme anxiety that Her Majesty's Government might find it possible to reconsider their decision, and that, by acceding to an armistice, however short, some common ground might be found which would lead to a general concert of the six Powers on this important question.

I reserve for another despatch my report of His Excellency's observations upon your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

Your Lordship will, however, find them, in the main, in the Duke's despatch to the Marquis d'Harcourt, which his Excellency was kind enough to read to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 83.

*Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received May* 23.)

Constantinople, May 20, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE language I have been holding to the Porte is, that although Her Majesty's Government are indisposed to join Berlin proposals, they must not be considered as advising their rejection; and that the Five Powers being agreed, the Porte should rather point out what it considers objectionable in the proposals, than offend them by a summary rejection.

No. 84.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

Foreign Office, May 23, 1876, 5·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

HER Majesty's Government have absolutely declined to adopt the Berlin proposals, but approve your advice to the Porte to pursue a conciliatory policy so far as it is able to do so.

No. 85.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Adams.

(No. 529.)

Foreign Office, May , 1876.

Sir,

THE Marquis d'Harcourt called at this office to-day, and told me that he had received a despatch from his Excellency the Duc Decazes, instructing him to communicate to me the views of the French Government on the policy of the Berlin proposals, and the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in regard to them.

As the despatch was too long to read conveniently, his Excellency confined himself to recapitulating its substance.

He then stated to me the opinion of the French Government, in almost the same words which the Duc Decazes had made use of, as reported in your despatch No. 347, Confidential, of the 22nd instant.

I thanked him, in reply, for the courtesy shown by the French Government to Her Majesty's Government in the matter, and for the desire which he had expressed on their behalf, that the two Governments should act in concert.

I, however, said that Her Majesty's Government had already carefully considered the question in all its aspects, and were not indifferent to the considerations to which he had referred. They could, nevertheless, not depart from the line of conduct which it had appeared to them they were bound to pursue, and I was consequently unable to do more than repeat the regret of Her Majesty's Government at being unable to act in concert with France and the other Powers who had accepted the proposal, and to request his Excellency to thank the Duc Decazes for his present communication.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 86.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received May* 23, *at night.*)

Vienna, May 23, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Russian Ambassador went to Pesth the day before yesterday, and Turkish Ambassador to-day. Although nothing can be learnt here, I think it inexpedient under present circumstances to go there, and shall not unless I have a communication to make.

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* Repeated to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Rome.

† Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 87.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 23, *at night.*)

Paris, May 23, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

DUC DECAZES has just informed me that Prince Hohenlohe came to him this afternoon and said that Prince Gortchakow and Count Andrassy had agreed that the Representatives should now address identic notes to the Porte in terms of Berlin Memorandum; that German Government adhere and are going to instruct Ambassador at Constantinople.

Duc Decazes answered that, in view of regrettable difference on English side, he had addressed a pressing appeal to English Cabinet, and awaited answer.

Austrian Chargé d'Affaires then arrived and made same communication and received same answer. He then added that Count Andrassy would consequently try and retard step at Constantinople if Duc Decazes saw more chance of inducing England to draw nearer to the views of the other Powers, at least as to armistice. Duc Decazes took note of this and promised speedy answer.

In communicating to French Ambassador in London, Duc Decazes ends by saying that it is at all events good that the English Cabinet should know these conciliatory dispositions at once.

No. 88.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 24.)

(No. 546.)

Paris, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

WHEN I saw the Duc Decazes to-day, as stated in my preceding despatch, his Excellency again expressed his surprise and regret at the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to join in the new proposals of the three Imperial Courts, and he said that when he telegraphed to Berlin the adhesion of the French Government, it was with the conviction that Her Majesty's Government would adopt the same course.

As I read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 385 of the 19th instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, the Duke made from time to time observations, the substance of some at least of which I will endeavour to convey to your Lordship.

With regard to the armistice he considered that it would be as advantageous to the Porte as to the insurgents, if not more so. The experience, he thought, of the past months had shown that the Turkish army were in such a condition that they could not put down the insurrection, and the War Department, as an organized portion of the Government, could employ the period of the armistice to more advantage in putting the army into a better state than the insurgents, who had no such organization to fall back upon, could possibly do for themselves.

He did not think that the expenses of the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents, or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees would be so great as that the Porte could not find means to meet them. At all events, if the alternative was to be a continuance of the struggle, he was of opinion that the war expenses which would fall upon the Porte would be much heavier in that case.

He did not, he said, consider that the concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy; on the contrary, he thought this measure would tend to the pacification of the disturbed districts. The struggle, he contended, was not a religious one, not a fight between Christian and Mussulman, but an agrarian insurrection, having its origin in bad administration.

He defended Consular supervision. He allowed, indeed, that the mission of the Consuls to Mostar had been a failure, but then that had happened whilst fighting was going on, and their chance of doing good was small, but he was of opinion that such a supervision as had been suggested would, during the armistice, have much greater chance of success in the disturbed districts.

But, besides these and other observations with which I need hardly trouble your Lordship, the Duc Decazes spoke to me at length, and in peculiarly earnest language, of the result which he dreaded if, by the non-consent of all the Powers, an armistice became impossible, and thus the present struggle were to be kept up.

His Excellency drew a graphic picture of the probable spread of the insurrection, of the consequent rising of one Province after another in the Ottoman Empire, of the

greater and greater effusion of blood, of the gradual dismemberment of the Empire, until at last, as he feared, all Europe might be drawn into the vortex.

He implored Her Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision; he trusted that they would at least consent to recommend an armistice, however short, in order that an attempt might be made to find some ground for the establishment of a common concert between the six Powers, and he declared that, for his part, he could not but consider that if England stood aloof at this momentous crisis, it would be "a public calamity" for Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 89.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 347. Confidential.)
Paris, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

DURING my interview to-day with the Duc Decazes, his Excellency spoke to me about the proposal which had now emanated from Russia, namely, that, as England refuses to adhere to the new Memorandum for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts, the other five Powers should proceed, without her, to address notes to the Porte in the spirit of that Memorandum.

His Excellency said that, so anxious was he that France and England should act cordially together in this question, as they had done in so many others, that he at once took steps with a view to inducing Italy to delay her assent to Russia's new proposal, but that it was too late, as he learnt that the Italian Government had already instructed their Representative at Constantinople by telegraph to join in giving effect to the Russian proposal.

The Duke told me that he was not going to imitate this action of the Cabinet of Rome, by giving in his adhesion to such a proposal at once by telegraph. He intended, he said, to wait, solely in the hope that Her Majesty's Government might re-consider their decision, and that England might, after all, renounce her present isolation, and thus a concert of the six Powers might still be obtained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 90.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, May 23, 1876.

AT an interview to-day with the Secretary in charge of the Foreign Ministry, I said that the Commissioner in Bosnia having failed to induce refugees to return, from want of regular troops to protect them, and the Commissioner in the Herzegovina having resigned because the Commander-in-chief would not detach troops for that purpose, Her Majesty's Government are not likely to be convinced of the expediency of the Berlin proposal for the concentration of the Turkish forces in these provinces.

No. 91.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received May 24.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, May 24, 1876.

FOLLOWING received from Mr. Gastrell:—

"Count Andrassy declared yesterday to the Hungarian Delegation that the question of Dardanelles Convention had not been even mentioned, and that the insurgents would accept the terms offered as soon as they were convinced that there was no hope of dissension between the three Powers.

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.
† Repeated to Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

"Baron Orczy has also stated to a colleague that Turkey will accept the new Note. The insurgents will disarm at a word from Montenegro, and the word will not fail to be forthwith given.

"Private and Confidential. At Emperor's dinner yesterday there was a conversation as to your coming down to explain England's attitude."

No. 92.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, May 24, 1876, 3:40 P.M.

I APPROVE the course you propose to pursue, as reported in your telegram of the 23rd instant.

No. 93.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, May 24, 1876, 4 P.M.

I APPROVE the language you held to the Secretary in charge of the Foreign Ministry, as reported in your telegram of the 23rd instant.

No. 94.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 319. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador called to-day to discuss with me the telegraphic despatch from the Porte which he had communicated to me yesterday, and of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch No. 312 of the 24th instant.

After his Excellency had recapitulated the substance of the telegram and made some general remarks, I stated that Her Majesty's Government would not advise any precipitate action on the part of the Porte in regard to the proposals which had been prepared at Berlin. It appeared to them that the proper course for the Porte to pursue was to carefully examine the several points in detail and ask for explanations upon them before giving any decisive reply. Her Majesty's Government would not, however, assume the responsibility of advising the Porte, who must be guided by what they thought best, after due consideration, for the welfare of the Ottoman Empire.

His Excellency then asked me what Her Majesty's Government supposed would be the next step taken by the Powers, and whether any modification was likely to take place in the proposals. I said that I understood that the Powers were likely to present an identic note or separate notes of a similar purport in the sense of the Berlin proposals, and I had no reason to suppose that it was intended to modify them in any respect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 95.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 14.)
Mostar, May 12, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, dated to-day, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, regarding the removal of Ali Pasha, the breaking-up of the camp at Gatzko, the return of some hundreds of families of refugees, and other matters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Elliot.

Mostar, May 12, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a couple of days ago Ali Pasha received a despatch announcing his removal from the Herzegovina, and his appointment to Scutari. His Excellency was much disgusted with this news, and tells me that he has tendered his resignation. He has heard that his removal was occasioned by the representations of Baron Rodich. He is replaced by a certain Salim Effendi, a person who is said to be honest and conciliatory, but timid in the extreme, and by no means fit for the position conferred on him.

The Commander-in-chief, Moukhtar Pasha, arrived here last night, and it is said that the camp at Gatzko is to be broken up. What is meant by this is not understood here, but it is supposed that some means of pacification has been decided on without more fighting. It is absolutely asserted by information from Montenegro and elsewhere that Moukhtar Pasha did not go to Nichsich, being unable, as before, to advance beyond Preshlka, three hours from that place, but that about 300 loads of provisions, which managed to get in advance of the troops, were taken and safely escorted to Nichsich by the inhabitants, who had come out to assist Moukhtar Pasha. Ali Pasha, however, who is not particularly inclined to place any faith in Moukhtar Pasha's assertions, says that, from certain information from other sources, he cannot doubt but that the Commander-in-chief really did reach Nichsich. After all, it is of very little consequence whether he did or not. The garrison has been relieved for a short time, but, unless a pacification is effected, it will have to be revictualled again in a few weeks.

Several hundred families of refugees have returned to their homes, and more are expected. The Austrian Government, it appears, has declared that they must do so, and that all supplies will cease if they do not; but it is said that if they are molested or not supported by the Turks, they have been informed that they will be at liberty to return, and rations will again be allowed them. Wassa Effendi has done all he can to insure their safety, but he complains that Moukhtar Pasha pays no attention to his demands for troops to be stationed in Popovopolie to protect them; and he attributes this to simple jealousy, because the people having paid no attention to a Proclamation he issued some time ago inviting them to return, he will do nothing to further this object, now that Wassa Effendi takes the initiative. Wassa Effendi seems thoroughly disgusted at the state of affairs, and the way he has been treated, and says he intends to send in his resignation. He says he has been deceived in the promises made to him respecting the funds to be placed at his disposal, and also that promises made to him regarding personal affairs have not been kept. He also states that he feels he shall be able to do nothing with Moukhtar Pasha and such a Governor as Salim Effendi, who, though one of his most intimate friends, he pronounces to be totally incapable of doing any good here. He feels that at any moment there is a great risk of all the families who have returned again taking flight to Austria, and he declares that no reforms can be carried out as long as the Medjlisses consisting of the people of the country have any power, and with Salim Effendi they will be paramount.

I can offer no opinion as to the changes I have mentioned, because I do not at all understand them. All I can say is, that during the whole of this business I have remarked that the sole object of the Porte apparently seems to be to remove every functionary who exhibits any capacity or truthfulness, and to replace them by those who are utterly devoid of such qualities; and I declare that it is hopeless to expect that any of the promises of the Government can be carried out under such circumstances.

Wassa Effendi has this instant informed me that Moukhtar Pasha has declared categorically that he will not send any troops to Popovopolie to protect the insurgents who are about to return to that neighbourhood, as he pretends he cannot move a single battalion. Wassa Effendi has telegraphed his resignation to the Grand Vizier and Raschid Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 96.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 38. Political.)

Ragusa, May 16, 1876.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH the substance of the following statement respecting the strength of the military force now in Dalmatia may have already reached your Lordship from other sources, I think it as well not to omit to forward it for the information of Her Majesty's Government. It is taken from the "Avvenire," of Spalato, of the 11th instant.

Since the beginning of the insurrection in the Herzegovina, only four battalions of the line, and three battalions of rifles ("cacciatori") have been sent to strengthen the Dalmatian garrisons.

The total force is this distributed:—

At Spalato:—The 5th battalion of the 22nd Regiment of Infantry, and the 3rd battalion Imperial Rifles.

At Cattaro and district:—3 battalions of 77th Infantry.

At Budua:—11th battalion Field Rifles ("Cacciatori di Campo").

At Ragusa and district:—3 battalions 60th Infantry, 21st battalion Field Rifles, and 7 battalion 27th Infantry.

At Castelnuovo:—2 battalions 27th Infantry.

Distributed between Zara, Knin, and Sebenico:—3 battalions 32nd Infantry.

Distributed between Sign and Imoschi:—7th battalion Field Rifles.

Total—1 division of 17 battalions of 4 companies each, amounting to 6,632 men.

Add to these—3 battalions mountain artillery, 1 company pioneers, 2 battalions Dalmatian "Bersaglieri" (Landwehr), half a squadron of mounted "Bersaglieri" (Landwehr).

Grand total—about 8,000 men.

The foregoing statement is not given as official, but as derived from official returns.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 97.

Mr. Herries-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office May 25.)

(No. 64.)

Buda Pest, May 21, 1876.

Sir,

COUNT ANDRASSY appeared yesterday before the Budget Committee of the Austrian Delegation, for the purpose of being privately interrogated as to his Oriental policy, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a précis of the proceedings, as reported on hearsay, but with substantial accuracy, in the "Pester Lloyd," of this morning.

Your Excellency will perceive that Count Andrassy describes the policy of the three Powers as that of establishing, with the concert of Europe, the *status quo* "amélioré" in Turkey, and that he considers the firm resolution of the three Powers to come to an understanding, "as eventuality follows eventuality," to be a proof of their intention to lay aside all special interests in favour of the guiding principle of the maintenance of peace in Europe.

As regards the attitude of England, his Excellency hinted that her reserve may be owing to the present system of telegraphic communication, and expressed, without being a prophet, his private conviction that she would not hold herself aloof as soon as she was convinced of the peaceful nature of the intentions of the three Powers.

His Excellency denied that there had been any connivance with the insurgents, even if, from local causes, the instructions as to strict neutrality had not been fully carried out, or that, in the policy of Austria, there had been two counteracting streams; for, as long as he remained Minister, there could be only one will acting for the State towards foreign countries, and he accepted full responsibility for himself and his Department.

Count Andrassy's declaration that he knew only one traditional policy for Austria, and that that was to act for the real interest of the Monarchy, is quoted with satisfac-

tion; and it is considered that the direct result of his frank explanations will be to much diminish the mistrust which has been felt, and to clear him, at any rate, from any imputation of a double policy which may have been made. But it does not escape observation that many matters, which it would be desirable to see clearly, loom mistily in the soft twilight which usually veils his Excellency's sketches of the situation of foreign politics.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Précis of Count Andrassy's Answers before the Budget Committee of the Austrian Delegation respecting his Oriental Policy.

AT the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Austrian Delegation on May 20 M. Skene, as reporter on the Common Budget for Foreign Affairs, recalled the fact that to the last Delegation the Ministry had announced a threefold policy, namely:—

1. The preservation of peace in Europe;
2. The maintenance of the interests of the Monarchy;
3. The prevention of the recurrence of similar relations.

His Imperial Majesty's reply had reassured them as to the first, whilst the third could not become practical till after the cessation of the present movement. As regards the second question, however, he wished to know of what advantage it was to Austria to take the initiative, and also to know, as far as possible, what had been the results of the Berlin Conferences.

Dr. Giskra remarked upon the vacillations in the treatment of the insurgents, and asked on what grounds the Reform proposals had not been carried out; what had caused further demands upon Turkey to be made; and whether an occupation or intervention was in view.

Dr. Kuranda put similar questions, and observed that he feared the note prepared in Berlin could be considered to be the firing of the first cannon, and that no clear programme existed as to the Oriental policy of to-day; and he then inquired what would happen if Turkey rejected the note.

Dr. Herbst indulged in similar criticisms, and put the additional question—Is there any course decided upon in the eventuality that the Reforms be proved impracticable, either from the incapacity of the Porte to carry them out, or from the continued opposition of the insurgents?

To these questions and other cross-examining remarks Count Andrassy replied as follows:—

That it was true he had last year declared his policy to consist in the maintenance of the general peace, the prevention of complications in Turkey and the neighbouring countries, and the attainment of such concessions as should tend to prevent a recurrence of the present movement. The first point he had obtained; the second had been gained by preventing other elements from mixing with the insurgents; and the third was being striven for by the proposed Reforms. The first two points were wholly in the hands of the Great Powers; and, as regards the third, the Reforms were supported by Europe, accepted by Turkey, and gladly welcomed in principle by the insurgents, who, however, claimed guarantees for their fulfilment. Hence the present stage of the action of the Powers was to peacefully remove the obstacles to the completion of the Reforms. He could not admit that the question was now at a more intense burning point than at the period of the last Delegations. In spite of all opinions to the contrary, the union of the three Powers had been successfully secured, and the project of reform accepted even by Turkey and the insurgents.

It has been asserted that England has not yet joined the other Powers; but a reason for this may be in the mode of communication by telegraph, which differs from that formerly in practice of full details. Without being a prophet he could express his private conviction that England would join as soon as she could be satisfied as to the peaceful tendency which has guided the three Powers in their course.

He could not communicate the agreement until it had been addressed to the Porte, but he could declare that its only object was to remove obstacles to carrying out the reforms, and to prove the perfect union of the European Powers in presence of the latest events in Turkey and especially of the occurrences at Salonica.

He set great value upon the determination of the Powers to maintain the peace of Europe and always to come to an understanding, as eventuality followed eventuality.

He met reproaches as to diverging from traditional policy, by declaring that he knew only one tradition—that of preserving the interests of the Monarchy. And no reproach could lie as to the supposed connivance with the insurgents at the beginning. The possibly incomplete fulfilment of instructions of strict neutrality lay in the local relations on the frontier. He must also deny that there were two currents of policy. The Ministry and he himself accepted full responsibility, and, as long as he was Minister, there could be only one "will of the State" manifested abroad. As regards the treatment of the insurgents the only policy was a middle policy between the opposing interests of the two parties. He then spoke decidedly against any idea of occupation.

As regards the reforms he could add that the insurgents had demanded things absolutely inadmissible, things already granted, and things which aimed at practical guarantees for the accomplishment of the reforms. The first were unconditionally rejected; but the practical guarantees must be sought for.

To a remark of Dr. Herbst that the reservation of an understanding "as eventuality follows eventuality," gave rise to anxiety, Count Andrassy replied that it had a very great importance, for it showed the intention of the Powers to lay aside all special interests in favour of the leading principle of the maintenance of peace. The *status quo ante bellum* was the basis on which the Powers were striving to bring about a pacification by the common action of Europe.

No. 98.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May 25.*)

(No. 228.)
Berlin, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive this day, through Mr. MacDonell, your Lordship's despatch No. 385 of the 19th instant, respecting the proposals submitted on the 13th instant to Her Majesty's Government by the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Russia.

In the absence of the Chancellor, I communicated and left a copy of it with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, for Prince Bismarck.

His Excellency renewed the expression of the regret the German Government felt at the inability of Her Majesty's Government to support the policy of the five Great Powers at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 99.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, May 25.*)

(No. 65. Confidential.)
Buda-Pest, May 21, 1876.

Sir,

WITH reference to my previous despatch No. 64 of to-day's date, I think it may be of interest to inform your Excellency that Count Andrassy, being met on his arrival here by reproaches as to his action in the Eastern question, concentrated the defence of his policy into the pithy remark,—"We used to act with the sick, we now act with the healthy."

I need not add that many, not excluding a colleague or two, are even more pleased with the practical bearing of this observation than all are with its happy triteness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 100.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 307.) *Vienna, May 21, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, to your Lordship the inclosed despatches which have been addressed to me by Major Gonne, Military Attaché to this Embassy; that of May 21 being in reply to some questions I have addressed to him respecting his opinion that Montenegro has given active support in the Herzegovinian insurrection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

Vienna, May 21, 1876.

Sir,

IN conformity with your Excellency's desire I have the honour to recapitulate my grounds for stating that Montenegro is the real "base" of the insurgent operations south of the Danube, from which men, money, and material are supplied.

1. I first call attention to the fact that, directly the frontier cordon of Austria became a reality, the bands of Peko Socic Simonic and the foreign volunteers all found their way to the Montenegrin frontier.

2. I chanced to visit Cettigné at a moment of popular exultation. The Turks, the traditional enemy of Montenegro, the detested race whose vicinity even had a blighting influence, the power which rendered the very notion of stability impossible had been beaten, and a fabulous number of "heads" had been cut off.* And who had won this victory? "Wo!" The Herzegovenians were spoken of in disparaging terms. Peko and the Montenegrins were the heroes.

3. I remarked in a despatch that I was ashamed of being behind the scenes, for at such moments of excitement, men are apt to throw aside caution and reveal facts which at other moments would remain secret. Hence it happened that I heard in a public room that 3,000,000 cartridges had been supplied from the Cettigné store (where the empty cases are filled).

4. Moreover, I conversed with a Herzegovinian through a Slav companion, and this man spoke of the fight, said that he had come to Cettigné to repose and refill his empty cartridge pouch, &c.

5. The only hotel was full of Russians, some belonging to the ambulance, and others, officers "on congé." I saw the latter one day in plain clothes, the next in a fantastic Montenegrin costume. Everyone pulled them about, looked at their weapons, and started them off for the insurgent camp.

6. Montenegrins also went off in the same direction in small parties with the enthusiastic wishes of their admirers "à la chasse des hommes," as a Frenchman very aptly described it.

7. On board the Lloyds steamer the captain had described to me how that the Russian Consul-General of Ragusa, or his servant, took large sums of money to Cettigné. And I understood that these moneys were, in addition to those collected by the local Committee—however this is of little matter—the money was probably the Russian Slav subscription to their struggling brethren. I quite believe the Russian assurances I received, to the effect that the Russian Government may possibly act according to its instincts when treating with Prussia and Austria, but that the Slav instinct, and an outside influence, forces its action in a direction antagonistic to its expressed desire. I may quote a remark rather apposite, "In the case of an absolute Government an expression of popular sentiment often has a more rapid and decisive effect than a constitutionally expressed opinion through a Parliament." The Russian Government may be sincere in the expression of her wishes, but her acts through her agents such as Consul-General Youine of Ragusa could not have been more calculated to waste the resources and weaken the Sultan's grasp of Slav Provinces. I was told on good authority that Consul Youine was virtually Prince of Montenegro as regards external policy, and this assertion was verified by what I myself observed.

* In truth, the heads are not cut off, but the noses and upper lips are to count the dead.

8. I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction, that the red cross covers more than hospital stores landed at Cattaro. As I rode down from Cettigné, not once but constantly, my passage was difficult, on account of the number of beasts of burthen carrying goods with the Geneva mark to the Russian ambulance. I imagine that thirty animals would have been ample to supply the chronic wants of the hospital, and over 200 passed me during this one journey.*

9. A newspaper correspondent who travelled some time with me told me that certain strangers at Cettigné were the gunners for a battery about to find its way through Cettigné to the insurgent camp.

The insurgent fighting men want for nothing, they have bread, meat, and even luxuries.

These assertions in paragraphs 8 and 9 must be taken for what they are worth, but I have no doubt as to their truth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. J. GONNE, *Military Attaché.*

No. 101.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 308.) *Vienna, May 21, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an extract, translated by Mr. Charlton, of a telegraphic report of a speech on the Herzegovina question, delivered yesterday by Count Andrassy in reply to a question put to him in the Austrian delegation, in which his Excellency attributes to imperfect information the hesitation of Her Majesty's Government to become parties to the Berlin programme, and expresses an opinion that they will eventually adhere to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Extract from Count Andrassy's Speech at Pesth.

(Translation.)

IT was stated that England had not joined in the general agreement of the European Powers. There was reason enough for its not as yet having done so, in the fact that the method of telegraphic communication between the Powers, which circumstances had recently rendered necessary, was in itself a departure from the customary mode of carrying on such intercourse, and, though he did not pretend to the gift of prophecy, he believed he could so far express his own private conviction that the English Government have clearly before them the intentions of the three Powers, and become convinced of their purely pacific character, that they too will consent to be a party to the agreement.

No. 102.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 309.) *Vienna, May 22, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 308 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inclose two reports which I have received from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell relative to the explanations given by Count Andrassy on the 20th instant before the Financial Committee of the Austrian Delegation at Buda-Pesth, on the subject of the recent Berlin Conference and the policy of Austria-Hungary in the Herzegovina question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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* I consider this estimate safe, though I did not count the animals.

No. 103.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 353. Confidential.) *Paris, May 24, 1876.*

My Lord,

THE Duc Decazes sent, late in the afternoon of yesterday, to ask me to come to the French Foreign Office, and, on my arrival, he said that Prince Hohenlohe had been with him, and had stated that Prince Gortchakow and Count Andrassy had agreed that the Representatives of Russia and Austro-Hungary at Constantinople should now address a communication to the Porte in the form of an identic note, embodying the rest of the Berlin Memorandum for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts, and that the German Government adhered to this resolution on the part of the two other Imperial Courts, and were about to instruct Baron Werther accordingly.

The Duc Decazes, as he proceeded to say, answered that in view of the regrettable difference in the matter of this Memorandum which had arisen on the part of England, he had, as your Lordship is already aware by my Confidential despatch No. 347, of the 22nd instant, addressed a pressing appeal ("une démarche instante") to the English Cabinet, and that he was now awaiting a reply.

The Duke said that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires called upon him after Prince Hohenlohe's departure, and gave to him similar information as to the resolution taken, as stated above, to present an identic note to the Porte, and that he returned to Count Kilfstein a similar answer to that which he had given to the German Ambassador.

Upon this, as the Duke informed me, Count Kilfstein added that he was instructed to say that Count Andrassy would consequently try to retard the intended step at Constantinople, if the Duc Decazes could see some chance of inducing England to draw nearer to the views of the other Powers, at least as to the armistice.

The Duke, as he continued, told the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires that he took note of this, and he promised to give him a speedy answer.

In his communication of the above to the Marquis d'Harcourt, the Duc Decazes said that he had ended by remarking that it was, at all events, well that Her Majesty's Government should be made aware, at once, of these conciliatory dispositions at Vienna, and his Excellency begged me, on my part, to telegraph to your Lordship without loss of time the information which he had just imparted to me.

This I accordingly did.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 104.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 355. Confidential.) *Paris, May 24, 1876.*

My Lord,

SINCE writing my Confidential despatch No. 353 of this day, I have seen the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, who tells me that he did not inform the Duc Decazes yesterday afternoon, by order of his Government, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople was to join in an identic note to the Porte on the basis of the Berlin Memorandum, but he testifies to the accuracy of my Report—and this is the important matter—that he had, in obedience to instructions, stated to the Duke that Count Andrassy would try to retard the intended step, if the Duke saw some chance of inducing England to draw nearer to the views of the other Powers, at least as to the armistice.

I could, of course, only report to your Lordship what, I am sure, the Duke said to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 105.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 332.) *Foreign Office, May 25, 1876.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the communication which your Excellency intends to make to the Turkish Government upon the subject of the recent outbreak in Bulgaria, as reported in your despatch No. 498 of the 12th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 106.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 324. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, May 25, 1876.*

Sir,

IN the course of the conversation with Musurus Pasha, reported in my despatch No. 319, Confidential, of yesterday, I took the opportunity of suggesting to his Excellency that it would be undesirable that the Turkish Government should misunderstand the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the proposals of the Berlin Conference.

Her Majesty's Government had declined to join in proposals which they thought ill-advised, but both the circumstances and the state of feeling in this country were very much changed since the Crimean War, and the Porte would be unwise to be led, by recollections of that period, to count upon more than the moral support of Her Majesty's Government in the event of no satisfactory solution of the present difficulties being found.

I merely suggested this in conversation, and carefully avoided pledging Her Majesty's Government to any line of policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 107.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 240.) *Foreign Office, May 25, 1876.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by your Excellency, as reported in your telegram of the 23rd instant, in deciding to remain at Vienna for the present, should you have no communication to make to Count Andrassy at Pesth.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 108.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 245.) *Foreign Office, May 25, 1876.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith the accompanying copies of despatches from Mr. Adams* stating that the Duc Decazes had informed him that Count Andrassy offered to delay the communication to the Porte of the Berlin proposals in the hope that Her Majesty's Government might still be induced to join in making a representation to the Porte, and I have to request your Excellency to express to Count Andrassy the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government of the disposition thus shown by his Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* Nos. 103 and 104.

No. 109.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25, 2·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 25, 1876, 1 P.M.*

GENERAL CHERNAYEFF, formerly in the Russian service, the same who took Tashkand, has just accepted service, with the rank of General, in Servia. His name is popular in Russia, and his Consul at Belgrade says that he did all he could to prevent this appointment.

No. 110.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 243.) *Foreign Office, May 24, 1876.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency to the Secretary in charge of the Foreign Ministry at Vienna, as reported in your telegram of the 23rd instant, relative to the improbability of Her Majesty's Government acceding to the proposal made at Berlin for the concentration in specific places of the Turkish forces in Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 111.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 211. Confidential.) *Vienna, May 25, 1876.*

My Lord,

UPON whatever plans the Herzegovinian question may be now about to enter, I have the honour to report to your Lordship the following observations which have been recently made to me in a private manner, as they are probably a true representation of the just character of the insurrection, and of the influences which have prevented the success of Count Andrassy's measures for its suppression.

My informant stated that persons thoroughly acquainted with its history spoke of it as a mischief-maker which might have been brought to an end at any moment by the expenditure of 10,000*l.* among the Chiefs and the Montenegrins. But, however this may be, he observed that, while Count Andrassy knew his project would settle all difficulties, Russian money and Russian agents nullified all his efforts, by subsidizing the Montenegrins and corrupting Dalmatian functionaries; and with two Austrian Vice-Consuls at Trebigné in the pay of Russia, and a General at Ragusa who looked forward to holding a high command in a military occupation of the Herzegovina, with every Dalmatian employé, from the Statthalter downwards, an avowed sympathizer with the insurgents, and with divided counsels in high places, it was not to be expected, he said, that Count Andrassy could succeed.

These observations appear to resume the information on the subject which has reached Her Majesty's Government from various sources, and they may therefore interest your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 112.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Adams.

(No. 536.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1876.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 358, Confidential, of the 24th instant, recording the substance of what had passed between the Duc Decazes and Prince Hohenlohe, and subsequently between his Excellency and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, as stated to you by the Duc Decazes, in regard to the intentions of the Austrian, Russian, and German Governments in the matter of the Berlin Memo-

No. 113.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Buda-Pest, May 26, 1876, 9·30 A.M.*

COUNT ANDRASSY, in repeating that an immediate answer was not asked for at the meeting with the Ambassadors at Berlin, said, as the French and Italian Ambassadors spoke with confidence of the programme being accepted by their Governments, and Lord Odo Russell expressed a personal opinion that it would meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortchakow may have intimated a wish to receive an answer before his departure.

He cannot concur in the objections of Her Majesty's Government to an armistice. He says the Turks can improve during it their military position, while the insurgents will daily become weaker; but what is principally important, if it is accepted, is, that Montenegro is prepared in that case to co-operate in the pacification of the provinces, even if Servia declares war, but if the refusal of the Porte gives a pretext to Servia to act, Montenegro could not then refuse to join her. It is only therefore by the Porte accepting a suspension of hostilities, and taking measures for the return of the refugees, that the two Principalities can be effectually separated; Montenegro having been made to understand that by rendering service to Turkey she may hope to obtain concessions which other neighbouring States could not claim on the same grounds.

Besides, though the armistice is fixed for two months, fifteen days will prove whether it will have the results expected of it, and he limited it if fails, the new measures to be concerted will not necessarily be directed against Turkey.

The assistance to be granted by the Porte should be limited as far as possible; and he admits that, if the Turks are to protect returning refugees, objections cannot well be made to the employment of troops for the purpose. He said the insurgents retaining their arms did not mean that they should return as an armed force to their villages, but individuals might carry arms.

He earnestly trusts, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government will see the expediency of the Porte accepting the proposals of the Powers.

I return to Vienna to-morrow.

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randum, and I have to request that you will express to the Duc Decazes the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government for this communication.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 113.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 26.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Strictly Private and Confidential.) *Buda Pest, May* 26, 1876.

COUNT ANDRASSY, with reference to my official telegram of to-day, said that he wished to state, for your Lordship's private information, what he cannot write to Count Beust. Austria can only maintain peace by effecting compromises with Russia, and as he failed in reconciling their views by telegraphic correspondence, he went to Berlin, where Prince Gortchakow advocated measures he could not approve, but which recent events and hourly telegrams from General Ignatiew supported. Prince Gortchakow also professed to have secured adherence of France and Italy, and to know that Her Majesty's Government would agree with him. Nevertheless, Count Andrassy says that he insisted on the programme adopted as the utmost concession he could make, stating his conviction that even it would be rejected by England. That it has been so he considered fortunate, as the independent attitude of Her Majesty's Government may be most useful in promoting Austrian as well as English interests. But to secure this advantage, a suspension of hostilities will, he says, be absolutely necessary for the reasons stated in my official telegram. He still trusts in the loyalty of the Emperor Alexander, but places less reliance than hitherto in Prince Gortchakow, who seems influenced by others and by General Ignatiew, to whose intrigues he attributes the present serious state of affairs in Servia. With respect to Klek being kept open for the Turks during the armistice he could not speak positively, but is of opinion that it should be so.

No. 114.

Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Athens, May* 18, 1876.

M. CONTOSTAVLOS confided to me the other day that he had instructed the Hellenic Ministers at St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris, to represent to the Governments to which they are accredited, in the event of the Great Powers finding it necessary to effect any changes in the territorial limits of Turkey, or to secure autonomy, or other concessions for the Slavs who are now in insurrection, that Greece, both by reason of her recent pacific attitude and by her position in connection with the Greek populations of Turkey, was entitled either for herself or for those populations to claim a fair share of any such changes or concessions.

The instruction was, he said, a strictly confidential one, and only intended as a guide for the language which those Ministers to whom it was addressed ought to hold when an opportunity for speaking upon the Eastern question should occur.

I understood from M. Contostavlos that it had not been drawn up in consequence of the recent additional complications at Salonica and in Bulgaria, but that it had been approved of by the King, and forwarded to the several capitals mentioned before or at the time of His Majesty's departure, its only object being that the interests of Greece might meet with consideration at the hands of the Great Powers.

As the Hellenic Government had no Agents for the present in England and Italy of a higher rank than that of Chargé d'Affaires, no similar instructions had as yet been sent to London and Rome. There had been no other reason for this omission.

When M. Contostavlos repeated to me yesterday his apprehensions that Greece would gain nothing by her recent conduct, not having the advantage, which he supposes the Slavs to have, of being supported by a great Power like Russia, I observed to him that all the Christian populations of Turkey would probably share in any administrative reforms or privileges which might be conceded to the insurgents; and that as regarded territorial changes, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire having been

guaranteed by Europe, none could take place except after a war of an European Congress. I added that Greece now held a very creditable position, whereas if she had joined in any hostile acts against Turkey, she would have already been on the verge of ruin; that she might certainly do a good deal of mischief to others, but could gain no good for herself, and that Great Britain did not look for any special reward for having also maintained a pacific attitude.

M. Contostavlos of course maintained that the position of Greece was very different from that of any other Power, and that it would be a bad example if it was proved to the Greek populations of Turkey that insurrection alone could obtain for them the concessions to which their intelligence and numbers entitled them.

It will no doubt be a satisfaction to him to have shown by the above instruction that he had taken steps to prevent the interests of Greece from being forgotten by Europe, and it will rest with the discretion of the Hellenic Ministers to enter upon the subject or not, according as the opportunity for so doing may present itself.

If not followed up by any hostile acts against Turkey, the language prescribed will be innocuous enough, as an appeal to the consideration of friendly Governments in the present disturbed and embarrassing condition of the neighbouring Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. STUART.

No. 115.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 358.) *Paris, May 25, 1876.*
My Lord,

I CALLED upon the Duke Decazes early this morning, by appointment, upon several matters of business; and I took with me your Lordship's despatch No. 529 of the 23rd instant, which had just reached me by messenger.

His Excellency had not then received his London post, and I therefore read your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch to him. Soon afterwards his despatches arrived, and amongst them was one from the Marquis d'Harcourt, giving a similar, but more lengthy, account of what passed between your Lordship and him on the 23rd instant, respecting the refusal of England to join in pressing the Berlin Memorandum upon the Porte.

The Duke made few remarks, but he showed some disappointment that Her Majesty's Government had not brought forward any proposal at all upon the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 116.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Adams.

(No. 540.) *Foreign Office, May 27, 1876.*
Sir,

THE French Ambassador called upon me to-day and said that he had received instructions from the Due Decazes to speak to me again with respect to the Berlin proposals.

The Duke would not repeat the expression of his disappointment at learning that Her Majesty's Government had decided not to join in the action of the other five Powers, but he could not conceal the apprehensions for the future to which this refusal had given rise. What was now likely to be the next step in the matter? It seemed to him that the Porte would probably refuse to accept the proposals, and, after having given much thought to the matter, he was unable to see anything to be done except to summon a Conference. The Due Decazes would not, however, propose a Conference unless assured that Her Majesty's Government would agree to it. The Duke, his Excellency said, did not ask for an answer now, but hoped I would think it over, and that I should agree with him in deprecating anything which might have the appearance of untimely distrust among the Powers.

I replied that I saw no objection to the idea of a Conference in principle, but that I thought it would be useless without a basis. If the Powers were not agreed beforehand, there was not much prospect that they would agree any the more when the Representatives met around a Conference table.

Her Majesty's Government had advised the Porte to receive the proposals of the Powers in a conciliatory manner, and not to meet them with an abrupt refusal, and they would continue to hold this language if necessary.

Some further conversation followed, in which I again took an opportunity of expressing my conviction that unless something could be done to detach Montenegro from the insurgents, or effectually prevent their receiving assistance through and from Montenegro, no useful result in the way of pacification could be expected.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 117.

Sir C. Wyke to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Copenhagen, May 26, 1876.*

THIS Government, accurately informed of all going on at Berlin, approve entirely attitude of Her Majesty's Government in holding aloof from the proposal of the five Powers to Turkey. New Turkish Ambassador there states that the Porte would not accept any such project tending to the annihilation of their power and existence in Europe, to uphold which the Turkish Government would, if necessary, fall back upon the religious fervour of the Mohammedan population against Christian aggression.

No. 118.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.[9]*—(Received May 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Buda-Pest, May 27, 1876.*

THE Turkish Ambassador read yesterday to Count Andrassy a Circular on the Berlin proposals. His Excellency said he must consider it as *non avenue*, no communication having been yet made to the Porte, but he answered some of its arguments in the same terms as he has spoken to me.

No. 119.

Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 106.) *Athens, May 21, 1876.*
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of an extract from the "Stoa" newspaper, relative to the alleged attempts of agents connected with Servian and Bulgarian Committees to excite the Greek populations in Thessaly and Epirus to insurrection.

I had been confidentially informed a few days ago that some such agents were at work, even in Greece and at Athens, but that their efforts had happily been so far unsuccessful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. STUART.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Extract from the "Stoa" of May 19, 1876.

(Translation.)

OUR readers will remember that a few days ago we wrote that certain foreign agents were running about on the frontier exhorting the Christians of the subjected provinces to revolt, and that such agents were also in Athens. Yesterday's "Regeneration," certainly drawing its information from a Ministerial source, certified the news we had given in the following terms:—

[9] Repeated to Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Rome, and Constantinople.

Since the affairs of Turkey have become more complicated, and the outbreak in Bulgaria has been announced, certain parties in Thessaly and in Epirus have commenced to plot and declare that the hour has come for these provinces to rise against the sovereignty of the Sultan."

Such are the contents of the correspondence from these provinces, and it is persistently maintained that many persons participate in this opinion.

In Macedonia the same language is held, especially since agents from two Committees, the one a Servian and the other a Bulgarian Committee, have visited several of the towns of that province, exhorting the strong to take up arms against the Sultan, as no other opportunity so propitious as this will ever present itself.

Followers of these Committees have also lately visited Yannina and other places in Epirus to raise the Greeks to insurrection.

No. 120.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 181. Most Confidential.)

Rome, May 19, 1875.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 177 of yesterday's date, I reported that M. Melegari, in reply to a question of mine, disclaimed in the most positive terms ever having heard, excepting by what has appeared in the newspapers, of the idea of a joint occupation of the insurgent provinces by Austrian and Italian troops. His Excellency's language was so precise on this subject that it is impossible for me to doubt its sincerity.

On the other hand, I cannot help thinking that it must have been some such idea as this which was passing through the mind of the King when His Majesty was pleased to honour me with the conversation reported in my despatch No. 168, most Confidential, of the 5th instant, and when consequently M. Melegari had answered my inquiry yesterday, and added that such an arrangement was one which, in their desire for a good understanding between all the Powers, the Italian Government could never entertain, even if it should be brought forward, I observed that from some words which fell from the King in my audience to present my credentials, I did not feel sure that His Majesty would be quite so averse to agree to such a project.

To this M. Melegari replied that the King was by nature of an active temperament, and prone to generous impulses; that no doubt, therefore, it would be agreeable to His Majesty to employ his forces in what His Majesty might consider the righteous cause of freeing a Christian nationality from the yoke of its Mussulman oppressors; but it was the duty of the Government, who were responsible to the nation, to take a dispassionate view as to the policy to be followed, and to be careful not to engage in any undertakings by which the interests of the nation might be compromised.

It is evident, therefore, from this language, that should a proposal ever be made to employ Italian with Austrian troops for occupying the insurgent provinces, it will, unless there is a complete change of feeling, meet with no encouragement from the Italian Government, even if Austria could ever be brought to agree to it, which it is not easy to conceive, and I cannot help thinking that in declining to entertain any such proposal the Italian Government would be acting very wisely.

There is, if I am not mistaken, on the coast of Dalmatia, an Italian speaking population with a leaning towards Italian nationality.

At Trieste the same feeling was openly manifested though it met with a rebuff in a public address to the King of Italy not long after the occupation of Rome. The presence of an Italian army in the Herzegovina might therefore, not improbably, be the signal for setting those Italian aspirations in motion. This could hardly suit the purpose of Austria, and is of itself a sufficient reason why that Power should object to a combined occupation. To my mind it should also be a sufficient reason for Italy to object, for when once an agitation for union with Italy should commence in the districts alluded to, there cannot be much doubt that it would spread to the other Italian speaking Provinces of Austria, including the districts of the Tyrol. The Trentino, nearly as far as Bolzen, &c., &c., where very strong Italian proclivities undoubtedly prevail, as I myself, during an excursion which I made in those parts some three years ago, had a personal opportunity of ascertaining.

These aspirations are now dormant, but there is no saying how little might arouse them, and the Italian Government might possibly, therefore, in the contingency alluded to, find itself placed in this position, either to go to war with Austria for her

Italian Provinces, or to incur all the odium of rejecting the appeals of populations aspiring to part of the Italian Kingdom. In any case the revival of the nationality cry could hardly fail to be attended with danger and complications, and I therefore venture to express the opinion that both in the interest of Italy as well as in that of the maintenance of peace, the Italian Government would do well to decline the proposal of a joint occupation if it should ever be put forward.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET

No. 121.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 186.)

Rome, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

I CALLED upon M. Melegari this morning, and his Excellency at once opened the subject of the non-adhesion of Her Majesty's Government to the measures advocated in the Berlin Memorandum. He repeated the regret which he had already expressed at this decision, adding that he hoped at all events Her Majesty's Government would consent to advise the Porte to accept the armistice, and if they could not join in recommending the other measures, that they would at least say nothing which might be an encouragement to the Turkish Government to reject them. If the Turkish Government did not feel that they would be supported by England in declining to accept the proposals, he had some hope that they might agree to them.

His Excellency went on to make some observations as to the nature of the proposals themselves, which he described as very little in excess of the demands set forth in Count Andrassy's programme. Although they had been presented by the three Northern Powers collectively, they were, his Excellency said, the work of the Russian Cabinet only. Russia would therefore make it a point of honour if the Porte accepted them, to obtain the submission of the insurgents, which her influence over them could unquestionably, if she really intended it, enable her to do. He (M. Melegari) was firmly convinced that Russia had no ambitious views at this moment, and that she was sincerely desirous for a termination of the insurrection. It depended, however, upon the attitude of the Porte whether she would have the opportunity of bringing her influence to bear upon the insurgents, and the attitude of the Porte could not but be influenced by that of Her Majesty's Government. If the present proposals were not accepted, some more decisive measures would become necessary, as the five Powers could not submit to having their advice disregarded. General Menabrea, his Excellency said, as well as the Representatives of the other Powers (I believe his Excellency mentioned those of France, Germany, and Austria) had been desired to appeal to Her Majesty's Government in the above sense, but he would be glad if I would also communicate his observations to your Lordship.

I replied to M. Melegari to the following effect: that as he had instructed the Italian Ambassador in London to communicate with your Lordship, I felt that any communication from me would be superfluous; that I, of course, could not undertake to say what might be the answer of Her Majesty's Government to the representations which might be addressed to them; but, speaking my own opinion, I thought that, as regards the appeal to them to support the mediation, Her Majesty's Government might very possibly feel that, in agreeing to do this, they would be advising the Porte to adopt a course prejudicial to its own interests. Whether it would be a fair demand or not, must depend upon the military position of the Turks and insurgents respectively; that as regards the request that Her Majesty's Government would not encourage the Porte to reject the measures proposed, Her Majesty's Government were certainly not likely to take any course which should appear to them calculated to produce additional complications, but that, objecting as Her Majesty's Government did to the plans suggested, it was impossible to expect them to do more than to state to the Turkish Government, if their opinion was asked, that they had better follow the policy which they thought most consistent with their own interests. Whatever that policy might be, Her Majesty's Government, I said, would certainly not be responsible for it. The Northern Courts, I continued, had invented a totally new system of diplomacy. They drew up their measures together without any sort of consultation with the other Powers, embodied the result of their deliberations in memoranda or notes, which they summoned the other Powers by telegraph to accept, or else to be responsible for any consequences which might ensue from their not doing

so. It appeared to me, however, that it was not the Government, who might object, and consequently refuse to be a party to a certain arrangement, who was responsible for the absence of united action amongst all the Powers; but the Governments who adopted this summary mode of proceeding, and I could not help being struck, as I had been on the occasion of the presentation of the Andrassy programme, with the hasty manner in which the Italian Government had rushed into views which they could have had barely time to examine.

As for Russia feeling it to be a point of honour to secure the submission of the insurgents if the present measures were agreed to, this was precisely the same language which had been held respecting Count Andrassy's despatch, and yet what had come of it? If Austria and Russia had really exercised their influence over the insurgents, a pacification would probably have already been brought about.

M. Melegari replied to this latter observation that the difference between the two cases was this: that Russia had only been the seconder and not the originator of the first programme, whereas the present one was her own work. That she wished to have the merit of bringing about the pacification, and she was therefore sure, if her proposals were accepted at Constantinople, to employ all her influence with the insurgents to bring them to terms also.

I asked, with reference to his Excellency's expression, that if the present proposals were rejected, more decisive measures would become necessary, whether this was to be understood as meaning that there had already been an exchange of views as to this eventuality.

M. Melegari replied that there had not been, but he repeated the phrase that the five Powers could not submit to their advice being disregarded.

It was absolutely necessary for the peace of Europe, he said, that the present conflict should be put an end to, to which I replied that it was to be hoped that great caution would be used in the choice of the means to be employed, so that those means should not produce the directly contrary result to that which it was intended they should attain.

M. Melegari said he had already explained to me (as reported in my despatch No. 177 of the 18th instant) the motives which had induced the Italian Government to accede to the Berlin Memorandum.

In compliance with M. Melegari's renewed request, I consented to telegraph to your Lordship on the subject of our conversation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 122.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 187.)
My Lord,

Rome, May 23, 1876.

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 297 of the 19th instant, inclosing a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 385 to Lord Odo Russell, informing him of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the Memorandum containing the proposals of the Austrian, German, and Russian Governments for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts, and in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, I have read that despatch to M. Melegari, and left him a copy of it.

In expressing his thanks for this communication, His Excellency said that the substance of the reasons assigned by Her Majesty's Government for not adhering to the measures suggested had already been brought to his knowledge by General Menabrea.

He regretted the decision, but he still had a slight hope that the Turkish Government would not reject them; though from a conversation he had had yesterday with the Turkish Minister, he gathered that a refusal was to be expected.

The conversation which ensued was similar to that which took place yesterday, and I need not, therefore, trouble your Lordship with a report of it.

I did not say anything to His Excellency on the subject of your Lordship's despatches No. 387 to Lord Odo Russell, and No. 308 to Sir H. Elliot, both of the 19th instant, of which copies are inclosed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 208, Confidential, of the same date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 123.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 317.)
My Lord,

Vienna, May 25, 1876.

WITH reference to Mr. Harriss-Gastrell's report No. 67 of yesterday's date, of the explanation given by Count Andrassy to the Hungarian Delegations on the previous day, relative to the late Conference at Berlin, and the policy of Austria-Hungary in the Herzegovina question, I have the honour to inclose herewith a fuller report of his Excellency's answer to the questions put to him on the subject, which appeared last night in the "Correspondance Autrichienne."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Extract from the "Correspondance Autrichienne."

Buda-Pesth, 23 Mai, 1876.

Séance du Sous-Comité de la Délégation Hongroise pour les Affaires Etrangères.

LE Président, Comte de Festetics, a précisé préalablement les deux questions arrêtées dans la Conférence préparatoire et inscrites au Protocole. En premier lieu, sur la situation politique en général, notamment en ce qui regarde l'Orient; en second lieu, sur les motifs en vertu desquels on accorde une subvention aux réfugiés de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine. Il a été posé d'autres questions encore; celle, en particulier, du Comte Ferdinand Zichy touchant les raisons détaillées des secours incessants, et d'une durée non encore délinie, accordés aux Rajas réfugiés; et celle de l'Archevêque Haynald, demandant quand le sons réunissants des cloches Chrétiennes rappelleront les réfugiés dans leur lieu natal.

Le Rapporteur, M. Falk, a posé trois questions: Premièrement, à l'égard de la distinction établie par le Comte Andrassy dans deux discours d'ouverture aux Délégations et renouvelées cette année, touchant les rapports de la Monarchie avec les deux Puissances Impériales d'une part, et les autres Puissances Européennes d'autre part, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Deuxièmement, d'où est parti en dernier lieu, l'impulsion qui a déterminé l'action des trois Puissances? Troisièmement, en quoi les événements de Salonique, de Smyrne et de Constantinople, ont-ils contribué aux Conférences de Berlin, puisque la convocation aux Conférences a précédé ces événements?

La réponse du Comte Andrassy à toutes ces questions successives se résume comme suit:—

Pour répondre aux questions ayant trait à la politique qu'il a suivie, le Comte Andrassy déclare qu'il doit avant tout faire observer qu'il ne peut s'agir ici que du passé et du présent, mais nullement de l'avenir; car, comme l'expérience des derniers temps ne l'a hélas! que trop montré des événements peuvent se produire qui déroutent toute prévision et tout calcul. Sa base est aujourd'hui ce qu'elle était l'année dernière. Comme alors la Monarchie poursuit un triple but:—(1.) Maintien de la paix générale en Europe; (2.) Apaisement de l'insurrection et pacification des territoires où sévit la guerre civile; (3.) Mesures pour empêcher le renouvellement prochain de ces fatals événements.

Pour aller au-devant du reproche qu'on pourrait lui adresser de n'avoir pas pris des mesures préventives à l'endroit des conflits survenus dans la Péninsule des Balkans, le Comte Andrassy rappelle l'origine et la nature de l'insurrection. Les prétentions premières des Rajas sont hors de proportion avec ce que ceux-ci réclament actuellement. Dans le principe, il n'a s'agissait principalement que de grands abus dans la perception des impôts, et, par exemple, l'extension aux bestiaux morts de l'impôt établi sur ces animaux; les exactions des fermiers d'impôts réclamant, entre autres, la moitié des produits naturels au lieu du tiers qui leur était assigné, et imposant leur volonté aux cultivateurs sous peine, pour ces derniers, de voir la récolte toute entière rester sur place et s'y corrompre. Tout réclamant était emprisonné. Les Rajas addressèrent des supplques aux Puissances. Celles-ci n'avaient cependant aucun prétexte d'intervention, tant que les choses n'avaient pas un caractère aigu, et que le soulèvement ne les obligeait pas à intervenir dans leur propre intérêt. Sans l'action unanime des Puis-

sances unies, auxquelles les autres Puissances se sont spontanément ralliées, tout le territoire Turc de Belgrade à Constantinople serait en feu. Aujourd'hui l'on possède l'assurance formelle que le soulèvement n'est alimenté en aucune manière par la connivence du Gouvernement Serbe. Les éléments Serbes qui grossissent les rangs des insurgés ont cela de bon qu'ils diminuent d'autant les ferments funestes de leur pays. Dans les districts même de l'insurrection, on a fait un pas vers la pacification. Les Rajas pourraient rentrer sans crainte dans leurs foyers sans que la pression éprouvée précédemment dans l'ordre matériel, politique ou religieux soit encore à redouter. Il pourraient relever leurs maisons, cultiver leurs champs, réédifier leurs églises, et rendre à leurs cloches leurs libres volées. Toutefois le retour des réfugiés est entravé tout particulièrement par ce fait que beaucoup d'entre eux ont, avant leur départ, exercé sur leur begs et sur les proches de ceux-ci des actes criminels, et qu'ils appréhendent une vengeance. En présence de l'extension toujours plus grande de la conflagration et des événements de Salonique, de Smyrne et Constantinople, on sentit la nécessité dans les Cabinets des trois Grandes Puissances de prendre en considération de nouveau l'état des choses, vu l'urgence toujours plus affirmée de trouver des formes spéciales de garantie pour la pacification.

A ce propos on agita la question de l'occupation. Le Comte Andrassy, pour sa part, s'est prononcé contre cette mesure. Son point de départ était alors, comme auparavant, le maintien du *status quo*, son but a été l'amélioration de la situation et des mesures ayant pour l'objet d'empêcher que le mouvement ne se propageât dans les districts avoisinants.

Ce qui le rend hostile à toute idée d'occupation, c'est que toute occupation doit nécessairement prendre fin, et qu'alors on se trouve aussi peu avancé que devant. Quant à la convocation d'un Congrès Européen, on n'y saurait songer; car les docteurs une fois réunis, d'autres malades pourraient bien se présenter, et, en outre, dans un Congrès il pourrait résulter de mobiles tout-à-fait secondaires de nouveaux groupements, qui entraîneraient des malentendus et occasionneraient peut-être des collisions.

La Russie a pris l'initiative de la Conférence. On a choisi ce mode de communication afin d'éviter les erreurs et les méprises qui peuvent naître d'une correspondance télégraphique.

La raison d'union intime des trois Puissances Impériales dans la question pendante, c'est que deux d'entre elles touchent immédiatement au conflit Oriental, et que la troisième Puissance, leur plus proche voisin, y est également fort intéressé. Au surplus, dans cette question, toute la diplomatie Européenne, par un accord tacite, a laissé l'initiative aux trois Empires, sans l'action desquels le concert Européen ne serait qu'une musique sans notes, et une vraie cacophonie. A Berlin, on a réalisé une entente parfaite vis-à-vis de l'état actuel des choses, et par là, selon toute probabilité, on a assuré la paix de l'Europe dans la mesure des prévisions humaines.

Ensuite, sur la proposition Vuenly, et après les conclusions du Comte Andrassy, il a été constaté, à l'égard des subventions aux réfugiés, que les sommes portées dans les propositions de crédits supplémentaires pour 1876 seront maintenues. Le Sous-Comité a émis un vote unanime de confiance entière dans le Comte Andrassy, et la séance a été levée.

No. 124.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, May* 28.)

Buda-Pest, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

COUNT ANDRASSY repeated before the Committee from the Hungarian Delegation for the Budget of Foreign Affairs the explanations of the 20th instant to the Austrian Committee respecting the Eastern question and the Berlin Conference.

According to a brief statement, written, I believe, by Mr. Falk himself, in to-day's "Pester Lloyd," M. Falk, acknowledging that Count Andrassy's Eastern policy had not diverged from the principles his Excellency enunciated last year, desired fuller information as to the difference in the attitude of Austria towards Russia and Germany, and towards the other signing Powers; as to the reasons for a Conference of the Ministers of the three Empires; and as to the rumoured raising of the question of altering the Dardanelles Convention?

His Excellency replied by confidentially stating his reasons for seeking a common action with Russia, the next most interested nation, and the support of Germany, which wished well to both countries, and by adding that it was more easy for three than for six Powers to agree in their views, and, when three were in accord, their proposals would be more likely of acceptance than those of one Power. The Conference was rendered necessary by the important change in diplomatic communication, effected by the telegraph, which, in presence of the celerity with which events passed, required that, from time to time, the Ministers of the allied Powers should confer together. It was also desirable, on this occasion, for special reasons; for he could not deny that in so complicated a question as this the principles discussed could not fail to involve a host of details, on some of which agreement between the three Powers could not be beforehand predicted. There had been such differences of opinion, and would be others. The fact that they had been so satisfactorily removed inspired the hope that any future divergence of opinion would be as easily dealt with. As regards the Straits' Convention, it was not even mentioned, and, indeed, no reason for touching the question existed, as soon as the need of foreign protection for the Christians of the Turkish capital ceased.

On Count Ferdinand Zichy expressing a fear that the reforms now agreed to would excite the aspirations of the insurgents, and result in prejudice to the integrity of Turkey, his Excellency sketched the history of the insurrection and the action of the Powers in much detail, and declared his belief that Turkey would accept the proposals of the three Powers, and that the insurgents would also accept them, as soon as they were again convinced that there was no chance of realising their hope of dissensions between the allies.

His Excellency concluded his explanations with some details respecting the refugees, of whom several hundreds of families had announced their wish to return, and with his strong hope of seeing the pacification completely accomplished in the course of the present year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 125.

Dr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, May* 28.)

(Confidential.)

Buda-Pest, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I learn on good authority that, from the papers laid before the Delegations, it appears that only double the usual number of troops—some 8,000 to 9,000 men on the peace footing—is stationed along the Turkish frontier, the increase having been effected by now moving down the autumn troops without bringing away the summer troops, and that no other than the usual distribution and moving of troops seems to be contemplated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 126.

Dr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, May* 28.)

Buda-Pest, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

AT a meeting *in pleno* this morning of the Austrian Delegation, at which the Report of the Committee on the Budget of the Foreign Ministry was presented, Dr. Kurmuth criticised the want of clearness on certain points and the need of a fixed programme in Count Andrassy's Oriental policy, and declared the chief task of Austria-Hungary's policy should be to uphold former traditions, for the people desired no share in any partition of Turkey. Dr. Giskra was equally decided in his opinion on the question of annexation; and Dr. Herbst, whilst declaring his confidence in the Foreign Minister, naturally withheld it from measures of which he was not informed.

Count Andrassy replied that, although free discussion was desirable, he could only speak under reserve. No Minister could, however, have a fixed programme in presence of continually changing events. He knew not any traditions which could, under all circumstances, be the salvation of Austria. As regards want of clearness, it

is impossible that there can be any as to the aims of his policy. They are summed up in the three points of his explanations. Two have been attained; the third, "which I look upon as the main task of Austria-Hungary," said his Excellency, "is the bringing about of such a state of affairs that the periodical recurrence of such dangers as now exist shall be prevented. As regards the means with which the maintenance of the two points and the attainment of the third shall be secured, I am not in a position to give any information." His Excellency concluded by observing that it was the lesser evil for Dr. Kuranda to remain in uncertainty as to those means than for all the world to know them, and in want of a programme, than for him to state one which might hereafter be impracticable or obstructing.

In the course of the debate only two Delegates—one from Dalmatia and the other from Salzburg—raised their voices in favour of annexation. No member of the military party spoke.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 127.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 411.)
Foreign Office, May 29, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE to call your Excellency's attention to the inclosed extract,* containing a translation of a letter published in the "Nord," purporting to have been addressed by the chiefs of the insurgents to M. Wisselitsky, and containing proposals closely resembling those which the three Powers adopted at the Berlin Conference, and I have to request your Excellency to endeavour to ascertain whether this letter is authentic.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 128.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 15. Political.)
Bosna-Serai, May 19, 1876.

My Lord,

THE local authorities so persistently maintain, and probably report to the Government at Constantinople, that the insurrection in Bosnia is extinct, beyond the existence of a few scattered bands of insurgents in the vicinity of the Austrian frontier, that I feel called upon to emphatically deny the fact. Encounters between the troops and insurgents, unimportant as they may be, are still of frequent occurrence; and only two days since the sole battalion in garrison at Serajevo was despatched to the Kraina to reinforce the army in the north. This town is, therefore, at the present moment almost denuded of troops, and in case of any tumult or disturbance, there are not even sufficient to maintain order.

The authorities here also state that the inhabitants of the districts of Glamosh and Petrowtza, who revolted about two months ago, have now proferred their submission, and that 50,000 okes of grain have been distributed amongst them for food and seed. I have every reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement, and in any case it is grossly exaggerated. Some few families who were forced against their will to join the insurrection have very likely returned to their homes, but there has, I am assured, been no submission of the mass of the inhabitants. The same spirit seems still to pervade all the insurgents in Bosnia—a resolute determination to carry on the struggle at any cost, rather than again submit to Turkish rule.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

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* "Times," May 27, 1876.

No. 129.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 8. Political.)
Rustchuk, May 20, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a further report I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

Since the date of this report the state of things here has improved, and we have reason to hope that the disturbances that occur every now and then in the Tirnova district will soon cease.

The truth is, my Lord, as I am told the Bulgarians themselves say, they moved too late in this quarter, for had advantage been taken of the moment when the Porte was most occupied with the Herzegovina, the authorities here would have encountered more serious opposition than what they do at present.

All the vilayet, with the exception of the Tirnova district, is quite tranquil.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

Inclosure in No. 129.

Consul Reade to Sir H. Elliot.

Rustchuk, May 16, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that since my last report the only disturbance that has occurred here has been in the vicinity of Tirnova, near the Balkans, where the following has taken place:—

The Kaimakam of Tirnova a few days ago ascertained that there were some insurgents in the village of Rahovitza, some five hours distant. Accordingly a number of zaptiehs were dispatched to the spot late in the evening, who discovered twenty-one of these people assembled in a house there, and with papers and Bulgarian flags (in satin) in their possession. All were taken the same night to Tirnova and placed in arrest.

On the following day about 400 of the villagers of Rahovitza, Lescovitza, and Bjilar, headed by two priests, whom they forced to join them, proceeded to Tirnova to rescue the twenty-one in prison, but were met on the road by two companies of infantry, who compelled them to return to their villages.

No sooner had this been effected than about 500 from Gabrova, at the foot of the Balkans, were reported to be on their way to join the 400 that had already been dispersed.

Two companies were immediately sent to meet these. A collision took place, resulting in the death of six of the insurgents and the wounding of several others and one soldier. The insurgents were put to flight, and took refuge in the Monastery of Dranova, where they were followed by the military.

They were summoned to surrender, but refused to do so; accordingly a battalion of infantry, accompanied by some Bashi-Bozouks and two mountain guns, have been ordered to the spot to capture the insurgents.

Insurgents have been arrested at Selwi, in the vicinity of Tirnova, but all is at present quiet there.

The proceedings of these people have been most contemptible, whilst the discipline of the troops is said to be admirable.

I have seen the Governor-General, who is confident that if nothing more formidable presents itself than what has hitherto manifested itself, the tranquillity of the vilayet will be in no danger.

It has been reported that the Varna railway line has been threatened between the stations of Sheytandjik and Simnia Road. The Pasha has placed night patrols on the spot, but as yet nothing whatever has been discovered.

Many of the revolutionary Bulgarians in Wallachia are said to be entering this vilayet, and some have already been discovered and arrested.

From all I see and hear, I am persuaded that there is nothing serious to fear for the moment, nor will there be if the Government acts with promptitude on the occurrence of any disorder. The Porte, however, I think, would do well were it to grant the Pasha more power, so as to enable him to make examples of some of the chiefs of the insurgents; for I am persuaded if this is not done the natives will think

that the Government is weak, and the disturbances, which at present are comparatively insignificant, are sure to increase; whereas, if a few examples were made of the chiefs, they would serve as salutary and, I think, successful lessons to the rest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

No. 130.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 4. Political.)
Rustchuk, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a further report addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador respecting the rising in the Tirnova district of this vilayet.

Up to this the authorities have had no great difficulty in putting down what they have encountered, and I am still of opinion that if nothing serious from abroad intervenes the rising may shortly be put down altogether.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Consul Reade to Sir H. Elliot.

Rustchuk, May 20, 1876.

Sir,

THE state of things here has improved since my last report, and the emissaries who have entered the vilayet from abroad find it daily more difficult to stir up the Bulgarians of the Province.

The insurgents from the Balkans having failed in getting the Bulgarians of Selvi to join them, threatened to come down and punish them. Accordingly the day before yesterday I believe about 1,000 were collected at Ducheva, a spot about two hours from Selvi. The Selvi people immediately sent off to Tirnova and Plevna for assistance, and Nedjib Aga, Governor of the latter place, at once hurried off with about 500 men of the reserve.

On their arrival where the insurgents were, they attacked them so vigorously that they completely routed them in a very short time. The killed and wounded were about 200. Nedjib Aga lost two killed and nine wounded.

I saw the Governor-General yesterday just as he had received this intelligence. His Excellency was in high spirits, and hoped that the disturbances here would soon cease, as the insurgents must now be convinced that they cannot do anything of importance. Indeed, I have myself heard from other quarters that the Bulgarians themselves say that not having taken advantage of the moment when the Turks were taken up with the Herzegovina, it is now too late to hope for any success here.

The so-called Bulgarian Committee of Bucharest, as I said before, are moving, but, as the people here, I am told, say, too late. A number of them (from 100 to 120) are on the opposite coast, between this and Widdin, waiting for opportunities to cross, but the Turks are so much on the alert, night and day, that as yet none have been able to come over.

In this town several have been arrested for going about endeavouring to stir up the Bulgarians to rise, but they have not succeeded in one single instance. The affair altogether is contemptible, and I think we shall shortly hear the end of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

P.S.—Since writing the foregoing the Pasha has sent to inform me that the Monastery of Dranova, referred to in my report of the 16th instant, has surrendered without a shot being fired.

R. R.

No. 131.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 222.)
St. Petersburgh, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAD an interview with M. de Giers on the 18th instant, when I informed his Excellency of the decision of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Berlin proposals for the pacification of Herzegovina and Bosnia, as contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant, recorded in your despatch No. 298 of that date.

I stated to his Excellency that I was not officially instructed to make this communication, as the official answer of Her Majesty's Government would be probably made through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, into whose hands the Memorandum containing the proposals of the three Powers had been placed, but that, as an act of courtesy, I wished to give him the earliest intelligence of the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government.

M. de Giers thanked me, and stated that he had been already prepared for this communication, and had received it with sincere regret. His Excellency expressed his hopes that, on a more detailed explanation of the views of the three Powers, Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to reconsider their decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 132.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 223.)
St. Petersburgh, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

AT an interview with M. de Giers this morning his Excellency informed me that he had not received any official communication from Prince Gortchakow for four days, and that he expected a courier to-morrow.

His Excellency was unable, therefore, to give me any information as to the course which the five Powers might take in regard to the measures proposed for the pacification of the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

His Excellency, however, said that the proposals of the Berlin Conference would probably be submitted to the Porte at Constantinople, not in a collective form, but by notes identic in substance.

I communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 305 of the 15th instant, addressed to Lord Odo Russell, explaining the grounds of objection entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the proposals of the three Powers at Berlin.

The only observation of note which his Excellency made was in regard to the last paragraph of the Memorandum (which appeared almost to amount to an invitation to the insurgents to reject any terms offered to them), to the effect that it was not intended to make known to the insurgents the nature of the paragraph referred to. The Memorandum was merely to be considered as a confidential communication of their views and proposals to the Governments of England, France, and Italy.

I took the opportunity to assure his Excellency that it was with sincere regret that Her Majesty's Government had found themselves under the necessity of declining to accede to the proposals of the three Powers. Her Majesty's Government, I observed, would most gladly and readily have given their approval and co-operation if they had conscientiously thought that the proposed scheme of pacification would prove practicable, and likely to attain the desired aim.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 133.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 227.)
St. Petersburgh, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

GENERAL CHERNAIEFF, formerly Governor-General of Turkestan, and till lately editor of the "Russki Mir" (the organ of the Slav party), has lately left this for Servia, and has, I am informed, entered the service of the Prince of Servia.

M. de Giers, in reply to my inquiry, stated to me to-day that General Chernaieff was no longer in the Russian service, and that, consequently, he was free to take service in any foreign State. He observed that this incident was not well viewed by the Imperial Government, for, undoubtedly, it foreboded no pacific purpose, but the Imperial Government were without responsibility, and were powerless to prevent it.

I have the honour to inclose the précis by Mr. Michell of an article from the "Nova Vremia" of the $\frac{17}{29}$th of May, referring to General Chernaieff's employment by the Servian Government, and alluding to the probable active co-operation of Servia in behalf of her Christian brethren.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 133

Précis of Article in the "Nova Vremia" of May $\frac{17}{29}$, 1876.

THE "Novoe Vremia" of the $\frac{17}{29}$th May states that General Chernaieff, the former editor of the "Russki Mir," is now in communication with the Servian Government with a view to his appointment as Commander-in-chief of the Servian army. By last accounts he is busily engaged in studying the military resources of the country. The General proceeded from Moscow to Servia on the 27th April last, and reached Bucharest on the 9th May (o.s.). The "Novoe Vremia" further informs its readers that Servia is quite prepared for war, and great enthusiasm prevails among the people in this direction. The loan has already been covered, several hundred thousands of florins having been contributed towards it in the shape of voluntary donations. It observes, however, that it is impossible to say to what extent these preparations will prove unnecessary after the Berlin Conference; but appears to think that the stronger Servia is, and the stronger the position of the insurgents, the easier will it be to deal with Turkey, and the more comprehensive will be the demands that the Christians of Turkey will be able to put forward. The presence, therefore, of General Chernaieff at Belgrade appears, according to this organ, to be useful, whether Servia declares war against Turkey or not. "With his undoubted military talents, and his sincere and disinterested devotion to the Slavonian cause, the General will be able to group around him all those who are as honestly bent, as he is himself, on the liberation of the Christians from Turkish thraldom. All Russians who understand the importance of the task with which Russia and Europe have now to deal wish him every success."

No. 134.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 228.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, May 24, 1876.

WITH reference to my previous despatch No. 227 of to-day's date on General Chernaieff's presence and military employment in Servia, I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a further article from the "Novoe Vremia," exonerating the Imperial Government from any responsibility in regard to General Chernaieff's acceptance of military service in Servia, and denying that it has any connection with Russian policy.

The article then continues to pass reflections on the refusal of England to give her adhesion to the Berlin proposals, and refers to the diplomacy of England as seeking to paralyze the action of Russia at Constantinople; it refers to certain articles in Turkish journals said to be of an offensive nature towards General Ignatiew, and alludes to certain reports in the Russian press accusing Sir H. Elliot of being the author of them.

I have thought it right to bring the violent and slanderous tone of this journal under your Lordship's notice, for in vilifying the character of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, a grave attack is made on Her Majesty's Government, the object of both being to incite public opinion against England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Précis of Article in the "Novoe Vremia" of May $\frac{5}{17}$, 1876.

GENERAL CHERNAIEFF IN SERVIA.—The Novoe Vremia" of $\frac{5}{17}$ May contains the following remarks on this subject, and on the refusal of England to give her adhesion to Berlin programme:—

"We consider it necessary to mention that General Chernaieff proceeded to Servia as a private individual, unconnected with the service, from which he retired already about a twelvemonth since. It would be erroneous to suppose that his presence in Servia, even as Commander of the Servian army, supposing he should fill that post, has any connection with Russian policy. It is quite possible that several retired Russian officers may join him, but they will do so entirely at their own private option.

"During the liberation of Italy many Englishmen, Germans, and Americans took part in the campaign, and no one ascribed such private enterprise and personal sympathy to the respective Governments. We consider, however, that General Chernaieff's journey is not devoid of meaning, as Servia must play an important part in impending events. These events do not at present bear a very promising aspect, as the Berlin Conference could not decide the question in such a way as to remove all doubt concerning the results. Such doubts, on the contrary, continue to increase; for to-day's telegrams inform us that England has refused to join in the decision arrived at by the Northern Powers.

"There is no doubt that with the great influence which English diplomatists exercise over the Divan the refusal of England will have important signification. As it is, the excited fanaticism of the Osmanlis will receive fresh fuel in hope, ungrounded though it may be, of support and defence on the part of England, in case of the Northern Powers approaching Turkey with an ultimatum at the point of the bayonet, instead of diplomatic notes.

"It is only requisite that England should show the new Prime Minister of the Sultan the futility of their hopes with regard to English countenance so as to prevent the Porte from turning a deaf ear to all the representations of European diplomacy.

"By latest accounts English diplomacy is secretly paralyzing the action of Russia at Constantinople, not disdaining to enter into league with the Turkish Ministers, if it be confirmed that Sir H. Elliot assisted them to write offensive articles in the Turkish journals against our Ambassador; a diplomatic scandal will be the result, such as Europe will not have witnessed for a long time. No one can forbid England to maintain her own interests in the East, but such a violation of diplomatic decorum as Sir H. Elliot has apparently been guilty of is only possible under the supposition that the British Government is hostile to that of Russia.

"The conduct of the British Ambassador will, if proved, untie Russia's hands in the East. It seems to us that under these circumstances the more determined the manner in which Russia asserts her power, the more certain will be the hope of a speedy and correct solution of the question. We are in a fatal manner involved in the Eastern question; we have already stated, and now repeat, that we cannot retreat.

"The force of circumstances must lead us, and it is useless to attempt to comfort ourselves with an illusion that we can avoid the decree of fate."

No. 135.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 235. Secret.)
My Lord,

Berlin, May 27, 1876.

I HAD some conversation with the Emperor William on the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 385 of the 19th instant, which His Majesty had just been reading in a German translation made at the Foreign Office for His Majesty's use.

The Emperor expressed the regret he felt at the decision arrived at by Her Majesty's Government, but said he was personally not sufficiently conversant with the question to form an opinion of his own on the arguments put forward by Her Majesty's Government against the proposals contained in the Memorandum drawn up by the Chancellors, but he had no doubt that, from an English point of view, Her

Majesty's Government were right. What he regretted was the absence of the support and co-operation of England, to which he attached the highest importance, in common with his allies.

He would tell me, in strict confidence, that he did not expect the efforts of the five Powers could galvanize a dead body into life again, but he thought it to the advantage of all concerned to put off the funeral as long as possible. The secret of the question, which no one could venture to allude to, was, after all, the possession of Constantinople; and he had received the most positive assurances from the Emperor Nicolas at the time of the Crimean War, and from the Emperor Alexander the other day, that Russia did not want Constantinople, and would not know what to do with it if they had it. In fact, the possession of Constantinople would break the Russian Empire into two halves, to use the Czar's own expression.

It was the manifest interest of Russia to keep the Turkish Empire together as long as possible, and in that view he fully agreed with the Emperor Alexander.

I explained the position of Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor William, and said that His Majesty would find that there was more vitality and power of resistance in the Turkish Empire than was generally believed in Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 136.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 236. Confidential.) *Berlin, May 27, 1876.*

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 387 of the 19th instant, I have thought it desirable in my communications with the German Government to indicate the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government in regard to the inconvenience which has again arisen, as in the case of Count Andrassy's note, of a set of articles being submitted by the three Northern Powers, for the acceptance of Great Britain without any opportunity having been afforded for a preliminary consideration of their details by Her Majesty's Government, or for the possible objections of Her Majesty's Government to be considered by the three Governments concerned; and I have explained that Her Majesty's Government attach little importance to forms in such matters, and would have readily accepted the present proposals had they appeared to them to afford a feasible plan for the pacification of the insurgent districts, but that they cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted, and which they do not believe calculated to effect the object with which, they are informed, it has been framed.

I have thought it the more desirable to offer these remarks in general conversation, because an erroneous and somewhat childish impression had gone abroad that Her Majesty's Government had taken offence at not having been consulted in the first instance, or invited to take part in the Conferences which Her Majesty's Government, it is concluded, desires to see transferred at some future period from Berlin to London.

This impression, I am happy to say, has, however, not been shared or credited by the German Government.

In talking on the subject with Herr von Bülow, his Excellency reminded me that the Berlin meeting, proposed by Russia, agreed to by Germany, and accepted by Austria, had been considered as a preliminary discussion only, to enable the two Governments more directly interested to agree on the measures best calculated, in their opinion, to bring about the pacification of the Herzegovina.

As soon as an agreement had been established, it was submitted by the three Powers to the consideration of the Governments of England, France, and Italy; and, in framing their proposals, they had been guided by a sincere desire to adopt only such recommendations as could meet, to the best of their belief, with the assent and support of all the Powers concerned.

It was the wish and intention of the Northern Powers thereby to afford every opportunity to the Governments of England, France, and Italy, for the consideration of the proposals submitted to them, and for the expression of objections and suggestions which Germany and her allies would gladly receive and take into earnest consideration

themselves, with the hope of acquiring the support and co-operation of Her Majesty's Government in the work of pacification.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 137.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 411.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 29, 1876.*

I HAVE to call your Excellency's attention to the inclosed extract, containing a translation of a letter published in the "Nord," purporting to have been addressed by the chiefs of the insurgents to M. Wesselitsky, and containing proposals closely resembling those which the Three Powers adopted at the Berlin Conference, and I have to request your Excellency to endeavour to ascertain whether this letter is authentic.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 138.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received May 29, night.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapiè, May 29, 1876.*

I HAVE communicated your Lordship's despatch No. 385 to Lord O. Russell to Raschid Pasha, who was extremely gratified and grateful to Her Majesty's Government.

He told me confidentially that the Duc Decazes wishes to induce the Porte to ask Her Majesty's Government to join the other Powers in adopting the Berlin proposals.

The suggestion will certainly not be acted upon.

No. 139.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 423.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 30, 1876.*

AT an interview which took place yesterday between the German Ambassador and myself. His Excellency expressed anxiety to know whether Her Majesty's Government had advised, or intended to advise, the Porte to resist altogether the proposals about to be made by the five Powers in consequence of the agreement come to at Berlin. He was also anxious to ascertain whether Her Majesty's Government had communicated their proposals officially to the Porte, as a communication lately received from the Turkish Government appeared to indicate an intention of refusing even to consider them; a step which, besides its rashness, appeared premature in the actual condition of affairs.

The latter question I answered in the negative, telling his Excellency at the same time that Mussurus Pasha had called upon me within a day or two of the date at which the decision of Her Majesty's Government was taken; that I had found him already acquainted with the substance of the Berlin proposals, and that I had not hesitated to discuss them with him. I had not concealed, I said, my opinion as to the objections which might be taken to them; but I had, while pointing these out, warned the Turkish Government of the necessity of caution and conciliation, and Sir Henry Elliot, who had held the same language at Constantinople, had been approved for holding it. As to accepting the proposed armistice, I thought that was a question which the Porte could alone decide, as no other Power could be sufficiently acquainted with the details of the military and political situation to pronounce confidently which side would gain by a temporary suspension of hostilities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* "Times," May 27, 1876.
† Repeated to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

No. 140.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 340. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Russian Ambassador read to me yesterday, confidentially, a letter from Prince Gortchakow, not intended, as he said, for any eyes but his own, in order that I might be in a position to understand the impression produced upon the Russian Foreign Office by the language and conduct of Her Majesty's Government.

In this letter, among other things it was said that Sir Henry Elliot, so far from sharing the uneasiness felt by the Russian Ambassador at the recent demonstrations of public opinion at Constantinople, had rather seemed to approve of them, and to think that they might be a first step towards the establishment in Turkey of something like Constitutional Government.

In answer, I observed that I believed Sir H. Elliot to have been quite as much alive as any of his colleagues to the danger of a fanatical outbreak in the Turkish capital; that I had no means of knowing exactly the view he had taken of the demonstrations which led to the fall of the late Grand Vizier, but that, in so far as these demonstrations might be a warning to the Sultan of the general unpopularity which he had incurred by misgovernment, and of the consequent danger in which he was placed, I thought it quite reasonable to regard them as by no means an unmixed evil.

The latter went on to say that Her Majesty's Government had declined to lay before Parliament the correspondence that had passed on the subject of the Berlin proposals, grounding their refusal on the fact that these proposals had not yet been made known to the Porte; but it was clear that their purport was well known at Constantinople; had they been communicated by Her Majesty's Government?

To this I replied that I had certainly conversed with Musurus Pasha on the subject; that I had found him acquainted with the general purport of the proposals before our conversation; that he might have learnt some details from me which were new to him; but I reminded Count Schouvaloff that within three or four days of the communication made to Lord Odo Russell, enough had transpired, through the medium of the continental press, to make it unnecessary to look further for the source of the information possessed by the Porte.

I added that, considering Turkey to be more immediately interested in the matter than any other Power, I could not see any reason why the Representatives of the Porte should not have the earliest information of designs which so deeply concerned that Power.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 141.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 30, *at night.)*

Therapia, May 30, 1876.

(Télégraphié.)

THE identic note conveying the Berlin proposals was to have been sent in to-day by the five Representatives, but the deposition of the Sultan makes it doubtful what will be done.

No. 142.

Rashid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, May 31.)

Constantinople, le 29 Mai, 1876.

(Télégraphique.)

POUR faire suite à mon télégramme circulaire du 21 de ce mois.

Je résume ci-dessous deux télégrammes que nous venons de recevoir d'Ali et Mukhtar Pachas, et qui corroborent nos objections en ce qui concerne la trêve de deux mois à accorder aux insurgés.

Le Muchir commandant nous mande qu'aujourd'hui sept a huit cents insurgés peuvent à peine porter les armes; que le reste est accablé sous le poids de la misère;

résultant de son absence de ses foyers; qu'ils sont incapables de se réunir sur un même point, que le pourraient-ils qu'ils n'oseraient, après les déroutes sanglantes, tenir tête aux troupes Impériales; que quatre-vingt-dix sur cent d'entre eux ne veulent plus continuer la rébellion; que les considérations morales les empêchent seules de mettre bas les armes; que dans l'Herzégovine ils peuvent à peine paraitre par bandes de cinq à dix individus et qu'ils ne le font pas; qu'il est certain, en un mot, que les rebelles se trouvent à l'heure qu'il est dans l'impossibilité matérielle de faire un mouvement sérieux, à moins d'être activement soutenus par des forces Monténégrines considérables.

De l'Herzégovine, on nous informe que pour cette province seulement les habitants de Gabié et de ses environs sont rentrés venant par groupes de la Dalmatie; que la plupart de ceux du haut et du bas Kérasto sont retournés dans leurs foyers, il y a vingt jours; que les habitants de Metkoviteh ont notifié que plus de 1,500 individus sont prêts à rentrer; que d'autres sont venus spontanément par la station de —obigne; qu'un nombre considérable de familles émigrés du côté de Raguse sollicitent leur retour, et qu'enfin, si cela n'a pas pris jusqu'à présent le caractère d'un mouvement général, c'est que d'une part les subsides n'ont pas cessé d'être accordés, et que de l'autre cette tendance et ce désir, d'ailleurs très-accentués, sont contrecarrés par les Comités. Loin d'avoir été dissous, ces Comités continuent à distribuer des vivres et de l'argent aux bandes d'insurgés recrutées parmi les émigrés et qui s'opposent au retour de l'émigration.

No. 143.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 370. Very Confidential.)

Paris, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

AS far as I can learn, the general feeling among sensible thinking people here is that England has been right in refusing to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum, the terms of which are pretty accurately known now, and they blame what they consider to be the precipitate action of the French Government in this matter.

Among those who are apt to judge political events superficially, there are many, as I hear, who, following the bent of their prejudices, accuse England of leaving France in the lurch, as they pretend she did in the Franco-German war. This was to be expected, and is merely the old story of "Le perfide Albion" over again.

I have been very confidentially informed that there is much uneasiness at the French Foreign Office, owing to the great irritation said to exist at St. Petersburgh since it has been known that the British fleet is to be largely reinforced in the Mediterranean. One leading official, I am assured, went so far as to say that this irritation was so intense that he should not be surprised if Russia were to commit the foolish act of sending troops into Turkey at once. I merely mention this as a sample of the excitement which undoubtedly prevails in Paris.

The position of the Duc Decazes has been anything but secure of late. His approaching retirement from the Foreign Office has been freely canvassed, but his Excellency is not, I fancy, likely to resign, unless indeed an adverse vote of one of the Chambers were to leave him no alternative.

Besides, since his adroit speech in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, in answer to M. Naquet's question respecting the functions of the Commissioner to be delegated to the Egyptian Government for financial purposes—a speech which even his enemies confess to be a great success—the position of the Duc Decazes has been, at least for the moment, considerably strengthened.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 144.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 31.)

Constantinople, May 30, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

PORTE has sent (Circular?) to notify the accession of the Sultan Mourad.

The deposition of the late Sultan was combined by his Ministers, with precautions which prevented the possibility of resistance or the risk of disturbances.

Before daybreak the Palace was surrounded by troops on the one side, and by boats from the men-of-war on the other.

Some Ministers went to Mourad and took him to the War Office, where he was at once proclaimed.

A Pasha was sent to the Sultan to intimate to him that he was dethroned, and showed him that resistance was hopeless.

His Majesty is said to have shown dignity and calmness.

He was conducted to a boat, and conveyed, with his family, to the Old Palace. No exhibition of sympathy for him is (displayed?) anywhere, and the rejoicing appears universal.

The new Sovereign has received the homage of all the principal functionaries and heads of the Christian communities.

No. 145.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 31.)

Constantinople, May 31, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegrams yesterday were delayed by the closing of the telegraph offices.

No. 146.

*Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received May* 31.)

Paris, May 31, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

DUC DECAZES is anxious to learn views of Her Majesty's Government consequent on the situation created by the Sultan's deposition, and particularly whether they do not think this a favourable moment for arriving at a closer understanding between all six Powers.

(Confidential.)

The Duc Decazes evidently leans to an armistice and to direct negotiations between Turkey and insurgents and Turkey and Montenegro.

No. 147.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received May* 31.)

Rome, May 31, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs was much agitated on hearing from the Turkish Minister yesterday morning of the deposition of the Sultan. His Excellency tells me that the Italian Government suspend all judgment upon the new position of things created by a revolution the principles of which they cannot approve, but which they hope may perhaps be productive of good, until they are more completely informed of the motives of those who originated it and of the course they are likely to follow.

No. 148.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 1.)

(No. 232.)

St. Petersburgh, May 27, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose an article from the "Agence Russe," of May $\frac{15}{27}$, stating on authority that General Tchernaieff has received no military command in Servia, and that he is simply there as a correspondent for the "Russki Mir," of which he is the editor.

It adds that General Tchernieff, as likewise other retired Russian officers, induced by their Slavonic sympathies, and in view of serious events in Turkey, are leaving for

* Repeated to Rome, Constantinople, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, and Vienna.

† Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

Servia and Montenegro, and it considers that these are symptoms of an approaching danger "to dispel which there is not a moment to lose."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 148.

Extract from the "Agence Russe" of May $\frac{15}{27}$, 1876.

NOUS sommes à même de déclarer que M. Tchernïaïev, Général en retraite, n'a reçu en Serbie aucune espèce de commandement militaire et qu'il ne s'y trouve qu'en qualité de journaliste, ainsi que le prouve le télégramme de Belgrade signé de lui et que nous avons donné hier d'après "Le Monde Russe," son journal. Ce qui est vrai, c'est que ce général et d'autres officiers Russes en retraite, mus par leurs sympathies ainsi que par la perspective de prochaines conflagrations en Turquie, partent pour la Servie ou le Monténégro, et ils ne sont probablement pas les seuls. Ce sont là autant de symptômes d'un très-prochain danger, qui prouvent que pour le conjurer il n'y a pas une minute à perdre.

No. 149.

*Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received June* 1.)

Paris, May 31, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE language of the Duc Decazes to me this morning was certainly favourable with respect to the events at Constantinople, and I find a favourable impression in other quarters. I am to see Duc Decazes again to-morrow morning.

No. 150.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received June* 1.)

Vienna May 31, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

SEVERAL of my colleagues as well as myself having inquired of Count Mulinen what this Government thinks of recent events at Constantinople, he has asked Count Andrassy by telegraph what he is to answer.

A favourable impression has been produced in public opinion by the change, which the "Neue Freie Presse" considers a fortunate event for Count Andrassy. The funds have risen and the exchange has fallen.

No. 151.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 1, 3 P.M.)

Paris, June 1, 1876, 12·20 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday the Duc Decazes has just told me that he has received news of the accession of the new Sultan without distrust, and has forwarded to the French Ambassador at London for communication to your Lordship a copy of a telegram he has sent to French Ambassador at Constantinople explaining the views of the French Government. He adds that he looked upon the event not as a complication but as a simplification.

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* Repeated to Rome, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

† Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Rome, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

No. 152.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 1, 1876, 3·15 P.M.*

IN reply to your telegram of yesterday, Her Majesty's Government authorize you to congratulate the Sultan as you propose.

No. 153.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.[a]*—(Received June 1.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, June 1, 1876.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs seems much more reconciled to-day to the change at Constantinople. This effect is produced by the accounts he receives of the good impression which the event has created both in Europe and Turkey. He says that he is much reassured by fact of Her Majesty's Government having already conveyed their felicitations to the new Sultan; that the Italian Government intend to follow the same course, but being one of those which were to have presented the identic note recommended, now, of course, suspended, they must observe appearances with others. His Excellency knows, however, that France has also congratulated Sultan.

Mourad will, of course, be recognized as soon as his advent is officially announced.

No. 154.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.†*—(Received June 1.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 1, 1876.*

WITH reference to Mr. Adams' telegram of yesterday, I consider that the change which has taken place here makes it doubly undesirable to make any representation to the Porte on the subject of the Herzegovina, as the Porte may probably be even less disposed than before to listen to dictation of foreign Powers.

We do not know what course Porte proposes to adopt in regard to the insurrection, but important administrative reforms, affecting whole Empire as well as districts in question, appear to be contemplated.

No. 155.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 261.) *Foreign Office, June 1, 1876.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram of the 26th ultimo, reporting the arguments urged by Count Andrassy to induce Her Majesty's Government to accede to the proposals set forth in the Berlin Memorandum, I have to request that you will express to his Excellency Her Majesty's Government's appreciation of the courteous anxiety manifested by the Austro-Hungarian Government to secure their co-operation in this matter; but you will at the same time inform him that the question has been fully considered by Her Majesty's Government in all its aspects, and that they have not been indifferent to the considerations to which Count Andrassy refers.

They cannot, however, depart from the line of conduct which it appears to them they are bound to pursue, and they are consequently unable to do more than repeat their sincere regret at being unable to act in concert with Austria-Hungary and the other Powers who have concurred in the Berlin proposals.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

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[a] Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.
† Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

No. 156.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Paget.

(No. 332.) *Foreign Office, June 1, 1876.*

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador called upon me to-day and inquired what were the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the change which had taken place in Turkey.

I said that it had taken us by surprise, as it had all the rest of the world; that the revolution had been made by the Turks themselves, and had not to the best of my knowledge and belief, been instigated by any foreign Power; but that, as far as it was possible to form an opinion at so early a stage, I was inclined to think it a fortunate event. The misgovernment of the late Sultan had been notorious and extreme; and his successor, whatever he might turn out to be, could hardly do worse, and would probably do better.

General Menabrea then asked as to the course which Her Majesty's Government proposed to take in reference to the events which had led to the Berlin note, observing that he took for granted that nothing more would be heard of that document. I said I thought whatever might be done in the end, it was only common justice to give the new Sultan a little time to look about him, and to consider his course under circumstances so difficult as those in which he found himself.

Some general conversation as to the state of the Turkish Empire followed, in the course of which General Menabrea stated it to be the conviction of his Government that no effectual settlement of the troubles in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be arrived at that did not include the grant of autonomy in some shape to these provinces.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 157.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.[a]*—(Received June 1, at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, June 1, 1876.*

PRINCE BISMARCK is in the country. M. de Bülow thinks it premature to form an opinion on the events at Constantinople, the details of which are not yet known at Berlin.

Generally, however, a change for the better is anticipated.

No. 158.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1, at night.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June 1, 1876.*

I HEAR from good authority that the Emperor of Russia, from Ems, has again most urgently warned Servia and Montenegro against taking any aggressive action.

No. 159.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1, at night.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June 1, 1876.*

TURKISH Ambassador communicated telegram from Rashid Pasha to-day to Minister for Foreign Affairs, reporting general satisfaction at Constantinople on change of Sovereign, and announcing early transmission of a programme of policy to be pursued by the Porte.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet received any communication from

[a] Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Rome, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

Prince Gortchakow, and thinks that his Highness will await receipt of promised programme before pronouncing any opinion on events at Constantinople.

No. 160.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1, at night.)

Therapia, June 1, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

IT is stated that solemn inauguration of the Sultan is to take place immediately, and an intimation may be given that His Majesty will receive Ambassadors.

I would beg, therefore, to be informed as soon as possible when Her Majesty's Government consider that I may take part in anything implying that Her Majesty's Government recognize the new Sovereign.

No. 161.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1, at night.)*

Therapia, June 1, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

AN Imperial Hatt has been read. The present Cabinet is confirmed. The Sultan abandons 300,000*l.* of the Civil List, and makes over to the State all the revenues of the Crown estates, mines, forests, and manufactories. Immediate attention is directed to the finances and the equilibrium of the Budget, and the Ministers are ordered to ascertain the form of Government best suited to all the subjects of the Sultan, so as to assure to everyone full and entire liberty. His Majesty concludes by expressing the hope that the relations of all foreign Powers with him may be rendered still more intimate.

No. 162.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1.)

Therapia, June 1, 1876, 1 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

FRENCH Ambassador being authorized to convey his congratulations to the Sultan in the manner I suggested yesterday, I have done the same without waiting for your Lordship's answer.

No. 163.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 15.)

Mostar, May 19, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch, of to-day's date, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, announcing the re-instatement of Ali Pasha in his post here, and reporting the present position of affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 163.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Elliot.

Mostar, May 19, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the new Grand Vizier has reinstated Ali Pasha in his functions here, and that, as soon as Wassa Effendi heard of the changes in the Ministry, he telegraphed to withdraw his resignation.

I have nothing of importance to communicate this week. The Commander-in-

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

chief is still here, principally occupied, I believe, in making arrangements for bringing to the front ammunition and stores from Klek. The insurgents are committing isolated acts of brigandage wherever it is possible. The return of the refugees, though urged by Baron Rodich, is opposed in every possible way by the Slave Committees in Dalmatia and by the people.

At the present moment, however, there seems to be a general pause in affairs in expectation of what may result from the meeting of the Austrian, German, and Russian Ministers at Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 164.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 39. Political.)

Belgrade, May 10, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copy of my despatch of to-day's date, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot on this day, on the contradiction between General Ignatiew's language about Servia and his influence here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 164.

Consul-General White to Sir H. Elliot.

Belgrade, May 10, 1876.

Sir,

WITHIN the last fortnight I have been confidentially informed that both General Ignatiew and the German Ambassador at Constantinople have conveyed messages to the Prince of Servia, recommending him not to allow himself to be drawn too precipitately into a conflict with the Porte.

It is, I believe, not the first time that advice, almost identical, is given here from both these quarters.

In your Excellency's despatch of the 6th ultimo to the Earl of Derby, of which you were so kind as to send me a copy, an allusion is made to the indifference which the Russian Ambassador "almost ostentatiously proclaims towards Prince Milan."

I have every reason to believe that the Prince of Servia has not, during the last seven months, taken a single step of any importance here without consulting that Ambassador previously, and that both his negotiations with the Prince of Montenegro, and the military preparations carried on here, have been regularly and strongly recommended by General Ignatiew.

I am unable to account for this contradiction in his language.

From the language of my Russian colleague since the new Ministry came into office two days ago, I should not be at all surprised if hostilities should actually break out, that an attempt will be made, possibly with success, to reject the responsibility of very hurtful advice previously given on the men who will draw the logical consequences of those recommendations, and some of whom are known to be personally obnoxious to that General, and it may be even on Prince Milan himself, as their employer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 165.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 44. Political.)
Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copy of my despatch of this day addressed to Sir Henry Elliot on the opinions entertained of the Bulgarian insurrection at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 165.

Consul-General White to Sir H. Elliot.

Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

THE insurrection in Bulgaria is attracting more interest here than anything that has happened hitherto in the Herzegovina.

The patience, the enduring and industrious character of the Slav inhabitants of that Province, their habits and unwillingness to embark their lives and fortunes in hazardous and dangerous undertakings, all these make it highly improbable that they should have embarked in this venture without some assured prospect of assistance.

Unlike the Herzegovinians, they have neither the proximity of a Montenegro nor that of a foreign country like Dalmatia to fall back upon; they have no native Heyducks inspiring confidence and able to lead them to successful ambuscades and encounters, and back by devious paths into mountain recesses.

These and many other considerations have made persons well acquainted with Bulgaria come to the conclusion that this insurrection has been deliberately and carefully planned some years ago with foreign advice and assistance, and that everything has been prepared for a general rising of the Slavs in the entire Province, of which we as yet only see the commencement.

As long ago as last December, I had the honour to report to your Excellency in my despatch of December 4, 1875, that there was some sudden cause for anxiety for the tranquillity of that province.

Now that this new incipient insurrection has held its ground for four weeks, it is evident that it took the Ottoman Government quite by surprise; and what is most remarkable in it is that it should have broken out exactly in the part of the vilayet nearest to the railway leading to Adrianople, and least accessible, one might suppose, to foreign emissaries.

Very little information has transpired as yet on this subject at Belgrade, but I am assured by a military man, who is likely to be in possession of accurate information, that this movement is directed by a regular organization, prepared by the various Bulgarian Committees; that it is connected with a general plan well known to the Slav Committees in Russia; and that there are at this moment 15,000 insurgents in arms in Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 166.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 45. Political.)
Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copy of my despatch of this day, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, reporting the Decree granting a delay of three months for the payment of private bills.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 166.

Consul-General White to Sir H. Elliot.

Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that by a Decree of the Prince of Servia, published this morning, a law has been promulgated staying for three months the execution of all private bills which become due in the interval.

The application by an act of the Executive of such a privilege to debtors by enabling them legally to delay for a limited period of time the payment of their liabilities is known in German jurisprudence by the name of "Moratorium," and was, I believe, enforced at Paris during the last siege of that capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 167.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 46. Political.)
Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copy of my despatch of this day, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, reporting the establishment of a censorship for the press in Servia *pro tem.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 167.

Consul-General White to Sir H. Elliot.

Belgrade, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that by a Decree of the Prince of Servia, published this morning, the liberty of the press has been suspended, and all home and foreign journals are for the present submitted to a censorship.

There are four political journals printed in Servia, inclusive of the "Official Gazette" and of one supporting the present Administration, and it is, therefore, probable that the two independent organs will soon cease to appear, and thus reduce the above journals to two.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 168.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 48. Political.)
Belgrade, May 26, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Russian General Chernyoff arrived here a fortnight ago, and after having seen Prince Milan and been introduced to the Society of Belgrade as the editor of a leading Petersburgh journal the "Russki Mir," he proceeded on an excursion to the interior of Servia (Alexinatz).

The General is a popular man in Russia, not in Court circles and in the society of St. Petersburgh, but amongst the far more numerous class of persons, whether in the army or in the civil walks of life, who are sufficiently bold as to form political opinions in Russia, and still sufficiently sensible and patient as to scorn the revolutionary dreams of secret societies and of Nihilists.

The influential party to which the General belongs have been more and more ignored by their Government of late years, and the present Emperor appears to have almost forgotten, as well as Prince Gortchakow, the freedom of discussion which they

were but too glad to concede to them with a view to stir up and give a direction to the Russian national feeling during the discussion of the Polish question in 1863.

It is not impossible that the leading men of this party may feel that the question of the complications which may arise by an appeal to arms on the part of the Slavs in European Turkey will afford them an opportunity for asserting themselves, for which they have been waiting during ten years.

Major-General Chernayeff, who had commanded a Russian detachment in the first Central Asian expedition and conquered Tashkand, got out of favour subsequently and was allowed to retire into private life.

On his return from Alexinatz, he accepted a commission in the Servian army without giving, it appears, time to the Imperial Government to raise any formal objection to this act on his part.

I am inclined to believe that General Chernayeff had been in negotiation with some parties here with that view for some months, and that his opinion of the attitude that Russia will ultimately take in this question had more to do with this bold act on his part, than any excessive confidence in the military resources of this Principality.

M. Kartzoff assures me that this act of General Chernayeff's took him quite by surprise, and that he considers this step on the part of the Servian Government as wanting in proper deference to his own Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 169.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 50. Political. Confidential.)

Belgrade, May 27, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship this morning by telegraph the departure of my Russian colleague, M. Kartzoff, for Ems.

I went to take leave of him yesterday evening, and I found him more communicative than he had been of late; he admitted that the Prince of Servia and his Government were evidently bent on war, but he asserted that it was in the power of the Emperor of Russia to prevent their carrying out such an intention, as Servia was under far too great obligations to Russia to dare to act in contradiction to the positive orders of the Emperor.

I asked him if he had obtained any assurance that Servia should wait quietly till he returned from Ems; he said he had not, but that unless the Turks took the initiative he did not anticipate that the Government of Servia would rush into the conflict without waiting to see what was going to happen in other provinces of the Turkish Empire.

In fact, I gathered from his conversation for the first time a full confirmation of my invariable suspicions that Russia has been during the last ten months designedly making use of Servia, first with a view to exercise a constant pressure on the Porte, and ultimately to make her act, either now or few years hence, as a docile tool in upsetting the Turkish Empire by means of a general rising of the Christians both Slav and Greek.

M. Kartzoff said that there is no reason to think that the time has come for a general conflagration in the East, but he insinuated at the same time that should the Porte continue to throw difficulties in the adoption of what he is pleased to call the moderate demands and recommendations of Prince Gortchakow it is not unlikely that Servia will be allowed to commence hostilities, but he added that these were his private views, mentioned in strict confidence, and that he had no instructions from his Government for his guidance since the interview at Berlin.

As I have reason to suppose that M. Kartzoff is a personal friend of Prince Milan's, I availed myself of this opportunity to tell him that I was perfectly aware that the preparations for war which had been carried on here during the last seven months, had been initiated and prosecuted by the recommendation of General Ignatiew and by his, M. Kartzoff's, advice, and I asked him what he thought would be the position of Prince Milan in Servia if, after the considerable sacrifices which so poor a people have cheerfully submitted to, and after the country had been half ruined in the sanguine prospect of some great patriotic achievement, the Prince had to confess that the whole of these comparatively costly preparations had been mere waste and purely thrown away.

M. Kartzoff did not attempt to deny to me that he had recommended the Prince to be fully prepared, in accordance with the means available in a country so backward in military organization, but he pleaded that the advice proffered by him had no object in view but the defence of Servia against the possibility of a Turkish aggression.

I may say that he has always held nearly the same language to me as regards Servian armaments, and that I believe he was instructed to give such advice to the Prince of Servia, and that, moreover, for some reason or other, Prince Wrede, who certainly at one time held very strong and meaning language to Prince Milan, does not appear to have ever expressed any particular objection to any of the preparations undertaken by the Servian Government, with no other object in view but that of enabling the Principality to take an active part, sooner or later, in a general struggle against the authority of the Porte.

I may add that M. Kartzoff mentioned that the Porte, if it made up its mind to be conciliatory, might be induced to concede some sop to Servia, such as the possession of Zvornick or the like.

Indeed, I am too deeply convinced of the interest which Russia attaches to the preservation of her influence in Servia, to admit that that Power will allow the present Eastern incident to be closed without obtaining some slight satisfaction for Servia, though I am convinced also that her chief efforts will be directed to obtain substantial advantages for the Prince of Montenegro, in whose favour she will be inclined not only to exert any influence which she may possess singly, or in conjunction with her two Imperial allies at Constantinople, but even ultimately to sacrifice Prince Milan in Servia should the course of political events preclude immediate action on a more extensive scale, and should the disappointment and disaffection generated by this amongst Servians occasion actual sedition here, and recoil upon poor Prince Milan's head.

With a view to such a contingency I can, I think, understand the disparaging language employed about Prince Milan by General Ignatiew at Constantinople, by General Novikow at Vienna, and by other Russian agents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 170.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 51. Political.)

Belgrade, May 29, 1876.

My Lord,

I AM assured by competent persons that the military authorities here are of opinion that the preparations undertaken by them with a view to a conflict with the Porte are so far completed that they see no objection to commence hostilities as soon as the Government may feel disposed to do so.

The only thing wanting is the calling out of the militia. Of these about 12,000 men have been sent to Alexinatz and Negotine to take charge of the newly-constructed forts, which are intended to obstruct and, if possible, prevent a Turkish invasion.

Every morning we are alarmed by reports of an immediate convocation of the entire militia, but after hearing most conflicting accounts during the day, it has been hitherto always possible in the end to ascertain that these reports are, at any rate, premature.

It is certainly difficult to admit that all these preparations and the expenses they have occasioned have been incurred without some plan and object in view, and it is therefore probable that they may lead ere long to some hostile acts against the Porte.

In the meantime the Government denies any such intention, but they are possibly merely waiting for some signal or important intelligence.

It is not unlikely that an attempt will be made about Whitsuntide to open new centres of insurrection in Bosnia, whilst the main body of the Servian militia would, in such a case, defend the country from any reprisals on the part of the Ottoman army concentrated at Nish and at Widdin, a force which is said to have been diminished since the commencement of the disturbances in Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 171.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 503.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's telegram, conveying Lord Odo Russell's report of the points agreed upon at Berlin by the three Northern Powers, did not reach me till after my return from the Porte yesterday afternoon.

I have not yet had an opportunity of ascertaining the views of Mehemed Rushdi Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, on the question of the Herzegovina, but Rashid Pasha tells me that they are conciliatory, and that for the moment nothing will be done in reference to the despatch of troops to Scutari.

I am not disposed to anticipate any decided objection on the part of the Porte to most of the points proposed, except, perhaps, to the composition of the Commission of Relief, as suggested in the second clause, and certainly to the supervision by Consuls or Delegates of the Powers over the execution of the reforms, to which I should expect an almost insuperable difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Porte.

A practical supervision may be obtained without reference to the Porte, for the measures to be applied to the insurgent provinces having been officially communicated to the Guaranteeing Powers, the latter will be entitled to remonstrate if their Consuls report that the promised reforms and measures of relief are not carried out, and future tranquillity is thereby endangered.

Between this and formally constituting foreign Agents into a body intended to control the Turkish authorities there is a wide distinction.

By the course proposed at Berlin, as at present appears from the telegraphic report, the Powers would seem themselves to guarantee the faithful execution of the reforms, and it would be to them, and not to their own Government, that the insurgents would be taught to look.

If the Sultan's Government are now called upon to consent to this Consular supervision it will be a demand much in excess of what was contained in the Andrassy Note, and the Porte may inquire what security will be given that its acceptance of the new proposals would be beneficial, and that fresh concessions will not be required of it if the insurgents should reject the terms.

The compliance hitherto shown with the wishes of the Powers has, it is considered, been the reverse of advantageous.

It is remembered that the Consular Commission in the Herzegovina was consented to in the faith of an engagement which has never been fulfilled, that the Delegates should be withdrawn as soon as they had made certain communications to the insurgents. Their presence is admitted to have kept alive the hope that there would at last be a European intervention, but they are still retained.

Count Andrassy's note was frankly accepted, and the Porte was then told that no further concessions should be made, but if, instead of this, fresh proposals are now put forward, the Turkish Government will now be inclined to ask what reason there is for supposing that they may not be the prelude to new demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 172.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 506.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

I LEARN from Rashid Pasha that his Excellency was informed yesterday by telegram from Ragusa that the Turkish Commander in Bosnia, having entered into negotiations with the two most important insurgent Chiefs, has succeeded in coming to an understanding with them.

Until fully confirmed from Bosnia this news cannot, however, be fully accepted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 173.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 508. Confidential.) *Constantinople, May 17, 1876.*

My Lord,

THE late Governor of Philippopoli called upon me this morning and gave me some information respecting the insurrectionary movement of the Bulgarians.

He stated that he had received undoubted information that a rising had been organized to break out ten days later than it actually occurred.

He had communicated this information to the Porte, and had recommended the adoption of measures by which it might easily have been prevented, but Mahmoud Pasha took no notice whatever of his warning.

There is not, he says, the shadow of a doubt that the Russian Consul at Philippopoli was the prime mover and agent of the Revolutionary Committees by which the movement was directed, and his brother is at this moment a leader among the insurgents.

He gave me confidentially the copy of a letter which he addressed to the late Grand Vizier some weeks before the rising, and I have the honour to inclose a translation of it herewith.

I have already reported to your Lordship the anxiety of the Russian Ambassador to attribute to the discontent of some workmen what was evidently a deeply laid political movement.

It had broken out, as I have said, ten days before the combinations were complete, and if, by under-estimating its importance, the Porte could have been persuaded to delay taking the measures which were required, the fomenters of the movement might expect to retrieve some of the disadvantage caused by the premature explosion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 173.

Memorandum presented to the Governor-General of Adrianople, April 23, 1876.

(Traduction.)

IL y a un mois, j'avais eu l'honneur d'exposer verbalement à votre Excellence: 1. Que les Serbes se proposaient de susciter aussi des troubles en Bulgarie, en trompant sa population et en l'encouragement à la revolte par leurs machinations et menées revolutionnaires; 2, la façon dont ils s'efforçaient de fomenter des troubles parmi les Musulmans et les Bulgares; 3, que la surveillance armée des Balkans serait le moyen le plus efficace pour obtenir le maintien de la tranquillité; et 4, la nécessité d'adopter promptement toutes les mesures réclamées par les circonstances.

Des renseignements obtenus, il résulte que les Serbes ont lancé des bandes d'insurgés, qui ont franchi les Balkans, et ils redoublent de zèle dans leurs menées et leurs intrigues dans le but de décider les populations à se joindre à elles. Si, à Dieu ne plaise, cela venait à se réaliser, une bande considérable d'insurgés se réunirait dans les Balkans, ce qui amènerait de graves embarras.

En présence de ces circonstances les mesures, dont l'adoption immédiate est imposée par le devoir le plus sacré, sont les suivantes:—

L'importance topographique d'Islimie, Kazan, Kezarlik, Gabrova, Isladi, Odzhmuick, et d'Iveratcha, qui se trouvent situés au pied du grand Balkan, rend nécessaire le maintien d'un bataillon de troupes régulières dans chacune de ces localités.

Les populations Musulmanes des villages placés dans le voisinage des Balkans, connaissant tous les passages et issues de ces montagnes, aussi bien que les endroits où les insurgés pourraient se cacher, rendraient d'utiles services s'ils étaient formés en 15 ou 20 compagnies de volontaires de 100 hommes chacune, pour servir d'avant-gardes et d'éclaireurs aux troupes régulières dans la poursuite des insurgés. Portant déjà des armes et la plupart d'entre eux s'étant déjà acquitté du service militaire, ils sont aptes à manier les armes, nouveau système. Il faudrait donc les armer de fusils . . . . . ; en obtenant, par exemple, que Sa Majesté le Sultan exempte les officiers et les soldats volontaires du service de la reserve ("Redif"); cela, en outre favour spéciale qui leur serait accordée, servirait d'encouragement et de récompense.

De même que les bataillons de troupes régulières, placés dans les localités

susmentionnées, serviront de point d'appui à ces compagnies de volontaires, de même aussi, lorsque les bataillons devront entreprendre leurs mouvements, il faudra que deux compagnies au moins soient placées à la disposition de chaque bataillon. Leur point de concentration devra être disposé de façon à pouvoir effectuer ces mouvements de jonction.

L'ensemble de ces opérations militaires sera guidé par les circonstances et les localités. Tous ces bataillons et compagnies seront partagés en trois colonnes; d'après les localités, la première devra avoir pour point de réunion Chebka, la seconde Kazan et la troisième Orkhanieh. En suivant cette tactique, et si les circonstances l'exigent, la seconde et troisième colonne pourra opérer facilement sa jonction avec la première. D'un autre côté, ces deux colonnes, en se concentrant à Chebka, point de réunion de la première et centre des Balkans, seront à même d'opérer toutes ensemble un mouvement général.

Ces opérations militaires, ainsi combinées, auront pour résultat de faciliter la surveillance qui doit être exercée sur ces localités et le fait d'avoir assuré et gardé le Balkan fera évidemment échouer les plans revolutionnaires et séditieux qui pourraient être conçus.

Islimie, Kezanlik et Gabrova une fois pourvues chacunes d'un bataillon de troupes régulières, il n'y aurait qu'à expédier sans retard les troupes dont les autres localités auraient besoin. Ces dispositions ont pour but de ne pas modifier la ligne d'opérations à suivre par les forces militaires concentrées dans les localités précitées et d'assurer en même temps d'une façon satisfaisante la vie et les biens de ces populations dans le cas où il faudrait empêcher que les troubles qui semblent devoir éclater bientôt en Bulgarie, ne prennent de graves proportions ou bien que l'on se trouverait dans la nécessité de déclarer la guerre à la Serbie.

Enfin, confier le commandement supérieur de toutes ces forces à une personne possédant une connaissance parfaite des localités jouissant de toute la confiance des Musulmans et des Bulgares habitants ces endroits, et à laquelle on donnerait le titre de Commandant des Balkans; procéder à la formation immédiate des compagnies dont il s'agit, fournir sans retard les armes, nouveau système, avec les munitions de guerre nécessaires.

Ce sont les mesures que l'état actuel des choses consulte à adopter et que je soumets à l'appréciation de qui de droit.

No. 174.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 512. Confidential.)
Constantinople, May 18, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the alarm which had been spread abroad of an intention on the part of the Softas, or students of the Koran, to commence a general massacre of the Christians in Constantinople, has passed away.

There is, however, every reason to believe that the Softas will not rest content with their present success, but that, assisted by many leading men, they are bent on some further political movement, the object of which is to obtain a modified Constitution.

A rumour, true or false, has been gaining ground that Mourad Effendi, the Sultan's next heir, and his brothers, have been placed in close confinement, and this has tended to increase the irritation against His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 175.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 515.)
Constantinople, May 19, 1876.

My Lord,

WHEN I saw Raschid Pasha yesterday he spoke with much emotion and some indignation of the resolutions which he understood to have been come to at Berlin, the effect of which will be to deprive the Porte of all the advantages gained by Moukhtar

Pasha over the insurgents by the successful revictualling of the fortresses, and to check the disposition at present shown by the refugees to return to their homes.

The intimation, that if at the expiration of a two months' suspension of hostilities the Porte was unable to come to an agreement with the insurgents, the Powers would then have to consider what further measures were necessary, must inevitably prove fatal to the hope of such an agreement being arrived at.

As the insurgents will certainly understand this intimation to mean that if they stand firm there will either be fresh concessions in their favour, or else that there will be a foreign intervention in some shape or other, Raschid Pasha looks upon it as an encouragement to them to refuse to agree to the terms which, but for it, there was a good prospect of their accepting.

It is, I think, impossible to deny the force of this argument, and your Lordship will understand the reluctance of the Porte to consent to a proposal in which a future and indefinite interference by foreign Governments is included.

The objections which it at present feels might probably be greatly diminished if an explanation could be obtained from the Powers that the measures they hint at would be directed to the prevention of the extension of the field of hostilities by watching the proceedings of Servia and Montenegro, and ascertaining through agents of their own that those Principalities were observing a neutrality which should deprive the Porte of all pretext for attacking them.

The impression here is general that the insurrection has only been kept alive by the unavowed co-operation of Montenegro, and all impartial reports establish the active share taken in it by that Principality, which the Powers have shielded from the natural consequences of its acts.

The suggestion I have made is purely personal, and I have not mentioned it to Raschid Pasha, but the knowledge I have of the disposition of the Porte leads me strongly to believe that if some such explanation could be obtained from the Powers it would greatly increase the probability of the acceptance of the Berlin proposals, with some obviously necessary modifications.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 176.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 517.)
Constantinople, May 19, 1876.

My Lord,

RASHID PASHA asks how the Powers can believe that sanguinary collisions will be avoided if, as was proposed at Berlin, the troops in the Herzegovina are confined to some particular place, while both the Mussulmans and Christians are allowed to remain armed.

The Porte has never intimated an intention of disarming the Christians, and judging from the language both of Rashid Pasha and of Hussein Avni Pasha, the Minister of War, there will not, I think, be any difficulty in obtaining an assurance that it will not be attempted.

The Porte would be glad, if it were possible, that both Mussulmans and Christians should be deprived of their arms, but the habits of the population rendering this impracticable, it seems disposed to insist that while both parties retain their arms, neither of them should be allowed to carry them in public.

The habit of allowing Mussulmans only to carry arms has been productive of great abuses in many parts of the country, and cannot be too soon put an end to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 177.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 518.)
Constantinople, May 19, 1876.

My Lord,

DURING the anxiety which prevailed in consequence of the apprehension of sanguinary disturbances taking place in Constantinople there were daily meetings of the Representatives of the Guaranteeing Powers at General Ignatiew's, at which

there was an exchange of any information received, and any possible measures of precaution were discussed.

It was further thought by some that it might be possible to combine some common plan of defence, and that it would be well for all the Consuls to meet to see if this would be practicable, especially with the aid of the Croats and Montenegrins at the disposal of the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors.

I confess that I felt little inclined to call in the aid of such defenders, but being unwilling to separate from my colleagues, I consented to instruct Sir Philip Francis to take part in the proposed meeting.

I expressed, however, to him my opinion on the subject, in which he fully concurred, and your Lordship will perceive from the inclosed extract of the *procès-verbal* of the proceedings that the good sense of the majority of the Consuls led, as I expected, to the rejection of the well-meant but dangerous proposal.

It seems, from what was said at the meeting, that the number of these savage mountaineers at the disposal of the two Embassies amounts to above 2,000, and no slight alarm was created in Pera when several hundred of them assembled in an open space, and then proceeded to the Russian Embassy.

Many professed eye-witnesses state that they were taken in there for the night as a garrison, but they must be mistaken in this, as General Ignatiew says that he positively refused to admit them, although some received food at the Consulate, and passed the night in the yard surrounding it.

A large proportion of these Croats are engaged in peaceful employment in the neighbourhood, but had been summoned to town by their chiefs, whom they implicitly obey, and their presence added greatly to the danger of a collision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 177.

Précis of the Procès-Verbal of the Meeting of the Consular Corps at Pera, May 11, 1876, under the Presidence of Sir P. Francis.

SIR P. FRANCIS having explained that this meeting had been called at the desire of the Chiefs of Mission, and that its object was to tranquillize the minds of the foreign residents, and to provide measures for their safety, invited his colleagues to express their opinions.

The Italian Consul insisted on the necessity of not increasing the already existing alarm, and states that in his opinion the emergency of the case would be met by an increase of the Consular Guards.

The Russian Consul stated that there are two measures very desirable, viz., to make the members of the different colonies understand that their interests are identic, and, secondly, to appoint some places of refuge.

The French Consul, after remarking that the stationnaires, reinforced by those which were expected, would form a basis of operations, stated that it was for the Ambassadors rather than for the Consuls to decide on the adoption of measures.

The Mutessarif of Pera having been invited to attend at the meeting, stated that he did not think that there was any danger of disturbances, but that in the event of such taking place, he would trust rather to the military than to the police for repressing them.

On the Mutessarif's retiring, Sir P. Francis accompanied him to the staircase, and returned, saying that His Excellency had stated that he had no fear of public tranquillity being disturbed.

The Russian Consul then proposed the creation of a corps of firemen, but the idea having been opposed by other Consuls was dropped.

No. 178.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 524.)
My Lord,

Therapia, May 23, 1876.

WHEN questioned at the Porte about the Berlin proposals, I have said that I had little knowledge of the views of Her Majesty's Government, but that their indisposition to join in them must not be taken as a recommendation to the Porte summarily to reject them.

The five Powers being agreed, the Porte should, I thought, receive the communication in a conciliatory spirit, pointing out what appeared objectionable or unacceptable in the proposals, and any modifications which it might consider necessary.

My colleagues have all expressed the greatest regret at the decision of Her Majesty's Government on separating themselves from the other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 179.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 525.)
My Lord,

Therapia, May 24, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of further despatches from Mr. Vice-Consul Dupuis, reporting the progress of the insurrectionary movements in Bulgaria.

I have made strong representations to the Porte of the evils resulting from the employment of Bashi-Bazouks, and inclose herewith a copy of Mr. Sandison's report on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir,

Adrianople, May 16, 1876.

THE general topic of conversation here the last few days is that the Bulgarians of the village of Otlukoi, refusing to surrender, and taking refuge in a church or monastery, were bombarded by the troops under Hafous Pasha, when upwards of 300 men, women, and children were slaughtered.

According to other accounts it is stated that Hafous Pasha sent to demand a parley, and thrice times summoned the place to surrender, but, his messengers having been killed by the villagers, they were attacked as described. Others, again, state that the insurgents were driven off by artillery with trifling casualties. The last item of intelligence I hear is that the troops have since surrounded the village of Avradano, and that, unless it surrenders, it is feared the inhabitants will share the same fate as those of Otlukoi.

Extraordinary activity is being displayed here by the authorities and others in recruiting, arming, and forwarding to the disturbed districts Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians. Observing, in the meanwhile, great numbers of these irregulars about the streets, I represented to the Governor-General that it was scarcely safe to the public tranquillity to allow those troops to circulate the streets armed, and suggested that they might be localized somewhere away from the city, as it was generally feared that the slightest provocation might produce unpleasant consequences. The Governor-General assured me that the inhabitants had no cause to fear these troops, and that he had taken every precaution to maintain public tranquillity, but that he could not help keeping the Bashi-Bazouks here until such time as they received their arms and necessaries, when they were immediately ordered off to the front. I do not hear of any disorders having been committed by these troops in Adrianople, but I am assured that, once outside the city, they gave themselves up to all kinds of violence, and to the firing on women and other defenceless people in the villages and roads in this vicinity.

It having been several times brought to my knowledge that gunpowder was openly and freely sold by authority at a particular shop, not far from this Vice-Consulate, to Turks, and refused to Christians, I made inquiries on the subject, when the Governor-General admitted the fact of such an establishment for the sale of that article to recruits and volunteers, but denied that it was refused to Christians. I then told him that an English gentleman had applied to this office for a supply to defend himself in case of necessity. He raised no objections to this request, but in the

meanwhile I have it from that gentleman that the sale of gunpowder had been refused the son of the German Vice-Consul.

Frequent arrests are being made of Bulgarians in the different quarters of this city—strangers to the place. Among those arrests is one Hellenic subject, a respectable tradesman in Ali Pasha Bazaar, suspected of forwarding to Yamboli a case of firearms, knowing the same to be for the use of insurgents.

The news of the Russian Vice-Consul in Philippopoli having been insulted, though repeated, is not generally confirmed. Some say if he was not insulted, he is trying his best to provoke it by his conduct. Yesterday morning, my Russian colleague left for Constantinople with all his family, but I am told that, previous to starting, his luggage was opened and searched at the railway station.

I was informed, in confidence, yesterday morning, that the insurrection was spreading in the direction of Yamboli and Eski-Zaara, and the authorities in Bulgaria had asked for military reinforcements. This news I telegraphed immediately to your Excellency, but I have no confirmation to-day of this intelligence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HUTTON DUPUIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 179.

Vice-Consul Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot.

Adrianople, May 19, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, to the credit of the local authorities be it said, a more satisfactory state of public feeling exists in Adrianople since addressing you on the 13th and 15th instant, when disturbances and disorders appeared imminent. Whether this change is owing to the presence of a strong military force, or to the reported successes of the troops under Hafous Pasha in the disturbed districts, does not appear, nevertheless it may be presumed both circumstances have contributed to the present improved condition of affairs.

In the surrounding country unhappily such is not the case, and reports continue to reach me of acts of insubordination, excesses and disorders by the Bashi-Bazouks, Circassians and even armed Gypsies, who, it is stated, rob, plunder, kill, and levy black-mail on peaceable people. Unheard of cruelties and tortures, on the other hand, it would seem, are also practised by Bulgarians on women, children, and other defenceless Mussulman villages. How far the atrocities said to have been committed on both sides are true or exaggerated, I have no means of ascertaining.

A Bulgarian friend in the railway service, and who seems pretty well informed of what is passing, assured me yesterday that while in company with some Germans at the Hermanly Station he overheard a Turkish official, an Albanian, proceeding to Shumla, either as Kaimakam or other office, say to some of his suite that instructions had been issued in Constantinople to decimate the Bulgarians, and to kill every male child under six years of age, in order to exterminate the race and compel the rest to emigrate, as was done by the Russians to the Circassians. This may probably only be foolish, idle talk; nevertheless, as such indiscreet language, if true, must be most reprehensible coming from a Government official, and can only serve to embitter the existing bad feeling between Turks and Bulgarians, the sooner that official is removed from the service the better.

It is believed that the Ottoman Government contemplate establishing both here and at Philippopoli military camps, or at all events to keep strong garrisons in these places, and that Abdul Kerim Pasha, the Generalissimo of the Turkish army, and Chefket Pasha, just arrived from Constantinople, will organize and carry out those intentions. Abdul Kerim Pasha and the Governor-General will go to Philippopoli to-day.

A war trophy in the shape of a wooden canon made from the hollowed-out trunk of a tree bound round at intervals with iron hoops and mounted on ordinary cast wheels taken from the insurgents at Ofiakoi, is on view in the Konak yard, an object of no small merriment and derision to the Turks here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HUTTON DUPUIS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 179.

Mr. Sandison to Sir H. Elliot.

Therapia, May 23, 1876.

Sir,

IN accordance with your Excellency's instruction, I strongly represented to Rashid Pasha the injudicious employment of Bashi-Bazouks in Bulgaria, for which the Porte alone was responsible.

His Excellency stated in reply that Vizirial orders were sent yesterday directing the authorities in Bulgaria not to resort to the services of Circassians as irregulars. I thought proper to tell his Excellency that this was doing away with one class of Bashi-Bazouks only, and that there were just as strong grounds for giving similar orders in regard to the common Bashi-Bazouks, who were equally brutal and licentious.

His Excellency did not seem to think, however, that the matter rested any longer with the Porte, now that Abdul Kerim Pasha, the Generalissimo, was entrusted with the sole direction of everything connected with the military operations in Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. SANDISON.

No. 180.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby:—(Received June 2.)

(No. 526. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 24, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of two private letters which I have received from Mr. Consul Blunt, giving fuller details of the occurrences at Salonica, and mentioning the risk that he himself incurred in his attempt to save his colleagues.

I also inclose the copy of a letter from Commander Austruther, of Her Majesty's ship "Bittern."

I trust that your Lordship will concur in the approval that I have addressed to Mr. Blunt for the courage and tact he has displayed in very difficult circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 180.

Captain Austruther to Sir H. Elliot.

"*Bittern*," *Salonica, May* 11, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE just been informed, through the courtesy of Captain Sachtouris, of the the Greek iron-clad "King George," that their gun-vessel "Salaminia," is sailing at once for Constantinople. Mr. Blunt, who has just left me to pay official visits to the Turkish and Russian Admirals, has begged me to express his regret to your Excellency that these duties will so occupy the two remaining hours that he will be unable to inform you himself of the position of matters. He has, therefore, as we are acting together, very cordially requested me to write to you on the subject.

Your Excellency has been informed by telegram of all events of importance, and is aware of the excited and uneasy state prevailing among all classes on shore, but I regret to report that this disturbed feeling, which at first was confined chiefly to the town, appears to be generally spreading into the adjacent country and villages.

Foreign ships of war are assembling rapidly. Seven iron-clads, frigates or corvettes, being at present at anchor here, and we expect almost hourly the appearance of three French, two Italian, two Turks, one Austrian, and I hope two English vessels, all large frigates or iron-clads.

The only danger of further disturbances taking place will be when the interment of the unfortunate victims of the late outbreak takes place, and I regret to find that the Russian Admiral seems to thinks it is almost a necessity to land as many armed seamen and marines as possible—ostensibly as a firing party—and to conduct the

ceremony with high funeral honours. The men will not, however, of course, carry only blank cartridge in their pouches, as it is impossible, I believe, for the Governor-General to guarantee that no disturbance may arise from the landing.

I know Mr. Blunt's opinion is that there is "some risk," probably slight; but it is not possible to foresee the events, and I—much as I should like to act with the Russians—agree with Mr. Blunt that if by landing we do precipitate a rising, the consequences might be most terrible, especially to those who are inland, and far from any shelter or protection we could afford them; and we should justly be held most blameable for our share in the business.

If, however, I find it is decided by the other foreign ships of war and their Consuls that this demonstration is to take place, I am sure my wisest plan will be to act with them, as an apparent want of unity might hasten the very thing we are anxious to avoid; and also even the small addition of our men, only forty with arms, may just bring the numbers up to an aggregate too considerable for any fanatics to rise against.

My movements will of course be guided by the instructions received by our Consul from your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. ANSTRUTHER, *Commander, R.N.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 180.

Consul Blunt to Sir H. Elliot.

(Private and Confidential.)
Sir, *Salonica, May* 12, 1876.

I BEG leave to thank your Excellency for your kind note of the 7th instant, and for the expressions of sympathy it conveys.

These are most anxious times, and I only hope I shall succeed in doing all that is right and proper in the difficult and exceptional position I find myself, especially as I see signs of a disposition to make use of these horrible occurrences to serve political purposes. I shall endeavour to act cordially with Mr. Gillet and Mr. Robert, but I am sorry to say that Mr. Gillet appears to misunderstand me, and to think that there exists a dissidence between me and some of my colleagues in reference to the funeral. He says that, while my colleagues maintain that the funeral should not be celebrated till there are sufficient troops to protect it, I have expressed an opposite opinion. I emphatically declare that this is not the case.

Mr. Gillet, at the urgent solicitations of the Abbott family (as appears from the inclosed notes), that the funeral should be celebrated at once, begged the Consuls to express their opinion, and to decide if it should take place immediately or be deferred. Most of the Consuls were decidedly of opinion that the funeral, which is to be conducted with all possible honours, should be deferred till the authorities had sufficient force to protect it and preserve tranquillity. I had suggested, considering the dreadful state of suspense and prostration Mrs. Abbott is in, in consequence of the prolonged presence of her son's disfigured and mutilated body in the house, that the body might be buried quietly without any pomp and military demonstrations, and that I would myself accompany the funeral. Mr. Gillet now makes use of this suggestion as a proof of inconsistency on my part, but I have the satisfaction to feel that most of my colleagues do not share this opinion, and that I am in perfect accord with them—with the Italian Consul in particular.

My proposal that the Consular Corps should appoint a representative to attend the Commission, for the purpose of furnishing all the important information the Consuls individually and collectively had obtained and were in a position to procure, was approved and supported by Mr. Gillet and Mr. Robert; and the Consuls, after some discussion, appointed M. Foscarini, the Italian Consul, than whom a better selection could not have been made. He represents the largest foreign community in this place, and on this account has exceptional means to procure information, and to act solely in the interests of the inquiry, without any ulterior views with which the Russian, Austrian, and Greek Consuls are credited. It is on this account that the other Consuls insisted upon M. Foscarini acting as a medium of communication between the Commissioners and the foreign Consular Corps, and it is precisely for this reason that the Russian, Austrian, and Greek appear to take umbrage at the selection the rest have made.

I respectfully beg your Excellency to pardon the hurried form of this letter, and I have, &c.

(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 180.

Mrs. Ralli to Consul Blunt.

My dear Mr. Blunt, *Wednesday, May* 10, 1876.

I BEG of you in the name of all the family to have a special meeting and take strong measures for the quietness of the place, as the funeral must take place to-morrow, otherwise this delay will be paid by poor aunt's life, who is to-day very bad and insists upon the funeral taking place to-day, but at last we have succeeded in pacifying her, promising that early to-morrow it will take place.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) CATHERINE P. RALLI.

P.S.—Alfred has just written to the German Délégue for the same purpose.
C. P. R.

Inclosure 4 in No. 180.

Consul Blunt to Sir H. Elliot.

(Private.)
Sir, *Salonica, May* 15, 1876.

THE general alarm is subsiding, and I do hope that everything will go off as yesterday's operations, which were conducted with firmness and determination. Vahan Effendi, Mr. Gillet, Mr. Robert, M. Foscarini, and I had possession of the Conak, and Eshref Pasha directed the military movements in person, being on horseback the whole of the afternoon. The members of the Medjless were kept under supervision in the Conak, and the whole business was managed admirably, and so far to the satisfaction of the two Delegates.

I am also happy to say that I remark a change in M. Gillet's attitude towards me, and a disposition in both Delegates to notice and regard with more attention the considerations M. Foscarini and I set before them in the interests of the inquiry.

The etiquette question was most *mal-à-propos*, and I may say improper, and should not have taken place at all. The French corvette, "Chateau Renaud," saluted, immediately she anchored, the Russian Rear-Admiral Boutakoff, and would not salute the town and the Ottoman Vice-Admiral. The latter sent to the Commander of the "Chateau Renaud" an officer to demand explanations. The Frenchman answered that he could not salute as his nation was in mourning, an excuse which was rejected by the Vice-Admiral, and which gave offence to the Ottoman officers. All this happened just as the Ottoman Marine detachments, the only force we relied upon, were about to take possession of the principal streets leading to the Greek and Frank quarters. Mr. Robert, however, succeeded in arranging matters, and the necessary explanations and salutes were exchanged.

With reference to the United States' Vice-Consul, M. Pericles Lazzaro, I beg to assure your Excellency that I do not at all believe that he had any, the least, part in the abduction of the girl. He was not here when the girl arrived at Salonica by the train on the 5th, and returned from an excursion to Vodina on the evening of the 6th instant, having been absent from Salonica about a week with M. Vatikisti, the Greek Consul-General, and M. Mavrocordato, a member of the Greek Parliament. If his carriage went to the railway station on the evening of the 5th, it does not appear that it was for the prearranged (as it is supposed) purpose of assisting in the abduction of the girl, but to meet M. Lazzaro and party, who also were expected that evening. The Greeks stopped the carriage, and forced the coachman to take up the girl and conduct her to the Consulate. Nor was the Consul's brother, M. Nicola Lazzaro, a Russian subject, at home when the girl was brought to the house, which was about half-an-hour after sunset. She remained the night in the house, and was sent the next morning, to whose house we do not yet know for certain. So far the Consul's brother was not to blame. And had he not refused to reveal where the girl had gone, or been sent, the disturbances may not have taken place, at least there

would have been no bloodshed; but, as I said before, I sincerely believe that my United States' colleague is not responsible; and I should deem it a great favour if your Excellency would kindly submit my testimony to his Excellency the United States' Minister.

The girl, as far as I hear, is a worthless creature. I was at the Conak when my "cavass" brought her (it was about half-an-hour after the murder), and I saw her. She appeared to me about 18 years of age, if not more. I should add, that if my "cavass" had not succeeded in making the infuriated crowd believe in the identity of the girl, the American Consulate would have been attacked, and more lives would have been sacrificed. The "cavass" acted bravely and faithfully, and I shall, on a later occasion, solicit your Excellency's favourable consideration of his conduct and of that of the French "cavass," Yashar, who stood by me, and with some ten or twelve Mohammedans surrounded me and escorted me to the Conak. I claim your Excellency's indulgence for the form of this letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

I forgot to mention that my "cavass," Hussein, while making his way through the crowd, was fired at.

J. E. B.

Inclosure 5 in No. 180.

Sir H. Elliot to Consul Blunt.

Constantinople, May 19, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE had much satisfaction in receiving your telegrams stating that the funerals of the Consuls and the execution of six of their murderers had taken place, without disturbance of the public tranquillity, and it affords me particular pleasure to convey to you my appreciation of the courage and judgment you have exhibited under circumstances of great difficulty, and my congratulations on your escape from the dangers to which you exposed yourself.

With reference to the difference of opinion which may have arisen between you and Mr. Gillet, I have to state that, although Mr. Abbott was German Consul, as he was at the same time a British subject, you did no more than your duty in endeavouring, as far as possible, to show deference to the wishes of his family as regarded his funeral.

I shall hope to receive from you all the details of the facts which may have been elicited by the inquiry into the lamentable occurrence, and I have especially to request you to report any grounds that exist for supposing the outbreak that occurred to have been the result of any preconcerted attack by the Mussulmans upon the Christians.

The statements respecting the woman who was the immediate cause of the catastrophe, as regards her age, her own wishes, and previous relations with the Mussulmans, are all so contradictory, that I should be glad to be correctly informed respecting them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 181.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 554. Confidential.)

Therapia, May 25, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a confidential report from Mr. Sandison respecting the designs of the Softas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 181.

Mr. Sandison to Sir H. Elliot.

(Confidential.)

Therapia, May 24, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transcribe some items of news communicated by M. Mavinitch, for your Excellency's information:—

"J'ai causé ce matin avec M. Stamatelo, sous-Gouverneur de Péra, qui m'a assuré que les Softas n'ont pas remis leur requête au Sultan. Ils l'ont donnée au Sheikh ul Islam.

"Il paraît que le Grand Vizir, ainsi qu'un ou deux Ministres, sont contraires à la constitution, le reste du Cabinet est favorable. Les Softas insistent toujours sur leurs demandes, lesquelles se résument, dit-on, aux points suivants:

"Constitution; Chambre de Députés; réglement de la Liste Civile; stabilité des emplois confiés à des personnes d'honnêteté et de capacité éprouvée; élimination des employés incapables; réduction du nombre des fonctionnaires publics; augmentation de leurs traitements; réorganisation des Tribunaux; amortisation de la dette publique, avec paiement des intérêts; et en dernier lieu la restitution des millions prélevés par le Sultan en sus de la Liste Civile.

"Si les Softas ne parviendraient pas légalement à faire accepter les demandes ils auront recours à la force.

"L'armée est avec eux ainsi que la population de toutes les classes qui les appuieront avec enthousiasme. Ils savent que les Chrétiens aussi leur prêteront leur appui moral.

"On prétend que Hussein Avni Pacha est contraire à ces manifestations libérales. On dit même qu'il aurait assuré le Sultan qu'il se ferait fort de disperser les Softas à la pointe de la baïonnette.

"Le Sultan est très occupé de ces événements; il hésite.

"M. Stamatelo serait disposé de développer à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur les moyens employés par feu Aali Pacha pour faire échouer en Bulgarie, il a quelques années, les plans de la Russie. Il serait prêt en même temps d'exposer les moyens dont se sert le Général Ignatiew pour fomenter des troubles et les fils dont il dispose, sans en excepter l'Exarque Bulgare.

"Les Turcs en général envisagent leur situation comme étant désespérante et reposent toutes leurs espérances sur l'Angleterre, avec l'appui de laquelle ils se croient en mesure de triompher soit financièrement soit politiquement. Ils sont aussi très préoccupés de la Conférence de Berlin.

"Un grand nombre d'ouvriers de l'arsenal mis en grève demandent les arriérés de quatre mois.

My own information respecting the Softas' demands tallies very much with M. Mavinitch, except as regards the presentation of their petition, which I am assured was delivered to the Sultan, as he was going to Mosque on Friday last, by Izzeddin Effendi, who received it from the hands of a deputation of three Softas, who had refused to hand the document to His Majesty's First Chamberlain.

In support of what is now stated as to the demands of the Softas, I may mention what fell from the Minister of Police the last time I had occasion to see his Excellency, viz., that though the Softas are giving out that the petition they purposed presenting to the Sultan was in order only to pray His Majesty to overlook the step they had lately taken, this was not the only object they had in view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALFRED SANDISON.

No. 182.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 555. Confidential.)

Therapia, May 25, 1876.

My Lord,

I informed your Lordship that the Sultan was stated to have placed his heir apparent, Murad Effendi, and his brothers, in strict confinement, although the fact then was not fully ascertained.

Its truth is, however, now beyond doubt, and the Princes were not even allowed to go to the Mosque on the Fridays, which was a measure of extreme rigour.

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The Sultan afterwards became aware of the effect which was being produced upon the public by this act, and intimated to the Princes that they were at liberty to have their apartments, but they now decline to avail themselves of it.

They can, however, see nobody except the persons of their own households, who are placed about them by the Sultan.

I cannot say that His Majesty is altogether without cause for distrust of his nephew.

It has been known for some time that the Prince would be ready to proclaim a Constitution on the day of his accession, and he has certainly been in communication with some of its most influential advocates; and that many of these, if they cannot obtain their object regularly and through the Government, are prepared to attempt to depose the Sultan, and to place Murad Effendi in his place is, I believe, almost beyond all doubt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 183.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 536. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, May 25, 1876.*

ALTHOUGH immediate confidence was restored when the demonstration of the Softas brought about the dismissal of Mahmoud Pasha, there is every appearance of the movement being the prelude to something far more serious.

I have been at much pains to ascertain the objects and intentions of the Softas, who may at present be regarded as to a very great degree representing the intelligent public opinion of the capital, if not of the Empire.

Their wish, I might perhaps say their determination, is to obtain the entire reform of the administration, which alone can save the Empire from the total and speedy ruin with which it is threatened.

Mahmoud Pasha was looked upon as directly responsible for a large share in the present desperate state of affairs; it was he, they say, who during his first administration encouraged the Sultan in all his caprices, being only anxious to retain His Majesty's favour, and totally indifferent to the welfare of his country.

The Sovereign having once been taught to consult nothing but his own humour, no subsequent Minister has been able to restrain him; those who attempted it being invariably dismissed within a few weeks.

The reproach is, no doubt, in a great degree well founded.

Added to this cause of unpopularity was also Mahmoud Pasha's supposed subserviency to the Russian Ambassador; and although I myself believe this to have been much less the case during his late, than it was during his former, administration, it received a confirmation from the habit of General Ignatiew, whether prompted by his great vanity, or by some other motive, of attributing to himself the credit of most of the acts, appointments, and dismissals emanating from the Government.

The continuance of the insurrection, the financial collapse, the misery and discontent prevailing in every corner of the Empire are unanimously attributed to the Grand Vizier and to the Russian Ambassador, and the feeling entertained towards them is at this moment one that cannot be designated by any milder term than one of absolute execration.

The first object, therefore, of the Softas was to procure the dismissal of the obnoxious Vizier, and in this they were successful, although they did not succeed in procuring the nomination of Midhat Pasha, who, as the champion of the reforming party, is the only man in whom much confidence is placed.

Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, though engaging general respect as an incorruptible and patriotic statesman, is not supposed to have the energy to extort from the Sultan the concessions and limitations of his authority that are considered necessary, and which might possibly still preserve his Throne, if, indeed, this is not too late.

The word "Constitution" is now in every mouth, without there being any well defined understanding what it means, except that it signifies the establishment of some popular or national control over the present purely arbitrary will of the Sovereign.

The Softas, knowing themselves to be supported by the bulk of the nation, Christian as well as Mussalman, in calling for this control, will not, I believe, desist in their efforts till they have obtained it, and should the Sultan resolutely refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appears to me almost inevitable.

Texts from the Koran are circulated with a view to proving to the faithful that the form of Government sanctioned by it is properly democratic, and that the absolute authority now wielded by the Sovereign is a usurpation of the rights of the people, and a contravention of the Holy Law.

Both texts and precedents are appealed to to show that allegiance is not due to the Sovereign who neglects the interests of the State.

The disaffection runs through every class, and no one now thinks of trying to conceal his opinion.

Among the porters in the streets, the boatmen on the Bosphorus, and Pashas who have filled or are now filling the very highest posts, civil or military, the same language is held, and I should be at a loss to name a single quarter in which the Sultan could with any confidence look for support against a well-organized attempt to depose him.

Generals and Admirals declare that both officers and men of the two services share the feelings of the public, and that they would certainly not act against the Softas in any movement they might make.

Relying upon this, some of the more adventurous believe that they could carry out a revolution without bloodshed or disturbance; but the risk is in truth far greater than they calculate, for if the Minister of War, either from feelings of loyalty or from motives of personal ambition, were to stand by the Sultan, any revolutionary movement must be followed by frightful consequences.

At present the harmony between the Mussulmans and Christians is perfect, and a thorough understanding exists between the Softas and a large portion of the Greeks of Constantinople; but if serious disturbances were once to occur, religious fanaticism might very quickly be excited.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 184.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 538.)
My Lord, *Therapia, May 25, 1876.*

MR. CONSUL BLUNT, in his report of the attempt made by members of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committees to raise the population of the district of Mulish, has mentioned the large quantity of Russian roubles current in that part of the country.

The same statement has been made to me by several persons, and especially by a gentleman who has exceptionally good information of what passes in the Bulgarian provinces, as regards the district now in revolt near Philippopoli; and it is certain that Russian silver is being sent there by railway from Constantinople in considerable quantities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 185.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 5. Political.)
My Lord, *Rustchuk, May 25, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith inclosed, copy of a further report to Her Majesty's Ambassador on the rising in this vilayet, and dated the 23rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

Inclosure in No. 185.

Consul Reade to Sir H. Elliot.

Rustchuk, May 23, 1876.

Sir,

SUBSEQUENTLY to my last report of the 20th instant, nothing of much consequence has occurred in this vilayet.

The Authorities, however, are kept constantly on the move by reports which are purposely spread, and which turn out to be greatly exaggerated or devoid of all foundation.

For instance, a very serious movement was reported at Travna between Tirnova and the Balkans. Some troops were sent to the spot; a few disaffected persons were found, but who at once submitted.

A collision on Monday last between a body of insurgents and some troops at a village called Yenikeni, in the district of Tirnova, in which about 100 of the insurgents were killed, is to-day reported in a bulletin of the Government paper here, but not having heard of it from any other quarter, I cannot vouch for the truth of it.

There is a grave matter here which I should bring to your Excellency's knowledge, and that is the arming of the Mussulmans and Circassians in the vilayet, and the letting loose of the latter on the Bulgarians simply reported to be in revolt.

The lawless character of these Circassians is notorious—they are not to be trusted at any time; to employ them therefore in the way I have stated at the present moment, is, in my opinion to drive many, who have hitherto remained quiet, to revolt.

This fact has only been known here the last two days, and it has already created a very bad feeling in the place, as every one knows how difficult it will be for the Authorities to withdraw the arms these men have been provided with.

As regards the arming of the Mussulmans, a Frenchman who returned yesterday from an inland town, states that whilst he was there an order arrived from Rustchuk for the Mussulmans to arm at once, and this order was accompanied by an intimation to the effect that those who should be found unarmed would be punished.

I am told that identical orders have been issued to other districts; if, therefore, the present rising, which was said to be dying out, assumes greater dimensions, I do not think it will be a matter of surprise.

Respecting the Monastery of Dranova which the Pasha said had surrendered without firing a shot: I am now informed from other quarters that the Monastery was battered down by the two guns sent there, that there was comparatively a considerable number of killed and wounded, and that some 30 were taken prisoners. The affair, however, I am told has had an effect favourable to the Government.

I have now reason to think that the Governor-General receives reports that are not to be relied upon.

The Commissioner sent by the Porte to Tirnova left this for that destination yesterday morning; should I hear of his proceedings I will at once report to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

No. 186.

Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 110. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Athens, May 25, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, a portion of the last number of the "Messager d'Athènes," containing copies of two petitions, which are said to have been presented to the Governor-General of Crete from the General Assembly of Cretans, with a view to obtain from the Porte the more complete application to the Island of the Organic Law of 1867.

I likewise inclose an article from the "Messager," and a letter which it publishes from Crete, upon the question at issue.

My Ottoman colleague informed me, confidentially, that he was convinced, from the style and terms of these petitions, that they must have been drawn up at Athens, probably under the auspices of the Committee connected with Crete, which meets at the Piræus, and have been forwarded from thence to the Cretan Assembly.

I do not believe, however, that either the Hellenic Government or the Hellenic Consul in Crete can have had any part in the matter, as M. Contostavlos told me that the news had taken him by surprise, and seemed annoyed with the Consul for not having given him any notice that such an outburst of discontent was to be expected. The recent murders at Salonica may, perhaps, have encouraged the Cretans to suppose that a favourable opportunity had occurred for insisting upon the removal of their remaining grievances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. STUART.

Inclosure 1 in No. 186.

Extract from the "Messager d'Athènes" of May 20, 1876.

CRÈTE.—On nous écrit de la Canée :—

"La population Chrétienne de l'Ile de Crète a obtenu, à la faveur de la dernière révolution, des priviléges administratifs que la Porte n'a guère respectés. Au commencement de l'insurrection de l'Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Turc, qui craignait une nouvelle révolution, s'empressa de rappeler les mesures fiscales qu'il avait prises quelques mois auparavant au mépris de ses promesses officielles. Le retrait de ces mesures, au moment où la Turquie se trouvait dans l'impuissance de faire honneur à ses engagements, fut un trait de lumière pour les Crétois. Aussi s'agitent-ils depuis lors pour demander et, au besoin, exiger une sincère application de la Loi Organique de 1867.

"L'ouverture de la session de l'Assemblée Générale a donné lieu à une véritable manifestation. En réponse au discours d'ouverture, les Représentants des districts Chrétiens de Candie, c'est-à-dire, des trois-quarts de la population totale de l'île, ont adressé au Gouverneur-Général deux pétitions dont vous trouverez ci-après une copie.

"Ces pétitions, rédigées en termes respectueux, n'accusent pas moins, de la part de leurs signataires, la ferme pensée de poursuivre, par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, les réformes demandées. Deux voies sont ouvertes aux Crétois, la voie légale, c'est-à-dire, les vœux de l'Assemblée Générale, et la révolution. Si les vœux de la population ne sont pas exaucés, dans ce qu'ils ont de juste et de légitime, une explosion est à craindre.

"Les nouvelles de l'Herzégovine, l'annonce de la révolution Bulgare et de l'attentat de Salonique ont causé une indicible émotion. Les plus impatients, les exaltés, ne parlaient rien moins que de mettre le Sultan en demeure d'accorder son autonomie à l'Ile de Crète ou de lui faire entendre que les Crétois étaient prêts à recommencer le jeu sanglant de 1866.

"Je pense qu'il est de l'intérêt de la Turquie de ne pas tergiverser comme d'habitude et de répondre d'une manière catégorique aux vœux des Crétois. On ne doit pas avoir oublié à Constantinople que, seuls, les Crétois ont tenu pendant trois ans en échec toutes les forces de l'Empire; on doit savoir aussi que, ne se sentant plus sous la protection de l'Europe, les Musulmans de Candie sont tombés dans le désespoir et l'abattement. On ne saurait donc songer à tirer parti de leur fanatisme, les Chrétiens étant partout plus nombreux et plus aguerris.

"Le Gouverneur de l'Ile de Crète a répondu qu'il n'avait pas de pouvoirs pour répondre aux questions posées par les Crétois, et qu'il transmettrait leurs vœux à la Sublime Porte. Dieu veuille que sa réponse ne se fasse pas trop longtemps attendre et qu'elle ne repousse les demandes des Crétois!"

Voici les pétitions dont il est question dans notre correspondance :—

"Excellence,

"Les paroles par lesquelles votre Excellence a ouvert la Session actuelle de l'Assemblée Générale des Crétois, nous ont fait comprendre que le premier, le principal but du Gouvernement Impérial est d'assurer la prospérité de notre pays par l'égalité de tous devant la loi. Comme nous n'avons d'autre souhait, que nous poursuivons le même but, nous vous soumettons, Excellence, la proposition suivante :—

"Pour assurer la prospérité et le progrès du pays, comme l'exigent le progrès moderne et le siècle où nous vivons, il faut surtout appliquer fidèlement et dans son

véritable sens le principe d'égalité devant la loi et d'égalité des charges hautement proclamé par notre Souverain dans le Firman Impérial qui accompagnait la Loi Organique.

"Une expérience de plusieurs années a prouvé que la Loi Organique de notre île n'a pas répondu à l'esprit et à la lettre des Ordonnances Impériales sur l'égalité des charges, non-seulement parcequ'elle n'a pas été sincèrement appliquée, mais parcequ'elle est obscure et défectueuse. Aussi ne saurait-elle pas plus répondre aux besoins du peuple Crétois qu'à ses progrès de tous les jours.

"Pour ces motifs nous considérons qu'il est de toute nécessité de vous exposer, en notre qualité de légitimes Représentants du peuple Crétois, dont nous vous transmettons les vœux, que la première question que nous devons discuter dans le cours de cette session est la modification à apporter dans notre Loi Organique sur des bases légales plus larges répondant aux intentions bienfaisantes de Sa Majesté Notre Vénérable Souverain, aux besoins du pays, aux exigences de notre siècle et de la civilisation.

"En formulant cette proposition nous avons l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence que notre désir est de discuter avec vous toutes les modifications à apporter à la Loi Organique, et de la compléter, sur la base des priviléges et des garanties de 'self-government' qui nous ont été accordées, car là est la consolidation de l'ordre et la prospérité de notre pays.

"Agréez, &c.

"*La Canée*, 26 *Avril* (11 *Mai*), 1876."

"Excellence,

"En décrétant dans la Loi Organique la réunion annuelle de l'Assemblée Générale des Crétois, Sa Majesté Impériale, notre bienfaisant Souverain, se proposait sans doute d'avoir là un moyen sûr par lequel le peuple pouvait soumettre chaque année au Gouvernement et discuter les améliorations qu'il croirait nécessaires au bien-être du pays, et le Gouvernement apprendre d'une manière régulière les aspirations et les plaintes légitimes du peuple, et prévenir ainsi, par une commune entente, le relâchement des liens d'obéissance et de la confiance, si nuisible aux intérêts de tous.

"Cependant, nous sommes forcés d'avouer à regret que cette institution, qui devait être si bienfaisante pour le pays, n'a aucune importance aujourd'hui, et peut-être aurait-elle été déjà anéantie si l'accomplissement des devoirs électoraux, qui ont été conférés en même temps aux membres de l'Assemblée, n'exigeait chaque année leur présence à la Canée.

La non-exécution des demandes légitimes que l'Assemblée Générale a formulés dans toutes les sessions qu'elle a tenues a prouvé que l'Assemblée n'est pas faite pour renseigner le Gouvernement sur les besoins du pays et pour leur donner satisfaction, qu'elle n'a jamais été un point d'entente sincère et mutuelle entre gouvernants et gouvernés.

"Tout au contraire. La façon dont cette institution a fonctionné jusqu'ici, a fait des membres de l'Assemblée de simples électeurs du Conseil-Général d'Administration et de la Cour d'Appel, et de simples rapporteurs des pétitions de quelques-uns de leurs mandataires. Cette dernière qualité surtout, officiellement proclamée par le Gouverneur Salvet Pacha, a failli, dans son application, enlever à tout représentant le droit d'émettre son opinion ou de faire des propositions non comprises dans le Lâkla du district qu'il représentait, pour empêcher toute entente, toute délibération commune des représentants sur les intérêts généraux du pays.

"A l'appui de nos dires, il nous suffira de rappeler l'arrestation, qui a eu lieu à cette époque, des représentants des provinces d'Héraclion, de Rhéthymno, et de Mirabello.

"Attendu que dans ce siècle d'égalité, dans ce siècle où les droits de l'homme sont universellement proclamés, l'institution de l'Assemblée Générale ne répond ni aux intentions paternelles de notre vénérable Souverain, ni à l'esprit et à la lettre du Firman Impérial qui accompagne notre Loi Organique,

"Attendu que la prospérité des habitants de l'île doit reposer sur les principes de la justice et de l'égalité, d'après la volonté souveraine du Sultan;

"Par ces motifs, c'est en complétant et modifiant en partie cette institution sur cette base, que nous croyons qu'elle s'élèvera dans l'avenir à la hauteur où le désir et la volonté de notre Souverain l'ont voulue placer.

"Le devoir sacré que nous avons à remplir envers notre Souverain et notre patrie nous ont engagé à porter ces choses à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial.

Ayant confiance dans sa prudence et dans sa justice, nous espérons que le pays ne tardera pas à voir se réaliser ses vœux les plus ardents, les plus légitimes pour la gloire immortelle de ce Gouvernement et la prospérité de ce pays si cruellement éprouvé.

"Poussés par les devoirs que nous sont imposés, nous n'avons pas hésité à parler le langage de la franchise et non celui de la flatterie menteuse et de la ruse. Aussi espérons-nous fermement que, dans sa sagesse, le Gouvernement Impérial saura apprécier ce langage inspiré par les sentiments du plus parfait dévouement et du plus profond respect.

(Suivent 42 signatures des représentants du peuple Crétois.)

"*La Canée*, 1 (13) *Mai*, 1876."

Inclosure 2 in No. 186.

Extract from the "Messager d'Athènes" of May 20, 1876.

NOUS appelons toute l'attention de nos lecteurs sur les nouvelles de Candie. L'Assemblée Générale des Crétois se plaint en termes respectueux mais énergiques de l'insuffisance de la Loi Organique de 1867, dont les principales dispositions ont été d'ailleurs violées par les autorités Ottomanes. Il est temps que l'on en vienne à Constantinople à une plus juste et plus équitable appréciation de la situation. Les Crétois, peuple fier et belliqueux, se laisseront-ils éternellement abuser par des promesses sur lesquelles on ne saurait faire aucun fond? Nous ne le pensons pas.

On sait que la Loi Organique a été octroyée aux Crétois pour les engager à déposer les armes; on sait aussi que les priviléges garantis aux Crétois par cette même loi ont été supprimés un à un, que l'Assemblée Générale—dont les fonctions ont quelque chose d'analogue à celles des Conseils Généraux Français tels qu'ils ont été constitués par la Loi de 1871—n'existe plus que de nom, que le peuple de Candie voit une insulte du Gouvernement central dans le retard apporté à donner satisfaction à des griefs aussi justes que légitimes.

Les Crétois, comme tous les Grecs de Turquie, ne demandent pas mieux que de vivre en paix avec les Musulmans, mais il faut encore que cette paix soit possible, qu'elle ne donne pas d'une part toutes les charges, de l'autre tous les priviléges et tous les droits.

De graves complications, complications autrement sérieuses que celles provoquées par l'insurrection de l'Herzégovine, seraient à craindre si la Porte refusait d'exaucer les vœux des Crétois. Pour s'en faire une idée exacte, il suffit d'un retour en arrière de quelques années, il suffit de se rappeler la situation qui avait été faite à l'Europe et à l'Orient par la dernière révolution Crétoise.

No. 187.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 316.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 24, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the inclosed despatches, which have been addressed to me by Major Gonne, Military Attaché to this Embassy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 187.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Vienna, May 20, 1876.*

THE scheme for a military occupation of the Slavonic provinces in revolt against Turkey is as follows:—

General Rodich has command of the XVIIIth Division, consisting of the 32nd, 27th, 72nd, and a regiment which was intended to relieve the 32nd Regiment, but which

Dalmatian Army of Observation.

is now an additional strength to the army of observation in Dalmatia. Also 3 Jäger batteries, destined to be reinforced by a like number from the Tyrol; and 2 mountain batteries, destined to be reinforced by 4 more from the Tyrol. General Rodich would hold an independent command; his duty would be to occupy Herzegovina as far as the River Narenta, and to observe Montenegro.

Western Corps, commanded by Field-Marshal General Mollinary:

III Division, consisting of the Military Colony Troop on the Croatian frontier of Bosnia.

Western Corps for occupation of Bosnia.

6th Regiment, stationed at Gratz.
7th " Trieste.
36th " Agram.
A cavalry brigade, under Colonel Beales, Fünfkirchen.
A field-battery at Agram.
The remainder of the artillery and train to be sent from Pesth and Vienna, where six batteries are in readiness.

Eastern Corps, commanded by General Seudier:

Eastern Corps for observation of Servia.

II Division, consisting of—
20th Regiment, at Pesth.
34th " at Temesvar.
A cavalry brigade, "
Artillery and train from Vienna. The duty of this corps, commanded by an officer junior to General Mollinary, is to observe Servia.

In the event of an occupation, every reserve of the regiments named would be called out, and the mobilisation would be complete in fourteen days, but three battalions per regiment would be ready for action in a less time.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. S. GONNE, *Major, 17th Lancers, Military Attaché.*

No. 188.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 223.)

Buda Pesth, May 26, 1870.

My Lord,

ON receiving yesterday your Lordship's despatch No. 225 of the 19th instant, I proceeded to Buda-Pesth, and at an interview to-day with Count Andrassy, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch to Lord Odo Russell No. 385 of the 18th instant, and, at his request, I gave him a copy of it.

When I had finished reading the despatch, his Excellency said that he would answer it in writing through Count Beust, but, in the meanwhile, there were several points on which he would make some verbal observations. In the first place your Lordship seemed to be under an impression that Her Majesty's Government had been invited to give an immediate answer to the telegraphic summary of the Berlin proposal transmitted to them by Lord Odo Russell. This, he repeated, as he had formerly stated to me, was entirely incorrect; but he supposed, as the French and Italian Ambassadors appeared to have no doubt that the proposals would be at once accepted by their respective Governments, and Lord Odo Russell expressed a personal opinion that they contained nothing contrary to the views of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortchakow may have intimated a wish to receive an answer before his departure from Berlin.

I said Her Majesty's Government were not, however, singular in believing that an immediate answer was expected, as the Duc Decazes had expressed regret that the time fixed for the arrival of the answers had rendered it impossible to communicate with London before forwarding that of the French Government. As his Excellency also said that Her Majesty's Government are alleged to have been offended at the proposals having been drawn up without their concurrence, I answered that, whatever they may have thought of the form in which their assent to the Memorandum had been applied for, your Lordship had stated in the House of Lords that it would not have prevented the proposals it contained being accepted, if they had appeared likely to effect the purpose for which they were made.

* The railway problem has been carefully worked out.

Count Andrassy then said that he entirely differed from the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the proposed armistice, as it would, in his opinion, be more beneficial to the Porte than to the insurgents. The latter would, he believed, become weaker during a prolonged suspension of hostilities, having no power of cohesion or means of increasing their numbers, and having hitherto depended, in a great degree, for their supplies of food and ammunition on the capture of Turkish convoys; whereas the Turkish forces would have time to recover from their late fatigues, to fill up their battalions, and to improve in many essential points their military position. Another important reason, however, for concluding such an armistice is the effect it would have on the action of Montenegro. He said the Senator Petrovich had brought a Memorial to Berlin containing many impracticable suggestions, and Prince Nicolas had, therefore, been informed that the only means by which he could obtain any advantage from the question would be by employing his influence with the insurgents for the pacification of the Provinces; as, if he rendered an important service to Turkey, he would be placed in an exceptional position, which might enable him to obtain favours from the Porte which other neighbouring States or Principalities could not claim on the same grounds. Prince Nicolas is, therefore, prepared to act in this manner if the armistice is agreed to, even if Servia declares war, but if a refusal of the Porte to grant the armistice should give Servia a reasonable pretext to support the insurrection, the force of circumstances will oblige Montenegro to make common cause with her. It is only, therefore, by the Porte agreeing to a suspension of hostilities and taking immediate measures for promoting the return of the refugees that the two Principalities can be effectually separated.

His Excellency then went on to say that the armistice had been fixed for two months in order to ensure its success, there being reason to hope that such a long suspension of hostilities will give confidence to the refugees, and induce them to return to their homes, on the Porte taking measures to satisfy them that the assistance promised will be at once afforded to them. Fifteen days will suffice to prove whether this expectation is well founded, and whether the armistice is likely to have the results expected from it; and, should it fail to effect the pacification of the provinces, there is nothing in the last paragraph of the Berlin Memorandum to show that the new measures to be concerted will necessarily be directed against Turkey. He concurred in your Lordship's opinion as to the demoralizing effect of unlimited almsgiving, observing that all that can be expected of the Porte is that it should provide for the immediate necessities of the refugees, and furnish them with materials for rebuilding their houses; and, on my objecting that the only way in which they could provide for themselves would be by cultivating the land, and that several months at least must elapse before any harvest could be reaped, he admitted this difficulty, but maintained that the returning population could not be worse off than they are at present, and that, though they might have to undergo privations, they would eventually, without any great expense to the Porte, recover their normal position.

With regard to the concentration of the troops at places to be agreed upon, he said it was essentially necessary that they should not be immediately brought into contact with the Christian population. I therefore made the same observation to him which I had formerly done to Count Mollinen at Vienna, as to Vassa Effendi having tendered his resignation because Moukhtar Pasha had refused him troops to protect the refugees who had already returned, and as to Hyder Effendi having failed in his negotiations with the Bosnian emigrants, because he had no regular troops at his disposal; and his Excellency answered that the general cantonment of the troops at fixed stations need not prevent small detachments of regular soldiers being employed, where their services appeared to be necessary for the protection of the Christian population.

Though it was proposed that the insurgents should retain their arms, he said it did not follow that they were to return to their villages as an organized armed force; but, as the Turkish Ambassador had admitted that it would be impossible to disarm the Turkish population, the Christians must also, as a mere act of justice, be entitled to carry arms.

His Excellency therefore earnestly trusts that Her Majesty's Government will see the expediency of the Porte assenting to the suspension of hostilities, and accepting, as a basis for future arrangements, the proposals of the Powers.

I propose returning to Vienna to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 189.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 326. Secret.)
Vienna, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

IF the statements of a person who has apparently the means of obtaining information, can be relied upon, it is almost certain that Servia will declare war to Turkey within the next three weeks, by which time it is hoped that the arms which have been ordered from abroad will have arrived.

These consist of 60 Krupp guns, ordered through an Agent at Hamburgh, 60,000 chassepôts, and 40,000,000 cartridges, which will be forwarded through Russia as soon as a payment on account, which has been stipulated for, has been made.

My informant said he will know the day on which these arms are despatched, and he hopes to give information to the Turkish authorities on the Danube which will cause them to be seized on their passage up the river.

He said 1,600 artillery horses have been already received from Hungary, and paid for on delivery, and 1,800 more have been ordered. They are, however, in wretched condition, and very badly cared for. The equipments for them, and for the artillery he declares are furnished by a person named Freund, who lives in the Herren-Gasse at Pesth, who has contracted to deliver harness, etc. to the value of 80,000 ducats.

Another contractor at Vienna, he says, has received an order for 40,000 to 48,000 cartridge pouches of which 20,000 have been delivered, and 4,000 rejected, as unfit for service.

My informant also believes that, when war is declared, the Servian army will be largely recruited from the Austrian Serb provinces, and he says three corps of foreign volunteers have been already formed, one of 3,000 men at Chalatz on the Save, another of 2,000 men at Valeyvo, near the Turkish frontier, and another of 1,500 at Nicotin, while at Belgrade a corps of 1,000 volunteers is being organized under the command of Stratimirovich.

He represents M. Ristich as no longer able to hold back, even if he wished it,—to have accepted the presidency of the Omladina, and to be in communication with Austrian Serbs, Militz, the Neusatz agitator, having been to Belgrade last week to confer with him.

The Moriterium established by the Government Decree, will prevent, according to my informant, the payment of Bills of Exchange due to Austrians to the amount of nearly 1,000,000*l.* sterling (this appears an exaggeration), and lead to the bankruptcy of many persons engaged in trade in Servia.

My informant made other statements which appeared to me to be unfounded, and which therefore, in some degree discredit those which I am reporting to your Lordship. I have encouraged him nevertheless to continue his communications, and if his present information prove to be correct, an estimate may be formed of the value of his future reports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 190.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 327. Confidential.)
Vienna, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

AS Count Andrassy had said to me, during my recent visit to Pesth, that it had been alleged that Her Majesty's Government was influenced in their rejection of the Berlin proposals by resentment at their having been only asked to adhere to them, after they had been finally agreed upon by the three Imperial Governments, I have thought it expedient to acquaint Count Mulinen, for his Excellency's information, with the observations which your Lordship has made upon the subject in your despatch No. 226, Confidential, of the 19th instant.

It may be hoped that the decision which Her Majesty's Government have considered it necessary to take on the present occasion, may lead the framers of the Berlin Memorandum to feel the inconvenience of committing themselves hereafter to

a course of action in questions of general European interest until they have ascertained how far it will meet with the approval of Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 191.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 329.)
My Lord, *Vienna, May 30, 1876.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 215 of the 25th instant, I have requested Count Mulinen, who is in temporary charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here, to convey to Count Andrassy the expression of the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government of the disposition shown by his Excellency in offering to the Duc Decazes to delay the communication to the Porte of the Berlin proposals, in the hope that Her Majesty's Government might be induced to join in making a representation with respect to them to the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 192.

The Duc Decazes to the Count de Bourgoing.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby, June 2.)

(Télégraphique.) *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, le 31 Mai, 1876.*

VOUS pouvez répondre à la notification qui nous a été faite de l'avénement du nouveau Sultan.

Nous n'avons pas, vous le comprenez, à nous expliquer sur les événements qui l'ont amené ; nous l'accueillons sans méfiance, et sans nous permettre de préjuger ses intentions, nous estimons cependant que le Prince tiendra à honneur d'inaugurer son règne en faisant cesser, en suspendant tout au moins, l'effusion de sang, désireux qu'il doit être d'épargner à ses peuples les horreurs de la guerre civile, de faire cesser de regrettables malentendus et de rétablir la paix dans toutes les parties de son Empire. Nous constaterons avec sympathie les efforts qu'il fera dans ce but auprès des uns et des autres et l'esprit de conciliation et de sage tempérament qui les dirigera.

Il me paraît comme à vous que la remise de la note doit être ajournée. Il serait impossible d'agresser à un pouvoir nouveau et dont les dispositions et les tendances ne peuvent être justement appréciées, les représentations et les conseils qu'un ensemble de faits, auxquels le nouveau Sultan a été étranger, nous avaient paru rendre nécessaires. L'Europe doit tout au moins à Mourad V quelques jours de crédit et de confiance.

Personnellement, relisez le télégramme que je vous ai adressé le 28, à 9 heures du soir, à la suite de l'entretien entre M. d'Harcourt et Lord Derby, et insistez dans ce sens auprès des Ministres Turcs.

No. 193.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 375.)
My Lord, *Paris, May 31, 1876.*

THE Duc Décazes said to me this morning that he was anxious to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the new situation caused by the deposition of the Sultan, and his Excellency suggested whether the present might not be a favourable moment for an attempt to establish a closer understanding between all the six Powers upon the Eastern question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 104.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 376. Confidential.) *Paris, May* 31, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to any preceding despatch, I should mention to your Lordship that, in his conversation with me this morning, the Duc Decazes said that he supposed that a short time must be given to the new Government at Constantinople to determine on their policy, but at the same time he declared his opinion to be in favour of the conclusion of an armistice and of direct negotiations being opened between the Porte and the insurgents, and between it and Montenegro, and he stated that he had sent instructions in this sense to the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

He observed that there were naturally certain differences among the Powers upon the Eastern question, that there were what he called "des nécessités d'attitude" which made one Power incline in favour of the insurgents, whilst another rather favoured Turkey; and he thought that it might be better, for the present, that the new Ottoman Government should be left to attempt to settle its own affairs.

Meanwhile he was, as your Lordship is well aware, and as I have reported, anxious to see a closer understanding established between all the six Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 105.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 380.) *Paris, June* 1, 1876.

My Lord,

AFTER the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Aziz and the elevation to the Throne of Mourad V had been officially notified to the French Government by Sadyk Pasha, the Duc Decazes, as he has informed me, instructed the French Ambassador at Constantinople to declare to the new Ottoman Government that the Cabinet of Versailles accepted the notification; that they trusted that the Porte would avail itself of the new order of things to make an attempt of itself to settle the internal affairs of the Empire, and that the new Sultan would see the advantage of making this attempt, of doing what was in his power to stop the further effusion of blood, and of thus striving to bring about the pacification of the disturbed districts.

The Marquis d'Harcourt, as the Duke informed me this morning, is now directed to communicate to your Lordship the views of the French Government, and to make known to you the tenor of the instructions which have been sent to M. de Bourgoing. He is also, the Duke said, to endeavour to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government on the present crisis.

With regard to the impression produced upon this Government by the events at Constantinople, the Duke said that he had received the intelligence without distrust, and that he considered it likely to be a simplification rather than a complication of the Eastern question.

The thinking part of the public, I gather, consider the change of Sultans and Government in Turkey as likely to be of advantage to that country in its internal affairs, but they reserve their opinion as to whether these events may not bring about serious complications, at no distant time, between some of the Powers in Europe, and there appears to be a certain dread of such complications ending in war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 106.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 381. Most Confidential.) *Paris, June* 1, 1876.

My Lord,

I THINK it right to mention, most confidentially, that I have become aware of a certain uneasiness in influential quarters with respect to the present policy of the

Duc Decazes, owing to what is considered to be another instance of his precipitate action. I allude to the haste manifested by his Excellency, which has been published to the world through the press, in instructing the French Ambassador in Constantinople to accept the new order of things there and to tender advice to the Porte. It is feared that the Duke, in his anxiety to assume the character of mediator, as it has been expressed to me, and to make it appear that France is acting a prominent part in the present crisis, is not serving her true interests; that he may thereby offend Prince Bismarck; and it is considered that the true policy for France, in her actual state, is to keep in the background, and to await events, rather than to attempt to lead them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 107.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 1, at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 1, 1876.

COUNT MULINEN has received no answer from Count Andrassy, and a letter received from Mr. H.-Gastrell to-day states that Count Andrassy could give no opinion yesterday to the German Ambassador as to the probable consequences of the changes at Constantinople, but Baron Wenckeim, the Hungarian Minister in attendance on the Emperor, said that they had been expected, and even hoped for, for some days previously; that he thinks Turkey will attack Servia and Montenegro, and that Russia will not interfere, as she is not ready, and the Emperor Alexander would not incur the risk of an European war.

Count Andrassy is expected here on Saturday.

No. 108.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 2, 1876, 5·15 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have, by my telegram of yesterday, authorized your Excellency to congratulate the Sultan on his accession.

You are therefore authorized to take any other steps which may be proper in regard to recognition.

Credentials to new Sultan will be prepared and sent as soon as usual intimation by Royal Letter of Accession is received.

No. 109.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 2, at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 2, 1876.

COUNT ANDRASSY, who will return here on Sunday morning, writes he has informed the Representatives of Austria to state that Count Zichy is instructed to maintain unofficial but benevolent (*sic*) relations with Porte until the notification of the accession of the Sultan Murad is received, when Count Mülinen presumes he will be recognized, but Count Andrassy has not yet expressed any opinion on the new position of things, and it is probable that the three Imperial Courts will endeavour to avoid any appearance of a difference in their views.

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* Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 200.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 20.)
Scutari, May 22, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for your Lordship's information the copy of a despatch I have this day addressed to Sir Henry Elliott, and in which I have ventured to sketch to his Excellency in a few words the advantages that might be derived by the Turkish Government from the exceptional political condition of this Province, by a change in the manner of its administration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure in No. 200.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Scutari, May 22, 1876.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 16th instant, and to the menacing attitude, constantly increasing, of the Slavonic populations in the Turkish provinces, I venture to bring before your Excellency, in a few words, the following reflections that have occurred to me regarding the advantages that might be drawn by the Turkish Government from the peculiar position of North Albania, and the distinct characteristics of its inhabitants.

The Albanians are, both by race and language, entirely separated from the Slavs. The majority profess the Roman Catholic religion, but, whether Moslem, Roman Catholic, or Orthodox, the North Albanian places in the first rank his attachment to his race and his antagonism to his neighbours the Slavs. He is courageous and warlike to the extent of considering a natural death a matter for regret, and, as he is not surrounded by kindred nations, he is not liable to dangerous aspirations of political aggrandizement.

The Roman Catholics number about 130,000, and the Moslems about 84,000. There are also about 40,000 Orthodox Slavs in the northern and western extremities of the Pashalik, but they properly belong to Montenegro and the Herzegovina, and do not to a great extent trespass upon what is really Albanian ground.

The revenues derived from the Province are insufficient to defray the expenses incurred by the Turkish Government in its so-called administration. It is only over the populations of the towns and plains that the Government exercises any real authority, the mountaineers having maintained a partial although un-united independence.

The influence of the Roman Catholic clergy, principally composed of Italian Franciscan missionaries, and of Albanians brought up in the Seminaries of Rome, is very great, and historical associations are sedulously fostered to secure the exclusion of the Slavs, and to continue the antagonism existing with the Toschs, or inhabitants of South Albania, the majority of whom profess the Orthodox faith. During the Hellenic war of Independence the Toschs, who sided with the Greeks, were successfully subdued by the Roman Catholic Guegas or North Albanians.

Hitherto the Turkish Government has endeavoured to obtain complete control over the mountaineers by keeping apart as much as possible the different tribes, and spreading dissensions and jealousies among them; but, as the partial success of this policy has only tended to show the Guegas the oppression they may expect in the event of its complete establishment, and to give rise to a half sympathy for the Slav populations now in revolt, a change in the opposite direction would probably tend to raise a formidable bulwark against the Slavonic ambitions, which have become so threatening.

Chiefs, whose positions should be made hereditary, and who should be highly subsidized, should be appointed by the Porte to rule over the Mountain Tribes, and they should have to look for support and for directions for the common good to a Governor-General in Scutari, whose tenure of office should be for a fixed term. The existing military organization of the tribes could be easily perfected and extended, as has been done in Montenegro, and every encouragement should be given to the North Albanians to consider themselves as favoured feudatories of the Porte. A very powerful hold would be exercised over the Chiefs through the subsidies, dependent on

their good conduct, owing to the difficulty in the way of obtaining any kind of contributions from the needy inhabitants, and the impatience of Turkish support against the encroachments of the Slavs would be more and more appreciated as a knowledge arose that it could be unaccompanied by oppression or a loss of independence.

The loyalty of the Roman Catholic clergy could be entirely depended upon, as the liberty of action they enjoy in this country contrasts favourably with that permitted them elsewhere; and it is only by disintegration and destruction of old institutions worked at by the system of centralization now existing at the Porte, that this part of the Ottoman Empire has become open in a slight degree to the hostile attempts of foreign intriguers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 201.

Mr. Adams to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 387.)
Paris, June 2, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Duc Decazes asked me to-day if I knew when and in what form Her Majesty's Government were going to recognize the new Sultan.

I replied that I had as yet received no information from your Lordship upon the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. O. ADAMS.

No. 202.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 3.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, June 2, 1876.

TURKISH Ambassador communicated to-day to Count Müinet the substance of the Imperial Hatt, and a telegram respecting the ex-Sultan having addressed a letter to his successor abdicating the Throne. They have been forwarded to Count Andrassy.

No. 203.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 3.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, June 2, 1876.

IF it be true, as stated in a telegram received by the Turkish Ambassador from Belgrade, that General Tchernaieff has declared the Servian Army is not fit for war, he has probably done so in consequence of pressure from Ems, as he congratulated* (? Prince Milan on the) condition of the Army before entering the service of the Principality.

No. 204.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received June 3.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
Vienna, June 3, 1876.

I AM told that a telegram received by the French Ambassador to-day from the Secretary of Embassy at Pesth represents Count Andrassy to consider change at Constantinople likely to facilitate arrangement of the Herzegovina question, and as approving of suggestion of the Duc Decazes as to expediency of having friendly

* Unintelligible.
† Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

explanations with the Porte previously to the establishment of official relations with the new Sultan.

No. 205.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 3.*)

Vienna, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
INQUIRIES by Mr. Harriss-Gastrell confirm information in my despatch No. 325, of harness being sent from Pesth for Servian Army.

No. 206.

*Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received June 3.*)

Vienna, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
I HAVE addressed a letter to Count Mülinen requesting him to acquaint Count Andrassy that Her Majesty's Government have received information of the arms and ammunition, referred to in Mr. Monson's telegram of yesterday, having been forwarded to Cattaro in a Lloyds' steamer.

No. 207.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received June 3.*)

Vienna, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
REPORT received from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell states that Count Andrassy, in a confidential conversation with the Turkish Consul-General at Pesth, observed that the Porte should agree to an armistice if only for eight days, and endeavour to come to terms with the insurgents; that she could easily settle with Montenegro, and that she should turn all her forces against Servia, who seems determined to move.

No. 208.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(*Received June 3.*)

Vienna, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
I HAVE received following from Mr. Munson for your Lordship:—
"One of Lloyds' steamers touched at Ragusa last night, bound to Cattaro with 14,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition, packed as provisions, for Montenegro.

No. 209.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.‡—(*Received June 3.*)

Berlin, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
(Private.)
BULOW tells me privately that he does not expect the recognition of the new Sultan will meet with any difficulty at Berlin, but he cannot speak officially until Prince Bismarck's return from the country.

* Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh.
† Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.
‡ Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Rome, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

No. 210.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 3.*)

Rome, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
ORDERS were sent yesterday to Italian Minister at [Constantinople?] to congratulate on accession of Sultan Murad.
Foreign Minister told me that the three Empires, with which he has been communicating, will do the same to-day.

No. 211.

*Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received June 3, at night.*)

Constantinople, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
GENERAL IGNATIEW has been endeavouring to persuade his colleagues to observe an attitude of coldness towards the new Government, but I [believe?] that they have refused to assent, and that they send to-day, not to congratulate the Sultan, but to intimate that they acknowledge the change.
The Russian flag, which always flies at the water, has not been hoisted since Murad's accession.

No. 212.

*Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received June 4.*)

Constantinople, June 3, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
THE Reports of Her Majesty's Agents from all parts of the Empire represent the accession of Sultan Murad as having been received with general satisfaction. Tranquillity has not been disturbed anywhere, and harmony exists between the Mussulmans and Christians, except perhaps at Aleppo, where the Consul reports uneasiness. From Erzeroom I have received no report.

No. 213.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 4.*)

Rome, June 1, 1876.

(No. 201.)
My Lord,
I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a question was put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies by Count Rasponi relative to the deposition of the Sultan, and the political consequences which that event was likely to have.
M. Melegari replied that the event alluded to by Count Rasponi occurred in the night of the 29th ultimo. The news had been communicated by a laconic telegram from the Grand Vizier. No details had been received. By what influences the Sultan had been dethroned were unknown; it was therefore impossible for the moment to appreciate the consequences and the bearing which the event might have.
Telegrams from the Consuls announced that the deposition of the Sultan had been received with the greatest enthusiasm. In the meantime the Government had already given orders to the fleet to be ready to start for the East.
I inclose herewith an extract from the "Italie," containing a report of the question put to M. Melegari and of his Excellency's answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

* Repeated to Embassies.

Inclosure in No. 213.

Extract from "L'Italie" of June 1, 1876.

CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS.—SÉANCE DU 31 MAI, 1876.

Présidence de M. BIANCHERI, *Président*.

LA séance est ouverte à 2 heures ¾.

Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance est lu et approuvé.

Il est donné communication du résumé des pétitions.

Quelques congés sont accordés.

M. Corte présente un rapport.

L'ordre du jours appelle le vote d'ensemble des projets de loi approuvés dans la séance d'hier.

M. Massari fait l'appel.

(Trois membres de l'Ambassade Birmane entrent dans la Tribune de la Diplomatie. Ils sont accompagnés du Sénateur Cerutti. Les Birmans sont en tunique blanche, cheveux relevés en chignon au sommet de la tête, mouchoir en mousseline roulé autour de la tête, aigrette au côté, gants blancs.)

M. le Président annonce que M. Rasponi Giouachino désire interroger le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères sur les derniers événements de Constantinople.

M. Melegari, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, dit qu'il est prêt à répondre.

M. Rasponi.—Selon des télégrammes récents, le Sultan Abdul Aziz a été détrôné.

La chute d'un Souverain à la suite d'une révolution est toujours grave; mais elle est très-grave aujourd'hui dans la crise que traverse la Turquie. L'opinion publique est alarmée. Elle se demande quelles peuvent être ses conséquences politiques.

L'orateur demande des renseignements sur le caractère, la portée et les effets de ce grave événement.

M. Melegari, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (Vif mouvement d'attention).—L'événement qui fait l'objet de l'interrogation de M. Rasponi s'est passé dans la nuit du 29 au 30 courant. Nous n'avons pas encore des informations détaillées. Il est donc impossible pour le moment d'en apprécier les conséquences et la portée. L'événement a été communiqué par un laconique télégramme du Grand Vizir. Plus tard, nous avons reçu des dépêches de nos Consuls, qui nous annoncent que les populations ont accueilli avec enthousiasme la déposition du Sultan.

C'est tout ce que nous savons pour le moment. Nous ignorons par quelles influences le Sultan a été détrôné et les conséquences que peut avoir cette révolution. En attendant, je suis bien aise d'annoncer que le Gouvernement a déjà donné l'ordre à l'escadre de se tenir prête à partir pour l'Orient, afin de protéger, au besoin, la vie et les biens des Italiens et aussi des personnes qui, sans être Italiens, sont placées sous la protection de notre drapeau.

M. Rasponi remercie le Ministre des éclaircissements qu'il a donnés. Il désirerait toutefois savoir si de graves désordres se sont produits.

M. Melegari, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Les télégrammes reçus se bornent à dire que l'événement a été accueilli avec enthousiasme par les populations Turques.

L'incident est vidé.

No. 214.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 230.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 26, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 313 of the 19th instant, transmitting a copy of a despatch addressed to Lord Odo Russell, informing him of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the Memorandum containing the proposals of the three Powers for the pacification of the Turkish insurgent districts.

I had an interview to-day with M. de Giers, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I read to his Excellency the above named despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, and at his Excellency's request placed a copy of it in his hands.

His Excellency stated that he should transmit the communication to Prince Gortchakow at Ems, and in His Highness' absence he refrained from offering any observations further than that of expressing his sincere regret that Her Majesty's Government had been unable to accept the proposals which had been agreed upon at Berlin by the Governments of Austria, Germany, and Russia, and to which the French and Italian Governments had since given their adhesion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 215.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 236.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 30, 1876.*

WITH reference to Sir H. Elliot's telegram of the 27th instant, stating that the rejection by the Porte of the Berlin proposals appeared certain, I have the honour to state that, in a conversation I had with M. de Giers, his Excellency expressed a confident hope that they would be accepted by the Porte, with perhaps some reservations.

The opinion generally entertained here in official circles is that, if the Porte should summarily reject them, no influences could hold back Servia and Montenegro, or prevent them from joining the insurgents, and that a general rising in the other provinces would follow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 216.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 237.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 30, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a leading article from the "Agence Russe" on the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the Berlin proposals.

This article comes probably from an official source.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 216.

Extract from the "Agence Russe" of March ½, 1876.

PRESSÉ par ces amis, le Cabinet de St. James cherche à atténuer l'effet regrettable produit par son refus d'accéder au programme des cinq Puissances continentales. Nous apprenons qu'il déclare ne point vouloir s'opposer à Constantinople à l'armistice ni conseiller à la Porte de ne point y accéder. Nous ignorons jusqu'à quel point cette déclaration atténuera en Angleterre ainsi qu'en Europe l'impression regrettable produite par sa première réponse. Ce qu'il y a de certain c'est que cette réserve ou cette abstention nouvelle n'influera pas d'avantage les décisions de la Porte que ne l'eut fait l'expression de sa part d'une opinion plus tranchée. La Porte sait fort bien que dans le cas où elle suivrait des conseils de résistance venus de Londres, elle aurait seule à en supporter toutes les conséquences et qu'elle ne pourrait compter, le cas échéant, sur aucune assistance pratique et matérielle de la part de l'Angleterre. La variante qui se manifeste aujourd'hui dans le langage du Cabinet Anglais n'a donc en réalité aucune importance. Elle ne modifiera ni dans un sens ni dans un autre les résolutions de la Porte et n'effacera pas le fait de l'isolement de l'Angleterre de toutes les autres Puissances de l'Europe dans une question où, en principe comme en fait, comme but aussi bien que comme moyens, il ne s'agit que de la préservation de la paix générale, de la pacification de l'insurrection Slave et partant de la conservation même de l'Empire Ottoman.

Il y avait pour le Cabinet de Londres dans l'état où étaient les choses avant

l'entrevue de Berlin une position noble et belle à prendre, un grand rôle à remplir, auquel le conviaient les sentiments essentiellement humanitaires, Chrétiens et libéraux de la nation Anglaise, aussi bien que les services rendus par l'Angleterre à la Turquie alors qu'elle aurait pu supposer qu'on en voulait à son intégrité et à sa conservation comme Puissance tenait les clefs du Bosphore. C'était de proposer elle-même aux Puissances les moyens qui lui paraissent les plus efficaces pour parvenir à la satisfaction des légitimes griefs des rayas. Proposés par elle, ces moyens auraient pu être plus réellement pratiques et plus décisifs parceque, moins soupçonnée d'arrière-pensées, de convoitise et d'égoïsme que la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, elle eut été et plus libre dans leur choix et plus apte à leur donner la sanction voulue. Au lieu de ce rôle loyal, franc et utile, au lieu de cette co-opération à ciel ouvert à l'œuvre commune d'intérêt commun élaborée par tout le monde et dont le succès est nécessaire à tous, à l'Angleterre aussi bien qu'aux autres Etats qui vivent de travail et de paix, le Cabinet de Londres a préféré prendre une attitude de dépit et de bouderie qui l'isole du sein des Grandes Puissances et ne peut que lui aliéner les sympaties publiques sans même lui gagner celles de la Turquie.

Il y a plus, et ceci nous paraît décisif, tant il est vrai, qu'en politique,—science exacte par excellence, science de valeurs et de calculs,—la résultante est tout, dit tout, explique tout. Nous sommes loin assurément de soupçonner le Cabinet de Londres de tendre, par un refus, à compliquer la situation, à provoquer la guerre, ou tout au moins à pousser les choses en Orient à leurs dernières extrémités. Tout au plus l'accuserons-nous de cette indifférence égoïste pour les maux et les nécessités du continent à laquelle l'autorise et le convie, en quelque sorte, la position insulaire de son pays. Mais ce n'est pas là le langage que tiennent les faits, les résultats. La décision, son refus n'est defendu en effet,—si on en excepte ses propres organes officieux,—que par les journaux qui, depuis le commencement de la crise, ont poussé aux complications orientales et ont prêché la guerre sainte contre le Musulman. Il est en Russie même un journal qui s'est distingué entre tous dans cette voie, dont les attaques contre les efforts pacifiques de la diplomatie n'ont été dépassées que par la ferveur de ses vœux pour une conflagration générale entre Chrétiens et Turcs. Et bien, ce journal est précisément celui qui approve le refus du Cabinet de Londres et y applaudit.

Cela nous paraît être, pour les partisans des idées saines de paix et de conciliation, la condamnation la plus grave, la plus décisive, qui puisse être faite de la décision au cœur léger de Lord Derby et de Mr. Disraeli.

Quant à ces journaux et à tous ceux en général qui voient dans la décision du Cabinet de Londres le germe d'une future conflagration ou tout au moins la possibilité pour toutes les populations de l'Orient d'accomplir leur rêve de soulèvement général, nous sommes au regret de devoir leur dire qu'ils se trompent du tout-au-tout dans leurs calculs. La Porte, nous en sommes convaincus, adhérera aux propositions des cinq Grandes Puissances continentales par cela seul que leurs demandes sont juste, combinées dans l'intérêt de sa propre conservation, qu'elles lui sont soumises avec toute la déférence voulue, par cela seul, enfin, qu'elles se nomment Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, France, Italie, Russie, c'est-à-dire l'Europe continentale toute entière.

No. 217.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No 238.)

St. Petersburgh, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a précis by Mr. Michell of the following articles from the Russian press on the Berlin Conferences and the state of Turkey:—

1. The "Golos." refers to the influence of European diplomacy on the insurgents as accounting for their present inaction, or to their desire to await the result of the energetic interference of the three Empires.

The "Golos" regards the reinforcement of the English fleet in the Mediterranean as recognizing the necessity of protecting British subjects in Turkey.

2. The "Novoe Vremia" suggests and recommends Russia to call an European Congress, and to propose the abrogation of the Treaty of Paris.

3. The "Birja" considers it quite natural that England, not having taken part in the deliberations, should have declined the Berlin proposals.

4. The "Russki Mir" justifies the refusal of England to adhere to the Berlin

proposals. It considers that the solution of the Eastern question cannot be advanced by means of diplomacy, if the measures proposed do not meet with the energetic cooperation of the Eastern Powers, and especially of England.

The importance of an intimate friendship, and even of an alliance, with England is now fully shown.

5. The "Moscow Gazette" comments on the second letter of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and supports his ideas for the regeneration of Turkey, but considers that it can only become a reality when it first becomes established in the Provinces, and that the broader the autonomy of the Christian Provinces the greater will be the security for the Turkish Empire against violent changes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 217.

Précis by Mr. Michell of Articles in the Russian Press respecting the Berlin Conference, &c.

THE "Golos" says, with reference to Lord Derby's declaration in the House of Lords as to the problematic effect of the Berlin Conference in pacifying the insurgent Provinces, that such doubts are already partly confirmed by a recent telegram from Ragusa, according to which the Herzegovinians have decided not to entertain the proposal of an armistice, which they had previously been ready to accept, but to demand complete autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, contemplating at the same time to establish a temporary Government of their own. This news, however, the "Golos" remarks, requires confirmation, as it is not likely that the insurgents, at the risk of losing the support and sympathy of the Great Powers, have become more exacting in their demands, especially now that events have taken such a favourable turn for them, and that Russia has assumed the leading part in the settlement of the Eastern question.

The present inaction of the insurgents seems rather, the "Golos" considers, as a proof of the influence exercised over the insurgents by European diplomacy, or else of a desire on their part to await the result of the energetic interference of the three Eastern Empires.

The "Golos" then notes the fact of the issue of a loan of 12,000,000 francs by Prince Milan of Servia, who, it is to be supposed, has at last, under pressure of the Omladina, or young party, determined to take an active part in the struggle between the Christians and Mussulmans.

The "Golos" also remarks that the reinforcement of the English fleet in the Mediterranian is a sign that the English Cabinet, in spite of their Turcophile policy, have recognized the necessity of adopting measures of precaution in respect to Turkey for the protection of English subjects residing within the Ottoman Empire.

The "Novoe Vremia" of May $\frac{1}{13}$th, reviews the position of England with regard to this question, and after commenting on the fact that the British fleets have been ordered to Turkish waters, proceeds to state:—

"England's policy being so plainly revealed, we consider that she should be defeated by her own weapons. First of all, it is indispensable to take measures to be ready with an army; then, as England refers to the Treaty of Paris, under which European men-of-war are not allowed to enter the Dardanelles or Straits of the Bosphorus, and all interference on the part of Europe in Turkish internal affairs is prohibited, it is desirable to raise the question of completely repealing such Treaty, which is already literally torn to atoms. As the Treaty inconveniences Russia most, it should behove her to take the initiative in this case. We are repeatedly told that a cordial understanding exists between the three Empires, and that at Berlin Russia was allowed to take the lead. There is no doubt concerning the support of France, and Italy will join the strongest side; consequently, it would be quite natural for Russia to call a European Congress, and propose the abrogation of the Treaty of Paris, as an international agreement already defunct and incapable of effecting the reforms in Turkey which Europe considered necessary already twenty years ago."

The "Birja" of May 14th, in an article on this subject, writes:—

"Looking at the Berlin Conference from a foreign point of view, the British Government could not act otherwise than it has done. On the strength of their alliance, the three Eastern Empires did not invite the representatives of England to their deliberations, but merely informed her of what they had collectively decided upon, in order that she should take note of the same. The consequence is, that England, for the preservation of her dignity as a great Power, was forced to decline the proposals worked out at the Conference.

"In reality, such refusal by England will in nowise change the decision of the three Emperors, nor yet that of Italy and France, who have joined them. Yesterday's telegram from Pesth confirms previous advices, that Austria does not intend occupying Turkish provinces with her forces, and thereby assist the Porte in quelling the insurrection. It is evident that, when the decision of the Berlin Conference has been communicated to the Porte, and a suspension of arms effected, serious negotiations will be entered into with the insurgents to induce them to lay down their arms, on conditions fully guaranteeing their rights and property in Turkish territory."

The "Russki Mir" contains the following article on the subject of the refusal of England to give her adhesion to the Memorandum drawn up at Berlin:—

"Notwithstanding the clamour raised on all sides against England on account of her 'obstinacy' in refusing to coalesce with the three Eastern Empires in the matter of the Turkish crisis, this obstinacy, if such a term be at all applicable to the policy of a great and an independent Power, finds reasonable justification both under present political circumstances and in the mutual relations which exist between the different States. A few months ago Great Britain took part, though rather reluctantly, in the diplomatic campaign undertaken under Count Andrassy's guidance, with the object of settling the Bosnio-Herzegovinian question. And what, may we ask, was the result of this reforming outcry, and especially of the part that England played in it? Why, nothing but failure and general confusion. We have repeatedly expressed it as our opinion that the European Cabinets are primarily interested in the preservation of peace between themselves, and that Eastern affairs serve them merely as materials for the 'exercise' of alternate feelings of friendship and animosity, rather than as a source of anxiety requiring practical solution.

"The well-known fate of Count Andrassy's note could not but have the effect of deterring dispassionate statesmen from similar fruitless enterprises, and the unfavourable effect of Austrian diplomacy was nowhere so strongly felt as in England. The Disraeli Cabinet, in giving its support to a project framed without its cognizance at Vienna, sacrificed to a certain extent the national self-esteem of the country for the sake of plans which, in the eyes of Englishmen, were anything but convincing. Such being the case, ought Lord Derby to be asked a second time to make the same sacrifice when the results of the first were so fruitless? Free from the complicated cares and combinations which occupy the minds of statesmen of the Continent, England is in no way obliged to conceal her real sentiments and her true interests; she is able to proclaim her views with firmness and sincerity in questions involving to Continental nations many considerations which do not in any way affect her own interests. It cannot be expected that England, which was once the Protectress of the Sultan and almost absolute Mistress on the shores of the Bosphorus, should now play a secondary part in the wake of three allied Empires which have taken upon themselves the settlement of European questions involving general interests. Such a concession we have no right to expect from the national feeling of England. Complete isolation in foreign politics would be more in accordance with the dignity of Great Britain than a subordinate position with only a deliberative voice. We should have had greater grounds for surprise had England adopted the same course of action with respect to the Berlin Memorandum as that which she pursued in regard to the Andrassy note.

"Recent events have shown more clearly than ever that the solution of the Eastern Question cannot be advanced one step by means of diplomatic measures, if such measures do not meet with energetic co-operation on the part of the Eastern Powers, and particularly with that of England. The importance of an intimate friendship, and even of an alliance with England, is now fully shown. We must now seriously think of connecting ourselves closely with that powerful nation, a connection for which a solid foundation is already established in the region of Central Asiatic affairs. The existence of the triple alliance will prove no obstacle in this respect,

inasmuch as Germany is not less interested than ourselves in drawing England away from France, her present natural ally."

Letter of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

THE "Moscow Gazette" concludes a review of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's recent letter to the "Times," on the condition of Turkey, with the following observations:—

"For the realization of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's plan, or of that which was always called Russian policy, it is necessary to commence its application, not at the top but at the bottom; not from the centre of administration, but from the provinces. Under an autonomy of the Christian provinces, the realization of the plan will necessarily follow.

"The provinces must be freed from the despotism of Pashas and the barbarities of Bashi-Bazouks, and the inhabitants must be allowed to govern themselves.

"Under a system of self-government, it will not be possible for a Mussulman minority to tyrannize over the Christians. It would be easy to organize in the provinces a local militia, which in case of foreign danger could serve as a means of protection for the whole Empire, considering that these provinces would remain under the sovereign rule of the Sultan. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe speaks of the plan of giving autonomy to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a measure more of a palliative kind than that which he himself proposes for the whole Empire. His plan, however, can become a reality only when it first becomes established in the provinces; and, moreover, the broader the autonomy of the Christian provinces, the greater will be the security of the Turkish Empire against any violent changes."

No. 218.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 242.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 31, 1876.*

CABOULEY PASHA called on me yesterday morning to announce to me the important intelligence he had just received of the dethronement of the Sultan, and the proclamation of Murad Effendi as his successor.

I have just seen M. de Giers, who informed me that this measure was entirely the act of the Grand Vizier and the Ministry.

He said that they had placed Murad Effendi in the Seraskiat, defended by troops, and had then proceeded in the night to the Palace of the Sultan. They represented to His Majesty his incapacity for continuing the government of the country, and the necessity of his retirement, and they requested him to follow them.

His Majesty did so, without any resistance, and he was taken to the Seraglio, and placed under confinement there.

It appears that the treasure of the Sultan, which is said to be considerable, and to have been kept in his palace, has fallen into the hands of the Government.

These were the only details of this important event which has yet reached the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 219.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 245.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 31, 1876.*

PROFITING of the permission recorded in the concluding paragraph of your Lordship's despatch No. 314, marked Confidential, of the 19th instant, I communicated to-day to M. de Giers the views therein contained of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the Berlin proposals, and of the motives which had induced Her Majesty's Government to decline to give their assent to them. I had already, before receiving that despatch, expressed a personal opinion in the same sense, and I thought it very advisable that it should be confirmed by your Lordship's authority.

M. de Giers merely observed that he would report the substance of my communication to Prince Gortchakow, adding that his Highness deeply regretted the abstention of Her Majesty's Government from co-operating with the other Powers, and expressing a hope that an opportunity would soon offer which would re-establish the perfect concert among the Six Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 220.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 40. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, May 26, 1876.*

A TELEGRAM, of which the inclosed is a copy, was received yesterday at the Turkish Consulate General from Moukhtar Pasha, announcing a Turkish victory on the 23rd instant. The Slavs, of course, deny its correctness, and say that the combat resulted in an insurgent success, and in considerable loss on the side of the Turks. The Russian Consulate here telegraphed yesterday to Cettingé for information; but I am assured that no answer has as yet been received, and that there is no probability of its being forthcoming before the departure of the steamer which takes this despatch. I am, therefore, inclined to think that fortune has again favoured the Turks, although I am sure that the numbers of the insurgents and of their losses have been exaggerated by the Turkish authorities.

It is asserted here that the insurgents have made up their minds to reject all overtures, as well for an armistice as for a pacification, and that the only amelioration in the conduct of the war consists in an undertaking by both parties to discontinue the mutilation of the killed and wounded.

It may well be that the report of the intention of the insurgents to continue the struggle "to the bitter end" is simply a ruse, devised to influence the Porte in its decision respecting the new propositions of the Powers.

General Jovanovics left Ragusa yesterday morning to inspect the troops quartered at the various forts and garrisons between this and Metcovics; and will afterwards proceed on a like tour of inspection to Cattaro and Budua.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 220.

Moukhtar Pasha to Danish Effendi.

(Télégraphique.) *Mostar, le 14/26 Mai, 1876.*

LES insurgés, d'un nombre supérieur à 2,000, campés à Banjani, ont été le 14 Mai occuper les hauteurs situés en face des villages Tchernitza, Kuludi, et Zagradie, district Gaczko, dans l'intention d'enlever le bétail conduit à la pâture. A peine les rebelles ont été aperçus qu'une vigoureuse attaque dirigée par un nombre suffisant de troupes les a mis en déroute. Poursuivis par nos soldats jusqu'à la hauteur de Kobila-glava, leur reserve laissée dans cette position et un renfort au-dessus de 1,000 hommes arrivant par la droite, ont été également dispersées et forcées de s'enfuir vers les montagnes de Banjani, en laissant 150 morts et autant de blessés. Dans ce combat auquel les habitants des bourgades sus-mentionées ont aussi pris part, nous n'avons eu, en tout, que cinq morts.

(Signé) AHMED MOUKHTAR.

No. 221.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 41. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, May 27, 1876.*

IN the telegraphic accounts of Count Andrassy's speech on the Eastern question before the Austrian Delegation at Buda-Pesth on the 20th instant, in which it is stated that his Excellency took occasion to repudiate any complicity on the part of Austria in the origin of the Herzegovinian insurrection, as well as any connivance on the part of Austrian officials in its continuance, I find a categorical refutation of much that for many months past, in my official correspondence with your Lordship and with Sir Andrew Buchanan, I have reported from Hungary and from Dalmatia.

That Count Andrassy was perfectly honest in making this declaration, and that his Excellency has fully convinced himself of its absolute correctness, it is, of course, impossible to feel a doubt. It seems to me, however, at least a somewhat singular fact that I should have found among the Slavs of Dalmatia a coincidence of opinion with the Magyars of Hungary, both as to the immediate causes of the outbreak, and as to certain details of the manner in which the insurrection has been encouraged. This is the more remarkable because, as it is unnecessary to remind your Lordship, the Slavs regard the progress of the insurrection with feelings widely different from those entertained on the subject by the Magyars.

During the early autumn of last year the conviction in Buda-Pesth was very general that the visit of the Emperor to Dalmatia had been adroitly used by interested politicians as an argument that an outbreak in Bosnia and the Herzegovina would elicit sympathy at Vienna. So firmly rooted was this opinion, that in his conversations with me Baron Wenckheim, at that time Prime Minister of Hungary, never neglected an opportunity of adverting to and ridiculing it. That the Supreme Government of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was directly concerned with the intrigues which produced the insurrection, no one would seriously allege; that it was ignorant of their existence is possible; that it has never appeared to recognize their gravity is certain.

These speculations as to the, now quasi-remote, past are perhaps unprofitable. With respect, however, to the connivance of Austrian officials in the assistance received by the insurgents, I cannot bring myself to believe that I have been so grossly deceived as to have been led during three months to misrepresent to Her Majesty's Government the sentiments and the action of the local authorities of Dalmatia. Were my information derived exclusively from those who are called "Turcophils," it might well be that I should persistently have misled both your Lordship and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. But from the moment of my arrival in Dalmatia, I have found an indisputable concurrence of testimony volunteered as much by those who sympathize with, and who work for, the insurgents, as by those of adverse sentiments, to the effect that officials who have been charged by the Vienna Government with the duty of maintaining neutrality, and with the mission of inducing the insurgents to come to terms, have been equally insincere in the performance of their task.

It has been Count Andrassy's misfortune that an astute diplomacy, directed at Constantinople with consummate skill, and seconded in Dalmatia and in Montenegro by hardly inferior ability, has been able to ally itself with Slav predilections and with military ambition for the frustration of all his Excellency's well meant schemes for a settlement of the existing difficulties. In my earliest reports from Ragusa, I ventured to refer to the "comedy" which was being played here. All that I have heard in the course of the ensuing three months has but served to confirm my first impressions, and to make me fear that the comedy is but the prelude to a drama, the fatal results of which this Empire will not escape.

The reflection that he has unconsciously been all along playing the game of Russia in a policy most dangerous to the continued ascendancy of his own nationality, must be so abhorrent to Count Andrassy that I am not surprised at the energy with which he refuses to admit to himself that he has in any way lost control of the situation. I fear that his Excellency takes insufficient account of the attractive extent to which the prospect of an eventual military occupation has been displayed before the eyes of those in high command, or of the influence in the Councils of the State which they, at least, flatter themselves is enjoyed by the representatives of the army. In this respect I may be mistaken; nevertheless, I own to being impressed by the ominous resemblance of the tone in which, only the night before last, the

General in command here dismissed as trivial Count Andrassy's disclaimer of any intention of "acting the gendarme" in Turkey, to the confidence with which, nine months ago, the Staff Officers of the garrison at Peterwardein predicted to me that the summer of 1876 would see the entry of Austro-Hungarian troops into the insurgent Provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 222.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 42. Political.)
Ragusa, May 28, 1876.

My Lord,

THE news that Her Majesty's Government has refused to subscribe to the decision taken at Berlin has produced a profound impression here; and although Ragusa is, in itself, an inconsiderable town, it is at this moment the centre of Slav agitation, and the head-quarters of an organization which controls or stimulates Panslavist sentiments and demonstrations throughout the greater part of Dalmatia.

The impression I refer to is, I think, a salutary one. I derive my opinion from a conversation I have had this morning with some four or five of the most active sympathisers with the insurrection, and I am sure that their language was dictated by no desire to be agreeable to me.

They were unanimous in their appreciation of the sagacious prevision of Her Majesty's Government as to the futility of the new proposals, whatever their real nature may be. They concurred in severely criticising Count Andrassy's policy, which, they said, showed his Excellency's utter ignorance of the real state of affairs. They were equally outspoken about Russia, saying that she was simply playing with Austria ("sta giocando coll'Austria"), and that her game was so transparent that it was no credit to see through it.

On my putting the direct question as to what were the present intentions of the insurgents, they replied that nothing was positively known. It was clear, however, that their best policy would be to arrange with Russia and Montenegro that the armistice, if agreed to, should not begin till July, and should then last for two months, by which time the return of the inclement season would forcibly suspend military operations, and give more time for Turkey "to bleed to death."

I have spoken of the "salutary" impression produced by the action of Her Majesty's Government, because from this conversation I could see that my interlocutors, ardent sympathisers as they are with the insurgent cause, had compared with real respect the frank and independent conduct of England with the feeble temporising policy adopted by certain other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 223.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 43. Political.)
Ragusa, May 28, 1876.

My Lord,

M. DE WESSILITZKY passed through Ragusa this morning on his way to Cettigné to communicate to the Prince of Montenegro the Berlin Memorandum.

I am told that he will not remain in Cettigné, but will proceed to Bosnia in a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 224.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 44. Political.)
Ragusa, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 41 of the 27th instant remarking upon Count Andrassy's recent speech before the Delegations, and on the conduct of the Austrian Government towards the insurgents, I have the honour to inclose extract and translation of an article published in the "Avvenire," of Spalato, of yesterday, in which his Excellency's assertions are adverted to in excessively strong language. The tone of the article will also illustrate very appositely the observations I ventured to make in my despatch No. 42 of the 28th instant, as to the manner in which public opinion here expresses itself on the diplomatic ability of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 224.

Extract from the "Avvenire" of Spalato of May 29, 1876.

(Translation.)

"AS to Russia, it is only Count Andrassy—that triple extract of diplomatic ingenuity—who does not see how the whole movement is caused and fostered by her. But a statesman who ventures to take upon himself before the Delegations the responsibility of the acts of Baron Rodich and Marshal Mollinary, and at the same time to deny that the Austrian Government has for a single instant encouraged the insurgents, can well permit himself to recognise in Russia the most loyal friend of the Empire of the Habsburgs as well as the most disinterested patroness of the Crescent."

No. 225.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 45. Political.)
Ragusa, May 30, 1876.

My Lord,

WASSA EFFENDI, the President of the Commission of Reforms, has arrived at Ragusa on his way to Trebigné to confer with the members of the Commission there relative to the return of the Herzegovinian refugees.

He tells me that from the district of Mokrovics a considerable number of families have already returned, as your Lordship will have heard from Mr. Consul Holmes. At the same time he does not speak in a very satisfied tone of the way in which the Austrian local authorities second his efforts.

Even the Slavophils and Russians here are willing to admit that large supplies of grain are already at the disposition of the Turkish authorities for the support of the refugees and the sowing of the arable land.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 226.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 5.)

(No. 70.)
Buda-Pest, May 29, 1876.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th instant, I have the honour to state to your Excellency that on the following day an article appeared in the usually well informed "Pester Lloyd," criticising Dr. Kuranda's remarks on Count Andrassy's oriental policy.

It is worthy of note that Dr. Kuranda's appeal to a traditional policy is dismissed as old-fashioned. Its motive was the integrity of Turkey at any price, it means a

...ignoourly struggle against Russian influence, and its object open opposition to every national or liberal aspiration in the Balkan Peninsula, but in practice object and means were confounded.

Dr. Kuranda's reproach of his Excellency for having no such a policy is held to be his best praise, even if it were not a fact that, long before he succeeded to office, such a policy had become a figment after dwindling in the Crimean War to a mere theory. Such a policy is not only impossible, but of all others the least useful to the Empire. Whatever one may think of Count Andrassy's foreign policy, three facts are evident, that it has kept the peace, has localised the insurrection, and has caused the Porte to improve its internal situation. But a traditional policy means either to remain passive and let others decide the fate of the Austrian Monarchy, or to take an active part against the insurrection and enter not only upon the dreaded intervention but into an European conflict.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 227.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 5.)

(No. 72.) *Buda-Pest, May 29, 1876.*
Sir,

THE Committee of the Hungarian Delegation on the Foreign Office Estimates has issued its report, which, in a retrospect of Eastern policy, records that between the Powers there are partly diverging interests; that however, in spite of them, peace has "as yet" been maintained; that Austria will favour the re-establishment of the *status quo* so long as the vital interests of the Monarchy will allow, and that the *status quo* can only be secured by the accomplishment of internal reforms in Turkey. But the report adds that, "in presence of the incalculable course of events, no promises were asked from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for such promises might, at a decisive moment, have to give way to higher considerations."

It concludes by noting the gravity of the situation, by supporting the present policy, "so long as the vital interests of the Monarchy may not demand another policy," and by giving the sanction of the Delegation to their maintenance by every means which the development of events may render necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 228.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 5.)

(No. 73.) *Buda-Pest, May 29, 1876.*
Sir,

AS an occupation of Bosnia by Austria would, from the large number of Roman Catholics in that Province, be also a demonstration of the Roman against the Greek Church, and as in such a case it would be even still more desirable for her to curb Pan-Slavist aspirations, it may be worthy of record that the Hungarian Minister for Public Instruction recently carried to a successful conclusion an arrangement between His Apostolic Majesty and the Holy See, by which the priests of the Franciscan Order for Bosnia are now educated in the Hungarian Seminary at Gran, instead of the Croatian Seminary at Agram.

By this change it is hoped that in course of time the influence of the Bosnian priesthood may be exerted rather against than for Pan-Slavism.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 229.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 5.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, May 30, 1876.*

IN yesterday's meeting of the Austrian Delegation, Dr. Sturm brought forward the resolution of the Committee on the War Office Estimates, that an economy of 2,262,000 fl. (about 200,000*l.*) should be effected by postponing till March next the usual calling out in October of the annual contingent of recruits for the infantry and chasseurs, and that of this saving a sum of 1,075,400 fl. (about 100,000*l.*) should be applied to improving the diet of the soldier.

Some days ago an article from the pen of a military expert appeared in the "Pester Lloyd," defending the feasibility of this mode of economy, and averring that it would, from a military point of view, in no wise impair the fighting power of the army. But these views were combatted in the Committee by Count Andrassy and others on military grounds. It was, however, clear that such a measure would not be acceptable, merely on the ground of not being prejudicial to efficiency in times of peace; and the course of yesterday's debate showed that political reasons rendered it desirable not even in appearance to lessen the military strength of the Empire.

Count Andrassy now opposed the resolution by stating that, although he had in Committee declared his belief that peace would be maintained, he had in no wise guaranteed what the future might bring forth. Only two things can secure peace—a peaceful policy, and an army ready to do battle; and there are only two means for a Sovereign and the nation to hold an enemy morally in check—the number of the combatants, and the leadership of the army. As the latter does not in itself suffice, and is always a matter of uncertainty, it behoves a nation to ensure the former. Moreover, this was not a suitable moment to propose economy of this kind. He had never stated that Austria could have no enemies. No one razes a fortress, because it is not actually besieged. The War Budget was the normal one, and neither he nor the War Minister could acquiesce in such an economy even for so desirable a purpose as that of improving the condition of the ranks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 230.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 442.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 1, 1876.*

EDHEM PASHA, the Turkish Ambassador, received the first intelligence of the deposition of the Sultan, and of the elevation to the throne of Mourad, on the morning of the 30th ultimo, which his Excellency communicated to Herr von Bülow forthwith.

He also announced at the same time the suppression of the insurrection in Bulgaria by the Turkish authorities.

I asked Herr von Bülow what impression these startling events at Constantinople had produced in Berlin.

His Excellency said he thought it too soon to form and pronounce an opinion on them yet, considering that details were wanting, and that it would take some days before we could know how the change had been received in Turkey; all things considered, however, he could not but hope that it would be productive of good, and lead to an improved state of things in Turkey.

The Berlin press I notice, takes a favourable view of the change, and the funds have slightly risen in consequence.

The attitude of England is generally approved by the liberal press in Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 231.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 413. Confidential.) *Berlin, June 1, 1876.*

My Lord,

I AM confidentially informed by Herr von Bülow that he declined to discuss the Circular addressed by the Sublime Porte to its Representatives on the subject of the Memorandum of the Berlin Conference with Edhem Pasha, because the Memorandum, or at least the results of the Conference, had not yet been officially communicated at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 232.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 416.) *Berlin, June 3, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 411 of the 29th ultimo, calling my attention to a letter published in the "Nord" purporting to have been addressed by the chiefs of the insurgents to M. Wessilitzky, and containing proposals closely resembling those which the three Powers adopted at the Berlin Conference, and requesting me to ascertain whether the letter is authentic; I have the honour to state that the result of my inquiries leads me to believe that it is so, because its authenticity has never been called in question or denied by the official press of the three Northern Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 233.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)*

Vienna, June 4, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE communication made yesterday to the Porte, I am told here, was to congratulate the Sultan, and as soon as the letter arrives notifying his accession, the usual answer will be sent to it.

One of my colleagues has expressed a hope to me that Sir H. Elliot may receive his new letters of credence in time to give him the rank of Senior Ambassador, as much inconvenience has hitherto arisen from General Ignatiew holding that position.

I have not yet seen Count Andrassy, but hope to do so to-morrow.

No. 234.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)*

Vienna, June 5, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ANDRASSY having declined receiving any one to-day, I have seen Baron Hofmann, who said that the Sultan's death will cause no delay in official recognition of Mourad.

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* Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

No. 235.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Berlin, June 5, 1876.*

I AM told on very good authority that Prince Gortchakow wishes for a General Conference in the hope of getting his own plan adopted, which Count Andrassy had successfully resisted and rejected in the Berlin Conference.

Prince Gortchakow flatters himself that he will have the support of the "Times" newspaper, in which a plan similar to his has been repeatedly recommended. As far as I know it is based on the autonomy of the States under the suzerainty of the Sultan, like Servia and Roumania; but I am not quite certain as to the details of Prince Gortchakow's plan.

No. 236.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 5, 1876, 3 P.M.*

AN inquest has been held on the late Sultan by nineteen medical men, among whom were Dr. Dickson, physician to Her Majesty's Embassy, the doctors of the Austrian and French Embassy, and others of high standing, Turkish, Greek, and Armenian. They certified unanimously that the death was the result of suicide, and that the deceased Sultan had opened the veins of his arms with a pair of pointed scissors. Dr. Dickson tells me that neither he nor any of his colleagues entertain a doubt that the act was voluntary.

Since the Sultan's deposition all arms and cutting instruments had been kept out of his reach, but yesterday morning he asked for a pair of scissors to cut off his beard. A small pair was given him, and he then turned his attendants out of the room and locked the door. His Majesty was buried in the mausoleum of his father, Sultan Mahmoud, with every mark of respect.

No. 237.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 5, 1876, 11 P.M.*

MUSURUS PASHA has twice telegraphed to the Porte that I have been intrusted personally to congratulate Sultan in name of the Queen, and some surprise seems to be felt that I should not have done so.

I failed to-day to see Rashid Pasha, but I shall try again to-morrow, and will explain that I have no instructions to convey congratulations personally or from the Queen.

Although I could not be received officially until I receive fresh credentials, the influence of Her Majesty's Government over the new Sovereign would be advantageously affected by my seeing His Majesty unofficially, when I might perhaps be permitted to convey to him a complimentary message from the Queen.

There is some difference between the Constitutional and Conservative members of the Government, and although Sultan is believed to be well inclined to former, it is important to confirm him in that tendency.

No. 238.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June 5, 1876.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that General Ignatiew has been instructed to maintain business relations with Porte. General Ignatiew had received official notification of accession of Sultan and had forwarded it by post. Minister for

* Repeated to the Queen, Paris, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

Foreign Affairs says that, on the completion of the due formalities, recognition will probably take place. He had no knowledge of the instructions having been sent to General Ignatiew to facilitate. All diplomatic business is transacted at Ems, and Minister for Foreign Affairs here appears ignorant of action taken there.

No. 239.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

Belgrade, June 5, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
THE danger of hostilities with the Porte appears less imminent, and Prince Milan, in contradiction to the urgent remonstrance of the war party, will address letter congratulatory to the new Sultan on his accession.

No. 240.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 5.)

June 5, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)
GREEK Government has officially recognized the new Government in Turkey.

No. 241.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 16.)
Mostar, May 25, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch of to-day's date, addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, reporting a recent combat at Tchernitza, and that preparation is being made for another expedition to Nichsich, also regarding the difficulties which exist as to the return of the refugees.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 241.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Elliot.

Mostar, May 25, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, on the 23rd, a large band of insurgents attacked a body of troops engaged in cutting wood at Tchernitza, in Gatzko. Reinforcements were sent to their assistance, and in the evening the soldiers returned to their quarters, according to telegrams from Gatzko, victorious. Probably the simple truth is, that, having fallen into an ambuscade, they managed to extricate themselves, and that the insurgents naturally retired as soon as this happened. The affair is not important, but it may be remarked that this is, perhaps, the first instance of the rebels attacking the troops without the inducement of any convoy to pillage.

Moukhtar Pasha is preparing for another expedition to revictual Nichsich. In his last attempt he merely succeeded in conveying enough provisions to suffice the garrison for a short time, but took nothing to the starving inhabitants.

On the the 22nd my Austrian colleague, M. Wassitch, went to Metcovich to see what was being done to facilitate the return of the refugees. He reports that, up to the present moment, no steps have been taken to put their houses in a habitable condition, and that nothing has been done in any way beyond mere promises to encourage them to return. I have spoken to the Governor-General on the subject, and I see that on all sides a want of confidence prevails which prevents anything from being accomplished. The Turks hesitate to incur the expense of rebuilding houses before the Christians absolutely return to occupy them, and the latter will not return while they see no preparation made to receive them. The authorities pretend that they have all the materials for rebuilding the houses ready, but no one seems to know in what depôts they are collected; also that they have plenty of provisions to supply to the people, but instead of being on the spot, they seem to be warehoused

at Ragusa and Kleck, and certainly not very available for immediate distribution. In short, confusion, mismanagement, and distrust prevail. I see no administrative ability, and the authorities seem to me more occupied in criticising and complaining of the proceedings of Baron Rodich and the Dalmatian Revolutionary Committees than in taking any vigorous measures to put matters in order within their own jurisdiction. Ali Pasha, however, assures me that very shortly some villages will be prepared to receive the refugees, and Wassa Effendi goes to-morrow to Metcovich and Ragusa to inspect matters personally.

I see that the disturbances which I told your Excellency I expected in Bulgaria, if the actual state of affairs were prolonged, have seriously commenced. This greatly aggravates the situation here, and I fear that it will now require a most decisive European intervention to restore order, if it be still possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 242.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 541. Confidential.)
Therapia, May 27, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Grand Vizier having called upon me yesterday, I inquired what the Porte proposed to do about the Berlin proposals.

His Highness answered that until they were officially communicated and their nature fully known no decision would of course be come to, but his language was such as to convince me that they will not be entertained.

The Turkish Empire was, he said, already brought low enough, and its very existence depended upon the maintenance of such prestige as still was left to it.

He was perfectly confident that if the Powers abstained from encouraging expectation or hopes of their future intervention, the Turkish Government, when left alone, could bring the insurrection to an end within two months.

A wrong course had been followed throughout, for the overwhelming force which would have rendered resistance vain had never been dispatched to the scene of insurrection, and the troops had, moreover, been sent to the wrong direction.

What should have been done, and what, I presume, his Highness now proposes to do, was to concentrate a very large force at Novi-Bazaar, from whence it would be easy to intercept sympathisers from Montenegro or Servia, and to assume, if necessary, active operations against those Principalities in the event of open hostilities being attempted by them.

The insurgents thus isolated and deprived of the external assistance by which the movement had been kept alive, would, he was certain, quickly come to terms.

A consideration which weighs with the Porte in favour of this plan is, no doubt, a desire to be independent of Austria, in case that Power, upon the rejection of the Berlin proposals, should close the Port of Kleck against the Turkish troops.

I asked Mehemet Rushdi Pasha whether it would not be possible for him to come to a direct understanding with the Prince of Montenegro without the intervention of any foreign Power.

He showed no inclination to open himself to me on this subject, but the little that he did say rather tended to convey the impression that he intended to attempt it.

He had, he said, telegraphed to the Prince, who was extremely pleased with his communication, the nature of which, however, he did not disclose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 243.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 544.)
Therapia, May 27, 1876.

My Lord,

THE reports of Her Majesty's Consuls at Erzeroum and Trebizond of the state of their districts continue to be extremely unsatisfactory.

Months ago, as I informed your Lordship, I communicated the substance of their

reports to the Porte, and I was assured that it was quite alive to the necessity of taking the measures that were required; and with this view proposed at once to dispatch a Special Commission to concert them.

I have frequently recurred to the subject, but in vain; for nothing whatever has been done, and at any moment the Porte may find itself involved in difficulties entirely owing to its own apathy or negligence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 244.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 363.) *Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the advice given by your Excellency to the Porte respecting the spirit in which the proposals agreed upon at Berlin should be received, as reported in your despatch of the 22nd ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 245.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 364.) *Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.*

Sir,

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your having congratulated the Sultan, as reported in your telegraphic despatch of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 246.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 366.) *Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the representation which your Excellency made to the Porte of the evils resulting from the employment of Bashi-Bazouks, as reported in your despatch No. 525 of the 24th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 247.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 6.)

(No. 80. Confidential.) *Buda-Pest, June 2, 1876.*

Sir,

BARON ORCZY expressed to me to-day his opinions in connection with the present phase of the Eastern question.

The one was that the reserved attitude of England was much to be regretted, as it would only render Turkey more obstinate in refusing timely reforms.

The other was that, if at the present conjuncture "the Powers put their hands in their pockets" it would only be for the purpose of letting the conflagration extend.

It is possible that, whilst the former opinion echoes the irritation, the latter reflects both the weakness and hopes of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 248.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 6.)

(No. 81. Confidential.) *Buda-Pest, June 2, 1876.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of to-day's date, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Count Andrassy was understood in that conversation to suggest quite confidentially four points, which, if accurately apprehended, would indicate a desire to separate from the policy of Russia in Turkey.

These points were that Turkey should agree to an armistice—the sole point to be at present insisted upon—"even if it be for only eight days;" that she should then try to come to terms with the insurgents; that she could easily settle with Montenegro, and that then she should turn all her force immediately against Servia, which had, in spite of his Excellency's counsels, armed to the teeth, and seemed determined to move.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 249.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 6.)

(No. 82. Confidential.) *Buda-Pest, June 2, 1876.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of to-day's date, reporting the substance of a conversation between Count Andrassy and my Turkish Colleague, I think it desirable to inform your Excellency that the latter was much impressed by the apparent change of attitude in his Excellency, who abandoned his usual dogmatic, peremptory, and almost discourteous mode of discussing Eastern politics with him, and seemed to be animated by a desire to express himself in a more careful and conciliatory manner.

His Excellency is now—my Colleague added—"un homme ébranlé," and, as he is very susceptible in politics to the influence of the actual present, even an engagement for a different policy might now be obtained from him, if England is resolved to follow the line indicated by her attitude in respect of the Berlin Note.

I remarked that no doubt Count Andrassy had been much harassed by his cross-examinations before the Delegations, and that his fatigue of mind was visible in his speeches; but I had no means of estimating the apparent change in his Excellency's attitude which he had noticed, neither had I any knowledge of the future policy of England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 250.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 587. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.*

THE French Ambassador communicated to me on the 2nd instant the substance of the instructions which had been sent by telegraph to the French Representative at Constantinople on the accession of the new Sultan.

The Duc Decazes had informed the Comte de Bourgoing that the French Government did not feel called upon to express any opinion on the events which had brought about the change of Sovereigns; they were ready to accept the new Ruler without distrust, and without prejudging his intentions. They trusted, however, that he would consider it material to his own honour to inaugurate his reign by the cessation, or at least the suspension, of bloodshed. Desirous as he must be to spare his people the horrors of civil war, his first endeavours, it was to be hoped, would be directed towards removing the present unfortunate misunderstandings, and re-establishing peace in all parts of his Empire. The French Government would welcome with sympathy the efforts which he might make with this object, and hoped to see his course guided by a spirit of conciliation and moderation.

The Duc Decazes agreed with M. de Bourgoing that the presentation of the note containing the proposals for the pacification of the Herzegovina must be deferred. It would be impossible to address to a new Executive, the disposition and intentions of which could not be thoroughly known, representations and advice which had seemed to be demanded by a state of affairs in which the present Sultan had had no part. Europe was bound to allow Mourad V some days, at least, of credit and confidence.

I expressed a general acquiescence in the views thus put forward by the Duc Decazes.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 251.

Count Beust to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 6.*)

18, *Belgrave Square, S.W., le 4 Juin*, 1876.

Cher Lord Derby,

JE viens à recevoir un télégramme, dont voici la substance:

D'accord avec la Russie et l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est décidé d'ajourner la démarche projetée à Constantinople, mais il juge qu'un accord sur une ligne de conduite est plus que jamais nécessaire, en vue surtout de l'attitude menaçante de la Servie. La Russie et l'Autriche ont fait parvenir à Belgrade des conseils de modération, et nous serions heureux que le Cabinet Anglais voulût y agir dans le même sens.

Ne désirant pas vous déranger autrement, cher Lord Derby, qu'en portant ce qui précède à votre connaissance, je me borne à vous le transmettre par écrit.

Mille, &c.
(Signé) BEUST.

No. 252.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 6.*)

Constantinople, June 6, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

ROYAL letters announcing Sultan's accession will be sent off to-morrow.

Turkish Ambassador at Vienna telegraphs that Austrian Government will send the new credentials for their Ambassador without waiting for reception of letter.

No. 253.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.[a]—(*Received June 6.*)

Rome, June 6, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

INSTRUCTIONS have been sent to Italian Minister at Constantinople, who is in business relations with the Turkish Government, by having conveyed to the Porte the usual compliments on accession of new Sovereign, to counsel spontaneous adoption of such measures as may render it unnecessary for the Powers to give any effect to the Berlin Memorandum.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is acquainted with the tenour of intended proclamation mentioned in Sir H. Elliot's telegram of 4th instant, and on the whole takes a more favourable view of the general situation. Sultan Murad will be recognized as soon as his accession is formally notified. The accounts from Belgrade, where Italian Consul-General has been desired to give pacific counsels, are more reassuring. The Prince says he will only act on the defensive.

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[a] Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

No. 254.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 6.*)

Berlin, June 6, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

THE first leader in the "Times" newspaper of Friday, 2nd instant, recommending that England and France should unite to make known to the Northern Powers what settlement for the revolted provinces of Turkey they think most equitable, has created some alarm here. It is thought to mean that the Anglo-French alliance is to be revived in opposition to Northern Powers.

The Emperor has put off his departure for Ems.

No. 255.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

Foreign Office, June 6, 1876, 5·40 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

IN reply to your telegram of to-day, there is no foundation for the statement mentioned by your Excellency of a revived Anglo-French alliance, in opposition to the Northern Powers. Say so if necessary.

I have not indicated any views as to future policy in regard to Turkey beyond expressing opinion that some time should be allowed to the new Sultan to consider his course.

No. 256.

The Earl of Derby to Consul-General White.

Foreign Office, June 6, 1876, 7·15 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Austrian Government have asked Her Majesty's Government to join in counselling moderation at Belgrade. You may act in concert with your Austrian Colleague in advising the Prince to pursue a pacific policy.

No. 257.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 276.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 327, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, in addressing a communication to Count Mulinen in the sense of my despatch to your Excellency, No. 226, Confidential, of the 19th of May.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 258.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 277.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1876.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language you held to Count Andrassy, as reported in your despatch No. 323 of the 26th ultimo, on the subject of the rejection by Her Majesty's Government of the Berlin proposals.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 259.

Raschid Pasha to Mussurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby, June 6.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 5 Juin*, 1876.

JE vous transmets ci-dessous le texte d'une lettre adressée, d'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, par son Altesse le Grand Vizir aux Commissaires Impériaux en Bosnie et en Herzégovine:—

"M. le Commissaire, Sa Majesté Impériale, notre Auguste et bien-aimé Maître, a voulu inaugurer son règne juste et régénérateur par une mesure éclatante qui corrobore ses sentiments de clémence et de haute sollicitude pour ses peuples. Le Sultan Murad V a, avant tout, tourné ses regards compatissants vers ses sujets égarés de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, et daigné accorder amnestie pleine et entière à tous les insurgés.

"Un délai de six semaines, à dater de la proclamation par vos soins du contenu de cette dépêche télégraphique, leur est accordé pour qu'ils fassent leur soumission, rentrent chez eux, exposent leurs griefs et leurs sollicitations aux autorités locales, qui ont reçu l'ordre d'y prêter l'oreille avec justice et bienveillance, et de prendre toutes les mesures pour assurer le bien-être des familles qui ne sont pas encore rentrées. Le Commandant a été en même temps prévenu de cette amnestie générale afin de faire cesser partout les opérations militaires pendant les six semaines, et permettre ainsi aux insurgés de se mettre en toute sécurité en relation avec les autorités pour faire leur soumission. Il est bien entendu que les mouvements nécessités par le ravitaillement de Nichsich seront exceptés de cette suspension des opérations.

"Votre Excellence voudra donc bien, à la réception de cette dépêche, s'empresser d'en faire savoir la teneur, au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale, notre Auguste Maître, à tous les habitants de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, par une proclamation spéciale rédigée en langue Turque et Bosnienne, afin que les malheureux qui sont depuis si longtemps frustrés de la douceur de leurs foyers sachent une fois pour toutes que notre magnanime Souverain est prêt à leur ouvrir les bras, à ensevelir le passé dans un profond oubli, et à leur faire largement profiter des bienfaits de son règne."

Veuillez bien faire part à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la teneur de cette lettre.

No. 260.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 6. Political.)

My Lord, *Rustchuk, May 27*, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a further report, transmitted yesterday to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, on the disturbances in this vilayet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. READE.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Consul Reade to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Rustchuk, May 26*, 1876.

FROM the account given by the local authority here, the insurrection is almost entirely suppressed, whilst from the reports we hear elsewhere the contrary would appear to be the case.

Between the two it is difficult to judge. I am, however, inclined to think that the state of things is not so bad as is made out here.

But what is condemned by everyone and has created panics in many places is the arming and employment of Circassians, which I had the honour to mention in my despatch of the 23rd instant.

Notwithstanding the defence offered by the Governor-General of the measure, it is most undoubtedly calculated not only to prolong the present difficulties but also to drive many, who have hitherto remained quiet, to revolt. Those men can not be kept under any sort of control, and whenever an opportunity offers, they do not hesitate to take advantage of it, and the consequence is that we are daily hearing of the grossest acts of violence on their part.

It was this morning reported to the Director-in-chief of the Varna Railway that a large number of these people were hovering about and threatening the line near the station of Ishiklar, and that all the Company's men there had absolutely refused to work.

The affair was communicated to the Governor-General by the French Consul, and two companies of regulars have already been despatched to the spot, but I am inclined to think that the report will turn out to be greatly exaggerated if not devoid of foundation.

The present tactics of the insurgents appears to be to cause false reports to reach the Pasha, so as to have bodies of troops sent about in such a way as to at last cause the authorities not to give credit to the reports they receive, and thus enable the insurgents to effect *coups de main*.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. READE.

No. 261.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 7. Political.)

My Lord, *Rustchuk, May 30*, 1876.

THE Governor-General called at this Consulate yesterday, and informed me that from telegrams he had just received from the disturbed district, he was happy to say that the rising was all but put down; indeed, the people who have suffered, being convinced that all is over, are applying to the Government for assistance to enable them to repair their houses, and other property that has been damaged; and the Pasha told me that he had ordered this assistance to be given.

On Saturday last, some of the troops that were sent down the railway line to look after the Circassians, as reported in my despatch of the 26th instant, to Her Majesty's Embassy, returned with fifteen Circassians who had been seized committing depredations in villages near the line. These men, the Pasha says, had nothing to do with the present movement, but were evidently taking advantage of the opportunity, and will be at once tried and punished as severely as the laws permit.

At Gabrova two insurgent chiefs were executed; and the Pasha states, that this had such an effect that there was not a single insurgent to be seen there after.

At Trojan also, where there were a greater number of insurgents, the intelligence of the execution (at Gabrova), immediately produced a state of tranquillity that has reigned there ever since.

The Bulgarians here continue to assert that they have been duped a second time by the Agents of a Power from which they had reason to expect quite otherwise; indeed, these Agents (Russian) have for some days ceased to go among them; and I am told that they are very downcast from the turn affairs have taken here.

Since penning the foregoing, the intelligence of the accession to the Throne of Sultan Murad V has reached this, and been promulgated. The whole place is in a state of exultation; and this is sure to have a beneficial effect in every direction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. READE.

No. 262.

Mr. Petre to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, June 4*, 1876.

M. DE STAAL, who is Russian Minister at this Court, and a relation by marriage with Prince Gortchakow, returned here a few days ago from Ems, where he had been to pay his respects to the Emperor Alexander, and to see the Prince Chancellor.

M. de Staal was for some years Counsellor of Embassy at Constantinople, and is intimately acquainted with Turkish affairs. He told me he was present when the telegram announcing the dethronement of Sultan Abdul Aziz was read by the

Emperor, and that although it naturally created no little surprise, the news did not seem to affect His Majesty as much as might have been expected. The Emperor in fact said that the possibility of such an event had already crossed his mind after hearing of the action of the Softas.

In answer to a question which I put to M. de Staal as to whether the dynastic revolution which had taken place at Constantinople, when the first surprise occasioned by it had subsided, was considered at Ems as being likely to facilitate or to throw fresh obstacles in the way of a peaceful solution of the difficulties to which the present condition of Turkey, and more especially the Bosnian insurrection, had given rise, he said that on the whole the impression was that the change which had taken place might have a favourable influence, but that it all depended upon the course which Sultan Murad and his advisers decided upon promptly adopting in regard to the promised reforms, and above all in regard to the terms of an armistice with the insurgents. That the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in the Berlin Memorandum had pained the Emperor and had taken Prince Gortchakow by surprise, but that it was hoped that the increased influence at Constantinople which recent events had placed in the hands of England would make itself felt in such a manner as to further the pacification of the revolted provinces and restore tranquillity.

From M. de Staal's account the Emperor Alexander appears to have been much more excited and irritated by the news from Belgrade than from Constantinople. The Russian Consul-General at Bucharest arrived at Ems whilst M. de Staal was there, and the latter told me that the Emperor was perfectly furious when he heard that General Chernaieff, without the sanction or previous knowledge of his Sovereign, had assumed Servian nationality, and had been invested with the command of the Servian forces. His Majesty sent for Prince Gortchakow, and desired that the General's name should not only be at once struck off the roll of the Russian army, but that he should be deprived of all his Russian orders, as a public mark of the Emperor's displeasure. Prince Gortchakow had some difficulty in calming the Emperor down, and in inducing him, at all events, not to insist upon the latter portion of the order, but General Chernaieff from that moment ceased to be connected with the Russian army.

The news received at Ems from Belgrade, M. de Staal told me, was of a very disquieting nature in regard to the warlike intentions of the Servian Government, but that Prince Gortchakow had written or telegraphed to Belgrade, warning Prince Milan and his Ministers, in the strongest possible terms, that if they entered upon hostilities with Turkey they would forfeit every claim to Russian support or countenance, and would be left to their own devices.

Much of what I have written above is probably not new to your Lordship, but I have, nevertheless, thought it worth while to record the substance of M. de Staal's conversation with me, which I need not add was strictly confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE PETRE.

No. 263.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.— (*Received June 7.*)

(No. 347.) *Vienna, June 4, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the inclosed despatch, which has been addressed to me by Major Gonne, Military Attaché to this Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in 263.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

Vienna, June 3, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the change made in the present year in Servian military organization. I am indebted to Mr. White, the British Consul at Belgrade, for a translation of the Government Decree, dated 24th February, 1876.

*Staff.**—A General Staff for the whole army forms a department in the War Office of Belgrade, divided into three sections.

Section 1 undertakes army organization, mobilization and administration, together with the management of the Military Academy.

Section 2 is geographical, topographical, and statistical, and undertakes the "intelligence" branch of the service.

Section 3 takes charge of military archives, and regulates promotion, appointment, and leave of absence.

Although the Chief of the Staff, with the rank of General of Division, is Inspector and Director-General, each section has its own Director.

In section 3 this officer is the Military Secretary.

To each division a Staff Officer is permanently attached, who may, under exceptional circumstances, be assisted by a Second Staff Officer.

The Divisional Staff Officer ranks with the Sectional Director, to whom he reports. He is supposed to master every detail within his district.

To each brigade is granted a Brigade Major.

Pay is voted in time of peace to the following officers:—

1 Chief of the Staff.
4 Sectional Directors (the 4th being Director of the Central Offices).
10 General Staff Officers.
7 Divisional Staff Officers.
14 Officers attached to divisions.
19 Brigade Majors.
5 Supernumeraries.

These officers have a distinguishing uniform, and are selected from the standing army. The Prince reserves to himself the power of appointing the officers ranking as Generals.

The regulations regarding the Academy and military instruction are unchanged.

No officer is supposed to be appointed to a staff appointment till he has passed his examination as Captain on the Staff.

The Chief of the Staff, however, may make exceptions, and in point of fact many foreigners accept these posts.

The standing army consists in peace time of 2 battalions of 4 companies,† equal 800 men per battalion (at the present moment there are over 2,000 men in the two battalions, and these are very inferior soldiers) 2 squadrons of 80 men, equal 160. In other particulars as stated in Captain Cook's book.

The six divisions mobilized are supposed to place in first line—

80 Battalions of infantry and 35 squadrons.
22 Batteries of field guns, 8 centim.
18 Mountain batteries, 4 ditto.

On a former occasion I pointed out that, however good in theory, practically the Servian army, which affords instruction to the militia, was of little or no account. Since then foreign officers, including General Tchernaieff, have given the advantage of their advice to the Minister of War (and Chief of the Staff), General Zach, who is a very superior energetic officer; but the officers, as a rule, have had no experience in handling masses, and I feel convinced that it will require months rather than weeks to make the armed strength of Servia anything better than a mob; in truth, the country people would be far more formidable in guerilla warfare than in regular formation, and only as irregulars would they, in my opinion, be able to contend against the Turks.‡

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. S. GONNE, *Major, 17th Lancers, Military Attaché.*

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* Under the Chief of the Staff, General Zach.

† It was found impossible to officer four battalions.

‡ I am informed that my opinion is also that of General Tchernaieff after careful inspection. If my information be correct, Tchernaieff has declared the Servian armed strength quite unfit to take the field at the present time.

No. 264.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 397. Confidential.)

Paris, June 6, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Duc Decazes came to see me yesterday, and spoke to me confidentially and at great length on the present phase of the Eastern question. He did not, however, appear to have any distinct notion as to the course likely to be taken by the three Emperors with regard to the Berlin Memorandum, nor to have any specific plan of his own to propose. He recommended strongly, but in general terms, concert between all the six Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, and he dwelt earnestly upon the importance of their being on their guard against entertaining suspicions of each other's intentions.

In this way he arrived at what seemed to be his main object, and he proceeded to argue that steps should now be taken by Her Majesty's Government to show confidence in Russia, and to conciliate the Emperor Alexander. He began by defending himself against a charge which had, he said, been brought against him of being himself "too Russian." There were, he declared, no grounds for any such charge. All his efforts had simply been directed to keeping on such terms with Russia and with England as should cause him to be regarded by both as a friend, and enable him to speak to each frankly and confidentially.

He had, indeed, he went on to say, reason to think that his recent proceedings, since the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, had not been regarded very favourably at Ems. These proceedings consisted, if I understood the Duke rightly, in declining to admit that his previous acceptance of the Berlin Memorandum bound him to go on without further consideration, and press its acceptance upon the Porte, under the great change of circumstances produced by the deposition of the late Sultan.

The Duke said that he had reason to know that the intelligence of the fall of the Sultan Abdul Aziz had produced a most painful impression upon the Emperor Alexander; that His Majesty had remained for a long time silent after hearing it, and had at last uttered a few words on the fate of ill-advised Sovereigns.

The Duke proceeded to observe that the turn events had taken was undoubtedly favourable to English policy; that, in fact, circumstances had given England a diplomatic triumph. She was thus placed in a peculiarly favourable position for making concessions in order to conciliate Russia and alleviate any mortification which might have been felt by the Emperor Alexander and his Government. For his own part, the Duke declared that he could assure Her Majesty's Government positively that Russia had at this moment no designs upon Turkey, and that the Emperor was heartily desirous of bringing the present difficulties in the East to a fair and peaceful conclusion. The great display of naval force which England was making in the Mediterranean appeared, he said, to him to indicate suspicions for which he was convinced there was no foundation. He had not considered it advisable that France should make any similar demonstration, although he thought it well that the European Powers should have at hand the means of sending a few ships to any port in Turkey at which the safety of their own subjects or of the native Christians might be in danger from Mussulman fanaticism.

The Duke continued for some time to speak of the ill effects which must, in his opinion, be the consequence of the existence of suspicion between England and Russia, but the only suggestion he seemed able to make with a view to removing any suspicion that might exist, was that steps should be taken by England to be agreeable to Russia in the present crisis.

The Duke told me that the Russian Government had appeared to hesitate at first about recognizing the new Sultan, but that they were now urging immediate recognition, even without waiting for the accomplishment of the usual formalities. This change the Duke attributed to a desire on their part to be in a position to address strong communications to the Porte as soon as possible.

In the course of the conversation the Duke Decazes told me that he had recently received, through the Austrian Embassy here, an urgent appeal from Count Andrassy to press the Prince of Servia to abstain from hostile proceedings against the Porte, and that he had, in answer, shown the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires strong instructions to that effect which he had already sent to the French Agent at Belgrade.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 265.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 398. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 6, 1876.*

AT the races which took place yesterday at Auteuil in the Bois de Boulogne, Marshal MacMahon sent to Major-General Conolly to ask him to come into his stand. After having had a short conversation with the Marshal, General Conolly was taken aside by the Vicomte Emmanuel d'Harcourt, who spoke to him for some time on the Eastern question.

General Conolly had no doubt that it was intended that he should make me acquainted with the purport of the conversation, and he has accordingly given me a short summary of it.

M. d'Harcourt appears to have said in substance:

That the Emperor of Russia is very much exasperated against England.

That the French expect that Russia will soon insist upon presenting a very strong note to Turkey; and that the alternative will be given to France of supporting it, or of being left by Russia to the tender mercies of Prince Bismarck.

That France was saved from a German invasion by Russia last year; and that she will not be in a position to offer by her own means a successful resistance to an invasion for a year and a half more.

That Russia thus holds the knife at the throat of France, and that France has not been in so critical a position since the end of the last war.

That it is the interest of France to maintain, if possible, strict non interference in the Eastern question.

M. Emmanuel d'Harcourt is Marshal MacMahon's Secretary, and enjoys his full confidence, and is believed to have considerable influence with him in political matters. He is a son of the French Ambassador in London.

The language he used seems to me to go far beyond any danger to which France is really exposed at the present moment; but it shows that Russia is endeavouring, not without success, to create alarm here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 266.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 400. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 6, 1876.*

SADIG PASHA came to me this afternoon and told me that he had received in the morning the text of the instructions of the Porte to the Commissioners in the Herzegovina, announcing an amnesty to those who had taken part in the insurrection, and the suspension of hostilities for six weeks, and calling upon the insurgents to return to their homes, and lay their grievances and their wishes before the Sultan.

Sadig Pasha said that he had been prevented from communicating this text to the Duc Decazes, who had been obliged to go early to Versailles. The Duke had, however (he went on to say), without waiting to be made acquainted with the actual text, sent M. Desprès, the Political Director in the Foreign Office, to express the sorrow and displeasure with which he had read a summary of the document, which had been sent him by the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

Sadig Pasha told me further that the principal objections of the Duc Decazes appeared to be that the document did not contain a specific promise of the concessions laid down in the Andrassy Note, and that it made no allusion to that note nor to the communications with the Powers. He added that it would seem that the Duc Decazes even considered that the conditions prescribed by the Berlin Memorandum, of which the Porte had no official cognizance, ought to have been included.

Sadig Pacha asked how it was possible that a Government which respected itself could, in a document to be communicated to its revolted subjects, proclaim the intervention of Foreign Powers in its internal affairs, and its own submission to their dictation.

I inquired of him whether he supposed that the proposals made by the Porte in

the form laid down in these instructions would be accepted by the insurgents, or produce any perceptible effect on the insurrection.

He answered that he thought that the native Herzegovinians would most gladly accept the terms offered by the Porte, and return to their homes. These had, in fact, been forced into insurrection. As for the foreigners and revolutionists by profession, who formed the active part of the insurrection, it was not, he said, to be expected that any terms whatever would be acceptable to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 267.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 278.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 7, 1876.*

THE Austrian Ambassador communicated to me on the 5th instant a telegraphic despatch, which he had received from Vienna, to the following effect:—

The Government of Austria-Hungary have decided, in agreement with the Governments of Russia and Germany, to postpone the execution at Constantinople of the measures proposed at Berlin; but they considered that an agreement on a line of conduct was more than ever necessary, in view especially of the menacing attitude of Servia. Russia and Austria had instructed their Agents at Belgrade to counsel moderation, and the Austrian Government would be glad if the English Government would do the same.

I saw his Excellency to-day at the Foreign Office, and told him that Her Majesty's Government could scarcely expect that any advice which Great Britain could give would meet, under present circumstances, with the same attention at Belgrade as the counsels of the other Powers, and if those counsels were seriously pressed, the action of Her Majesty's Agent would scarcely be required.

I said that I would, however, give directions to Mr. White to act in concert with his Austrian colleague in advising the Prince of Servia to pursue a pacific policy, and added that, by the last accounts received from Belgrade, it appeared that the danger of hostilities was deemed less imminent, and Prince Milan was intending to address a congratulatory letter to Sultan Mourad on his accession.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 268.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 279. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 7, 1876.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 316 of the 24th ultimo, I have to request that you will inform me what would be the numerical strength of the respective corps d'armée destined, according to Major Comne's report, for the occupation of the provinces in revolt against Turkey; and I should, moreover, be glad to be confidentially informed of the source from whence Major Comne has obtained his information, and what is known as to the persons by whom this project has been discussed, and under what circumstances, as to time and place, it has been considered.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 269.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 284.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 7, 1876.*

THE Austrian Ambassador has just informed me that, for reasons which he promises to explain to me at length at a future interview, his Government have

decided on rejecting the idea of a Congress to consider the means of remedying the present state of affairs in European Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 270.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Paget.

(No. 353.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 7, 1876.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 186 of the 22nd ultimo, reporting a conversation which had passed between M. Melegari and your Excellency on the same day, on the subject of the non-adhesion of Her Majesty's Government to the measures advocated in the Berlin Memorandum, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to M. Melegari on that occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 271.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Paget.

(No. 354.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 7, 1876.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 187 of the 23rd ultimo, reporting that you had read to M. Melegari my despatch No. 385, to Lord Odo Russell, informing him of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the Berlin Memorandum, and that you had left his Excellency a copy of it; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 272.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, June 7, 1876.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Russia, Austria, and Italy have already recognized the new Sultan, and that France will do so without delay.

He says it has been settled at Ems that the presentation of identic note, founded on the Berlin Memorandum, shall (be) adjourned indefinitely. He suggests plans for united action on part of all the six Powers, which I forward to your Lordship this evening by post.

No. 273.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 7, 1876.*

GENERAL IGNATIEW is making every effort to persuade newspaper correspondents and others that the late Sultan was murdered.

Beyond those connected with the Russian Embassy, there is not, I believe, a person here who is not convinced that it was suicide; but by some perversion of facts and suppression of details, it would not be difficult to give a colour to the suspicion of murder.

The doctor of the German Embassy refused to attend the inquest.

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* Repeated to Rome, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

No. 274.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 7, 1876.*

A DESPATCH from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to-day states that his Turkish colleague has informed him that Count Andrassy, before leaving Pesth, sought a second opportunity of urging the expediency of the Porte granting an armistice, if only for eight days, and said it was a good occasion to show a wish for reconciliation, as the insurgents were exhausted.

I can only reconcile this with his Excellency's language last night, by supposing that he considers an engagement from the Porte to the Powers essential to the success of his plan for the pacification of the Provinces.

No. 275.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Vienna, June 7, 1876.*

HAVING ascertained to-day that it was decided yesterday, at an interview between Count Andrassy and M. de Novikoff, that the Ambassadors at Constantinople should be instructed to deliver a note to the Porte asking for an armistice, I have advised the Turkish Ambassador, if his instructions permit it, to address a note to Count Andrassy announcing to him officially the letter of the Grand Vizier to the Commissioners in the Herzegovina and Bosnia, and expressing a hope that his Excellency will see in it a desire of the Porte to meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the other Powers for a suspension of hostilities, and that his Excellency will give orders to the Austrian local authorities to co-operate with those of the province in making the necessary arrangements for the return of the refugees to their homes.

The Turkish Ambassador has decided to adopt this course and proposed submitting the note for my approval, but I said it appeared to me that my being acquainted with its contents before its delivery would be objectionable.

Should the Ambassadors at Constantinople have delivered their note of to-day, I hope your Lordship may consider that the communication to Count Andrassy which I have recommended will greatly facilitate the answer which the Porte may find it necessary to give to them.

No. 276.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 10. Consular.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, May 26, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that new arrangements had latterly been made for the collection of the "Aashr" or tithe on agricultural produce. The system of farming the tithes was entirely abolished, and officials styled "Aashr Mudiri" had been appointed in all the sandjaks at a salary of 2,500 piastres a month each, with a considerable staff of subordinates, to assess and collect the tax. Instructions, however, were received yesterday by telegraph from Constantinople to annul this arrangement, and it was publicly announced in the "Idareh Medjliss" or Administrative Council, that the tithes would be immediately offered for sale at public auction as heretofore. This will undoubtedly produce a very bad impression in the country, and confirm the opinion held by so many that the Porte has no sincere intention of introducing any reforms in the administration.

The Commission of Control continues to hold its sittings daily, but its labours have as yet borne no fruits. Its decisions are always communicated to the Governor-General, but he appears to entirely disregard them, and the very existence of this Commission is looked upon by every one as a complete farce.

No decision has yet been come to as regards the "Bedel-i-Askerish," or tax in lieu

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

of military service, although much time has been spent in discussing the matter. It was announced that the tax was only to be paid between the ages of 20 and 40, but the Government persists in demanding the same gross amount as heretofore, and it is naturally rather difficult to reconcile such conflicting instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

No. 277.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 8.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, May 31, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 29th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with its statement on the Eastern question, has to-day been unanimously adopted by the Hungarian Delegation.

I gather from the many opinions I hear around me that, whilst the explanations of Count Andrassy, which have gradually passed from optimist and most peaceful to hopeful and simply peaceful, have increased the personal confidence in his Excellency, they have increased in far greater proportion the distrust of Russia. I have, moreover, reason to believe that a confidential exchange of views has prepared the members of that Committee for any change of policy, and has induced them in this respect to abstain from adverse criticism, and to give his Excellency perfect freedom for the future.

I purpose sending your Excellency a *précis* of the speech with which M. Falk presented the Report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 278.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 8.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 1, 1876.*

CONVERSATION with Russian colleagues does not inspire confidence as to their wish to bring about a pacification of the insurgent provinces of Turkey by peaceful means at an early date.

The arrival of the news from Constantinople led the Russian Consul-General, who is, I hear, much vexed at what he calls the interference of England, to declare his views on other points in my presence yesterday. He then admitted that if Turkey, with the party of reform and action in power, were to attack Servia and Montenegro, she would easily occupy Belgrade and shut in Montenegro, "if let alone; but," he added, "the Turks will not be let alone; Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided between Servia and Montenegro, or erected into an independent province; all the Christian provinces, in fact, should for the moment be transformed into vassal States, and the Turks driven out of Europe forthwith, for a Civil Code is impossible by the side of the Koran, and no compromise is practicable."

The advocates of the speedy extension of extreme measures against Turkey generally overlook in Europe the difficulty of replacing Ottoman rule by worthy Christian Governments, and in Asia the probable result of an extermination of the Christians and the erection of a close Mussulman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 279.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 8.)

(Confidential.)

Buda-Pest, June 1, 1876.

Sir,

Although I have heard in Austro-Hungarian quarters the opinion expressed that General Ignatiew has had a hand in the recent events at Constantinople in the hope of creating confusion, I infer, from a conversation with M. de Novikow, that it is more probable that Russia is taken aback by the sudden change in Turkey. His Excellency is, moreover, incredulous as to the deposed Sultan being still alive, for it would be an isolated fact of the kind in the history of Turkey, but yet he seems to build hopes for the future upon such a fact.

I simply remarked that the Softas appear to have acted with much moderation and tact as well as energy, and that their proceedings showed at any rate a progress in civilization at Constantinople, which it was agreeable to note. His Excellency did not deign to agree in this view.

Server Effendi tells me that M. de Novikow was anxious to learn from him what sort of a position the deposed Sultan would have. My colleague said that he would be strictly guarded as a private individual with the grant of a small annual income, and that he would not be allowed to retain the title of Majesty. "Not even the title of Majesty?" exclaimed M. de Novikow; "No! your Excellency does not admit that Turkey is part of Europe, and in this respect at any rate we do not imitate European custom as to throneless Sovereigns."

My Turkish colleague thinks that the Russian idea is to try to form a party in favour of Abdul Aziz, but that such an attempt would necessarily and inevitably involve his summary execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 280.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 8.)

(Confidential.)

Buda-Pest, June 2, 1876.

Sir,

MY Turkish colleague, who is of Midhat Pasha's party, and manifests enthusiastic joy at the dethronement of Abdul Aziz, has confidentially related to me a long conversation yesterday evening with Count Andrassy, of which I have the honour to give the substance to your Excellency.

Server Effendi communicated to his Excellency a telegram respecting the events at Constantinople and promising the programme of the new Government; and in course of conversation he stated as his personal opinion that the new Sultan would faithfully observe the engagements taken upon his Excellency's note of December last; that a State Council, with Delegates elected from each Province, irrespective of nationality and religion, a controlled Budget, an amelioration of the defective mode of collecting taxes, an improvement of civil and criminal procedure and law in mixed and Christian cases, and real equality for Christians would be the salient points of the new Constitution; that, as regards General Ignatiew, who had by the downfall of Mahmoud Pasha and the dethronement of Abdul Aziz lost his last card, the Porte would not request his recall, but would treat him, when amusing and original, as amusing, and otherwise ignore him in the hope that his Government will recall him; and that, moreover, energetic action would probably be taken against the active abettors of the insurrection.

Count Andrassy is stated to have said that it would be better not to form a theoretical Constitution, impossible of real application, but to give direct vent to all complaints from the Provinces, and establish real improvements for the welfare of the Christians, for the attempt to decree an European Constitution would simply "cause the difficulties to spread from the circumference to the centre; that, as regards General Ignatiew, he was afraid that pressure might be put even upon him in favour of an immediate recall of the Russian Ambassador, but that Server Effendi was perfectly right in his view, for it would be a mistake to demand a recall when the said Ambassador could no longer keep his head above water; and that whilst it was

desirable to make an armistice and attempt to come to terms with the insurgents, it might also become necessary to take the initiative against the warlike demonstrations of Servia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS GASTRELL.

No. 281.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 8.)

Sir,

Buda-Pest, June 2, 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 31st ultimo, I have now the honour to give to your Excellency the substance of the speech which M. Falk, as reporter of the Committee, made on the 31st ultimo, in presenting to the Hungarian Delegation their Report on the Estimates for the Foreign Ministry.

M. Falk said that the position of the Eastern question was decidedly worse than in last autumn. It is true that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is untouched, and the insurrection is localised for the present, but when such a situation of affairs does not improve it is a sure sign that it has become worse. This fact fills with grief every sincere friend of peace, and especially every Hungarian, for if attention be paid to the voice of cool, calculating judgment, and heed be given to the real interests of the Austrian Empire, there is no combination so reassuring and satisfactory as the continuance of the Ottoman Empire. The insurrection has lasted a year nearly, and all the phenomena of the struggle strengthen our wish to preserve that Empire, for not a single political fact on which to base a new organization can be found in the course of the conflict. In whosever interest it may be that the nucleus of a new organization should be imported into the Balkan Peninsula from without, and that there a foreign nation may find a footing, and the points of fruition between it and us may be multiplied on our southern and south-eastern frontiers, it certainly is not in the interest of Austria-Hungary. Neither can our Monarchy play the part of a creator to bring order out of chaos; the political position and economical relations of the Empire loudly forbid such action. Nor have we either need, or desire, or capability of acquiring new territory. Under such circumstances, the Foreign Minister rightly took the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey as his starting-point, and the removal of causes of disturbance as his aim; and then, of two ways to reach his object, he rejected that of the traditional policy of supporting Turkey at any cost, which involved an abandonment of neutrality in favour of benevolent moral support and subsequent action on the side of Turkey. Otherwise, "those who to-day wave, at least in outward show, as some say, the white flag of neutrality, but who secretly give moral, and, perhaps, material aid to the insurrection, would then have gone into a hostile camp and openly assisted the insurgents;" and in that case our Report to-day would not have contained "even the small consolation that the European peace has not yet been disturbed, at any rate up to the present moment." The Foreign Department chose the other course, of removing all suspicion on the part of Turkey of sinister designs behind the good offices of the Powers, and of seeking from her the creation of the indispensable conditions of her preservation. "In order that this benevolent mediation should not rouse the susceptibility of the Porte as yielding to one Power or the fears of the insurgents as to its honesty, the friendly alliance of Russia, usually considered the opponent of the integrity of Turkey, was sought; and in order that the possibility of a friendly arrangement might not be excluded in case the views and, perhaps, the interests, of these two Allies should differ, Germany was invited, as likely to show an equally good feeling towards each." No preconceived theoretical project was elaborated; but the facts which became evident without their furtherance,—"at least without the open furtherance of one party, and entirely against the will of the other,"—were taken as a basis, and the endeavour was made, not to carry out what might be most advantageous for each party, but to find a mean, which should, nevertheless, prevent an open conflict of interests. The idea was no doubt sound, but as yet no acceptable basis of pacification has been found, for that of the famous Berlin Conference still hovers in suspense. At this second stage, England declined to be a party to the proposed note. "For us this step of England can raise no anxiety, neither can it for those who do not cloak other secret plans under their pacification projects. If the union of the three Emperors remains true to the original idea, England will certainly never disturb their action. But if one or the other Ally

should be unfaithful to it, those who have acted straightforwardly will find a powerful ally in that insular Kingdom, who will not allow Turkey to be worked out for objects inconsistent with the European balance of power and the peace of the world."

I should add that this speech was greeted with enthusiasm at many points, and that in conclusion M. Falk called upon the Delegation to give full confidence to Count Andrassy, as capable and sincerely desirous of guarding the real interests of the Empire.

As M. Falk's newspaper, the "Pester Lloyd," generally contains well-informed articles on the Eastern question, and as he was reporter on this Hungarian Committee, it may be safely assumed that his speech is well founded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 282.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 8.*)

(No. 550.)

Therapia, May 31, 1876.

My Lord,

MY despatches by the last messenger will almost have prepared your Lordship for the event that took place yesterday, and which has surprised no one who had given attention to the course which things were taking.

That an attempt to dethrone the Sultan was about to be made had become almost a matter of certainty, although its success would depend upon the part that would be taken by the Minister of War.

It ultimately proved that, although Midhat Pasha was the undoubted originator and organizer, Hussein Avni Pasha played the principal part in carrying out the plot, and that the two had acted in perfect concert.

The arrangements for ensuring success and for preventing the probability of disturbance, were made with consummate skill and foresight, but it is still a matter of wonder that a plot, of which so many were in the secret, and the existence of which was indeed generally, although vaguely, known to the public, should not have reached the Sultan.

It can only be explained by the fact that in the capital there was hardly a man who did not desire his overthrow, nor a friend disposed to warn him of the dangers.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam, the highest authority that Mohammedans can appeal to, had declared the lawfulness of deposing the sovereign.

The two following questions had been submitted to him by the Ulema:—

"If the first of the true believers gives signs of madness and of an ignorance of political matters; if he spends the public money on himself in excess of what the State or the nation can grant him, will he not thus become the cause of troubles and of the public ruin? Ought he not to be dethroned?"

To this the Sheikh-ul-Islam answered by a simple "Yes," and, signed by his name, "Hassan Hairoullah," the questions and the answer became a "Fetva," of which the authority would be admitted by all true Mussulmans.

It is stated that it was not till three days before that Mehmet Rushdi Pasha gave his consent to the execution of the project, which it was immediately resolved to carry out at once.

His Highness by this decision saved the country from the most imminent danger; for the public exasperation arrived at such a height that the Softas and the people would undoubtedly have attempted a revolution, which, in their hands, would have been attended by all the evils and dangers of a popular movement, but which, conducted by those in authority, has passed without disturbance or even uneasiness.

When those who are entrusted by their Sovereign with power turn that power against him, there is in such conduct an appearance of treachery that must create a painful impression.

In the case, however, of Mehmet Rushdi Pasha, I must state that I believe his conduct to have been guided by no considerations but those of the purest patriotism.

I could not at this moment name another Turkish Pasha so universally regarded as incorruptible in an atmosphere of general corruption, and at the same time so free of all suspicion of being actuated by motives of personal ambition.

He had long been convinced, as he has frequently told me, that the personal character of the Sovereign rendered the utter ruin of the country inevitable, but he

shrank from the act of violence to which he was at last driven, when, against his own wishes, he was placed in the high position which he now occupies.

The "Fetva" above quoted justified the deposition of the Sovereign in the eyes of all true Mahommedans, and it has been ratified by the voice of the nation with a unanimity for which there is probably not a parallel.

Midhat Pasha I believe to be equally devoted to his country, and to possess qualities of the highest order, but I am not prepared to say that he is as free from personal ambition as the Grand Vizier.

I am, however, inclined to think that he will be satisfied with the possession of power which, under the new Sovereign he is certain to have, without immediately aiming at the Grand Vizirate.

In Hussein Avni Pasha, the Seraskier Pasha, I feel less confidence, but the knowledge that the Sultan will rely upon the advice of Midhat, may keep him from intriguing against his colleague for a time.

Of the policy that will now be pursued by the Porte, it is still too early to speak, but I may say with confidence that energy will immediately be perceived in the correction of abuses in the internal administration, and that one of the first acts of the new reign will be to place all the subjects of the Sultan upon a footing of real equality.

The task is a difficult one, and existing prejudices and traditions will not be quickly overcome.

With regard to foreign politics, it may be taken as certain that the Porte will be less patient than heretofore of the interference of other Governments, but it is to be hoped that it will be careful to avoid all cause of legitimate offence.

The new Sultan is known to cling to the Western Powers, and it is to them that he will look for counsel and advice.

There is, moreover, at this moment among all classes, both of Turks and Christians, an enthusiasm for Great Britain, which puts Her Majesty's Government in a position in this country which they have not held for many years.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 283.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 8.*)

(No. 561.)

Therapia, June 1, 1876.

My Lord,

I, THIS evening, transmitted to your Lordship by telegraph the substance of the Imperial Hatt read this afternoon at the Porte, as conveyed by memory from those who had heard it.

I have now the honour to inclose a hurried and unofficial translation of the document.

The only material correction which it is necessary to make in my telegram relates to the domains of the Crown, which are not stated to be handed over to the State—this cession being apparently confined to the mines and manufactories.

Some disappointment may be caused by the omission of a more distinct allusion to the "Constitution," upon which the public is bent, but until the Government had decided what they were prepared to do in that direction it was obviously more prudent to confine themselves to promising that there should be a financial control.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 283.

Imperial Hatt, dated June 1, 1876.

Mon illustre Vizier,

PAR la volonté de Dieu et le vœu unanime de tous nos sujets, nous venons de monter sur le Trône de nos ancêtres.

Nous vous confirmons dans vos fonctions de Grand Vizier, ainsi que tous les autres fonctionnaires et employés de l'Etat.

Ainsi qu'il est à la connaissance de tout le monde depuis quelque temps les

difficultés de la situation intérieure comme extérieure du Gouvernement a produit dans l'opinion publique une manque de confiance qui a entraîné des pertes matérielles en altérant la tranquillité dans tous les sens. Il importe de faire cesser cet état de choses et d'y remédier; de rétablir la tranquillité dans le pays, et de ramener la confiance de tous les sujets de notre Empire; d'adopter une ligne de conduite de nature à assurer le bien-être ainsi que la prospérité matérielle et morale de tous nos sujets. La réalisation de ces vœux dépend de l'établissement sur une base solide et réelle des principes administratifs Gouvernementaux, et cette réalisation fait constamment l'objet de ma sollicitude. En conséquence, l'application de la loi et l'administration des affaires générales de l'Etat et l'octroi d'une législation sérieuse adoptée à la capacité des populations seront remaniés.

Tous nos sujets sans exception jouiront d'une pleine et entière liberté. Nous avons reconnu la nécessité de l'établissement d'un principe solide et stable qui amènerait toutes sortes de progrès, et qui assurerait l'harmonie et la bonne intelligence parmi tous nos sujets, et qui tendrait aussi à la conservation de la patrie. Pour mettre en exécution ce projet, il faut que les Ministres l'élaborent sur les bases sur lesquelles il doit reposer et le portent à notre connaissance; et pour arriver à ce résultat fondamental il devient nécessaire et important que les Ministères et Administrations du Conseil d'Etat, du Divani Ahkiami Adliyé, de l'Instruction Publique, du Maliyé, ainsi que tous les autres Départements, soient réorganisés, ce à que doivent aussi tendre les efforts des Ministres.

Comme les affaires financières forment aussi l'un des objets principaux et des plus importants du Gouvernement, il importe en conséquence d'établir un principe de nature à répondre à la confiance publique, c'est-à-dire, d'éviter toute dépense en dehors du Budget. Pour atteindre ce but et garantir les opérations financières, les améliorations à introduire à cet effet seront soumises à un mûr examen et à une surveillance rigoureuse.

Dans le but de venir en aide à ces dispositions, il sera déduit annuellement de ma liste civile 60,000 bourses en faveur du Maliyé, auquel je fais également abandon des mines d'Héraclé et autres, ainsi que les revenus des fabriques appartenant à la Couronne, dont l'administration relèvera du Ministère des Finances.

Veillez et facilitez avec le plus grand soin l'équilibre des finances au moyen de ces modifications et économies.

Maintenez et respectez en même temps l'exécution des Traités avec les Puissances amies; efforcez vous de resserrer les bons rapports d'amitié et de bonne intelligence qui existait entre le Gouvernement Impérial et les autres Puissances. C'est là encore mon plus sincère désir.

Que le Très Haut seconde nos efforts! Amen.

9 *Djemaz-ul-evel*, 1293 (1 *Juin*, 1876).

No. 284.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 567.)

Therapia, June 1, 1876.

My Lord,

WHEN the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz became known much anxiety was felt respecting His Majesty's personal safety.

It appears, however, that his life was never in danger, and he was not treated with any unnecessary harshness or disrespect.

The small Palace, to which he was conveyed with his sons and a part of his harem, is a low stone building situated at the Seraglio point at Stamboul, but it is not intended as his permanent residence, which will probably be fixed at one of the Palaces on the Bosphorus.

Sultan Murad has sent His Majesty a reassuring message stating that he had himself been called to the Throne by the will of the people, but that His Majesty had nothing to fear from him.

I have myself conveyed to the Porte strong expressions of hope that the fallen Sovereign may be treated with all the consideration and respect that are due to the position he has occupied.

The certainty that no party exists in the country likely to attempt a restoration contributes largely to His Majesty's safety.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 285.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 350. Confidential.)

Vienna, June 5, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 326 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose herewith extracts from letters which have been addressed to me from Bazias in Servia on the 1st and 2nd instant, although on some points the writer is evidently misinformed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 285.

Extracts from Letters addressed to Sir A. Buchanan from Servia.

Bazias, le 1 Juin, 1876.

DE passage à Bazias sur la route de Belgrade où j'arriverai cette nuit, j'ai rencontré ici le Prince Wrede, Agent Politique d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie, avec lequel j'ai eu un entretien sur la situation actuelle de cette Principauté, et je m'empresse de vous transmettre à la hâte le résumé de cet entretien.

Le Représentant Austro-Hongrois considère la situation politique comme étant très-tendue, il est convaincu que les Serbes marcheront prochainement contre la Turquie; M. Ristics et ses collègues se sont trop engagés en avant pour pouvoir rétrograder. Ristics est entre les mains des Omladinistes et il est forcé de faire la guerre. Le Prince Wrede se rend à Pest pour fournir personnellement des informations au Comte Andrassy sur la situation; il arrivera demain à Pest, où il restera deux à trois jours.

Le passage des chevaux de Semlin à Belgrade continue toujours; l'Autriche considère cette fourniture comme profitable pour son commerce.

Les armes ne sont pas encore arrivées. L'emprunt forcé de 1,000,000 ducats (12,000,000 fr.) ne réussira pas; le Gouvernement Serbe espère aujourd'hui recevoir seulement la moitié de cette somme, et cela est encore douteux, d'après l'opinion du Prince Wrede.

L'Agent Austro-Hongrois a, avant son départ, protesté, au nom de son Gouvernement, contre le Moratorium; le Consul-Général d'Allemagne fera proclamer la même demarche, qui me paraît maintenant trop en retard, on aurait dû protester avant la publication de la loi sur le Moratorium.

Belgrade, le 2 Juin, 1876.

Les événements qui se sont passés tout dernièrement à Constantinople ont fait sur M. Ristits et ses collègues une impression quelque peu décourageante. Bien que l'état-major Serbe ait expédié hier 5,000 hommes de la milice de Belgrade sur la frontière Turque (à Déligrade), on hésite avec la déclaration de guerre. Mais la guerre se fera sûrement. M. Ristits n'est plus le maître de la situation qu'il a pourtant créée, il est emporté par le courant et poussé par les Omladinistes; il est placé devant l'alternative de faire la guerre ou de se retirer toujours de la scène politique; ambitieux comme il est, il choisit la première éventualité; à la réception du télégramme officiel que le Grand Vézir a adressé au Gouvernement Serbe pour lui annoncer l'avénement au trône de Sultan Murad V, on a tenu ici un Grand Conseil des Ministres, qui a duré presque toute la nuit. On décidait d'abord de ne rien répondre au télégramme du Grand Vézir avant d'être tombé d'accord avec le Monténégro; une longue dépêche fut envoyée au Prince du Monténégro l'invitant à se joindre à la Serbie, et à profiter de cette occasion pour déclarer la guerre, et marcher ensemble contre la Turquie. Mais la réponse du Prince du Monténégro a été tellement évasive que le Gouvernement Serbe a dû préférer de reconnaître le Sultan actuel; aussi s'est-il empressé bien vite d'envoyer à Constantinople les félicitations de la Serbie au joyeux avénement de Sa Majesté le Sultan Murad V. L'Agent Diplomatique de Russie à Belgrade, M. Kanzoff, est en ce moment à Ems auprès de l'Empereur de Russie; il y est allé sur les sollicitations de M. Ristits afin d'implorer l'assistance de la Russie en faveur de cette Principauté; de ce fait résulte clairement que la Russie n'est pas restée étrangère

et sans influence sur le mouvement belliqueux de la Serbie; reste donc à savoir, si la Russie va maintenant exaucer les prières de Serbes présentées par M. Karzoff à Ems en appuyant efficacement et ouvertement la Principauté. D'après mon expérience en ce pays il se peut aussi que la Russie jugera maintenant à propos de désavouer les Serbes. J'ai vu à maintes occasions que la politique Russe consistait très souvent à exposer et à compromettre les pays suzerains, en les abandonnant ensuite. L'avenir le plus prochain nous apprendra à quoi nous en tenir à ce sujet.

Le Prince Wrede me demandait hier si je ne pouvait le renseigner sur la présence de M. Militits de Neusatz à Belgrade. Aussitôt arrivé ici je me suis informé minutieusement à cet égard, et j'ai appris de bonne source que M. Militits a des conférences fréquentes avec M. Ristits et M. Gronits. Dans ces conférences il a été décidé que M. Militits aidera le Gouvernement Serbe à former une légion étrangère des Slavs de Hongrie. Il serait à désirer que le Comte Andrassy apprenne les intentions de Militits. Outre cela M. Militits vient d'être chargé par le Cabinet Ristits de faire l'intermédiaire entre la Serbie et le Monténégro pour la conclusion d'un Traité offensif et défensif entre ces deux Principautés. La réussite de cette démarche est très-douteuse, et cela d'autant plus que Militits a toujours travaillé pour le Prince du Monténégro, qu'il désire mettre à la place du Prince Milan.

Pour compléter mes renseignements d'hier concernant le Moratorium j'ai appris ici que la Sublime Porte avait protesté la première contre cette mesure du Gouvernement Serbe.

J'ai parlé aujourd'hui au Général Frach, 1er aide-de-camp du Prince Milan, et chef de l'Etat-Major Serbe, sur ma demande quand les Serbes ouvriront les hostilités, il me répondait que cela se fera encore attendre un mois et d'avantage; cela me confirmait dans l'opinion que M. Ristits hésite par suite des recents événements à Constantinople. Cette hésitation est aussi la cause du mécontentement des officiers Serbes à qui Ristits disait positivement qu'ils marcheraient le 18 Mai passé.

J'ai aussi appris que l'artillerie et la cavalerie de Belgrade marcheront à la frontière Turque le 10 de ce mois.

Le fournisseur des fusils et canons Krupp est toujours ici; il attend un acompte du tiers pour commencer la fourniture; je connaitrai positivement cette expédition.

No. 260.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 403. Confidential.)

Paris, June 7, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Duc Decazes called upon me this afternoon, and told me that he had come to make known to me ideas which had suggested themselves to his mind, as he was reflecting upon the means of restoring concert between the six Powers on the Eastern question.

He had, he said, obtained a first success at Ems. The intention to present the identic Note founded on the Berlin Memorandum had been abandoned. In fact, the instructions sent by the Porte to its Commissioners in the Herzegovina, rendered the Note quite inapplicable to the present state of affairs. Two of the concessions principally insisted upon had been already granted spontaneously by the Porte. An amnesty and an armistice had been already proclaimed. Moreover direct communications between the insurgents and the Porte were provided for. Some exception might perhaps be taken to the wording of the instructions to the Commissioners, and objections might be raised in detail; but the spontaneous announcement of an amnesty and an armistice were facts of great importance which must be taken into account.

It had, the Duke said, been thought at first at Ems that the Note might be held over the Turks *in terrorem*, but he had objected to this, and it had been at last agreed that the presentation of it should be adjourned indefinitely.

Thus the difficulty arising from the terms of the Berlin Memorandum, and of the Note communicating them to the Porte, seemed to be removed, and the ground to be thus cleared for a return to united action by all the six Powers.

The Duke went on to say that in considering in what way advantage might be taken of this state of things, two plans had suggested themselves to his mind.

The first was to prepare a new Note of such a character that England as well as the other five Powers might agree to present it.

The second was to draw up a short declaration to be made by all the six Powers,

to the effect that they took note of the Declarations made in the instructions to the Turkish Commissioners, and were willing to give time for the new Sultan to carry into effect his paternal and benevolent intentions.

The Duke proceeded to tell me that it was only yesterday that he had received from Constantinople the text of the identic Note which had been drawn up there. On reading it he had been astonished to find that it differed very widely indeed from the Berlin Memorandum upon which it professed to be founded. Many of the parts which had been most objected to were omitted, and other parts had been very much softened. The Note was as different from the Memorandum as the moon from the sun—indeed the difference was greater, as the light of the moon was in fact the reflection of that of the sun, while the Note could hardly be said to reflect the Memorandum at all.

Finding the Note to be of so mild a nature, it had, the Duke said, occurred to him, that it might not be difficult to make such alterations in it as would, on the one hand, adapt it to present circumstances, and on the other, render it acceptable to all the six Powers. He left with me a rough draft, showing the text of the Note as originally proposed, and the alterations which he was inclined to suggest.

He also gave me a sketch of an identic Note or Declaration which might be made by the six Powers, if his second plan, that of in the first instance doing little more than taking note of the concessions already made by the Sultan, were preferred.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of both these documents. In the first the text of the Note as drawn up at Constantinople is given, the parts which the Duke would propose to omit being in italics, and the alterations and additions which the Duke suggests being placed in the margin.

The Duke told me that Russia, Austria, and Italy had already formally recognized Sultan Murad, without waiting for the arrival of the written notification of His Majesty's accession. He added that France would also formally recognize the new Sultan without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 260.

Draft Note prepared at Constantinople and Amended by the Duc Decazes.

(On supprimerait tous les mots soulignés en rouge [in italics]. Ils seraient remplacés par les renvois.)

Dépêche Télégraphique.

Therapia, le 5 Juin, 11 h. 5 m.

VARIANTES qui pourraient être utilement introduites :—

accueillaient avec une regrettable défiance les promesses qui leur étaient faites

Note préparé.

LE programme de pacification élaboré pour la Bosnie et l'Herzégovine par la Porte à la suite des suggestions des Grandes Puissances intéressées au plus haut point au prompt rétablissement d'une situation normale dans les provinces a rencontré dans son exécution de nombreuses difficultés. Elles provenaient principalement de ce que les insurgés et les familles emigrées alléguant l'expérience du passé *ne se fiaient pas à des promesses* et ne consentaient pas les premiers à cesser la lutte, les seconds à rentrer dans leurs foyers à moins d'une garantie matérielle positive de l'Europe que celle-ci n'était nullement disposée à leur accorder. Les Cabinets se rendaient compte d'un autre côté des circonstances que le Gouvernement Ottoman faisait valoir comme entravant l'application des réformes promises par Sa Majesté le Sultan. Selon la Porte, aussi longtemps que les insurgés parcouraient le pays en armes, et que les réfugiés ne se rapatriaient pas, il était matériellement

impossible de procéder à la nouvelle organisation des provinces révoltées. Enfermés dans ce cercle vicieux, les efforts combinés des Grandes Puissances et du Gouvernement Ottoman restaient stériles; les hostilités reprenaient leur cours en Bosnie et en Herzégovine; l'agitation, entretenue par cette lutte, s'étendait à d'autres parties de la Turquie et risquait d'allumer l'incendie que la médiation de l'Europe avait précisément en vue de conjurer.

des Gouvernments Européens

Les dangers d'une pareille situation n'ont pas échappé à l'attention *du Gouvernement Impérial,* désireux de concourir de toutes ses forces au maintien de la paix générale et à l'établissement d'un ordre de choses stable en Turquie. *Il ne doute pas que la Porte ne partage l'avis qu'une condition essentielle pour arriver à ce but doit être la cessation complète des hostilités pendant un terme suffisant pour assurer la pacification du pays. Il s'agirait* d'obtenir avant toute autre mesure une suspension d'armes en Herzégovine et en Bosnie pour deux mois. *Ce délai permettrait* à la fois au Gouvernement Ottoman de se vouer à l'accomplissement de ses promesses sans se laisser arrêter par la préoccupation de combattre les insurgés, et de ravitailler ses places fortes, *nos* Puissances d'agir sur les Herzégoviniens et les Bosniaques pour les engager à rentrer dans leurs foyers. Il *ne semblerait pas* qu'il y eut en dehors de cela un moyen efficace de procéder pacifiquement à la réorganisation du pays et d'inspirer aux insurgés et à leur famille assez de confiance pour que l'on pût espérer leur réinstallation. La Sublime Porte a évidemment partagé ces convictions et elle a dû s'en inspirer lorsqu'elle a, par son décret du . . . . annoncé une suspension d'armes à laquelle elle donne pour corollaire un armistice entière. Ce dernier bienfait sera d'autant mieux accueilli par les populations qu'elles se verront aussi plus rassurées sur le lendemain qu'il leur promet et sur lequel la Sublime Porte n'hésitera pas à s'expliquer tout au moins vis-à-vis de ses Alliés.

Pour arriver à ce but, plusieurs d'entre eux avaient désiré

Cette mesure devait dans leur pensée permettre

et aux

ne leur avait pas semblé

A cet effet l'armistice devrait être employé à des pourparlers directs entre la Porte et les délégués Bosniaques et Herzégoviniens *sur la base des vœux que ceux-ci ont formulé relativement à la mise à exécution des promesses octroyées par le Sultan.*

Nous ne doutons pas que dès lors cet armistice puisse être efficacement

Nous n'entendons point nous prononcer autrement que par voie de suggestions, sur les bases qui pourront servir à ces négociations et les rendre fructueuses; les réformes que la Sublime Porte a déjà décrétées, celles qu'elle paraît préparer en ce moment en s'inspirant d'une idée juste et féconde, l'assimilation effective de ses sujets de toute religion, serviront évidemment à préparer et à diriger les esprits

dans les voies de la conciliation et de l'apaisement.

Sur des points plus spéciaux et dans le même but, des expédients ont été indiqués en vue d'écarter et d'atténuer les difficultés locales.

On a dit par exemple, 1, que

devraient être
et que

(Voir note du 28 Février.)

on a supposé que

et que
pourrait être utilement

a paru

partie de la

en désarmant les Musulmans
cette mesure

s'efforceront [illegible]

Les deux principaux points en sont :—

1. Les matériaux pour la réconstruction des maisons et églises *seraient* fournis aux réfugiés rentrant; *la* subsistence serait assurée jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent vivre de leur travail. Ce terme n'a pas été précisé davantage, ou l'impossibilité de fixer l'époque de l'année où les familles seront rentrées, mais l'objet de cette demande a été accordé en principe par la Porte dans sa note du 28 Février.

2. En tant que la distribution des secours relèverait du Commissaire Ottoman, celui-ci devrait s'entendre sur les mesures à prendre avec la Commission Mixte mentionnée dans la note du 30 Décembre afin de garantir l'application sérieuse des réformes et d'en contrôler l'exécution. Cette Commission *seraient* présidée par un Herzégovinien Chrétien et composée d'indigènes représentant fidèlement les deux religions du pays; ils seraient élus dès que l'armistice aurait suspendu les hostilités.

3. *Il est évident que* pour donner aux familles une possibilité de rentrer avec sécurité et pour éviter des collisions qui auraient pu provoquer de nouvelles paniques il *serait* indispensable que jusqu'à l'apaisement complet des esprits les mouvements Turcs fussent surtout centralisés sur quelques points à convenir. Une pareille mesure pourrait d'autant plus facilement être mise à exécution que les forces Ottomanes se trouvent déjà groupées dans certaines localités en vue des facilités de commandement et d'approvisionnement. Il ne s'agirent donc que de préciser d'une manière plus positive et plus conforme à la nouvelle situation les points où les troupes seraient réunies durant la période de pacification. Il va de soi que pour ne pas livrer dans ces provinces une *excellente* population à la merci de l'autre, en établissant une distinction entre leurs droits respectifs au port des armes, le Gouvernement Ottoman placé dans l'impossibilité de violer les habitudes du pays ni des *armements des Musulmans,* ne songera également pas à l'appliquer, aux Chrétiens de façon que les uns et les autres conserveront leurs armes.

Les *cinq* Puissances unies dans une pensée d'ordre et de paix et désireuses d'employer leurs efforts à l'effet d'en ramener les bienfaits dans les provinces révoltées de la Turquie *ne manqueront pas*

Note préparé.

Ou a pensé que
pourraient recevoir

qu'

ils pourraient se prêter à en

ces

du rechercher les moyens d'y contribuer par l'action de leurs agents locaux. Ces derniers *recevront donc* pour instruction de prêter leur appui à tout ce qui aura trait au rapatriement des familles émigrées et afin d'inspirer à celles-ci une plus grande confiance dans l'exécution des réformes décrétées par la Porte *d'en* surveiller l'application conformément aux intentions de Sa Majesté le Sultan communiquées aux Grandes Puissances par la Circulaire du 13 Décembre.

Le Cabinet *Impérial* ne doute point que le Gouvernement Ottoman intéressé au premier chef au rétablissement de l'ordre en Herzégovine et en Bosnie ne s'empressé d'accueillir *les* suggestions amicales *des cinq Puissances* qui n'ont pour objet qu'une amélioration effective du sort des populations de ces contrées sans porter atteinte aux droits souverains du Sultan et au *statu quo* politique de l'Orient,

que toutes les Puissances entendent également respecter et faire respecter.

(Signé) BOURGOING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 286.

Draft of Identic Declaration suggested by the Duc Decazes for presentation to the Porte.

LES Puissances fermement unies dans un commun désir de voir le calme et la tranquillité renaître dans les provinces insurgées de l'Empire Ottoman et d'assurer à la fois l'intégrité de cet Empire et l'amélioration effective du sort de ses populations Chrétiennes;

Convaincues que ce double but serait plus heureusement atteint par la généreuse initiative que le Sultan a prise en octroyant spontanément un armistice et une large amnistie et par l'appel qu'il semble vouloir faire à des négociations directes pour dissiper toutes les défiances et donner à ses sujets les plus sérieuses garanties dans le présent et dans l'avenir;

Ont résolu d'attendre la réalisation des espérances que les vues libérales et conciliantes de Mourad V laissent concevoir avant de lui présenter les suggestions amicales que la continuation de la lutte pourrait leur conseiller.

No. 287.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)

Vienna, June 7, 1876.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs spoke favourably to me this evening of the orders given to the Turkish Commissioners and Commander-in-chief in the Herzegovina, observing that they are promising as far as they go, and that he shall be glad if the Porte succeeds by its own action in effecting the pacification of the Provinces; but as nothing is said of the reforms already agreed upon he fears the silence of the Porte with respect to them will excite suspicion of the insurgents. He has, therefore, telegraphed to Count Zichy that it will be necessary for the new Government to add to what they have now notified a declaration, that the Sultan will abide by the engagements entered into by the Porte in the name of his predecessor, and thus to replace question in the position in which it was before the demands made by the insurgents.

I met Count Andrassy yesterday and this evening in the public garden, but as

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

after to-morrow he will reside at Schönbrunn, I can have no future personal communication with him except by appointment, when I have instructions which require me to see him.

His Excellency fears that a demand just sent by the Porte to Servia to explain her armaments may bring matters to a crisis there.

No. 288.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, June 8, 1876.

BOTH the Russian and the Austrian Consuls-General have returned here with fresh instructions, one from Ems, the other from Pesth. Former has very precise instructions to dissuade from rash actions, whilst latter assures me that the Austrian Government had exhausted all possible counsel (on?) Servia, and that Her Majesty's Government must have been inexactly informed of any intention to renew previous remonstrance, admitting that an expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government might be highly desirable at this moment.

With a view to have no doubt whatsoever as to the desire of Her Majesty's Government for preservation of peace by Servia, I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram of the 6th, and his language, and that (of?) Prince Milan, appears reassuring, at least for the moment.

My opinion is that the Russian Government, having urged Servia to these ruinous preparations, now restrains her for some ulterior plan.

No. 289.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburgh, June 8, 1876, 6·30 P.M.

I AM told, but not officially, that new credentials have been sent from Ems to General Ignatiew.

No. 290.

Sir E. Thornton to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 8, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)

Washington, , 1876.

TURKISH Minister, instructed by his Government, asked last Sunday that the United States' Government should recognize new Sultan. Mr. Fish answered to-day that the question was not yet decided, but that he did not consider formal recognition indispensable, especially since death of late Sultan. The present Sultan having been heir presumptive, his right is incontestible. There has been no change either in the dynasty or in the form of Government. At most a new letter of credence might be sent to the United States' Minister at Constantinople.

No. 291.

Mr. St. John to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 60. Political.)
My Lord,

Bucharest, June 8, 1876.

YOUR Lordship has probably already been informed by Her Majesty's Consul at Roustchouk of an incident that occurred on the Danube a few days ago.

It appears that about 300 passengers, principally Bulgarians, while on board the Austrian Company's steamer "Radetzki," took charge of the vessel with all the arms they could find and compelled the Captain to land them on the Turkish side; where,

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Rome.

after having overpowered the guard, they were attacked by Turkish troops. Some were killed or taken prisoners, and the remainder were dispersed.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs here assures me that every precaution is being taken in order to prevent Bulgarians from crossing over to Turkey in large numbers, and that Austrian steamers are now prohibited to take passengers from one shore to the other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ST. JOHN.

No. 292.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 9.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 4, 1876.*

PRINCE WREDE, who returns to Belgrade to-morrow, after having, during the last two days, given here a personal report upon the state of affairs in Servia, told me to-day that he thought nothing could now prevent Servia from attacking Turkey; that Montenegro could not then remain quiet; and that, the Russian Chancellier at Belgrade having been unheeded in warning Servia against such a course, M. Khartzow, who had started for Ems, had been ordered to return, and had, nevertheless, been equally unsuccessful.

His Excellency is of opinion that the refusal of Great Britain to join the other Powers has had an influence in causing Servia so perversely to enter upon a warlike policy. On my expressing some surprise at this interpretation of our attitude, which, whatever it might mean, could not certainly be construed into a hint to the insurgents to continue fighting or into a suggestion to Servia to aggrandise herself at the expense of Turkey, he observed that there was a wide difference between an oriental and an occidental people, and that Servia, being incapable of taking so subtle a view of England's attitude, could only draw from it the inference that there was dissension between the Great Powers, who would therefore be neutralised the one by the other, and that consequently Servia had a free field before her. On my then hinting that, as the Serbs were defective in courage to stake so much upon such a throw as this, it was the general impression that Servia was acting under orders from without, his Excellency replied that, now that the national imagination was excited, Servia took as little heed of the advice of Russia as of that of any other Power.

Prince Wrede believes that the Porte has from 30,000 to 35,000 men at Nisch and Widdin at its disposal for an attack upon Belgrade; that Servia will post some 40,000 men in the entrenched camps for the defence of the capital, and will then invade Bosnia with 50,000 men; and that a march upon Belgrade by the Turkish troops will not be found to be as easy as may be expected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 293.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 9.)

(Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 4, 1876.*

WITH reference to Mr. Monson's despatch, Confidential, of the 26th of January last, respecting the inspiration of the articles on Eastern politics in the "Pester Lloyd," I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I learn indirectly that articles and letters, adversely criticising Count Andrassy's policy, have been consistently refused admission into the columns of that journal.

I beg to add, with reference to my despatch of the 2nd instant, that the speech of M. Falk as delegate, is regarded here from the same point of view as the articles of M. Falk as editor, and is generally held to be Count Andrassy's unofficial defense of his policy as well as his suggestion of the grounds on which a change of attitude might now logically follow in case of necessity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 294.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 9.)

Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 4, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 75 and 79 of the 31st ultimo and the 2nd instant respectively, I ought to have mentioned that, although the Report of the Hungarian Committee on Foreign Affairs was unanimously adopted, and although no debate took place, two voices were raised in criticism of the Austrian policy in Turkey.

M. Uermènyi considered that the general wording of the Report was too detailed, and yet that the details were too little known for praise or blame to be awarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

But M. Kukuljevris, speaking in the Croatian language, declared himself against the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey as against the interests of the majority of the people of Austria-Hungary, and especially of Croatia, for it signified within the Empire opposition to the intellectual and material progress of that majority, and in Turkey the continuance of Asiatic barbarousness. Reforms in a Christian sense were the only solution of the difficulty, and the nation which would advocate the most complete autonomy for the oppressed Christians would for a long time exercise the greatest influence in the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 295.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 9.)

Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 4, 1876.*

ON the 2nd instant there appeared on Eastern affairs an article in the "Pester Lloyd," of which the following is the substance:—

The revolution in Constantinople has had the first result of delaying the presentation of the Berlin proposals, not only as a mere matter of form and courtesy, but as showing a desire to give time to the new Sovereign to manifest his good will; for those proposals were not dogmas to be imposed unconditionally under all circumstances, and the question now is, whether this revolution does not demand a change of procedure. It remains of course to be seen whether a more intelligent rule and a certain stability in the Government be established.

If the new Government develop an activity in radical reforms, then no foreign influence is needed, and indeed such an influence would be necessarily repulsed. The mediation of the Powers seems on this supposition to be now deprived of an essential portion of its needfulness. Moreover, no united action can be expected, as England holds herself aloof, and other Powers will hesitate. And Russia is isolated if her idea be that the revolution in Constantinople shows such uncertainty at the Porte that the guarantees for reforms should be still more strenuously demanded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 296.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, June 9, 1876.*

I HAVE to request you to call Count Andrassy's attention to the statements in Mr. Monson's telegram, repeated in your telegram of the 7th instant, on the subject of the munitions of war for Montenegro stated to have been received at Cattaro.

No. 297.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June 9, 1876.*

A LEADING article in this morning's "Agence Russe" states that the condition imposed of revictualling fort renders armistice proclaimed by Porte illusory, as the Douga Pass is the theatre of hostilities between the Turks and the insurgents. It forgets that Porte has merely proclaimed a suspension on her part of military operations and not an armistice.

No. 298.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.[*]*—(Received June 9.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 9, 1876.*

BARON HOFMANN has informed me that the Russian Ambassador has received a telegram to-day reporting that the insurgents will not oppose revictualling of Nicksich and the Turkish forts. Baron Hofmann said he was not aware whether they had taken this resolution in consequence of their own weakness or of representations from Prince of Montenegro.

It is the more important, as the Turkish Ambassador has learnt by telegram that the Commander-in-chief is now on his march to provision fort.

No. 299.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.[*]*—(Received June 9.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 9, 1876.*

WITH reference to my telegram of 7th instant, it appears that Count Andrassy, after his interview with Russian Ambassador on that day, telegraphed to Ems objections to delivery of the note, and that his telegram was crossed by one from Prince Gortchakow agreeing, in consequence of information received from (?) Constantinople by the Due Decazes, as to intention of the Porte to promulgate radical reforms, to suspend action, while Powers will maintain understanding recorded in the Berlin Memorandum.

No. 300.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 52. Political.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, June 2, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the Belgrade brigade of infantry militia left this yesterday for a place called Deligrad, which is situated on the road to Alexinatz, and not far before reaching that town.

This brigade consisted of about 4,000 men.

It is generally believed here that if the Servian Government should decide on proceeding to extremities at this juncture, they will send off to the frontier, and that very shortly, not only the seventeen brigades of the first class of the militia, but also the second class.

As yet I have not been able to learn anything positive as to what is really in contemplation, and in official quarters such an intention is denied, and only the sending off of three brigades of infantry—in all, 12,000 men, to guard the newly-constructed forts at Deligrad, and at Alexinatz, is admitted up to this moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

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[*] Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 301.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 53. Political.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, June 3, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a copy of a despatch addressed this day to Sir Henry Elliot on the state of affairs in Servia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 301.

Consul-General White to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Belgrade, June 3, 1876.*

MY previous despatches will have prepared your Excellency to hear that the Prince of Servia and his Government might at any moment determine on a conflict with the Porte.

A desperate resolution of this kind, if adopted, will probably be kept secret to the last moment from the Representatives of foreign Powers at Belgrade, who will not be able to ascertain its correctness till a great part of the mobilized militia is on its way to the Turkish frontier.

The intelligence of the successful change brought about at Constantinople, and of the acclamation with which the advent of the new Sultan was hailed by populations of different creeds in the capital and in the provinces, might (it was hoped) without being at all too sanguine, have produced a salutary pause for reflection, and certainly the most impartial observer must admit that the moment would be very ill-chosen for a hostile attack upon a Government which bodes well to enter upon a new era of improvement, progress and reform.

I am sorry to have to report to your Excellency that as yet I perceive no symptoms of any disposition in Servia, either amongst rulers or people, to retrace the perilous course upon which they have entered.

Its dangers are generally admitted, but most people here say that things have gone too far now.

I saw M. Ristich, the Foreign Minister, yesterday, and spoke to him very earnestly in the above sense, especially when he showed me the telegrams of the Grand Vizier to the Prince, to which it appears no answer had been returned.

I shall not fail to inform your Excellency by telegram of anything bearing on the attitude of Servia towards the Porte which may come to my knowledge.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 302.

The Governor-General of Herzegovina to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby, June 10.)

(Télégraphique.) *Mostar, le 6 Juin, 1876.*

"BENACCO," bateau du Lloyd, a débarqué à Cattaro, le 1 Juin et les jours suivants, sous la surveillance d'un Sénateur, 1,800 caisses renfermant 6,000 fusils et 1,800,000 cartouches pour le Monténégro, achetés en Autriche. Votre Excellence pourra juger de la valeur des déclarations faites par le Cabinet de Vienne en vue de la pacification.

(Signé) ALY.

No. 303.

Raschid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, June 10.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 8 Juin, 1876.*

JE vous transmets ci-dessous, à titre d'information, le résumé d'un télégramme que le Grand Vizir vient d'adresser au Prince de Servie:

Les assurances formelles et réitérées de Votre Altesse avaient dissipé les préoccupations qu'avaient fait naître à la Sublime Porte les armements considérables de la Servie; néanmoins, ces armements, loin d'avoir cessé, étant poursuivis dans des proportions telles que l'armée Servienne se trouve prête à entrer à toute heure en campagne, la Sublime Porte ne peut rester indifférente à un état de choses peu rassurant pour la tranquillité de nos provinces limitrophes, d'autant plus que les incursions des Serviens ajoutent à nos inquiétudes. Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, justement ému de cette situation, et ayant vivement à cœur de conserver invariables les bons rapports entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement Princier, m'a ordonné de m'adresser officiellement à Votre Altesse pour avoir des explications franches et précises sur les motifs et le but réel de ces armements.

No. 304.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 465.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 10, 1876.

THE German Ambassador, in conversation this afternoon, spoke to me on the present state of affairs in Turkey.

I said that my language to every one had been that we were bound to allow the new Administration at Constantinople some breathing time, and to await the results of the efforts they were now making to bring about an arrangement for the settlement of the insurgent districts.

The Governments concerned might think it right to express severally their individual hope that the Sultan would go as far as he could in making liberal concessions to his discontented subjects, but I thought it was very expedient that we should refrain for the moment from anything in the nature of concentrated action or advice; for this reason in particular, that an indication or expectation of such interference would in itself be sufficient, in all probability, to ensure the rejection by the insurgents of the terms offered to them, whatever those terms might be.

I went on to say that now that the proposals drawn up at Berlin were, as I understood, abandoned in consequence of the altered position of affairs, I no longer saw any reason why the six Powers should not again be agreed in their course of action.

Count Münster said that proposals had reached his Government from various quarters, in especial from France, for a Conference.

I said that similar suggestions had also been received by us, but that while I saw no objection in principle to the idea of a Conference, I did not myself think that there would be any practical advantage in such a meeting, unless some preliminary agreement were first come to as to the general outlines of the plan to be discussed in it.

Count Münster told me that this was also the view which Prince Bismarck took of the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 305.

The Earl of Derby to Count Beust.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, June* 10, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, in accordance with the request which your Excellency made to me on behalf of your Government, on the 4th instant, I instructed Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Servia to join with his Austrian Colleague in counselling moderation at Belgrade.

I have since received a telegraphic despatch from him reporting that on his applying to his Austrian Colleague, the latter had stated that the Austrian Government had exhausted all possible counsel on Servia, and that Her Majesty's Government must have been under some misunderstanding in supposing that there was any intention to renew previous remonstrance.

Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, nevertheless, made the representations which he was instructed to make to the Servian Government, though necessarily, under the circumstances, he could not carry out the direction to act in concert in the matter with his Austrian Colleague.

I have thought it right to inform your Excellency of what has occurred in order that should you think proper you may call the attention of your Government to the circumstance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 306.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 10, *at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 10, 1876.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs received last night a telegram from Belgrade, stating that the Prince of Servia had given Russian, French, and Italian Consuls positive assurance that he would follow the counsels of the Powers.

No. 307.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 10, 1876.

THE Austrian Ambassador called this afternoon and informed me of a communication which he had received within the last 24 hours, and which he regarded as eminently satisfactory. He was given to understand, he said, that the Emperor of Russia had sent from Ems a message to the Government of Servia, which was of a nature more decisive than any previous communication of the same kind. His Majesty had warned the Prince of Servia that if, contrary to advice, he involved himself in a war with Turkey, not only had he no material assistance to expect from Russia, but moral support and sympathy would equally be withheld. This warning, Count Beust said, was due, in part at least, to the request of the Austrian Government that some such language should be held, and he thought its effect at the present moment would be decisive.

From the conversation which ensued, I gathered that the view of Count Andrassy as to the course to be pursued at present is the same as that of Her Majesty's Government. Count Andrassy, as I understood from Count Beust, objects to a Conference without definite basis, and thinks that time must be given to allow of its being seen whether the direct negotiations with the insurgents, on which the Porte had entered, are likely to bring about a satisfactory result.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 308.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June* 10, 1876.

GENERAL CHERNAIEFF and his staff left yesterday on a tour of inspection on the Turkish frontier. Upwards of 20,000 militia are now embodied.

No. 309.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 204.)
My Lord, *Rome, June* 3, 1876.

HAVING already acquainted your Lordship by telegraph with the impression produced upon the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the intelligence, first conveyed to him by the Turkish Minister, of the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz and the proclamation of Sultan Mourad as Emperor of Turkey, it is only necessary that I should give a general outline of my conversations with his Excellency upon those events.

I was not able to see M. Melegari the day on which the news first reached him,

and it was, therefore, partly from the information which I received from my Turkish colleague, who was good enough to call upon me immediately after he had seen M. Melegari, that I reported that his Excellency had been a good deal agitated by the announcement of the change which had been effected.

Karatheodory Effendi told me that M. Melegari had spoken of it as appearing to him as the beginning of a general confusion ("bouleversement"), the first effects of which might, perhaps, he feared, be seen in an outburst of Mussulman fanaticism against the Christians.

The Turkish Minister endeavoured to bring M. Melegari's mind to a different conclusion by representing the deposition of Abdul Aziz as the first step necessary to the inauguration of a complete change of system, and the introduction of such reforms as the state of the Empire imperatively called for, but which could never have been carried out while Abdul Aziz was on the throne.

Karatheodory Effendi told me that he could not flatter himself that he had produced much effect upon the foreign Minister, who, when he left him, was, he believed, about to summon his colleagues in order to deliberate with them as to what measures it might be necessary to take in view of the new position of affairs.

Shortly after Karatheodory Effendi had left me I went to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but M. Melegari had not yet returned from the Council. I therefore asked to see Count Tornielli, the Secretary-General, and found him, as I fully expected I should from my knowledge of his political bias, disposed to take a very unfavourable view of what had occurred. He spoke of it as a "révolution du palais," a simple change of Rulers by which personal interests would perhaps be advanced, but which would probably not be attended by any amelioration in the condition of things, Mussulman fanaticism was incurable, a break up of the Empire not to be avoided; etc.

I deprecated any hasty judgment, saying it would be better to await the development of events, and to allow time to the new Sultan and his Ministers to show what they intended to do, before forming any conclusions.

I told Count Tornielli I would return the next day to see M. Melegari, and I accordingly did so.

I found his Excellency still under the influence of his first impression as described to me by the Turkish Minister, though perhaps inclined to take a somewhat more reasonable view of things. He seemed, however, to have a sort of vague fear of Abdul Aziz having been assassinated as well as dethroned, and he spoke to me as he had done to Karatheodory Effendi of his apprehension of a possible outbreak of Fanaticism.

I ventured to observe that I did not share either apprehension, and I gave my reasons for not doing so.

After having done this, I said there was one point on which I was inclined to congratulate his Excellency, viz., that the change of Rulers in Turkey would enable the Italian Government to part company with the propositions of the Berlin Memorandum, for I took it for granted none of the Governments could contemplate presenting their notes under present circumstances, and that they would not interfere in any way in Turkish affairs until the new "régime" had had a new trial.

M. Melegari replied that he presumed the presentation of the notes would now be suspended, but he must of course communicate with the other Governments before speaking positively.

I then asked his Excellency what I was to tell your Lordship was the impression of the Italian Government on what had occurred, and he gave me the answer, which I reported by telegraph on the 31st ultimo, to the effect that the Italian Government suspended all judgment until they received more complete information as to the motives of the originators of the revolution, and the course they intended to pursue.

The next day, June 1, I again saw M. Melegari, who seemed much more reconciled to the great event than he was at first. He said he must admit that the general impression it had produced, both in Europe and Turkey, seemed to be favourable. That he had heard from Constantinople that the Dragoman of the English Embassy had already conveyed the congratulations of Her Majesty's Government to the new Sultan, and he looked upon this as a most reassuring fact. France had, he had also heard, done the same, and the Italian Government also intended to follow that course, but they had "des ménagements à garder," with the Powers with whom they were associated in the Berlin proposals.

I asked M. Melegari whether I was to understand by this that Italy intended to identify herself for the future with the policy of Russia in the East, and to detach herself from that of England, and I now hoped of France.

M. Melegari said that this was by no means his intention, that the Government fully proposed conveying their congratulations to the new Sultan—perhaps that day, perhaps the next—but that he thought it right, as the Italian Government had agreed to join the Imperial Cabinets in the presentation of an identic note founded on the Berlin Memorandum, which presentation was now suspended, to communicate with them previously to taking the step alluded to.

In reply to this I merely observed that a graceful act loses its grace if it is not performed at the proper moment. I telegraphed to your Lordship on the 1st the result of the above conversation.

I have seen M. Melegari again to-day, and his Excellency informed me that orders had been sent to the Italian Minister at Constantinople to offer the congratulation of the Italian Government on the accession of Sultan Mourad. His Excellency added that the congratulations of the three Imperial Cabinets would be conveyed at the same time.

In the course of further conversation, M. Melegari having expressed his entire satisfaction at the programme which had been issued in the name of the Sultan, I observed that I thought it ought now to be the policy of all the Powers to assist us far as possible in the realization of the measures which it indicated, and not to create any obstacles or difficulties by undue interference.

M. Melegari replied that this was precisely the sense of the instructions, both telegraphic and written, which had been sent to Count Corti.

I learnt from M. Melegari in this interview that there is a division of the Italian Squadron cruizing in the Adriatic, as well as one in the neighbourhood of Smyrna.

His Excellency, before my leaving him, mentioned that considerable alarm appeared to prevail amongst the Christians in some districts in Syria, where they had taken refuge at the Consulates, but the accounts he had received did not state there had been any acts on the part of the Mussulman population to justify this alarm.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 310.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 205. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Rome, June 5, 1876.*

IN the telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna repeated to me by your Lordship, under date the 2nd instant, it is stated that M. Wenkheim, the Hungarian Minister in attendance on the Emperor, had expressed the opinion to Mr. Harriss-Gastrell that in the event of Turkey attacking Servia and Montenegro, Russia will not interfere, as she is not ready for war.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Barbolani, the late Italian Minister at St. Petersburgh, while dining with me a few days ago, expressed exactly the same opinion.

On my asking Count Barbolani why Russia does not use the influence she undoubtedly possesses over the Princes of Servia and Montenegro to restrain their warlike attitude, he replied, in the first place, that Prince Gortchakow had to count with (ménager) the old Russian party which was for following up vigorously the traditional policy of Russia in the East, and next, that his Highness had to consider the position of the Princes themselves, who, if they opposed too much the national feeling of the people over whom they rule, might very likely be deposed, when the Government of the two Principalities would fall into the hands of the democratic leaders.

Count Barbolani expressed most decidedly his conviction that neither the Emperor nor Prince Gortchakow had the slightest wish for or idea of territorial conquests in the East of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 311.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord, *Rome, June 6, 1876.*

M. MELEGARI, whom I saw this morning, told me that he considers the general position of affairs in regard to the East improved.

The death of Abdul Aziz was certainly a sinister event; but it had not taken him by surprise. He was of course bound to believe that the late Sultan had committed suicide, since he had thus been officially informed by the Turkish Government, who promised to produce the most ample and authentic testimony in regard to the act. But his Excellency thought that it would be extremely difficult to persuade the world in general that the Sultan had put an end to his own existence, and that the precedents recorded in history as to the fate of deposed Sultans had not been followed in this instance. He could only hope, he said, that the Turkish Government, by the introduction of wise and liberal measures of reform, would soon cause the world to forget and forgive the act by which the reign of the new Sultan would not fail to be associated in the mind of the generality of people.

M. Melegari proceeded to say that he had sent instructions to the Italian Minister at Constantinople, who, by having conveyed to the Porte the usual compliments on the accession of the new Sovereign, was already in business relations with the Turkish Government, to counsel them to adopt spontaneously, and as speedily as may be, such measures as may render it unnecessary for the Powers to give any effect to the Berlin Memorandum; and on my reading Sir Henry Elliot's telegram of the 4th instant, giving the outline of a Proclamation to be addressed to the insurgents, then preparing by the Porte, His Excellency informed me he was already acquainted with the tenor of that document. His Excellency added that as soon as the accession of the Sultan Murad had been formally notified, His Majesty would be at once recognized.

M. Melegari then told me that he had received more reassuring accounts from Belgrade, where he had directed the Italian Consul-General to give pacific counsels. The Consul-General had been assured by the Prince that he did not contemplate any act of aggression, and was only preparing to act on the defensive. The disproportion between the number of Turkish troops on the Servian frontier and any force which the Servians could bring against them was a strong guarantee, in M. Melegari's opinion, for the sincerity of the Prince's assurances. M. Melegari stated that he did not believe in the existence of a Treaty of alliance between Servia and Montenegro. His information led him to a contrary conclusion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 312.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 213. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Rome, June 7, 1876.*

ALTHOUGH I have duly reported, in other despatches, the substance of my conversations upon Eastern affairs with the Italian Minister at the head of the Foreign Department, I think it right to say a few words as to the policy of the Italian Government in accepting somewhat hastily the propositions recorded in the Berlin Memorandum, and in regard to other matters which have subsequently occurred.

M. Melegari, in informing me that the Italian Government had adhered to the Berlin Memorandum, explained that the motive of their doing so was a desire to contribute, as far as in them lay, towards the pacification of the revolted Provinces of Turkey, and the maintenance of peace and harmony amongst the Powers. This, I have no doubt, is a perfectly sincere motive. The preservation of peace is an almost absolute necessity for Italy; but besides the motive thus put forward, there are others which, I think, may explain the recent policy of the Italian Government.

They had accepted the Andrassy note; and they looked upon the Berlin Memorandum as a continuation of the same policy. But, even if such had not been their

impression, I do not believe that their course would have been different. Italy, from the fact of her being a young Power, and still dependent, to a certain extent, upon the friendship and good-will of others, does not feel herself in a position to act alone; and will consequently be always much more prone, in a case of this sort, to follow a policy which has been already traced out, than to take a line of her own. Moreover, the Minister who now presides over the Foreign Department has not, it is impossible to conceal it, the qualities necessary for initiating an independent policy. There is, moreover, in the Foreign Department a gentleman, Count Torniolli, as Secretary-General, who is connected with Russia through his wife, and has unquestionably strong Russian sympathies. Count Torniolli, there is not the least doubt, has a very great influence on his Chief, and his voice will certainly have been heard in favour of accepting the Berlin Memorandum, which came as the well-known work of Russia, although described as the joint production of the three Imperial Cabinets. But, independently of this, an answer upon the Memorandum, the substance of which had been forwarded by telegraph, was suggested the same day, the Italian Government thought themselves bound to reply within that time, and there was therefore no time even if there had been any desire to communicate with England upon the subject. The acceptance of France was looked upon as a matter of course—the opinion being entertained that France would not willingly do anything to offend Russia. But even if the acceptance of France had not been looked upon as certain, I do not think it would have made much difference in the decision of the Italian Government. The Power to which Italy now looks as her natural ally is Germany. This has always been the political faith of the party now in office. It is also the desire of the country and Government to be on the best possible terms with Austria. There is, moreover, amongst all parties in Italy a strong feeling in favour of the Christians in Turkey, not so much because they are Christians, but because they are a nationality struggling, as the Italians did formerly, to free themselves from an oppressive yoke.

By accepting, therefore, the Berlin Memorandum, the advantages which the Italian Government looked to were (1st) as stated by M. Melegari, the maintenance of union amongst the Powers; (2ndly) the gratification of the national feeling in favour of the Christians; (3rdly) conciliating the three Empires, with two of which it is the desire of Italy to be on the closest terms of friendship.

Having once accepted the Berlin Memorandum, the Italian Government have thought it right in subsequent matters to continue to act in concert with the three Powers who originated it. I believe, however, that their communications have been, perhaps owing to the fact of the Emperor and Prince Gortchakow being away from St. Petersburgh, more especially kept up with Austria and Germany.

It must not be supposed from this that the Italian Government does not attach importance to acting in concert with England. Very far from it. There is no party in Italy which does not cling to the friendship and goodwill of England. There is no country so much and so generally admired and looked up to as England, but since the British Government allowed the essential part of the Treaty of Paris to be destroyed by Russia the feeling has certainly prevailed that England was no longer to be considered as a leader in Eastern affairs. She was thought to be indifferent, and therefore it is less surprising that a country like Italy, which cannot act alone, should have shown what may be considered precipitation in following the policy of the Northern Courts. But although the Italian Government, for the reasons above stated, have taken a different line from Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Berlin Memorandum, there is not the slightest doubt that the bold and independent policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this matter has placed England higher in public estimation in this country, as it seems to have done elsewhere, than any act, with the exception perhaps of the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, to which, as I reported at the time, an immense importance was attached, which has occurred since the abandonment of the Treaty of Paris. I see traces of these sentiments in almost every paper I take up, with the exception of the "Italie," which has lately been writing as if it were in the pay of the Russian Legation.

I do not therefore consider that from what has now occurred, the inference to be drawn is that the Italian Government will in the future stages of the Eastern question necessarily ally themselves with the policy of Russia.

M. Melegari has been careful to impress upon me on several occasions, as I have already reported, that although the Italian Government had accepted the suggestions for pacification contained in the Berlin Memorandum, they had expressly reserved their liberty of action in regard to the "mesures efficaces" which, in the event of the Memorandum having been presented and of a pacification not being accomplished

during the proposed armistice of two months, it is suggested in the concluding paragraph of the Memorandum should be taken in order to attain the desired end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 313.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 218.)
My Lord, *Rome, June 7, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 209 of yesterday's date, recording the observations of M. Melegari as to the manner in which the reported suicide of Sultan Abdul Aziz would be regarded by the public, I feel bound to say that as far as I am able to judge of public opinion in Italy, both as expressed in the press and in conversation, his Excellency's observations are fully borne out, viz., that it is the general opinion in this country that the late Sultan met his death by assassination, and not by his own hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 314.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 250. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 1, 1876.*

I WAS informed to-day on good authority that the Emperor of Russia had addressed from Ems a communication in very strong terms to the Princes of Servia and Montenegro, warning them against abandoning their neutrality and taking any aggressive action in support of the insurgents in the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

I am led to believe that this warning was most especially intended for Servia, where General Tchernaieff, it is said, has accepted a military command without the knowledge or authority of the Emperor.

In speaking lately with M. de Giers on the presence of this Russian General in Servia, his Excellency said that General Tchernaieff was no longer in the Russian service, and that, consequently, the Imperial Government had no power of restraint over him; but he gave me to understand that his presence in Servia was viewed with displeasure by the Imperial Government, and was not calculated at the present moment to be productive of good.

General Tchernaieff, since his disgrace after the taking of Tashkend, has been a deadly enemy of General Milintine, the Minister of War, and has been the editor of the "Russki Mir," which is the chief organ of the Slav party, and very hostile to Austria.

The displeasure, therefore, of the Imperial Government at the employment of General Tchernaieff by Servia is easily explained by the fears entertained that he may stimulate the violent party in Servia termed the "Omladinish," and thereby compromise the relations between Austria and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 315.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 251.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 5, 1876.*

I CALLED to-day on M. de Giers, with a view to ascertain in what light the Imperial Government viewed the startling events at Constantinople, and the impression they had produced.

In reply to my inquiries, M. de Giers stated that he had received no instructions from Prince Gortchakow, nor, indeed, had he received any intimation of the opinions of his Highness on the sudden change which had taken place at Constantinople.

His Excellency stated that he only received two Feldjägers per week from Ems, and that the last one had quitted on the 29th ultimo, before the deposition of the late Sultan had taken place.

All, therefore, that he could tell me was, that General Ignatiew had been instructed to maintain "des rélations d'affaires" with the Porte.

M. de Giers informed me that General Ignatiew had telegraphed that he had received an official notification of the accession of Murad V, which would be forwarded by post.

M. de Giers added that on completion of due formalities the recognition of the new Sovereign would, he presumed, take place.

In the meantime, he was not aware that any instructions had been sent to General Ignatiew to felicitate Murad V, but, as all the diplomatic business was transacted at Ems, he was not informed until later of the official intelligence received at, or the instructions transmitted from, Ems.

My German colleague, General Schweinitz, called on me to-day, and said that he was in the same state of obscurity as myself as to the impression produced on the Imperial Government by the events at Constantinople, observing very justly that the Russian Government were now at Ems.

I observe also, to a great degree, the same reticence on the part of the official and semi-official press, which is probably reserving its opinions until it receives the *mot d'ordre* from Ems.

The public here has received the sensational intelligence from Turkey during the last week with much emotion, with great surprise, and, I may say, with some satisfaction, considering that it may be the opening of a new era, which will tend to a satisfactory arrangement of the differences of the Porte with her Christian subjects in the Herzegovina and Bosnia, and to the general improvement of the Christian population of the Empire.

When the news of the dethronement of the Sultan was first received, some fears were entertained here that the new Sovereign would be subjected to the fanatic influence of the Softas, who were regarded as having been the prime movers of the revolution; but these fears have given way to sounder judgment, and the publication of the Imperial Hatt has produced a contrary impression, while there is undoubtedly a strong feeling of sympathy on the part of the Russian nation for the Christian population in Turkey, there is among the higher and enlightened classes an equally ardent desire for the maintenance of peace, and there is, moreover, a strong conviction that any entanglement of Russia in an European war, for which she is wholly unprepared, would be the greatest calamity which could befall the Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 316.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 10. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, June 1, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, Governor-General of Bosnia, was informed by telegraph early on Tuesday morning, the 30th ultimo, by the high functionaries and dignitaries assembled at the Porte, that, by universal consent, Sultan Abdul Aziz had been deposed, and His Majesty Sultan Murad had ascended the throne. This news was immediately made public, and a salute of 105 guns was fired from the fortress.

The information received was also officially communicated to myself and colleagues, and in the course of the day we all, with the exception of the French Consul, who declined to take any steps in the matter without instructions from his Government, called in uniform on their Excellencies Ibrahim Pasha and Haidar Effendi to offer our congratulations. In the evening the former held an informal reception at the palace of all the chief functionaries and notables of the place, both Mussulman and Christian, at which the Consular Corps was also present, and the greatest satisfaction and even joy was manifested by everyone at the change of Sovereign.

The rejoicings have lasted three days, and the town has been illuminated every

night; and I am happy to be able to report that the utmost order has prevailed throughout and the most perfect harmony between all classes and creeds.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

No. 317.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 17. Political.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, June 2, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the revolt in the north of this province is still maintained with the greatest persistency. Although the Turkish troops gain partial successes from time to time over the insurgents and scatter their bands, these latter invariably reform again, and others are constantly appearing in fresh directions.

Besides many other trifling encounters reported to have occurred lately, a severe engagement is said to have taken place on the 22nd ultimo at about two hours distance from the town of Bihach. According to official reports a large body of insurgents endeavoured to cross the Unna, but being vigorously attacked by a Turkish force, retreated towards Austrian territory. They were not allowed, however, to cross the frontier, and the Turks gained a complete victory, the insurgent band being broken up, with the loss of a great many men, while the casualties on the Turkish side were trifling.

Information has been received here that a considerable band of insurgents has again crossed the Save near Svinj, and succeeded in gaining the Vuchiak Brdo Mountains; and the Austrian Consular courier, who arrived yesterday, reports that when he left Brood a sharp fusillade was going on within earshot of that town. Great fears are, consequently, entertained for the safety of the Brood road, and the Turkish post has refused this week to accept any groups or packets, and will only carry letters.

There have been reports lately of disturbances in the town of Priedor. The Slave newspapers have even asserted that there has been a massacre of the Christians, and that all those who escaped death have fled from the place. I believe, however, that there is not even a semblance of truth in these statements. Two Christian merchants are said to have been murdered by some Bashi-Bozouks in the vicinity of Priedor, and this fact has probably been magnified into a massacre, for I have not been able to authenticate any serious tumult. In the present disturbed state of the country, murders and acts of violence are unfortunately of too frequent occurrence, but I do not think that any hostile feelings, likely to engender a massacre, are entertained by the generality of Mussulmans in this province against the Christians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

No. 318.

Acting Consul Freeman to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 21. Consular.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, June 2, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch Consular, No. 19, of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the order received from Constantinople to sell the tithes of this province at public auction has again been revoked, and the arrangements previously commenced for the direct collection of the tax by Government are now being completed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. B. FREEMAN.

No. 319.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 574.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 4, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the copy of a note which I received this morning from Raschid Pasha, officially announcing the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Aziz and the accession of Sultan Mourad V to the throne of Turkey.

I likewise inclose the copy of my note acknowledging the receipt of this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 319.

Raschid Pasha to Sir H. Elliot.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Sublime Porte, le 2 Juin, 1876.*

J'AI l'honneur de notifier, au nom de la Sublime Porte, à votre Excellence que devant les vœux unanimes du peuple Abdul Aziz Khan a été déposé et l'héritier présomptif Sultan Mourad V proclamé Empereur de Turquie.

Votre Excellence, qui a déjà été informée de cet heureux événement par l'entremise d'un fonctionnaire supérieur de mon Département, a également eu connaissance du programme libéral du Gouvernement que Sa Majesté a consigné dans son Hatt Impérial, lu solennellement hier à la Sublime Porte et dont un exemplaire a été remis à M. le Premier Drogman de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique. Mon Auguste Maître s'est plu par son rescrit Impérial à réintégrer son Altesse le Grand Vézir dans ses fonctions et confirmer tous les Ministres dans leurs postes respectifs.

Je vous prie, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vouloir bien porter l'avénement au trône de Sa Majesté le Sultan Mourad Khan à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique qui, je n'en doute pas, voudra bien, dans ses sentiments d'amitié, s'empresser de reconnaître le nouveau Souverain.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) RASCHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 319.

Sir H. Elliot to Raschid Pasha.

Sir, *Therapia, June 4, 1876.*

I HAD this morning the honour to receive your Excellency's note, notifying, in the name of the Sublime Porte, the accession of Sultan Murad to the throne of the Turkish Empire.

I shall not fail to forward your Excellency's communication by the earliest opportunity to Her Majesty's Government, who, as your Excellency is aware, had already authorized me to congratulate His Majesty on his accession.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 320.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 577. Very Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 4, 1876.*

I LEARN in great confidence from Rashid Pasha that a Proclamation is being prepared, granting a full amnesty to the insurgents of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and stating that the military authorities would receive orders to abstain from hostilities, and from all military operations excepting such as were necessary for the provisioning of the fortresses, for a period of six weeks, during which the insurgents are invited to make known their grievances and requirements to the new Sovereign.

Rashid Pasha states that he has little doubt of this Proclamation being approved by the Council of Ministers, although it was opposed by one important member, who insisted that its adoption would be displeasing to Her Majesty's Government.

Rashid Pasha had, he said, taken upon himself to declare that there was no ground whatever for any such apprehension.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

P.S. *June* 5.—Since writing the above, I learnt that the instructions in question have been forwarded to the Imperial Authorities by the telegram of which the translation is inclosed.

H. E.

Inclosure in No. 320.

The Grand Vizier to the Commissioners in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SA Majesté Impériale notre auguste et bien-aimé Maître a voulu inaugurer son règne juste et régénérateur par une mesure éclatante qui corrobore ses sentiments de clémence et de haute sollicitude pour ses peuples.

Le Sultan Mourad V a, avant tout, tourné ses regards compatissants vers ses sujets égarés de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine et daigné accorder amnistie pleine et entière à tous les insurgés. Un délai de six semaines, à dater de la proclamation par vos soins du contenu de cette dépêche, leur est accordé pour qu'ils fassent leur soumission, rentrent chez eux, exposent leurs griefs et leurs sollicitations aux autorités locales qui ont reçu l'ordre d'y prêter l'oreille avec justice et bienveillance et de prendre toutes les mesures pour assurer également le bien-être des familles qui ne sont pas encore rentrées. Le Commandant-en-chef a été en même temps prévenu de cette amnistie générale afin de faire cesser partout les opérations militaires pendant les six semaines, et permettre ainsi aux insurgés de se mettre en toute sécurité en relation avec les autorités pour faire leur soumission.

Il est bien entendu que les mouvements nécessités par le ravitaillement de Nikchik seront exceptés de cette suspension des opérations.

Votre Excellence voudra donc bien, à la réception de cette dépêche, s'empresser d'en faire savoir la teneur au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale notre auguste Maître à tous les habitants de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine par une Proclamation spéciale rédigée en langues Turque et Bosniaque afin que les malheureux qui sont depuis longtemps frustrés de la douceur de leurs foyers sachent une fois pour toute que notre magnanime Souverain est prêt à leur ouvrir les bras, à ensevelir le passé dans un profond oubli et à leur faire largement profiter des bienfaits de son règne.

No. 321.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 303. Confidential.)
Vienna, June 9, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Monson's Political despatch to your Lordship, No. 47 of the 4th instant, which I forward to-day by post, reporting the refusal of Baron Rodich to assent to Wassa Effendi's proposal to receive the Herzegovinian refugees, and to quarter them provisionally at Trebigné, I took an early opportunity, after receiving Mr. Monson's telegram, to speak to Count Andrassy on the subject. His Excellency, who expressed surprise at the statement made by Wassa Effendi, observing that there must have been some misapprehension on his part, said he would cause an inquiry to be made into the matter, as he could see no objection to Wassa Effendi's proposal, and would gladly learn that all the refugees had left for Trebigné.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 322.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 46. Political.)
Ragusa, June 4, 1876.

My Lord,

IN the afternoon of the day before yesterday I learned from one of the captains in the service of the Austrian Lloyd that a steamer (the "Ario"?) belonging to that Company had put into Gravosa at 2 o'clock that morning for coal; that she was bound for Cattaro, and had on board 14,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition, packed in cases as provisions, and destined for Montenegro. My informant having solemnly asseverated the truth of this statement, I lost no time in telegraphing the news to Sir Andrew Buchanan for communication to your Lordship.

It was reported yesterday that measures had been taken to stop the vessel at Cattaro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 323.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 47. Political.)
Ragusa, June 4, 1876.

My Lord,

WASSA EFFENDI, the President of the Reform Commission, returned from Trebinje on the 2nd instant. He called upon me yesterday evening, and told me that Baron Rodich would not assent to the proposal he had made, that all the Herzegovinian refugees who are willing to return should be received and provisionally quartered at Trebinje. The Turkish authorities have accumulated a large quantity of provisions and building materials at that place, which is distant but five hours by a good carriage-road from Ragusa. There are also there sufficient troops for the protection of the refugees; and the Civil Governor here, to whom Wassa Effendi had some days ago communicated this plan, fully agreed in its expediency and in the practicability of the fugitives being in this manner gradually reinstated in their homes, while the Austrian Government would be immediately relieved from the burden of their support.

The reason of Baron Rodich's refusal is unknown, but Wassa Effendi presumes that he requires that the refugees should at once be reinstalled each in his own house, and that they should be received by a Turkish Commissioner at any point of the frontier that they may choose, and protected by a sufficient force. Wassa Effendi argues, and it seems to me incontrovertibly, that such a plan is impracticable; that the nature of the country and the condition of affairs alike render its execution impossible; and that the only feasible proceeding for the repatriation of the refugees is the one he proposes.

In accordance with his urgent request, I yesterday evening telegraphed in this sense to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 324.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 48. Political.)
Ragusa, June 4, 1876.

My Lord,

M. DE WESSILITSKY returned from Cettigné the day before yesterday. He tells me that he considers his quasi-diplomatic rôle at an end, and that, for the present, he shall occupy himself exclusively with the relief of the refugees. Of these, he says, there are certainly over 60,000 in Montenegro, of whom a large proportion are women; and that, in spite of the large sums continually sent from Russia, they are in a pitiable condition. No money, he declares, can be spared for those who are in receipt of relief from the Austrian Government.

In M. de Wessilitzky's opinion, the claims of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to autonomy under the suzerainty of the Porte were not sufficiently taken into consideration at Berlin. He implied that the eventual partition of these provinces between Servia and Montenegro is the object always held in view by certain influential Statesmen; whereas he has always contended that the proper application of the Andrassy reforms would be the best solution for the present. He is no friend to the Russian idea of annexing a portion of the Herzegovina to Montenegro; having, it is alleged, ambitious designs of his own with reference to the future government of the Province of which he claims to be in some sort a native.

He declared that, during his recent stay at Cettigné, he had learned nothing whatever of the progress of the negotiations now going on there under the auspices of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 325.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 12.)

Buda-Pesth, June 7, 1876.

Sir,

ACCORDING to a letter of the 4th instant from Belgrade to the "Pester Correspondenz,"—alleged to be from a most trustworthy source—M. Ristics and another are the only two Ministers in the Servian Cabinet who oppose the immediate beginning of the war against Turkey, and on the two grounds that the forced loan comes in slowly, and will scarcely produce 180,000*l.*, and that all attempts at securing allies for Servia had failed. But even more sensible reasons could not now change the situation, and M. Ristics must yield to M. Gruics and his colleagues.

It further states that, as yet, Servia has spent some 250,000*l.* to 350,000*l.* in arming, but only in horses, accoutrements, harnessing, and saddles; for, although a contract for steel cannon and chassepots is signed, the contractor demands a large instalment of money in advance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 326.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 257. Very Confidential.)

Berlin, June 5, 1876.

My Lord,

THE Continental press ascribes the authorship of the Memorandum of the Berlin Conference to Prince Gortchakow, which is incorrect.

As your Lordship already knows, that document embodies the ideas of Count Andrassy, and was dictated by him to Baron Jomini after a long discussion with the Czar, in which he successfully persuaded His Majesty to adopt his views in preference to those of the Russian Chancellor.

The Memorandum which Prince Gortchakow brought with him from St. Petersburgh for submission to the Conference at Berlin was a bulky document of nearly seventy pages, in which he advocated the establishment of autonomic States under the suzerainty of the Sultan, like Roumania or Servia, as the best means of pacifying the revolted provinces.

This Memorandum was at once rejected by his colleagues, and Count Andrassy undertook the drawing up of the Memorandum, which was then submitted to the consideration of the Governments of England, France, and Italy on the 13th of May.

I am now informed on very good authority that Prince Gortchakow wishes for a general Conference, in the hope of getting his own plan of pacification adopted by the Great Powers, which Count Andrassy resisted and rejected in the Berlin Conference.

Prince Gortchakow flatters himself that he will have the support of the "Times" newspaper, in which a plan similar to his own has been repeatedly recommended.

It is suspected that he will endeavour to enlist the Governments of France and Italy to support his wish for a general Conference through the French and Italian

Ambassadors, M. de Goutaut and M. de Nigra, who are both gone to see him at Ems.

This information is, however, derived from a private, and not from any official source.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 327.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 260.)

Berlin, June 7, 1876.

My Lord,

I AM told that Prince Gortchakow is in favour of communicating to the Porte, after the recognition of the new Sultan Mourad V, the notes which were to have been presented on the 30th ultimo to the Ministers of the late Sultan Abdul Aziz.

Count Andrassy is in favour of delay, but says he will consent to the communication if Prince Gortchakow wishes it.

Prince Bismarck agrees with Count Andrassy in recommending further delay, since the Porte has already of her own accord proposed an amnesty and an armistice, and seems inclined to communicate directly with the insurgents, and listen to the expression of their grievances and requirements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 328.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 263. Most Confidential.)

Berlin, June 8, 1876.

My Lord,

THE first leader in the "Times" of Friday the 2nd instant, recommending that England and France should unite to make known to the Northern Powers what settlement they think most equitable for the pacification of the revolted Provinces of Turkey, has created some alarm in Berlin, because it is assumed to mean that the Anglo-French Alliance is about to be revived in opposition to the Northern Alliance.

The alarm has been increased by the telegraphic summary of another leader in the "Times" of the 6th instant, announcing the existence of a resolve that Russia shall not tear the Treaty of 1856 with impunity.

The friends of Russia in Berlin having succeeded in disquieting the mind of the Emperor William in regard to the policy of England with these articles, I was glad to be able to tell Prince Bismarck and Herr von Bülow that I had a telegram from your Lordship stating that there was no foundation for the report in Berlin of a revival of the Anglo-French Alliance in opposition to the Northern Powers.

Prince Bismarck told me in strict confidence that the Emperor William had been so much alarmed at the report that His Majesty had written him an autograph note, which he showed me, asking what should be done under the circumstances.

He (Prince Bismarck) had explained to the Emperor that the "Times" was not a "Ministerial paper," and that the anonymous writers of those articles were probably engaged, like the rest of the press of Europe, in stock-jobbing speculations.

He was much obliged for your Lordship's communication, which he would at once submit to the Emperor in confirmation of his own assurances that the report was totally unfounded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 329.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 265. Confidential.)
Berlin, June 9, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 445 of the 2nd instant, marked Confidential, I have to thank your Lordship for sending me, by to-day's messenger, a copy of Sir Andrew Buchanan's despatch No. 323 of the 26th ultimo.

According to the passage in that despatch relating to myself, which I was curious to see, Count Andrassy said "that your Lordship seemed to be under an impression that Her Majesty's Government had been invited to give an immediate answer to the telegraphic summary of the Berlin proposals transmitted to them by Lord Odo Russell. This, he repeated, was entirely incorrect, but he supposed as the French and Italian Ambassadors appeared to have no doubt that the proposals would be at once accepted by their respective Governments, and Lord Odo Russell expressed a personal opinion that they contained nothing contrary to the views of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortchakow may have intimated a wish to receive an answer before his departure from Berlin."

My distinct recollection of what passed at the Conference is as follows:—

After Baron Jomini had read us the memorandum of the 13th of May, and that Prince Gortchakow had invited us to submit a copy of it to the consideration of our respective Governments, I was the first to speak, and merely said that having no instructions I could only receive it *ad referendum*.

My French colleague said about the same thing, my Italian colleague also, but he spoke at some length, because he had instructions to give expression to the sentiments of friendship his Sovereign entertained for the Northern Powers.

Prince Gortchakow, who was speaking as "Doyen," in the name of his colleagues at their own request, on finding that in the absence of instructions we could give no opinion on the memorandum communicated to us, then expressed a hope that we might be able to let them know before he and Count Andrassy left on the following Monday how it had been received by our Governments.

I was particularly careful not to express any personal opinion or to commit Her Majesty's Government one way or the other during the Conference, which I was the first to leave as soon as it was over.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 330.

Mr. Hill to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 37.)
Munich, June 9, 1876.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's telegram of the 30th ultimo, announcing the deposition of the late Sultan of Turkey, reached me the same day.

Here, as elsewhere, the questions arising from the state of affairs in the insurgent Turkish provinces form a chief topic of conversation, and I am glad to be able to report that there appears to be a general feeling of satisfaction at the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government since the Berlin Memorandum was communicated to them.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs indeed maintains the reserve which is habitual to him in all matters of interest or importance; but, on the other hand, from persons whose views on most subjects are so widely different as those of a high Papal dignitary and a liberal Protestant professor, I have received expressions of the satisfaction with which they have learnt what they consider the honest and honourable action of England in the present crisis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLEMENT L. HILL.

No. 331.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, June 12, 1876.

TURKISH Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to state to Count Andrassy that the Porte, at the same time that it orders the suspension of hostilities in the Herzegovina, strictly maintains all previous engagements and promises made in regard to the insurgent districts.

No. 332.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 12.)

(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, June 12, 1876.

I SENT the following figures to Mr. White:—

"Porte is much pleased by a satisfactory message received from the Prince of Servia in answer to an inquiry it had made of the Prince into the cause of his armaments.

"His Highness states that in presence of Turkish forces (placed?) on her frontier, Servia could not avoid taking defensive measures, but she maintains no hostile design; that she has to rely for her existence on the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and the Prince proposes to send a delegate to Constantinople to convey his assurances of (good wishes?) for peace and good neighbourhood towards the Porte.

"Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs observes that the Prince has never before used such conciliatory language."

No. 333.

Raschid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha. June 13.)

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 12 Juin, 1876.

POUR faire suite à mon télégramme du 5 de ce mois, je vous transmets ci-dessous le texte d'un télégramme adressé par Son Altesse le Grand Vézir aux Commissaires Impériaux en Bosnie et en Herzégovine:—

"Par mon télégramme du . . . . . , je vous avais annoncé l'armistice accordée par Sa Majesté Impériale Mourad V aux insurgés de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine et les mesures arrêtées par ordre Souverain à leur égard. Si ce télégramme ne fait pas mention des dernières réformes octroyées par le Gouvernement Impérial, c'est parce qu'elles sont acquises déjà aux populations de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, et que les Commissions des réformes sont chargées de leur pleine exécution sur la base des instructions remises à leurs présidents. Veuillez donc ajouter à la Proclamation que vous êtes chargé de publier, que ces réformes sont et demeurent maintenues dans toute leur intégrité.

"Il va sans dire que pendant le délai de six semaines qui vient d'être accordé aux insurgés pour faire leur soumission et rentre dans leurs foyers, votre Excellence ne négligera rien pour les faire profiter des bienfaits qui leur ont été accordés par le Gouvernement Impérial. La Commission doit donc s'occuper sans retard et très activement de la mise à exécution des réformes conformément aux instructions et aux pouvoirs dont elle est munie. Les autorités locales écouteront avec justice et bienveillance les sollicitations et les griefs légitimes des délégués qui seront désignés de la part de ceux qui voudront faire leur soumission, afin de les soumettre à l'appréciation du Gouvernement Impérial."

Veuillez faire part à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la teneur de ce télégramme.

No. 334.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 381.)
Foreign Office, June 13, 1876.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government instructed your Excellency by telegraph, on being informed of the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz, to take such steps as might be proper for congratulating Sultan Mourad personally on his accession, and on the 9th instant I forwarded to you the Queen's letter of credence, accrediting you as Her Majesty's Ambassador to His Imperial Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government considered that in the present state of affairs it was desirable that your Excellency should be in a position to enter into the closest official relations with the Sultan and the newly instituted Government without delay, and they have, therefore, not awaited the observance of all the usual formalities on such occasions before authorizing you to present your credentials.

The Sultan and his Ministers cannot but be aware of the serious nature of the present crisis, and of the urgent importance of taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the change of Government to establish the administration of the country on a sound footing. Above all it is essential that no time should be lost in executing the reforms in the insurgent Provinces in a real and effectual manner.

In the note to Count Beust of the I pointed out that the reforms suggested by the Powers were all, or nearly all, already provided for by the Firmans of the Porte, or the laws of the Turkish Empire, and in recommending them to the Porte Her Majesty's Government felt that they were but asking the Porte to carry out those principles which it has constantly professed.

At the same time it is undeniable that the liberal and enlightened projects of reforms which have from time to time been promulgated at Constantinople, have not been brought into practical operation in the provinces. The spirit of obstruction has been permitted, by the laxity of the Porte, to prevail, and ignorance and corruption have too frequently disgraced the Administration, until the discontent of the Mahommedans as well as Christians has culminated in the overthrow of the late Sultan's throne.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much satisfaction that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna has assured the Austrian Government that the Porte abides by all the engagements for reforms in the disaffected provinces into which the Government of the late Sultan had entered. It is not enough, however, that the Porte should make assurances of its intentions, it should show the force of its intentions by its acts.

The incapable men who, as your Excellency has had too often reason to know have been placed in positions of authority, should be at once removed and replaced by those who can gain the confidence and respect of the people. Extortion and corruption should be promptly punished, and the reforms in the administration of justice, and the concession of full civil rights to all the religious communities rigorously proceeded with.

It is only by this means that the Porte can hope to forestall the designs of the enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and to secure for the new Government the confidence which under the rule of the late Sultan had been so disastrously forfeited.

Her Majesty's Government are not ignorant of the difficulty of uprooting abuses of long standing, and effecting a radical reform in the the administration of a country like Turkey, but the necessity is imperative, and Her Majesty's Government would not be doing their duty as a friendly and allied Government if they now shrank from urging it.

They feel that they are in a position, from the circumstances of the political situation, in which their counsel should carry with it peculiar weight, and they accordingly desire that your Excellency should avail yourself of the earliest occasion to express these views to the Sultan in courteous and becoming, but explicit language.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY

No. 335.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 289.)
Foreign Office, June 13, 1876.

Sir,

I SHOULD wish your Excellency to call the attention of Count Andrassy to the statements contained in the telegram from Mr. Monson which you forwarded to me on the 7th instant respecting the landing at Cattaro of cargoes of munitions of war destined for Montenegro, and to state at the same time that this information has been substantially confirmed by Her Majesty's Consul in Bosnia, who reports the landing at Cattaro of 1,800 cases of rifles with ammunition.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 336.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 13.)

Athens, June 13, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

TURKISH Minister informed me this morning that within the last few days the language of the President of the Council and of the Minister for Foreign Affairs had undergone a change. They now state that in the event of a rising in Servia it will be impossible to prevent Greek nation from taking part in a movement against Turkey. This, taken in connection with ———'s, of a Treaty between Greece, Servia, and other States, makes him think some inducement may have been held out to Greece to change her attitude.

He fears disturbances in Crete; and Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday, seemed anxious on this account. I have sent above figures to Constantinople.

No. 337.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 13.)*

Vienna, June 13, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

GENERAL MOLINARY reports that a collision took place yesterday on the military frontier between a detachment of Austrian troops and a band of 500 insurgents.

The latter having fired on the detachment and killed a man, the fire was returned. Thirty insurgents were killed and three made prisoners, the remainder escaping to the mountains; orders have consequently been given to reinforce troops in the district.

No. 338.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 21.)
Scutari, May 31, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch addressed by me this day to Sir Henry Elliot, and reporting to his Excellency the manner in which the news of the change of Sultans at Constantinople has been received by the authorities and public in this place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople.

Inclosure in No. 338.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Scutari, May 31, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that yesterday morning the Governor-General sent to inform me that he had received a telegram from the Porte, stating that, the Ottoman Throne having become vacant, Murad Effendi had been proclaimed Sultan. Later in the day I received a written communication from his Excellency to the effect that, Sultan Abdul Aziz having been dethroned by the unanimous wish of the nation, His Imperial Majesty Murad had been named his successor.

This morning the whole of the Consular body paid a visit to the Governor-General, and was received with every possible sign of honour, respect, and satisfaction. All the troops were drawn up before the Governor's residence, and presented arms on the arrival of the Consuls. A salute of twenty-one guns was also fired.

Achmed Hamdi Pasha endeavoured by every means in his power to create the impression that the new order of things at the capital will bring closer together than hitherto all the different nationalities and creeds existing in the Empire, and his success in conveying this belief has given universal satisfaction.

This afternoon I had the honour of replying in the following words to your Excellency's Circular telegram of the same date:—

"Sultan Murad's accession to the throne has caused among all classes here the greatest satisfaction. The local authorities have publicly marked their friendliness towards Christians and foreigners. Consular body paid official visit to Vali this morning."

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 339.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 366. Confidential.)

Vienna, June 10, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegraphic despatches of the 6th, 7th, and 9th instant, I have the honour to report further to your Lordship that, on the 6th, when I spoke to Count Andrassy of the communication made to Baron Hofmann of the copy of a telegraphic despatch, reporting the amnesty granted by the Sultan to the insurgents in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and the orders sent to the Turkish Commander-in-chief and the civil authorities in those provinces to suspend hostilities for six weeks, and to invite the insurgents to state their grievances to the local authorities, and to communicate with them, with a view to the restoration of peace, his Excellency gave me to understand that no communication had been made to him on the subject by the Turkish Government.

I therefore said that Faleon Effendi, the First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, had informed me that he had left, in the course of the morning, with Baron Hofmann, for communication to his Excellency the copy of a telegram, by which the Ambassador had been instructed to acquaint him with the substance of a letter from the Grand Vizier to the Turkish authorities in the province, by which, at all events, the suspension of hostilities to which his Excellency had attached so much importance, had now been spontaneously granted by the Porte.

His Excellency answered that Faleon Effendi might possibly have given some information to Baron Hofmann as to orders sent by the Porte to the authorities in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, but if they were only those respecting which a report had been received by him from Count Zichy, they would prove of little use in promoting the pacification of the provinces; that the question at issue could not be arranged by verbal communication of Faleon Effendi, and that the Porte ought to have stated officially that the armistice which they would be asked for by the Powers (here his Excellency corrected himself, saying, "which was wished for"), had been granted.

I had some communication subsequently on the subject in the course of the evening with Faleon Effendi, who stated to me that he delivered the copy of the telegram to Baron Hofmann early in the day, who was at the time about to confer with

Count Andrassy, and he therefore considered it impossible that it had not been communicated to his Excellency.

Next day I called on the French Ambassador and mentioned to him what had passed, observing that the communication made by the Turkish Embassy appeared to have embarrassed and annoyed Count Andrassy. Count de Vogüé said that he had seen his Excellency on the previous day, immediately after he had left the Russian Ambassador, when he was evidently vexed and annoyed at finding that he was expected to join Russia in addressing a note to the Porte, urging the acceptance of the armistice proposed by the Berlin Memorandum.

This information seemed to me to explain the unwillingness which Count Andrassy had shown to accept as satisfactory the orders given by the Grand Vizier for a suspension of hostilities; and I, therefore, called on the Turkish Ambassador and communicated it to him, suggesting that he might either perhaps still prevent the delivery of the note at Constantinople, or, if too late to do so, render it more easy for the Porte to answer it, if he addressed an official letter to Count Andrassy, referring to the verbal communication made to him on the previous day, and inclosing a copy of Raschid Pasha's telegram, accompanied by the expression of a hope that his Excellency would see in the amnesty proclaimed by the Sultan and the orders given by the Grand Vizier an intention of the Porte to meet the wishes which had been frequently expressed by his Excellency with respect to an armistice, and that orders would consequently be given to the Imperial authorities in Dalmatia and Croatia to concert measures with those of Bosnia and the Herzegovina for the return of the refugees to their homes.

A note to this effect, of which Aarifi Pasha has been good enough to communicate to me the copy (which I inclose herewith), was sent in the course of the afternoon to Count Andrassy; and his Excellency, the same evening, expressed to me a favourable opinion of the measures announced by the Porte, probably because, as I have since learnt, information had been received from Ems that Prince Gortchakow had assented to an arrangement by which the Parties to the Berlin Memorandum shall continue to maintain in principle the points on which they have agreed, but to suspend recommending them officially to the acceptance of the Porte, until the new Government has had time to consider the course which it may spontaneously adopt with regard to them.

I believe, my Lord, the above to be a correct account of what has passed here during the last few days; but I may mention, as a proof of the disposition to withhold information, that, on my asking Baron Hofmann yesterday in what form the notification had been communicated to the Government, he answered that Faleon Effendi had merely called and left with him a copy of a telegram stating the substance of the Grand Vizier's letter to the Commissioners.

I understand that Count Andrassy has expressed himself as much indebted to the French Government for promoting an arrangement at Ems which has released him from a very serious embarrassment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 339.

Aarifi Pasha to Count Andrassy.

Vienne, le 7 Juin, 1876.

M. le Comte,

POUR faire suite à la démarche que le Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade, Faleon Effendi, a été chargé de faire, hier, au Ministère Impérial et Royal, concernant la communication verbale d'un télégramme de la Sublime Porte, relatif à la lettre adressée, d'ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, par Son Altesse le Grand Vizir, aux Commissaires Impériaux en Bosnie et en Herzégovine, je m'empresse de transmettre, sous ce pli, à votre Excellence, une copie de cet important document.

Votre Excellence voudra bien y relever que Sa Majesté Impériale accorde, non-seulement une amnistie pleine et entière à tous les insurgés qui feront leur soumission dans le délai de six semaines, à dater de la publication de la lettre en question, mais qu'en même temps le Commandant-en-chef des troupes Ottomanes a été prévenue de cette amnistie générale, afin de faire cesser partout les opérations, pendant la période sus-mentionnée, à l'exception toutefois des mouvements pour le ravitaillement de Nichsich, et de permettre ainsi aux insurgés d'entrer, en toute sécurité, en rapport avec les autorités locales.

Je suis d'autant plus heureux de faire part à votre Excellence, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, du contenu de la lettre Grand-Vézirielle, que je présume qu'elle aura lieu d'en être satisfaite. La suspension des opérations militaires, pendant un délai déterminé, rentre, en effet, pleinement dans les idées que votre Excellence m'a maintes fois exposées et va, en quelque sorte, au devant des désirs des Puissances qui ont toujours considéré l'adoption de cette mesure comme un acheminement vers une prompte pacification.

Je me permettrai, en terminant, d'exprimer l'espoir que des instructions seront transmises d'urgence aux autorités Impériales et Royales, tant en Dalmatie qu'en Croatie, qui leur prescrivent d'employer leurs bons offices pour faciliter le rapatriement des réfugiés.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) AARIFI.

No. 340.

Raschid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, June 14.*)

Constantinople, le 13 *Juin*, 1876.

(Télégraphique.)

POUR faire suite à mon télégramme du 8 de ce mois, je vous transmets ci-dessous, pour votre information personnelle, la réponse du Prince de Servie, ainsi que la réplique du Grand Vézir à Son Altesse :—

"*Belgrade, le 7 Juin.*

"J'ai reçu le télégramme de votre Altesse en date d'hier, et j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à sa haute appréciation les considérations suivantes :—

"Lorsque l'insurrection éclata l'année dernière en Herzégovine, une vive émotion s'empara des esprits en Servie; la vigilance de nos autorités se trouvant dans les premiers moments surprise, un certain nombre d'individus originaires soit d'Herzégovine, soit de Bosnie, et établis dans la Principauté, passèrent la frontière. Me trouvant alors à Vienne, j'ai fait prendre, dès mon retour, les mesures les plus sérieuses pour la surveillance de la frontière, de sorte que depuis l'automne dernier pas un seul volontaire ne l'a franchie pour pénétrer dans les provinces limitrophes de la Principauté. Néanmoins, les agressions des Bachi-Bozouks, Tcherkès, et Arnoutes, leurs incursions armées sur le territoire de la Principauté n'ont pas cessé jusqu'à ce jour, de sorte que mon Gouvernement a dû en faire continuellement l'objet de plaintes légitimes auprès des Gouverneurs-Généraux de Provinces et même auprès de la Sublime Porte. Ces plaintes ont engagé le Gouvernement Impérial à déléguer, pour les examiner, le Colonel Faïk Bey, et à inviter mon Gouvernement à envoyer aussi un délégué. C'est à la suite de cette invitation que le Colonel Oreschkovitch a été désigné de notre part. J'attendrai avec confiance le résultat de cette Commission, qui constatera suffisamment d'où sont parties les agressions dont parle la dépêche de votre Altesse. De même nos troupes qui, aux premiers bruits alarmants, avaient été désignées sur la frontière, en ont été rappelées déjà avant l'hiver; il ne s'y trouve nulle part aujourd'hui de troupes Serbes, à l'exception des ouvriers employés aux travaux de défense. Malgré cela, l'armée Impériale est restée dans ses positions, enveloppant la Servie d'un cercle de fer, et entretenant dans les esprits des appréhensions continuelles qui ont arrêté dans le pays tout commerce et toute industrie. En face d'une insurrection qui s'étend jusque dans le voisinage de la Servie depuis déjà six mois, en face des incursions armées de bandes indisciplinées qui répandent l'incendie et le pillage dans nos districts frontières, enfin, en face de l'attitude menaçante de l'armée Impériale vis-à-vis de la Servie, l'Assemblée Nationale a chargé mon Gouvernement de veiller à la sûreté du pays, et a mis dans ce but à sa disposition les moyens nécessaires. Telle est, Altesse, la vraie et unique signification des préparatifs militaires qui se font ici; destinés à la défense du pays, ils cesseront en même temps que les causes qui les ont provoqués; ils n'ont d'autres buts. Eloigné de tout dessein qui pût porter atteinte soit aux rapports dans lesquels se trouve vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte, soit à l'intégrité de l'Empire, intégrité dans laquelle la Servie puise sa force, et voyant, d'autre part, d'après votre dépêche, que les bruits alarmants concernant la Servie trouvent créance à Constantinople, j'ai résolu d'y envoyer un délégué spécial qui donnera à la Sublime Porte tous les éclaircissements nécessaires, et aura l'ordre de s'entendre avec le Gouvernement Impérial par un échange d'explications franches et loyales, de manière à mettre nos rapports réciproques sur le pied d'une entière confiance. Mon Envoyé partira sans délai, et je ferai connaître son nom à votre Altesse par l'intermédiaire de mon Agent à Constantinople."

Réponse du Grand Vizir, le 12 *Juin.*

J'ai reçu le télégramme de votre Altesse du 7 Juin. Je suis heureux, mon Prince, de dire à votre Altesse que, pendant ma carrière de cinquante années, il m'a été donné de constater que les dispositions et les sentiments bienveillants du Gouvernement Impérial à l'égard de la Servie sont restés invariables et ont été corroborés par des preuves successives et éclatantes, et que la politique traditionnelle de la Sublime Porte a été de respecter toujours et en toute occasion, en conformité des stipulations des Hatti Chérif et des Traités, l'autonomie et les privilèges de la Principauté. Je me félicite d'autant plus de témoigner aujourd'hui encore à votre Altesse ces dispositions, qu'en ma qualité de vieux Serviteur de l'Etat, et m'inspirant de cette même politique, je n'ai cessé de concourir à tout ce qui a été de nature à assurer le bonheur et la prospérité de la Servie. Je rappellerai même ici avec satisfaction que je me suis trouvé au pouvoir dans des circonstances qui ont été particulièrement favorables à la Principauté. Je me flatte d'espérer, mon Prince, que votre Altesse, dont nous connaissons les sentiments à l'égard de la Cour Souveraine, ne doutera pas de ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de dire. Elle s'expliquera dès lors aisément les mesures de précaution qui ont dû être prises par le Gouvernement Impérial au début de l'insurrection de l'Herzégovine, et en présence surtout des incursions de bandes et de la vive agitation des esprits constatée par votre Altesse elle-même, agitation qui s'est manifestée dans la Principauté. Ces incursions avaient même pris depuis un caractère inquiétant; les bandes qui passaient la ligne de démarcation allant jusqu'à incendier des corps de garde, à tirer sur nos patrouilles, à assassiner des gendarmes isolés, à commettre des meurtres sur des gens inoffensifs, à piller des villages, à brûler les récoltes, à enlever les bestiaux, &c. En face de cette situation et en considération de la probabilité que des réclamations analogues aient pu avoir lieu de la part des autorités Princières, nous avons nous-mêmes pris l'initiative de faire constater sur les lieux mêmes les plaintes des autorités locales par une Commission composée d'un délégué Ottoman et d'un délégué Serbe. Si le départ du premier a été ajourné, c'est à la suite de l'information qui nous a été fournie par l'Agent de votre Altesse que le délégué Serbe étant malade, il ne pourrait pour le moment se rendre à sa destination. Telles sont en résumé, mon Prince, les causes des mesures de précaution prises par la Sublime Porte, et dont fait mention le télégramme de votre Altesse. Tel est le motif qui a fait différer provisoirement le départ du délégué Impérial, qui se mettra en route aussitôt que nous aurons reçu l'avis que son collègue est parti. Nous nourrissons, comme votre Altesse, l'espoir que cette Commission parviendra à résoudre les difficultés locales en donnant une solution satisfaisante aux plaintes formulées de part et d'autre.

No. 341.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 378.)

Foreign Office, June 14, 1876.

My Lord,

IN the course of a long and interesting conversation which I held with the Russian Ambassador on the 12th instant, he expressed regret at the general distrust which appeared to be felt in England as to the designs of his Government, thinking, as he said, that the character and antecedents of the Emperor were a sufficient guarantee for his pacific intentions.

I assured his Excellency, in reply, that we did not doubt, and never had doubted, the desire of the Emperor for the maintenance of peace; he was well known to be opposed on principle to a warlike policy, which, moreover, would be obviously opposed to the interests of Russia at the present moment; but I reminded his Excellency that the language and conduct of Russian Agents had not always been in accordance with what I could not doubt was the intention of the Government, and that the sympathy generally felt in Russia for the insurgent population of Turkey was a matter of notoriety. These circumstances were in themselves enough to explain any expressions indicative of suspicion or mistrust that might have appeared in the press, or in public speeches—expressions, I must observe, which had never been used or sanctioned by

Her Majesty's Government. I was glad, I added, to take the opportunity of acknowledging the importance of the service rendered to European peace by the warning recently addressed by the Emperor to the Prince of Servia, which, according to our latest reports, appeared to have accomplished its object.

In answer to a further inquiry by Count Schouvaloff, I said that it was not a part of the system or policy of England to take up a position of isolation in Eastern matters, as, indeed, our conduct during the last few months had shown. Her Majesty's Government had given their support to the note of Count Andrassy, though at no time sanguine of the results to be expected from it; they had dissented from the policy indicated in the Berlin Memorandum for reasons frankly stated by them at the time, and which they still held to be valid; it now appeared that action on that document was indefinitely postponed, and, as far as I saw, there was no present cause of difference between Her Majesty's Government and those of other Powers. All were agreed that the new Sultan should be allowed time to consider his policy and to deal with the insurgents by direct negotiation. The success or failure of his overtures to them remained to be seen, and while that continued uncertain, no further step could well be decided upon.

Count Schouvaloff did not dissent from the above observations, but said it would be desirable to know what was the solution of the difficulty which England desired to see adopted. What was the drift and object of British policy? Until that was known to his Government, united action was impossible, however much other Powers might desire it.

I said in reply that, supposing the negotiations now in progress between the Porte and the insurgents to end in a pacification, it was obvious that the object we desired would be effected without our interference, and nothing more need be said or done in the matter. Supposing them to fail—which, I did not conceal from him, I thought to be the more probable alternative—I doubted the possibility of effective interposition, unless we were prepared (which Her Majesty's Government were not) to use compulsion as against one or other party in the quarrel. The insurgents appeared to be fighting, not for administrative reforms, but for independence or autonomy in some form; the Porte, on the other hand, was willing to grant reforms more or less extensive, but would certainly not concede autonomy unless compelled: the differences between the views of the two parties seemed irreconcilable, and I did not believe that either would be willing to give way. Nothing, I thought, remained, except to allow the renewal of the struggle, until success should have declared itself more or less decisively on one side or the other; if the Sultan found that his troops could make no head against the insurgents, and that the latter continued to hold their ground, he might and probably would be willing to yield to the pressure of necessity. In that case, the revolted provinces would have acquired for themselves a position similar to that of Servia or Roumania. If, again, the Sultan succeeded in even partially re-establishing his authority, the demands of the insurgents would be moderated, their confidence would have received a check, and they would acquiesce in some such arrangement as that made with the Cretans after the war of 1866-67. In either event, the time would not be distant when the Powers might usefully and successfully mediate; but that time did not appear to me to have arrived as yet.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 342.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 599. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 14, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your despatch No. 403, Confidential, of the 7th instant, in which you transmit the drafts of two notes which it is proposed by the Duc Decazes should be presented to the Porte by the Powers, and which were left with you by his Excellency, the first being founded on the draft note which was to have been presented in consequence of the proposals at Berlin, and amended by the Duc Decazes; the second being a project of a note suggested by his Excellency.

Her Majesty's Government have great satisfaction in recognizing the friendly desire of the Duc Decazes to obtain the co-operation of Great Britain in the concerted

action of the other Powers who had agreed to the Berlin proposals. They feel, however, bound to point out that the draft of this present note varies rather in language than in substance from those proposals to which Her Majesty's Government with much regret felt themselves unable to assent.

Her Majesty's Government are still reluctantly compelled to abide by that decision, and since the previous identic note is confessedly superseded to so great an extent by the recent Proclamation of the Porte, and the new state of things arising from the deposition of the late Sultan, and has been indefinitely suspended, Her Majesty's Government cannot take part in any project which would revive it.

With regard to the second project of a note—that suggested by the Duc Decazes himself, Her Majesty's Government desire to state that, as they have no suggestions which they intend to offer to the Porte, and have declined to concur in offering those proposed at Berlin, it would not be possible for them to agree to the presentation of a note in which it was said that they were waiting "avant de présenter les suggestions amicales que la continuation de la lutte pourrait leur conseiller."

Her Majesty's Government, moreover, cannot but feel that the words above quoted are open to the objection of being in the nature of a menace to the Porte, and thus serving as an encouragement to the insurgents to continue the struggle in the expectation of an intervention of the Powers.

I have to request your Excellency to make known to the Duc Decazes the views of Her Majesty's Government as above expressed, and to assure his Excellency how fully Her Majesty's Government recognize the goodwill of the French Government in the matter. They confidently trust that the French Government will not see, in their declining to accept either of these drafts, anything but such an expression of opinion as they do not doubt that the Duc Decazes desired to elicit.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 343.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 600. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 14, 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 599 of this day's date, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government cannot overlook the fact that if the Powers who advocate enjoining proposals on the Porte are sincerely desirous of pacifying the insurgent provinces, they should show their good-will by restraining (as it is notorious that some of them have the means of doing) the open encouragement given to the insurgents, and by using real influence to restrain Servia and Montenegro.

Whatever may have been the origin of the insurrection, there can now be no doubt that it is fomented from without, and that the efforts of the Turkish Government are baffled in a military sense by the warnings addressed to the Porte to respect Montenegro, which is practically the focus of the insurrection; and in a political sense, by the projects continually put forward with the object of making the insurgents look to foreign Powers, and not to their own Government, for protection and guarantees, thus effectually discouraging any arrangement between the insurgents and the Porte.

While these causes are allowed to operate, and the prospect of military immunity and political advantages held out to the insurgent Chiefs, it is in vain to suppose that the districts can be pacified, even though, as appears to be probable, a majority of the inhabitants, or at all events a large number of them, may be anxious to return to their homes, and willing to submit to the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government leave to your Excellency's discretion the best manner of expressing these views in conversation with the Duc Decazes. Her Majesty's Government do not desire to make any formal representation on these matters, but as the Duc Decazes has invited a frank interchange of opinions, they think it right not to conceal from his Excellency what they believe to be now generally recognized as the true state of the case.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 344.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 601. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch Confidential, No. 600, of this day's date, I have to call your Excellency's attention, as showing the means by which the insurrection in Turkey is maintained, to the reports which Her Majesty's Government are receiving of the supplies of arms being received by Montenegro through Cattaro, and to the telegram from Consul Holmes, which arrived yesterday, stating that the insurgents had attacked the village of Razno, to which the inhabitants had returned, and driven off 2,000 head of their cattle.

It is obvious that while a frontier warfare of this kind is allowed to continue projects for pacification containing recommendations for the return of the inhabitants must be illusory.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 345.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 470.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1876.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 265 of the 9th instant, in which you correct Count Andrassy's version of what passed at the Berlin Conference, as far as concerns his impression with regard to your own observations, I have to state to you that I have never entertained a doubt as to your report of your attitude and remarks at the Conference having been literally accurate.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 346.

The Earl of Derby to Consul-General White.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1876.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, giving an account of an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, at which his Excellency requested me, on behalf of his Government, to authorize you to join your Austrian colleague in counselling moderation at Belgrade, and I have accordingly to instruct you to act in concert with your Austrian colleague in the manner desired.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 347.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 14, 1876.*

IF the Prince of Montenegro could be induced to follow the example of the Prince of Servia and send some one to Constantinople to congratulate the Sultan, great benefit would be likely to result from it.

The Porte does not appear altogether indisposed to make some concessions to Montenegro, but says naturally that it cannot make the first overtures.

No. 348.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 126.)
My Lord, *Athens, June 6, 1876.*

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship yesterday by telegraph that Greece had officially recognized the new Government in Turkey.

I think that the Hellenic Government rather prides itself on having been one of the first to recognize the accession to the Throne of Sultan Mourad, and that they are anxious to cultivate friendly relations with the Porte.

M. Commoundouros, the Prime Minister, whom I saw to-day, informed me that the revolution lately effected at Constantinople had produced a favourable impression in Greece, but he expressed a hope that the Sultan's promises would be accompanied by some guarantees which would ensure their fulfilment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 349.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Mostar, June 2, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch of 25th May addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, reporting the feeling with which the news of the accession of Sultan Murad was received here, also regarding the present state of the country and other matters.

Her Majesty's Ambassador having informed me of Mr. Freeman's appointment to the post of Vice-Consul at Mostar, and there seeming nothing more to be done here beyond reporting passing events, I intend to return to Serajevo next week, and shall send Mr. Freeman to Mostar as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

Inclosure in No. 349.

Consul Holmes to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Mostar, June 1, 1876.*

ON the 30th of May the Governor-General addressed a Circular to the European Delegates and Consuls here announcing the accession to the Throne of Sultan Murad Khan.

In the evening he held an official reception, and the town was ordered to be illuminated for three nights.

The population seems to have received this intelligence with indifference, but certainly with more satisfaction than regret. Ali Pasha told me that many of the Mussulmans believed that the late Sultan was dethroned because he was too favourable to the Christians, and because he would not consent to war with Montenegro and Servia. The official class is delighted with the change, and hope great things from it. Up to the present moment perfect tranquillity prevails.

Mouktar Pasha is still preparing for his expedition to Niebsich. In the meanwhile bands of the so-called insurgents pillage and destroy property in every direction, penetrating to even a few hours from Mostar. The Commander-in-chief says he cannot prevent this. He would require several thousands of Bashi-Bazouks and Pandours to do so. He seems to think that his soldiers are unfit for this duty and that it is not his business to attend to it. The fact is, that since the beginning of the revolution the troops have never done anything beyond endeavouring to carry provisions to their different posts, and in this even they can scarcely be said to have succeeded.

The peaceable inhabitants, both Mussulmans and Christians, are terribly wearied of their present situation, and no efforts seem to be made in the right direction to put an end to it.

I repeat what I have said before, that the war in the Herzegovina has been, and is, entirely kept up by the inhabitants of the old revolted districts, who have been

virtually independent of the Porte for the last fifteen years, supported by Montenegro. These people care nothing for any concessions which may be made to the inhabitants of the Herzegovina, which would in no wise affect them, and are ready to continue to harass the Turks and maintain their present attitude, so long as they receive orders to that effect from Montenegro and Russia, and while they are, as hitherto, protected and paid to do so. I, therefore, believe that no promises of reform or any amount of concession to the Christians will produce any effect until Montenegro is either persuaded or forced to give the signal for peace.

In the meantime, I hear that fresh Russian emissaries and officials are continually arriving at Cettigné, and that Russian vessels are landing cargoes of provisions at Cattaro for Montenegro, and that Russian money is also sent there without stint.

Under all these circumstances, I see nothing to prevent the present state of affairs from existing until the Turks are driven out of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 350.

Mr. St. John to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 62. Political.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, June 6, 1876.*

WITH reference to a telegram in the "Times" of the 31st ultimo, stating that the Montenegrin Minister of War had informed General Rodich that an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded between Servia, Montenegro, Roumania, and Greece, I have the honour to report that M. Cogalniceano, the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has, on my bringing it to his notice, informed me that the article in question, having appeared in several foreign newspapers, had already been officially contradicted by him, and solemnly assured me that, so far as these Principalities were concerned, the report was entirely false.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ST. JOHN.

No. 351.

Mr. St. John to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 63. Political. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, June 6, 1876.*

WITH reference to Mr. Vivian's despatch No. 47 of the 6th ultimo, inclosing details in connection with the Russian forces upon the Bessarabian frontier, as furnished by a Pole, formerly an officer in the Turkish contingent, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying extract of a letter dated May 23rd, which I have received from the same person, now residing on the Danube, close to the Servian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ST. JOHN.

Inclosure in No. 351.

Extract of a Letter dated Tenou Severin, May 23, 1876.

AVANT-HIER j'ai reçu une lettre de mon compatriote de Kilia en date du 10 Août, par laquelle il m'informe que l'armée Russe en Bessarabie s'augmente de jour en jour par l'arrivée de détachements d'Infanterie.

Je regrette sincèrement que je ne puis vous donner des renseignements plus détaillés pour le moment.

Heureusement qu'il m'est possible de vous donner, par contre, quelques détails, non sans importance, sur la Serbie.

A Cladova, qui est sise vis-à-vis de cette ville, on a réuni, avec le consentement tacite du Gouvernement, 900 volontaires, parmi lesquels il y a soixante Italiens, anciens compagnons de Garibaldi.

Tous ces volontaires sont parfaitement équipés, et armés de fusils du système Autrichien à six coups ainsi que de revolvers.

Leur Commandant-en-chef est un certain Voïvode Panaïote, qui s'est déjà distingué pendant le soulèvement de la Bulgarie en 1868.

Ce corps a été formé pour agir dans le Balcan dans le but de soulever les Bulgares.

Panaïote, qui est d'origine Bulgare, a très-grande influence avec ses compatriotes, mais n'étant pas militaire, il a auprès de lui un capitaine de l'armée Russe, qui véritablement est le Commandant-en-chef.

Chacun des volontaires sans distinction de grade—les chefs y compris—reçoivent 1 fr. par jour. C'est à la fin de la campagne qu'ils seront récompensés par la patrie.

No. 352.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 16.)

(Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Buda-Pest, June 5, 1876.*

WITH reference to my two despatches of the 2nd instant, marked Confidential, I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that Server Effendi tells me that Count Andrassy sought, before leaving this capital, a second opportunity of conversation with him, and therein reiterated the desirableness of an armistice of at any rate eight days, and observed it was a good occasion to show this wish for reconciliation, as the insurgents were exhausted.

My Turkish colleague has reported to Constantinople that his impression, derived from these two conversations, is that Count Andrassy insists only upon a short armistice and has a desire to abandon the other points of the Berlin Conference.

It appears, too, that his Excellency allowed his vexation at Servia's proceedings to appear very clearly by saying, "Servia is determined to attack you; if you can beat her, so much the better for you and so much the better for us."

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

P.S.—May I ask your Excellency to be good enough to mark as "Most Confidential" my two despatches of the 2nd instant, which I inadvertently marked "Confidential" only?

J. P. H. G.

No. 353.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 50. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, June 7, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 46 of the 4th instant respecting the cargo of munitions of war destined for Montenegro, I am this morning assured that M. Plamenac, the Montenegrin Minister of War, came down to Cattaro with 1,700 Montenegrins to receive it. The cargo was landed, and the manifest, noting 6,000 rifles and a very large quantity of boxes of cartridges, was verified, and has been sent to Baron Rodich. The restriction on the export of arms to Montenegro has been removed, it appears; and no difficulty was made about the landing of the cargo. The rifles, which are said to be of the pattern in use in the Austrian army, but provided with the old-fashioned bayonet, were at once transported to Cettigné by the Montenegrins aforesaid.

I am further assured that another steamer, with six cannon and the requisite ammunition, is expected at Cattaro on Montenegrin account.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 354.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 51. Political.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, June 7, 1876.*

MOUKHTAR PASHA is said to have collected at Gatzko 750,000 okes of corn, and to be making preparations for another expedition to Nichsich. As no beast of burden can in these mountainous regions carry more than 70 okes, and as Moukhtar Pasha cannot have more than 2,000 animals at his disposal, a comparatively small portion only of this grain will reach the beleaguered fortress.

Some of the refugees from the district of Popowo regularly cross the frontier now to cultivate their fields during the day, returning to Austrian soil at night.

Among those quartered at Ragusa and in the immediate neighbourhood, typhus fever is said to be very prevalent; but the authorities are careful to conceal, as far as they can, the extent of the epidemic. I visit one or two of the refugee camps daily, and invariably encounter litters and coffins; but as I have no faith in any of the statistics I obtain here, I shall not commit myself to any statement of the proportion of cases and deaths.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 355.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 56. Political.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, June 7, 1876.*

PRINCE WREDE, my Austrian colleague, having returned from Pesth last night, where he had been to see Count Andrassy, I called upon him this morning to ask him what steps it was his intention to adopt with a view to impress upon the Prince of Servia, and of his Government, the pacific counsels of our Governments.

He replied, as he had told our Italian colleague a few hours previously, that Count Andrassy considered that all means of persuasion and friendly counsel had been exhausted by the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade when he had made his last representations here in March last, as reported in my despatches Nos. 14, 18, 20, and 21, all marked Political, to your Lordship, and that the Imperial Government had determined to abstain from giving any further advice to the Prince of Servia and to watch the events taking their course.

I told Prince Wrede that I had reason to believe that his Government had asked your Lordship distinctly to instruct me to join him in counselling moderation, and that, moreover, I understood from Count Joannini that a similar application had been made quite recently by the Austrian Ambassador at Rome to the Italian Government, and that I was very much surprised to hear from him that he had no instructions to that effect, as I had been desired to act in concert with him in giving advice to that effect.

Prince Wrede said that he did not anticipate any good result from any advice of this kind, as he was of opinion that Prince Milan and his Government had gone too far in their warlike proceedings to allow of their receding or shrinking from its results now; he added, however, that as neither the British nor the Italian Governments had given any expression to their views officially since last October at Belgrade, it would, he thought, be acceptable to his Court and desirable as an evidence of the similarity of the views of the different Cabinets if the Representatives of these Powers were to express to the Servian Government how much it would put itself in the wrong by departing from a pacific policy.

I observed to my Austrian colleague that such a language had been frequently employed by me unofficially here, but that the opportunity of giving it an official form had been denied us by the notion taken at Belgrade by two of the three Imperial Powers, besides which one did not like intruding.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 356.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 58. Political.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, June 8, 1876.*

IN accordance with the instructions received from your Lordship by telegraph, I applied to Prince Wrede to learn from him what advice he was about to give to the Prince of Servia, and I had a conversation with him, as reported in my despatch No. 56, Political, of yesterday, from which I ascertained, to my great surprise, that he was abstaining completely.

In the course of the day I learnt that my Italian colleague had been exactly in the same predicament, and having found out the inaction of Austria, had tendered the pacific advice he had been instructed to give in concert alone.

The French Acting Consul-General had preceded us all with the advice of his Government, and had a long interview with the Prince on Sunday the 4th instant.

M. Kartzoff had just returned from Ems. The extreme war party were urging the Prince to commence hostilities at once, instead of recognizing the new Sultan, and I had every reason to consider the moment as critical.

I therefore thought I should be acting in the spirit of your Lordship's instructions by going at once to speak to the Foreign Minister, and leaving no doubt on his mind of the pacific wishes of Her Majesty's Government, as a concert with my Austrian colleague could not be brought about, owing to his want of instructions.

I told M. Ristich, in general terms, that Her Majesty's Government attached naturally great value to the preservation of peace in these parts, and as there were reasonable hopes of improvement under the new Government at Constantinople, I said it would be highly reprehensible of Servia to break the peace at such a moment.

M. Ristich endeavoured to attenuate the offensive character of Servia's preparations. He tried to show that the conduct of his Government was such as was commanded by the feelings of the people and by the exigencies of the condition of the adjoining provinces, and he evidently wished me to think that, as far as possible, proper regard would be paid to the advice of the Powers, and that there was no danger for the moment.

The Prince himself came into the room, and continued the conversation in the same tone.

I trust that your Lordship will consider that in acting thus I was only doing what I thought most advisable under the circumstances, and most in accordance with the spirit of your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 357.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 59. Political.)

My Lord, *Belgrade, June 8, 1876.*

The return of M. Kartzoff, my Russian colleague, from Ems was looked forward to with considerable interest at Belgrade.

M. Kartzoff happened to be at Ems on the day when the news of the change of Sultan reached his Imperial Majesty, and he received instructions both from the Emperor and from Prince Gortchakow.

In compliance with these he has had to drop all intercourse with General Chernaieff here, and likewise to inform Colonel Ismailoff, another retired Russian officer, who was desirous to take service in Servia, that the Emperor prohibited his doing this, and that he should forfeit his Russian pension in case of non-compliance with this intimation. Colonel Ismailoff remains here, I believe, as correspondent.

The message which M. Kartzoff brought here for the Prince on behalf of his Sovereign was, according to M. Novikoff, a very precise and positive one; but from the effect it appears to have produced here, it is not improbable that it lost some of its force by transmission.

This message consisted certainly in recommending the Prince not to precipitate

matters, in cautioning him not to place any reliance on Russian assistance, and in advising him to wait to see what might turn up. I am assured that it did not include any intimation that Servia should cease her armaments.

Owing to the intimacy of the relations existing between Prince Milan and my Russian colleague, and to the advanced state of Servian preparations for action, it is quite impossible to form a correct estimate of the exact nature of their conversations, but I have reason to believe that they had by no means as peaceful a tendency as is represented.

The Prince has not even promised any delay, but merely to try and do his best, and when the signal is given to commence, all parties will pretend to have been taken unawares by some untoward event, and Russia will pretend surprise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 358.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 60. Political.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, June 9, 1876.*

ON several occasions I had the honour to address remarks to your Lordship on the relations of Servia and Montenegro, their rivalship, and how these two petty Principalities egged each other on in the pursuit of political influence for aggrandisement.

Since the outbreak in the Herzegovina, Servia had been desirous to emulate the activity displayed by the smaller State during last autumn, in artfully supporting the insurrection and directing its movements; this has been the case, chiefly as regards Servia, since last winter, when Prince Milan ascertained that Prince Nicholas had a fair prospect of obtaining an accession of territory, through the protection of Russia, for his services in the Slav cause, and when he was induced to open negotiations with him under the auspices of that Power.

These negotiations were carried on by two successive Envoys sent from here to Cettigné, Mr. Philip Cristitch, and later, Colonel Olympitch or Alimpitch, neither of whom succeeded, however, in concluding a positive Treaty between the two Princes, though one had been carefully drawn up with great secrecy, and was even signed, it is said, by the last-named gentleman without being ratified by the two Princes.

It is now believed by well-informed persons that this Treaty has been ratified about a fortnight ago, and I am assured from a reliable source that the Prince of Montenegro has actually pledged himself to go to war with the Porte as soon as hostilities shall have been commenced between Servia and the Suzerain Power.

I am told that Count Andrassy has positive information on the subject, and it may be that the coldness ascribed to the Count during the Berlin interview to the Russian project of aggrandising Montenegro, has been followed by Russia's permission to allow a formal alliance to be concluded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 359.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 61. Political.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, June 9, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that, having seen Mr. Ristitch, the Foreign Minister, twice in the course of a week, I took occasion to press him to send a proper reply to the Grand Vizier in answer to His Highness' notification of the accession of Sultan Mourad V.

I am informed that a reply has been sent to Constantinople by the Prince by this day's post.

The hesitation in giving one was due to some advisers who thought this a favourable opportunity to pick a quarrel.

I trust your Lordship will think that I was justified in endeavouring to use my humble influence to counteract these intrigues.

Since the so-called Berlin Memorandum was drawn up, the situation of Servia has been so far modified that the Prince feels, what he previously only suspected, the difference of views between the Great Powers; it is impossible to preserve him altogether from Russian influence, but I have always, since the commencement of these complications, attached much importance in delaying an open rupture with the Porte, as long as it is possible, and this consideration induced me to advise his doing homage to the new Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 360.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 62. Political.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, June 10, 1876.*

THE German Consul-General Count de Bray has been instructed by his Government yesterday to give pacific counsels to the Servian Government.

It is rather strange that the Austro-Hungarian Agent, at the request of whose Government these steps have been taken, has abstained from renewing those he made two months ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 361.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 64. Political.)
My Lord, *Belgrade, June 12, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the state of affairs in Servia continues very critical.

Upwards of 20,000 men of the militia have been embodied and sent either to occupy the new forts on the roads towards Nish and Widdin near the Turkish frontier, or on that frontier on the Drina. A large number of officers have been appointed and sent in various directions, and about 3,000 men are being drilled near Shabatz, evidently with a view to be employed in Bosnia as soon as the insurrection extends there in the direction of Servia.

An inroad into Bosnia by some armed bands, none having been sent since last autumn, will probably constitute the prelude and commencement of regular Servian hostilities.

The advice and counsels of the different foreign Representatives have hitherto gone unheeded, and the sincerity of the Russian recommendations can well be doubted, the Prince has been so artfully drawn into a net by the action of the Slavophil agents and of the Omladina, combined with the unfortunately unadvised means adopted by Austria, to deter him from action, and the occasionally offensive language employed by agents of that Power, that it is much to be feared that he is no longer a free agent, and that matters have got beyond his control, so that he cannot, even if he would, recede unless under positive orders from Russia, and such as would be manifest to all his people and to the whole world.

The usual Budget provides no means for embodying the militia; money out of the new loan comes in very slackly. A paper currency will soon have to be resorted to, and though hardly one-fifth of the men are as yet under arms the expense is estimated daily at nearly 2,000*l.* even now.

No very long delay is therefore possible, and the financial situation must, ere long, inspire some desperate resolution, or, in the absence of foreign aid, a confession that the resources of the country have been miscalculated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 362.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 597.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 8, 1876.*

SOME disappointment has been caused by the comparatively small amount of money discovered in the private treasury of the late Sultan. Besides the bonds for 8,000,000*l.* of Turkish Consolidés, which His Majesty was known to hold, not more than 100,000*l.* in cash was discovered there. The Grand Vizier, however, declares that he never expected more; and, taking into consideration the enormous amount expended by Sultan Abdul Aziz upon the construction of palaces and farm buildings, and the purchase of houses adjoining his palaces, as well as the fact that his accumulations of money date only from the period of the first Grand Vizirate of Mahmoud Pasha, after the death of Aali Pasha, about five years ago, the expectation of discovering greater hoards would seem to have been unreasonable.

Jewellery to the amount of about 1,000,000*l.*, and recently purchased, was also found in the Palace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 363.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 602.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 8, 1876.*

ONE of the questions upon which the Ministers are known to be divided in opinion relates to the admission of Christians into the army.

The necessity of putting an end to the distinction which has been maintained between the two religions has long been admitted in principle, and while one clause of the Hatti Houmayoun of 1856, drawn up under the advice of the Western Powers, stated that Christians should be admitted to the military schools, another declared that measures should be immediately concerted for admitting them generally into the army.

These two clauses have hitherto remained a dead letter.

At one time a disposition was shown by the Porte, some fourteen years ago, to give them effect, but the influence of such high authorities as Earl Russell, as Secretary of State, and of Lord Dalling, as British Ambassador, was exercised against it, and nothing was done.

The unwillingness which would at that time have been found among the Christians to be called upon for military service to a great degree explains the opinion then formed by Her Majesty's Government, but it was an erroneous one, and it would have been far better to face the many and great difficulties with which the question is undoubtedly surrounded rather than to maintain the one great badge of distinction existing between the two races.

The Christians have become aware that until it is swept away their nominal equality with the Mussulmans cannot be complete and real; and sharing, as I do, this conviction, I spare no exertion to persuade the Turkish Ministers that this is the moment for commencing the great reform.

It is not necessary that the conscription should at once be put in force among the Christian population, but the military schools should at once be opened to them, and they might be received either as volunteers or as substitutes for Mussulmans drawn as conscripts.

The Grand Vizier does not appear to be altogether opposed to this, and Midhat Pasha is ready to go still further; but I can speak with no certainty of Hussein Avni Pasha, the Minister of War, whom I have not had an opportunity of seeing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 364.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 603. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 8, 1876.*

GENERAL IGNATIEW has just been with me talking of the relations between Turkey and Russia being imperilled by the violence of the temper at present being exhibited towards his country.

He was aware, he said, that the wrath of the Turks was principally directed against himself, but in the press and among the public a tone was adopted which would provoke retaliation by the press of Russia, where the feelings of the people might soon be roused to a dangerous extent.

I said that, as far as I could judge from the extracts I had seen from the Russian papers, their tone towards Turkey had been to the full as violent and offensive as anything that has appeared here.

Nevertheless, I had constantly expressed the strongest disapproval of the tone latterly adopted here toward Russia, and I had several times suggested to the Government that they should exert their influence to moderate it.

The General said that, although he, of course, knew it to be untrue, he had often been told that this violent language had been used to give me pleasure.

I answered that I was sure that he could not have any doubt upon that point.

He said that the Turks talked much of the presence of Her Majesty's squadron at Bessika, and implied from it that they were sure of receiving support from Great Britain if there should be a rupture with Russia.

I said that the language uniformly held to the Turks had been to recommend them scrupulously to avoid giving cause of offence to Russia, and as for the presence of the fleet at Bessika, he was aware that I had not asked for it till, at a meeting at his own house, he had dwelt upon the danger said to be threatening the tranquillity of the capital. I had then mentioned openly that, as the vicinity of ships-of-war might perhaps give a sense of security, I was disposed to ask for some to be sent. If he could recollect the date when this occurred, he would see that there was nothing in it to be taken either as a menace or as an encouragement to Turkey to adopt a course offensive to his Government.

In the course of this conversation the Ambassador used an expression, when speaking of the possibility of the feeling in Russia being roused to the pitch of calling for war with Turkey, which it is right for me to report:—

"If," he said, "war is thought necessary in Russia, do not think there will ever be the slightest difficulty in finding a pretext for it. We have questions on our frontier, out of which I would undertake within two hours to establish a *casus belli*; and this I have often told the Turks."

Your Lordship must not, however, understand that there was anything at all menacing in the tone in which he made this remark.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 365.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 604.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 8, 1876.*

THE Bulgarian insurrection appears to be unquestionably put down, although, I regret to say, with cruelty, and, in some places, with brutality.

I am not disposed to accept the accounts, which come from the sources to which it would not be difficult to trace the origin of the movement, which are exaggerated to a degree which must deprive them of the slightest credit, but there is evidence that the employment of Circassians and Bashi-bazouks has led to the atrocities which were to be expected.

These irregulars have now been recalled, but not before they had done enough to embitter the feelings which must be entertained by the Christians towards the Mussulmans.

I learn, however, from other, and especially Christian sources, that an effect has been produced by the movement that was probably anticipated by none.

The indignation of the Bulgarians is now directed chiefly against the Russians, by by whom they were, they say, urged, and almost forced, to rise against their Government.

They do not stay to inquire whether it was the Russian Government, the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, or the revolutionary and Slav Committees in Russia, which led them on their ruin; but the same feeling towards Russia appears to have been produced among the Bulgarians by the collapse of their movement as the suppression of the Cretan insurrection caused among the Greeks, who from that day lost their confidence in the Power in which they had hitherto trusted, and who now look upon it with an aversion not to be surpassed by that of the Turks themselves.

The feeling entertained towards Russia in this country must at this moment be a matter of interest to Her Majesty's Government, and it is so different from what it has ever before been that it deserves your Lordship's attention.

On all previous occasions, when the relations of Turkey and Russia were critical, the sympathies of a large portion of the Christian communities were, secretly or openly, on the side of the latter.

Now, on the contrary, they see, or fancy they see, in her the source of much of the misgovernment and misery from which they are all suffering; and, I believe, the only part of the Empire in which Russian influence is at this moment unquestionably great is in the revolted districts of the Herzegovina, and in Servia and Montenegro, where it is unbounded; but any pretension on her part to be regarded as the protector of the Christians of the East, would be generally repudiated by them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 366.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 368.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

I YESTERDAY acquainted Count Andrassy with the substance of your despatch No. 261 of the 1st instant, instructing me to express to his Excellency Her Majesty's Government's appreciation of the anxiety of the Austro-Hungarian Government to to secure their co-operation in carrying out the proposals set forth in the Berlin Memorandum, and expressing their regret at being unable to act in concert with Austria-Hungary and the other Powers in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 367.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 369. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 368 of this date, reporting my having exceeded the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 261 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in doing so, I observed to Count Andrassy that, as he had rather wished Her Majesty's Government not to oppose the reception by the Porte of the Berlin proposals than to join the other Powers in urging it to accept them, I presumed that he would not consider your Lordship's answer satisfactory.

I said, however, that I would read to him for my own satisfaction the Report No. 354 of the 26th ultimo, which I had addressed to your Lordship of our private and confidential conversation on this subject, and I was glad to find that his Excellency considered it to be a correct and accurate statement of the language which he had held to me.

He objected, however, to the censure, which I expressed in the last paragraph, of the Imperial authorities in Dalmatia as being too severe, observing that great allowances should be made for the difficulty of watching with inadequate means a very excessive and difficult frontier, while the expense incurred of maintaining a larger force, and the fevers from which the troops were likely to suffer, more especially on the banks of the Save, had hitherto prevented the Government from increasing the means at the disposal of the Croatian and Dalmatian military authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 368.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 370.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 278 of the 7th instant, acquainting me with your instructions to Mr. White to act in concert with his Austrian colleague in advising the Prince of Servia to pursue a pacific policy, Count Andrassy, some days before I had received it, had expressed to me his satisfaction at having learnt from Belgrade that Her Majesty's Government had complied with his wishes on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 369.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 371. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Count Andrassy, calling his Excellency's attention, as instructed by your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant, to the landing of arms at Cattaro for the Prince of Montenegro.

I have since also had some conversation with his Excellency on the subject, when he stated to me that the Prince of Montenegro has done nothing yet which would have justified the Austro-Hungarian Government in preventing His Highness receiving these arms, more especially as he had given positive assurances that they were for his own use, and would not be given to the insurgents. Therefore, although their embarkation had been prohibited for several weeks, his Excellency said he had at last yielded to the remonstrances of the Prince, supported by the Russian Government, and allowed the arms to be embarked.

He said an incident, however, had occurred with regard to the shipment which had given him great dissatisfaction, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs having sent an instruction in his Excellency's name to General Rodich to explain to the Turkish authorities, if any complaint were made on the subject, that the arms had been landed in Cattaro in violation of the orders of the Government, a statement which his Excellency said he had found it necessary to contradict.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 369.

Sir A. Buchanan to Count Andrassy.

Dear Count Andrassy, *Vienna, June 10, 1876.*

HER Majesty's Government having been informed that 6,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition were disembarked at Cattaro on the first day of this month from a Lloyd's steamer, I have been instructed by Lord Derby to call your Excellency's attention to the subject.

It is said that these arms, evidently the same referred to in a letter which I addressed to Count Mulinen on the 3rd instant, were received at Cattaro by the

Montenegrin Minister of War and a large body of Montenegrins, and that the manifest of the cargo was sent to General Rodich.

Her Majesty's Government have also been informed that there is reason to believe that six cannon for Montenegro are shortly expected at Cattaro.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 370.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 372. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 12, 1876.*

HAVING learnt accidentally yesterday that the Montenegrin Senator Petrovich, who is still here, has announced to Count Andrassy the intention of his Government to place troops upon the frontier near Nicksich, as a precautionary measure, in consequence of the Turkish Commander-in-chief apparently intending to concentrate a large force in that district, and having reason to believe that the Russian Ambassador considers the circumstances to justify such a measure, I have expressed a strong opinion to Count Andrassy against its expediency, observing that it appeared to me that nothing could be more impolitic on the part of the Governments having any influence on Prince Nicholas, than to sanction a demonstration of a more or less hostile character on his part, at a time when everything possible ought to be done to remove causes of irritation and to promote the success of the steps taken by the Porte for the pacification of the insurgent provinces.

Count Andrassy appeared entirely to share this opinion, but I gathered from his language that he would offer no serious objection to the view taken of the matter by Russia.

During our conversation his Excellency mentioned that the Prince of Montenegro, though declaring that he will act in conformity with the wishes of the Powers, and has not yet promised in a satisfactory manner to use his influence with the insurgent for the restoration of peace, and his Excellency said he has therefore told the Senator Petrovich that he must insist on receiving, without further delay, an unconditional engagement on the part of the Prince that he will do so.

I have had some conversation also with the Russian Ambassador respecting the proposed occupation of the frontier by Montenegrin troops, and I have expressed to his Excellency the same opinion upon it which I had done to Count Andrassy.

M. de Novikoff said that the experience of the last war, however, entirely justified the Montenegrins in watching their frontier on the side of Nicksich, and that as only one or two battalions are likely to be employed for the purpose they ought not be an object of suspicion to the Turkish authorities. I answered that as a small force must be useless for the defence of the territory, and its presence could not fail to create irritation and distrust, if it did not lead to collisions with the Turkish troops and cause new complications; his defence of the intended measure was, in my opinion, rather an additional reason why it should not be adopted.

His Excellency, however, then alleged that Prince Nicolas was obliged to respect the opinions and apprehensions of his subjects in questions of this kind in order to maintain his authority, but that he could confidentially assure me that, whatever movements of troops might take place in the Principality, His Highness would maintain peace with Turkey.

This assurance is the more satisfactory, as Count Andrassy received a telegram yesterday from one of his agents in the Herzegovine, stating that Montenegro would declare war on Sunday next, the 18th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 371.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 373.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

IN a recent conversation with Count Andrassy on the subject of Servian armaments, I said that I had been informed that the Government were expecting a large supply of Krupp guns from Germany, and his Excellency answered that if they did the guns could only reach them through Russia, as he had strictly prohibited their receiving any arms through Austria-Hungary.

If he had not prohibited, at the same time, the export of horses, he said he had not done so, because he had ascertained that the Servian Government could procure them from Bessarabia, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to deprive the Hungarian horse dealers of the market, which has been opened to them at Belgrade.

I am told here, in answer to inquiries which I have caused to be made, that a Prussian domiciled at Vienna has supplied considerable quantities of arms and ammunition to the Government of Servia, and that he has found no difficulty in forwarding his goods to Belgrade, through Russia, and also by Constantinople and the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 372.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 375. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

WITH reference to my letter to Mr. Bourke of the 9th instant, I inclose some further extracts of letters from Servia on the present state of affairs there.

Although reliance cannot be placed on all the statements of the writer, he appears to have the means of obtaining information which throws some light on the situation, and the course which events are likely to take.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 372.

Extracts from Letters from Servia on the State of Affairs

Belgrade, le 7 Juin, 1876.

EN vous confirmant mes précédentes lettres j'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que M. Karzow, Agent Diplomatique de Russie en Serbie, est de retour ici depuis hier au soir. Il verra dans quelques jours le Prince Milan et M. Ristits pour leur notifier la volonté de l'Empereur de Russie et de M. Gortchakow; j'ai appris du reste que M. Karzow a été chargé par son Gouvernement de dissuader la guerre au Prince de Serbie et de lui conseiller le maintien de la paix. Pendant l'absence de M. Karzow une démarche semblable a été faite par le Vice-Consul Russe à Belgrade. Peut-on se fier à ces procédés pacifiques de la part de la Russie? Quoiqu'il en soit, ces démarches sont restées sans résultat aucun, puisque les Serbes sont maintenant plus décidés que jamais à faire la guerre à la Turquie. Il en a été de même de la démarche que le Chargé d'Affaires de France a été chargé par le Cabinet de Paris de faire auprès du Prince Milan. Ce dernier et ses Ministres répondent à toutes les exhortations présentées par les Représentants des Puissances étrangères par un *non possumus*, c'est déjà trop tard, disent-ils, nous sommes trop engagés et le peuple Serbe veut la guerre. Cependant la majorité de la nation ne voulait ni veut la guerre; les milices seraient très heureuses d'être renvoyées dans leurs foyers. La preuve éclatante que le peuple désire la paix c'est que l'emprunt forcé réussit si mal. Il y a un grand nombre de Serbes qui refusent de contribuer à cet emprunt.

J'apprends qu'un nombre assez considérable des hommes qui sont partis pour la frontière, il y a dix jours, sont tombés malades, ils ne sont pas habitués à la vie militaire.

Le Gouvernement Serbe vient d'envoyer M. Karabiberzovics, négociant de Belgrade, en Prusse pour y acheter des chassepots. Quant aux canons Krupp, l'affaire doit se décider dans quelques jours, je connaîtrai la route par laquelle ces armes seront expédiées. L'achat des chevaux continue toujours.

Le Prince Wrede me disait aujourd'hui que son Gouvernement prendra des précautions sur la frontière et que les fonctionnaires Panslavistes seront changés; vaut mieux tard que jamais.

Le 9 Juin, 1876.

J'ai eu aujourd'hui avec M. Ristits un long entretien.

Il me disait que le peuple Serbe veut absolument la guerre qui est devenue inévitable; c'est lui seul qui temporise encore et modère les passions. Cela ne saurait durer longtemps; tout pousse vers la guerre, et à la fin il ne pourra plus résister, et la guerre sera déclarée, dans quelle éventualité il se retirerait du Ministère. La Serbie fait de grands préparatifs et des dépenses énormes. Si donc on pourrait indemniser la Serbie de ces sacrifices en lui donnant pour compensation la Bosnie, ou une partie de cette province, et si l'on en faisait autant pour le Monténégro en donnant au Prince Nikita la Herzégovine, alors lui (M. Ristits) se ferait fort de tranquilliser l'insurrection et de rester en paix avec la Porte Ottomane. Mais si nous ne recevons pas l'équivalent que nous demandons, je me retire, et la guerre éclatera.

Je m'étonnais beaucoup que M. Ristits voulait faire avec l'affaire de la Serbie, aussi celle du Monténégro, en mettant pour conditions que l'on donne l'Herzégovine à cette dernière Principauté. Je demandais donc à M. Ristits s'il existe un Traité entre la Serbie et le Monténégro, puisqu'il défend si bien les intérêts du Prince Nikita. Là-dessus, il me répondait, qu'un Traité n'existe pas encore, mais que le Monténégro a les mêmes droits sur l'Herzégovine que la Serbie sur la Bosnie, et que pour la pacification de l'insurrection on a besoin du concours des Monténégrins.

Voici jusqu'à quel point va l'aveuglement de M. Ristits même qui devrait se rendre compte de la véritable situation politique; il croit sérieusement qu'il pourrait obtenir la Bosnie par voie diplomatique et sans coup férir. Je m'abstiens de critiquer ces idées absurdes qui n'admettent pas même la critique et qui dominent pourtant dans les esprits exaltés du Ministère Serve. Depuis que j'ai parlé à M. Ristits j'ai l'espoir que la paix sera conservée ici sans que la Porte ait besoin de céder la Bosnie. Les Serves ne marchent pas, si la Russie ne les aide point; ils ont conscience de leur faiblesse et craignent d'être vaincus par les Turcs. Le Ministère Serve est maintenant très embarrassé de s'être avancé si loin: s'il pouvait se retirer il le ferait volontiers. Je crois même que l'envoi de quelques centaines d'hommes à la frontière Turque n'a d'autre but que d'appuyer cette demande de Bosnie par une espèce d'épouvantail. Je base mon avis sur cette circonstance que l'on envoie seulement de Belgrade au su et à la vue des Représentants étrangers, quelques centaines d'hommes et cela par intervalle de deux jours et chaque fois 120 hommes; outre cela je m'aperçois depuis avant-hier que les achats ont cessé et que le Ministre de la Guerre refuse toute proposition nouvelle.

Tout dépend de la politique Russe; si la Russie ne conseille pas secrètement de faire la guerre, tout restera tranquille. Je saurai bientôt à quoi m'en tenir à ce sujet.

J'ai vu aujourd'hui également le Général Zach, Chef d'Etat Major et Aide-de-camp du Prince Milan; celui-ci est tout à fait à la guerre. Il me disait que la décision ne dépend plus du Prince et que pour empêcher la guerre les diplomates devraient se hâter sans quoi il serait trop tard et la force déciderait alors. Malgré cela je n'ai pas cru devoir vous cacher mes impressions, qui cependant pourraient se modifier dès demain d'après les événements.

On s'étonnait beaucoup ici que le Prince Wrede s'est abstenu cette fois d'appuyer les démarches de ses collègues pour conseiller encore le maintien de la paix au Gouvernement Serve.

Le 10 *Juin*, 1876.

En ce qui concerne les explications demandées par la Porte sur les armements, le Gouvernement Serbe répondra que la Serbie se voit obligée d'armer puisque la Porte a concentré des troupes sur les frontières Serbes.

On voit aisément que cette réponse est dilatoire et évasive et que la Serbie veut gagner du temps. Si la Porte exige ensuite le désarmement, il est certain que le

Général Chernaieff, avec quelques brigades et surtout les volontaires, passeront la frontière et essayeront un coup sur Nisch (Nissa); si ce coup réussit, alors les troupes régulières suivront sur le territoire Turc, et la guerre sera ouverte; mais si ce coup ne réussit pas, on désavouera le Général Chernaieff et les volontaires, et le Cabinet Ristits dira aux Serbes qu'il a voulu faire la guerre, mais que les circonstances ne sont pas favorables. Par ce moyen le Cabinet Ristits et les Omladinistes croient pouvoir sortir de la mauvaise position où ils sont en ce moment, et sauver ainsi le prestige dont ils jouissent parmi le peuple Serbe. Il serait donc nécessaire que la Turquie garde bien Nicha (Nissa) pour parer le coup.

A cette occasion il me faut mentionner que les Serbes ont mis du dynamite dans quelques endroits sur la frontière pour faire sauter les Turcs qui voudraient entrer en Serbie. Je connais la personne qui sait où sont ces endroits pourvus du dynamite; il ne voulait me les indiquer sans une récompense d'argent.

On compte donc ici qu'en quinze jours les volontaires passeront la frontière Turque; par ce moyen M. Ristits compte, s'il ne peut obtenir la Bosnie par voie diplomatique (et l'Herzégovine pour le Monténégro), sortir de la position excessivement difficile dans laquelle il se trouve en ce moment.

Je suis aujourd'hui à même de vous prouver que la Russie n'est pas de bonne foi. En revenant d'Ems M. Karzow, Consul-Général de Russie, est allé voir le prince Milan et M. Ristits, et leur disait que le Gouvernement Russe désire que la Serbie n'entrave pas en ce moment l'œuvre de pacification entreprise par les Puissances du nord. Là-dessus le Prince et M. Ristits, qui s'attendaient à recevoir de M. Karzow une réponse définitive, soit la guerre ou la paix, demandait à M. Karzow si c'est là volonté ou le désir de la Russie que la Serbie désarme; à cette occasion M. Karzow répondait que la Serbie est libre de faire tout ce qu'elle fait. Enfin, lorsque M. Ristits faisait remarquer à M. Karzow que le peuple Serbe s'est ruiné pour obéir à la Russie en faisant de dépenses pour les armements, et que maintenant il est impossible de retenir les Serbes, M. Karzow disait toujours que les Serbes peuvent faire ce qui bon leur semble. J'en conclus que la Russie ne désire point le désarmement des Serbes; elle veut les voir en armes pour le moment opportun. Le travail secret du Consul-Général Russe nous fera voir bientôt plus clair encore. Que ce fonctionnaire ait rompu en visière avec le Général Chernaieff cela ne prouve rien, puisque l'Empereur Alexandre déteste Chernaieff.

Hier le Représentant de l'Allemagne a fait des démarches auprès du Prince Milan pour la conservation de la paix.

Les Serbes fortifient l'endroit de Kledova sur le Danube en face de Kalé, pour empêcher le passage à la flotille Turque.

Depuis quelques jours on laisse passer librement les Slaves de l'Hongrie en Serbie, où ils se font enrôler en qualité de volontaires. Il y a à Belgrade vingt bureaux d'enrôlements pour les volontaires Slaves venant de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Avant-hier on a enrôlé à Belgrade seul 300 volontaires envoyés par Militits, qui fait ouvertement propagande pour l'emprunt forcé de la Serbie.

No. 373.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 378.) *Vienna, June* 15, 1876.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH public opinion may not have a very great influence on the policy of the Austrian-Hungarian Government, it will, I trust, be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to know that while the press generally has approved of the course followed by Great Britain with respect to the Berlin Memorandum, the public, as represented on the Exchange and in the cafés, has been enthusiastic in its appreciation of the successful firmness with which Her Majesty's Government has arrested the proceedings, by which Russia has been lately promoting the disruption of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 374.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 379. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 279 of the 7th instant, marked "very confidential," I have the honour to inclose herewith a further report from Major Gonne, containing, as far as it can be procured, the additional information asked for by your Lordship.

Your Lordship will learn from the inclosure that, in the event of a mobilization taking place, with a view to the occupation of the insurgent Turkish provinces, the corps of General Rodich would be increased to 26,000 men, that of Colonel Molenary to 28,000 and 2,700 cavalry, and that of General Scudier to 12,000 men and 1,800 cavalry, which would evidently be an insufficient force to do more than act as a corps of observation on the Servian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S.—With reference to this subject, I may state that, on Count Andrassy's return from Buda-Pesth, I have reason to believe that the Archduke Albrecht spent two hours with his Excellency at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and at my calling yesterday on his Excellency, by appointment, I had to wait some time, as he had been sent for by his Imperial and Royal Highness.

A. B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 374.

Major Gonne to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Very Confidential. Secret.)

Sir, *British Embassy, June 12, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour of submitting a further report on the Austrian "scheme of occupation," and I may at once explain that one of my colleagues obtained the main facts from an *employé* in the War Office of Vienna, and your Excellency may rest assured that the information is perfectly reliable except as to detail.

In my Report No. 19 I rendered information as I received it. I now correct the obvious errors which have been acknowledged by the informant.

The scheme was made out by the War Office Staff, but I can place no more exact date than last winter; it was submitted to the Archduke Albert, and was duly placed before and approved by the Emperor. Still it is my duty to explain that the military problem was worked out as a matter of course, and as a useful and necessary practice. The only one part which points to Government complicity is that the army of observation for Servia is provided for.

The reason why I assert with confidence that my authority is trustworthy is because I have had it in my power to compare the scheme with my own notes. Nor in this instance do I consider that the informant committed a wilful breach of trust. The plan passed through his hands accidentally, and there seemed no cogent reason for supposing that the content was "Confidential." Under these circumstances I am the more anxious that my source of information may remain strictly secret.

I take this opportunity of forwarding the information sold by Baron Erlet, which is still of considerable value.

The War Office gives out that the Austrian "War Order" has been changed, but to change the position of the thirteen army corps is not easy, and in point of fact the numbers only are susceptible of change, strategical considerations remaining constant. I have kept no copy of the accompanying map, and shall be obliged by the original finding its way eventually to the Intelligence Department of our army.

I fear your Excellency will think I am prejudiced against the Austrian army, but indeed, I search in vain for elements of strength. I find it is true, an elaborate, and somewhat admirable military organisation, but divided counsels. The scheme of occupation is Slav, and this fact is enough to insure the opposition of the dominant party of whose policy Count Andrassy is the exponent. In the army itself I find

young men of small stature well equiped but badly fed. I look upon the officers as a body, as of an inferior class. I fail to find that motive power pre-eminent in Germany —patriotism.

The few remaining officers of the old aristocratic Austrian army are a striking contrast to the modern officer, who may be always found in the "Caffé Haus" or the "Beer-Halle."

Of my own branch of the service (cavalry), I need only remark on this occasion that when the Empress recently distributed four prizes to officers who could produce the best trained "charger,"—the competition extended throughout the whole army—six horses only were shown: two Lieutenant-Colonels gained the first two prizes, and of these one only merited distinction.

I have the honour to inclose the opinion of Baron Stoffel touching the "décadence" of the Austrian army after 1866, and also a corrected idea of the occupation scheme forwarded in my despatch No. 19.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. S. GONNE, *Major, 17th Lancers, Military Attaché.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 374.

Extract from Opinion of Baron Stoffel.

. . . . . Ils indiquent tous comme on va pouvoir s'en convaincre, un affaiblissement des caractères et un commencement de désorganisation morale.

1. Il est avéré aujourd'hui que c'est grâce à la trahison d'employés ou d'officiers Autrichiens que les Prussiens ont pu se procurer, avant et pendant la guerre, les états des effectifs et des placements de l'armée Autrichienne. A Florence, le Gouvernement Italien connut, par le même moyen, la composition exacte de l'armée de Vérone, et je pourrais citer tel officier Prussien qui, envoyé à Florence avant la campagne, rendit compte à Berlin, jour par jour, de tous les mouvements qui s'opéraient autour de Vérone.

2. Le nombre des prisonniers Autrichiens a été prodigieux. Parmi les officiers faits prisonniers plus de cinq cents n'étaient pas blessés.

3. Voici un fait dont je puis certifier l'exactitude. Le lendemain de la bataille de Sadowa, le Prince Royal de Prusse, comptant sur l'effet moral produit par cette grande victoire, envoya un major en parlementaire à Königgrätz, pour traiter de la reddition de la place. Pendant que cette officier attendait l'arrivée du Gouverneur, un capitaine Autrichien lia conversation avec lui, et lui apprit que la place n'était pas en état de résister, que la garnison était démoralisée, et que toute l'armée Autrichienne désirait la paix. L'officier Prussien assista à un conseil de guerre présidé par le Gouverneur, où fut consentie la capitulation de la ville. Un seul article ayant donné lieu à discussion, il demanda à en référer au Prince Royal, et se mit en route pour le rejoindre. Le hasard voulut que sur ces entrefaites le Général de Gablenz, venu du quartier-général Prussien, passa par Königgrätz. En apprenant ce qui venait d'avoir lieu, il défendit expressément au Gouverneur de rendre la place. Sans ce hasard, Königgrätz capitulait le jour même, sur une simple sommation.

4. Au combat de Tobitschau, livré le 15 Juillet, un régiment de cuirassiers Prussiens s'empara de deux batteries Autrichiennes. Elles comptaient un capitaine, deux lieutenants, deux cents canonniers environ, seize pièces et autant de caissons. On les dirigea, sous l'escorte de vingt-cinq cuirassiers Prussiens, sur Brunn, distant de Tobitschau de quatre journées de marche. Le quatrième jour, lorsque les deux batteries n'étaient plus qu'à trois lieues de Brunn, elles furent rencontrées par un officier Prussien, qui se rendait dans cette ville par ordre du Prince Royal. Quel ne fut pas son étonnement de voir deux batteries ennemies cheminer paisiblement sur la route, comme en promenade militaire! Profitant d'une halte, il ouvrit quelques coffres; tous étaient chargés. A tout événement et de peur que les Autrichiens ne se ravisassent, il fit jeter à l'eau toutes les munitions.

Ainsi voilà trois officiers Autrichiens, avec deux cents canonniers, seize pièces d'artillerie et autant de voitures chargées en guerre, qui se laissent conduire par vingt-cinq cavaliers Prussiens.

De pareils faits ne sauraient être attribués uniquement à la démoralisation qu'engendrent de grands désastres militaires; ils révèlent, comme je l'ai déjà dit, un abaissement des caractères et une véritable décadence morale.

Inclosure 3 in No. 374.

(Strictly Confidential.)

Corps on the Frontiers of Herzegovina and Montenegro, under Field Marshal Rodich.

		Strength.
Zara	XVIIIth Division—	
	35th Infantry Brigade, consisting of 32nd Regiment	3,000
	7th, 11th, and 19th Jäger Battalions	3,000
Ragusa	36th Infantry Brigade, consisting of 27th, 69th, and 72nd Regiments	9,000
	21st Jäger Battalion	1,000
Spalato	2 Depôt Battalions	2,000
	6 Battalions of Jägers (now in Tyrol)	6,000
		24,000

The above would be formed into five brigades, with a mountain battery to each brigade.

Two batteries are in Dalmatia, three in Tyrol.

Western Corps, to occupy Bosnia, under Field Marshal Mollinary.

		Strength.
Graz	VIth Division—	
(The rest of 27th Regiment in Dalmatia.)	11th Infantry Brigade, 27th Regiment	2,000
	9th Battalion of Jägers	1,000
	12th Infantry Brigade, 52nd and 79th Regiments	6,000
Görz	VIIth Division—	
	13th Infantry Brigade, 15th and 22nd Regiments	6,000
	10th Jäger Battalion	1,000
	14th Infantry Brigade, 17th and 40th Regiments	6,000
Agram	XXXVIth Division—	
	71st Infantry Brigade, 48th Regiment	3,000
	Cavalry—5th Uhlan Regiment.	
Carlstadt	72nd Infantry Brigade, 33rd Regiment	3,000
		28,000
	Cavalry from Fünfkirchen, probably 2 regiments, in addition to the 1 Uhlan regiment	2,700
	(For Artillery, *vide infra.*)	

Eastern Corps, to observe Servia, intended Commander Lt. Field Marshal Seudier.

		Strength.
Pest	XXth Division—	
	39th Infantry Brigade, 38th Regiment	3,000
	40th .. 56th	3,000
	XXXIVth Division—	
	67th Infantry Brigade, 73th Regiment	3,000
	68th .. 64th	3,000
		12,000
	1 Cavalry Brigade of 1st and 13th Hussars	1,600

As regards the Landwehr, it was proposed to call out that of districts denuded of troops, but not to send any at first with the active corps.

As regards artillery one regiment of thirteen batteries goes by rule to each corps on service; three batteries are told off to each division, the remainder being in reserve.

Batteries were held in readiness at Pest, Vienna, and the Tyrol, and are so still, but the exact strength is not decided.

The proportion of train, &c., is also in readiness.

(Signed) T. S. GONNE.

No. 375.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 383. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 13, 1876.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday on the subject of the reforms promised by the Porte in the Herzegovina, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note, and its inclosure, addressed to Count Andrassy by the Turkish Ambassador to-day, communicating to his Excellency a telegram containing the substance of the orders sent to the Commissioners in the insurgent provinces.

A telegram was received yesterday from Count Zichy reporting the explanations which he had received on the subject from Raschid Pasha, and I trust from Baron Hofmann's language to me this morning that they will be found satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 375.

Aarifi Pasha to Count Andrassy.

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 13 Juin, 1876.*

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre sous ce pli à votre Excellence copie d'un télégramme que son Altesse le Grand Vézir vient d'adresser, par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, aux Commissaires Impériales en Bosnie et en Herzégovine. Ainsi que votre Excellence le verra, ce télégramme est, en quelque sorte, le corollaire de la lettre Grand-Vézirielle que j'ai déjà porté à sa connaissance par ma communication en date du 7 courant.

Le Grand Vézir commence par déclarer que s'il n'a pas fait mention dans sa lettre précédente des dernières réformes octroyées déjà par le Gouvernement Impérial aux populations de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, c'est que, dans sa pensée, ces réformes sont acquises aux dites populations et que les Présidents des Commissions Exécutives, réunies sur les lieux, demeurent chargés de leur exécution, sur la base des instructions qu'ils ont reçues. Son Altesse invite subsidiairement les Commissaires Impériaux à ajouter dans la Proclamation qu'ils ont été chargés de publier, que ces réformes sont et restent dans toute leur intégrité et ajoute qu'ils ne doivent rien négliger pendant le délai de six semaines qui vient d'être accordé aux insurgés pour faire profiter ces derniers des bienfaits du Gouvernement Impérial; qu'enfin la Commission doit s'occuper sans retard et très activement de la mise en exécution des réformes, conformément aux instructions et aux pouvoirs dont elle est munie. Les autorités locales sont en même temps mises en demeure d'écouter avec bienveillance les sollicitations et les griefs légitimes des Délégués désignés de la part des insurgés qui voudraient faire leur soumission.

Votre Excellence voudra bien reconnaître avec la loyauté qui le caractérise qu'on ne saurait tenir un langage plus clair et plus précis.

Cette nouvelle démarche de son Altesse le Grand Vézir témoigne de la ferme volonté du Gouvernement Impérial de ne point se départir de la voie des réformes en même temps qu'elle est un hommage rendu aux désirs exprimés par les Puissances.

En portant ce qui précède d'ordre de mon Gouvernement à la connaissance de votre Excellence, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 375.

The Grand Vizier to the Turkish Commissioners in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 13 Juin, 1876.*

PAR mon précédent télégramme je vous avais annoncé l'amnistie accordée par Son Altesse Impériale Mourad V aux insurgés de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, et les mesures arrêtées par ordre souverain à leur égard.

Si ce télégramme ne fait pas mention des dernières réformes octroyées par le Gouvernement Impérial, c'est parcequ'elles sont acquises déjà aux populations de

la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, et que les Commissions de ces réformes sont chargées de leur pleine exécution sur la base des instructions remises à leurs présidents.

Veuillez donc ajouter à la proclamation, que vous êtes chargé de publier, que ces réformes sont et demeurent maintenues dans toute leur intégrité. Il va sans dire que pendant le délai de six semaines qui vient d'être accordé aux insurgés pour faire leur soumission et rentrer dans leurs foyers, votre Excellence ne négligera rien pour les faire profiter des bienfaits qui leur ont été accordés par le Gouvernement Impérial.

La Commission doit donc s'occuper, sans retard et très activement, de la mise à l'exécution des réformes, conformément aux instructions et aux pouvoirs dont elle est munie. Les autorités locales écouteront avec justice et bienveillance les sollicitations et les griefs légitimes des délégués qui seront désignés de la part de ceux qui voudront faire leur soumission, afin de les soumettre à l'appréciation du Gouvernement Impérial.

No. 376.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 394. Confidential.)
Vienna, June 14, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 375, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inclose an extract of another letter which I received this morning from Belgrade. Its statements are, perhaps, in some degree confirmed by the intended mission of a special Servian Agent to Constantinople, and as anything may be believed from the past conduct of the Government, it is not impossible that the writer's information may be as well founded as he pretends it to be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 376.

Extract of a Letter from Servia to Sir A. Buchanan, dated June 11, 1876.

M. RISTITS adressera Mardi prochain aux Grandes Puissances un Memorandum, par lequel il expose la situation précaire de la Principauté et la nécessité qu'il y a pour la Servie de sortir bientôt de cette situation. Il demande au même temps aux Puissances leur efficace intervention auprès de la Sublime Porte pour que celle-ci cède pacifiquement la Bosnie pour la Servie en considération des aspirations de la nation Serve et des grands sacrifices que les Serves ont fait. Sous ces sacrifices il est entendu les dépenses pour les armements et pour soudoyer les insurgés et émissaires en Bulgarie, en Bosnie, en Herzégovine, et même dans les Provinces Slaves de la Hongrie. Le Memorandum a été conseillé par la Russie, et si M. Ristits n'obtient pas la cession territoriale (et il est à prévoir qu'il ne l'obtiendra pas), alors M. Ristits se retirera, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous l'écrire dans une de mes précédentes lettres, et les volontaires sous le Général Stratimirvoics et aussi les Généraux Chernayeff et Rauko Alimpics franchiront la frontière Turque; s'ils réussissent toute l'armée Serve suivra et s'ils ne réussissent pas le Gouvernement Serve dira qu'ils ont agi sans ordres. On a tort de supposer à la Russie des intentions pacifiques; ses demarches occultes le désavouent hautement. La Russie ne conseille pas le désarmement; elle veut que la Servie reste en armes. Ainsi depuis le retour de M. Karzoff les Serves sont plus décidés à faire la guerre qu'auparavant. Tout ce que M. Karzoff a voulu attendre c'est un sursis de quelques semaines et il l'a obtenu par le Memorandum ci-dessus mentionné. Les armements continuent sur la plus vaste échelle—l'enrôlement des volontaires augmente journellement et l'état-major Serve travaille sans cesse avec l'assistance du Prince Milan. Je sais aussi que l'état-major Russe vient d'envoyer à la Servie un plan de campagne. Je connais tous les fils des menées Russes, et je viendrai très prochainement à Vienne pour un jour afin d'entretenir verbalement votre Excellence de ces affaires.

No. 377.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 298.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, June 16, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government approve the remarks made by your Excellency to Count Andrassy, as reported in your despatch No. 372 of the 12th instant, as to the inexpediency of sanctioning the assembly of Montenegrin troops in the neighbourhood of the Turkish frontier, whatever might be the avowed object of such a gathering.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much satisfaction that Count Andrassy had told Senator Petrovitch that he must insist on receiving, without delay, an unconditional engagement on the part of Prince Nicolas that he would use his influence with the insurgents to promote the restoration of peace. I should wish you to express to his Excellency the pleasure with which this information has been received, and to state that it is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that he will continue earnestly to impress upon the Prince these counsels, which, if they are followed, will be the surest method of leading to the pacific solution equally desired by both Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 377*.

Count Beust to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 16.)

M. le Comte,
Belgrave Square, le 15 *Juin*, 1876.

J'AI me suis empressé de porter à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement la substance de la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 10 du courant, relativement à des instructions transmises suivant le désir que je lui en avait exprimé au Consul-Général d'Angleterre à Belgrade et à ce que cet Agent a été dans le cas de mander en conséquence.

Mon Gouvernement très reconnissant de l'appui donné par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique aux conseils de modération donnés par lui-même n'en déplore que d'avantage un malentendu qui très probablement a été occasionné par une manière erronée, dont le Prince de Wrede a cru devoir interpréter les ouvertures de son collègue d'Angleterre. Il paraît avoir supposé qu'il s'agissait d'une démarche collective à laquelle en effet le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'aurait guère pu s'associer après avoir fait précédemment à plusieurs reprises les remontrances les plus vives. Une intervention analogue de l'Agent et Consul-Général d'Angleterre était d'un grand secours pour le Représentant du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, et le malentendu que je me suis permis d'expliquer a seul pu l'empêcher d'en témoigner à son collègue toute la satisfaction qu'il devait en éprouver.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) BEUST.

No. 378.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 299.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, June 16, 1876.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 366 of the 10th instant, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approves the advice given by you to the Turkish Ambassador, which induced him to record, in an official note addressed to Count Andrassy, the fact of the communication, which had been made verbally to Baron Hofmann, of the telegram reporting the amnesty offered by the Porte to the insurgents, and the instructions respecting a suspension of hostilities for six weeks sent to the Turkish military and civil authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I approve also the judicious suggestions made by you, and adopted by the Ambassador, as to the conciliatory language by which the communication should be accompanied.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 379.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
Vienna, June 16, 1876.

THE person who has been sending me reports from Servia believes that M. Christic is to ask the Porte for the concession of Bosnia to Servia, and of the Herzegovina to Montenegro, or, at all events, the appointment of Prince Milan Obrenovitch and Prince Nicolas as Governors of these provinces.

No. 379 A.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received June 16, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, June 16, 1876.

HAVING failed to find Count Andrássy, I have communicated to Baron Hofmann the substance of Sir H. Elliot's telegram of the 4th instant, respecting the expediency of Montenegrin Agent being sent to Constantinople. His Excellency said that, as the Prince of Montenegro does not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Sultan, such a mission might prove hurtful, by raising questions of etiquette, but that possibly it might be arranged to send some one unofficially.

No. 379 B.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
Therapia, June 16, 1876.

THE assassin of the two Ministers is stated to be the brother or near relation of the late Sultan's wife, who died a few days after His Majesty.

I had inquired yesterday of Dr. Dickson whether he knew the cause of her death.

He stated that she had been the victim of the fatal practice, common among Turkish ladies of high rank, and had died of inflammation, caused by an attempt to procure abortion.

No. 379 C.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
Serajevo, June 16, 1876.

A TELEGRAM has been received here stating that Austrian troops at Malievatz attacked insurgents about to enter the district of Bihach, killing thirty-two, and taking from them 1,200 rifles and the flocks in their possession. The Government here has made a request for the latter.

No. 379 D.

Consul Blunt to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 19. Political. Confidential.)
Salonica, May 26, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, an extract of a letter marked Private, which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Blakeney, furnishing some interesting information on the state of public feeling in Epirus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

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* Repeated to Constantinople.
† Repeated to Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

Inclosure in No. 379 D.

Vice-Consul Blakeney to Consul Blunt.

(Private.)
(Extract.)
Prevesa, May 20, 1876.

OWING to the tone assumed by the Greek press within the last few days, purporting to show that under existing circumstances Greece ought to be prepared for every emergency, and owing to various rumours about military preparations in that country, I fear the Turkish authorities no longer rely on the friendly relations which, up to the day when the news reached us of the massacre at Salonica, appear to have existed between the two countries; and, as a proof that the local authorities suspect that some movement on the part of Greece is anything but improbable, M. Kyprioto informs me privately that, in consequence of a telegram despatched to Constantinople by the Vali of Janina, the order for the four battalions of the First Class Army Reserve in this province to proceed to the Herzegovina has been countermanded, and our garrison is daily expected to be reinforced by one or two battalions of the Second Reserve.

The above disquieting rumours have not failed to inspire in the Christians the hope that the time for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire is fast approaching. It is generally believed, however, and I am of the same opinion, that the Christian population of this province will never be induced to take up arms against the Turkish rule unless actively supported by the Greek Government. However, there is no knowing what course the Greek Government might decide upon. I am, therefore, not so sanguine as I was a fortnight ago that tranquillity in this province runs no risk of being disturbed.

I have already reported to you the impression produced here by the massacre of the Consuls. At Janina, too, the authorities took a very sad view of the affair; but the mass of Mussulmans in that place did not share the same feeling, but, on the contrary, seemed to think that it served the Consuls right for interfering with other people's business.

No. 380.

Consul Sandwith to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 14. Political.)
Canea, Crete, May 29, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency Sir Henry Elliot, giving a list of the principal changes which the representatives of the Cretan Christians desire to see introduced into the Organic Law.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

Inclosure in No. 380.

Consul Sandwith to Sir H. Elliot.

Canea, Crete, May 28, 1876.

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 22nd instant, I had the honour to state to your Excellency that that day had been fixed for the Christian half of the General Assembly to present to Raouf Pasha the modifications they desired to see introduced into the Organic Law. These modifications, however, were of so extensive a character, affecting almost every part of the law in question, that one day was found quite inadequate for their consideration, and the whole week has been occupied in going over, one by one, the articles of the law, which, when it was promulgated eight years ago, was thought to be a liberal concession to the Christian Islanders.

The further concessions now demanded by the latter have all been entered in the Minutes of Proceedings of the Assembly, forming a voluminous document in modern Greek, a translation of which it is impossible to prepare for transmission by this post, as the meetings were only brought to a conclusion yesterday, and the post leaves to-morrow morning. I therefore confine myself on the present occasion to giving your Excellency a list of the principal demands made by the representatives of the Christians, reserving the fuller consideration of them for the following post.

1st. They demand that the people shall be entitled to elect representatives for the General Assembly, in proportion to the relative numbers of the two sects in the several districts, thereby giving a great preponderance of Christian Deputies.

2nd. That the Administrative Council (Idaré Mejlis) sitting at Canea shall be formed of the Governor-General (Vali), as President, and of six members elected by the General Assembly, four Christians, and two Mussulmans, and that all those Government employés who at present sit there by virtue of their office shall be excluded. That the District Administrative Councils shall be constituted on the same principle.

3rd. That, inasmuch as the Vali who sanctions the decisions of the various tribunals is a Mahommedan, the President of the Appellate Court which sits at Canea, and the Presidents of the Courts of First Instance and of Commerce, holding their sittings in the chief towns of Canea, Candia, and Rethymo, shall be Christians, the four judges of the said Courts being, as at present, two of them Christians and two Mussulmans.

4. That in the districts (kazas) where the majority of the inhabitants are Christian, the Presidents and three of the Judges shall be Christian, the remaining Judge being a Mussulman. That in those districts where the majority are Mussulman (this obtains in one only), the same proportion shall be observed in favour of Mussulmans.

5. They demand that Kaïmakams (Governors of districts or kazas) shall henceforth be chosen from among Cretans and appointed by the Porte instead of at present by the Vali (this being a recent innovation), and that before entering upon the duties of their posts, their fitness for their posts must be pronounced by the Administrative Council.

6. That Mouvins (assistants attached to each Kaïmakam) shall be appointed by the Vali, also selected from among natives, their fitness for their posts being likewise decided by the same Council.

7. That inasmuch as the Governor-General is a Mahommedan, the post of Mussulman Councillor (Mushaver) be suppressed, the office of Christian Councillor being alone retained.

8. That the corps of zaptiés be recruited exclusively from the natives of the island in proportion to the respective numbers of the two religious communities, and that, instead of their superior officers (consisting of a Colonel and four Majors) all belonging to the dominant faith, two of the latter shall be Christians. (Of the 2,800 zaptiés enrolled, upwards of 2,000 are at present Albanians.)

9. That the Defterdar and the four Muassabéjis (Director and sub-Directors of the Financial Department) shall have each a Christian clerk attached to them, and that a Budget of the receipts and expenditure of the Administration shall be annually presented to the General Assembly, the same items of which shall be submitted for their consideration and approval.

10. Larger powers are demanded for the Christian Demogerontias, Courts which administer the properties and protect the interests of minors and orphans, and in some instances of pious foundations. They demand that the decisions of these Courts shall be binding.

Lastly, they desire that the sittings of the General Assembly shall be open to the public.

Such are the principal of the radical reforms which the chosen leaders of the Cretan Christians have decided to ask of the Porte. They have been elaborated by the town deputies, chiefly lawyers and doctors educated at Athens, men who were excluded from the Assembly when the towns were virtually deprived of their franchise in 1869. Now that they have recovered the right of returning their own members, these latter at once acquired that ascendancy over their rural colleagues which superior intelligence never fails to command, and this in spite of the unremitting efforts of the authorities to create distrust and suspicion among them. Government agents have been sent to different parts of the country to induce some of the inhabitants to express their disapproval of the measures proposed by their representatives, but the general effect of these efforts has been to heighten the enthusiasm in their favour. Perfect accord has not, however, always reigned amongst them, and compromises have in certain cases had to be made in order to prevent disunion. In the Article, for instance, which demands not only that a Christian shall be President of the District Courts, but that three of the four Judges should also be Christians, the deputies of the towns were in favour of the Judges being equal in number. Their country colleagues, however, threatened to withdraw their support if their wishes in this matter were not respected, and the others were obliged to yield.

These meetings of the past week have been held in the absence of the Mussulman deputies, for fear of provoking unseemly disputes. The latter, who are, of course, advised of the proceedings of their Christian colleagues, are in no submissive mood, and are sparing no pains to prevent the acceptance of the demands of their rivals at Constantinople. Both parties seem sanguine of success, and it will be no easy problem for the Porte to devise such a compromise as shall satisfy the Christians without exasperating the Mussulmans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

No. 381.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Scutari, June 5, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch addressed this day by me to Sir Henry Elliot, and reporting to His Excellency the arrival from Montenegro of M. Wassiltchikoff and two Garibaldians, and the manner in which the latter were made to return to Montenegro.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Enclosure in No. 381.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Scutari, June 5, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the day before yesterday one of the small lake steamers belonging to Montenegro arrived here from Rieka, having on board as passengers M. Wassiltchikoff, one of Prince Nicholas' body-guard, a Montenegrin medical student, and two Italians.

M. Wassiltchikoff has been in Montenegro since January last, occupied with the organization and management of the Russian Society for the succour of the wounded, and states that he is now about to visit Corfu and the Southern Coast of Albania prior to returning to Russia, his duties in Montenegro having devolved on a M. Paiutine, who has recently arrived at Cettigné from St. Petersburgh.

Count Vivalde de Pasqua and M. Capura, the Italians, belong to the Garibaldians who have endeavoured to have their services accepted by the chiefs of the insurrection in the Herzegovina, and the Count commanded the fifty Italians who were present, early last April, at the meetings that took place in the Suttorina between Baron Rodich and the insurgents.

Immediately on the appearance of these persons in Scutari the Governor-General wrote to the Russian and Italian Consuls for particulars and explanations as to the character and intentions of the new arrivals. His Excellency was obliged to accept as satisfactory the reply given concerning M. Wassiltchikoff, but the Italian Consul having persisted in declining to furnish any further particulars than the names of the two Italians, on the ground that it was not in his power to call upon them to explain to him the object of their visit, the Governor-General sent the Chief of the Police to order them to leave the country within twenty-four hours.

M. Borio, the Italian Consul, having spoken to me concerning what he was pleased to call the extraordinary conduct of Achmed Hamdi Pasha, I explained to him at once that I thought his Excellency was acting with great moderation in not arresting two persons who had quite recently taken an active part in an insurrection still in progress, and when the object of their visit was apparently to provide themselves with

horses for the purpose of better continuing their warfare against Turkey. I disagreed entirely with M. Berio on the wide scope given by him to the privilege of exemption of Italians in all cases from Turkish jurisdiction, and urged him most strongly to profit by the opportunity still given him by the local authorities to get the two Garibaldians out of the country.

I believe my remarks must have had the effect of making my Italian colleague modify his first intentions of resisting the wishes of the Pasha, for shortly afterwards I heard Count Vivalde de Pasqua tell M. Wassiltchikoff that his Consul had requested him and M. Capura to return to Montenegro at once, and that they were consequently leaving immediately. Count Vivalde de Pasqua added that had he not known beforehand that great liberties might be taken with the Turkish Government he would never have ventured upon coming to Scutari; and he explained that he would never dream of paying a visit to Salzburg was he engaged at the time in carrying on an insurrection in the Tyrol.

I regret to say that only too frequently Consular officers, and not solely, Garibaldians, are disposed to presume upon the forbearance of the Turkish Government, and thus give rise to the belief in the native mind that most Consuls are prepared to make an abuse of the peculiar privileges over which they are appointed to watch.

When the two Italians re-embarked for Montenegro they were accompanied from the town to the steamer, a distance of more than two miles, by Russian and Italian cavasses, a mark of honour to which they were not entitled, and which, under the circumstances, ought not to have been extended to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

P.S.—I have now ascertained that both the Italians took an active share in the last engagements in the Duga Pass, when Nichsich was successfully relieved by Moukhtar Pasha, and that their intention in coming to Scutari was to cross over the mountains of Clementi and Pulati and reach Pristina, where they hoped to join the insurrectionary movement going on in Bulgaria.

W. K. G.

No. 382.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 23.)
Scutari, June 6, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch this day addressed by me to Sir Henry Elliot, and furnishing his Excellency with particulars concerning the present state of the besieged town, Nichsich.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Scutari, June 6, 1876.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Excellency the following information, derived from a native Christian of Scutari, who has just arrived here from Nichsich, where he had been detained from the commencement of the Herzegovinian insurrection. His escape from Nichsich was effected through the connivance of some influential Montenegrin friends.

He states that the troops in that town have provisions for two months longer, but the inhabitants will again have to place themselves on half rations in a fortnight's time from this date. Secret intercourse has, however, been maintained throughout the seige with Montenegrins, who sell to the inhabitants, during dark nights at prearranged spots, grain and other necessaries.

All the forts in the Duga Pass are fully provisioned for at least ten months' longer, and my informant's conviction is that Nichsich cannot be starved out, although it is the impression of the Montenegrin authorities that they maintain a very efficient blockade. The Commandant is in nightly communication with Moukhtar Pasha. The few Christian families still in Nichsich are well treated by the Mohammedans, and the general health of the inhabitants is good.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 383.

Consul Reade to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 8. Political.)
Rustchuk, June 9, 1876.

My Lord,

SINCE the date of my No. 7, Political, I have heard nothing particular to report upon respecting the disturbances in the Tirnova district of this vilayet except from the Governor-General, who states that all is quiet again.

Fayli Pasha, the General commanding the troops in the district, arrived here three days ago by way of Widdin. I therefore think that what the Governor-General says is correct.

On Sunday last the Pasha read me a telegram he had just received from the Roumanian Government respecting certain measures which he had requested them to take in the vicinity of Galatz and Braila, relative to some disaffected Bulgarians in that quarter.

The telegram, if sincere, was certainly highly satisfactory; and the Pasha read it to me to show the good effect produced in Roumania by the recent changes at Constantinople. If the telegram be honest, any Bulgarians in Roumania who still have designs against this vilayet will surely be thwarted.

The Archbishop here, a man of great influence over the Bulgarians, called at this Consulate a few days ago and gave me an opportunity of conversing with him as to the relations between the Bulgarians and Mussulmans here.

His Eminence told me that he had issued a strong circular throughout his diocese with a view to promote a better feeling, and assured me that he should not cease to do all in his power with this object always in view.

He said that the principal difficulty that lay in his way was the conduct of some of the minor authorities in the country districts, which was often such as to drive the parties wider apart.

His circular, he added, was issued in consequence of a conversation I had previously had with him on the subject, and as he said that nothing could be better than the feeling of the Governor-General on the subject. I said that I should always be most happy to bring to the Pasha's knowledge, unofficially, anything his Eminence might wish him to know. This I was able to offer, as the Pasha had requested me to let him know whatever I might hear in this way.

The Bishop thanked me and said that this would greatly facilitate matters, and spoke in strong terms of the way in which the Bulgarians have been duped from abroad.

The Governor-General is also working hard with a view to reconciling the two communities in question, and I, having the confidence of both, shall not fail to do all I can, unofficially, in assisting to promote this object which, if brought about, will undoubtedly reduce, if not sweep away, the present difficulties of the Porte, at any rate, in this part of Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. READE.

No. 384.

Sir C. Wyke to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, June 14, 1876.*

I HAVE already informed your Lordship, by my cypheret telegram of the 26th ultimo, what I had gathered from my verbal communications with this Government of their views with regard to the attitude assumed by that of Her Majesty's Government in the latest phase of the Eastern Question; but these were in no way shared in by the leading journals of this capital, which have always been hostile to England since the war with Germany in 1864, when, as they declare, we deserted and left this country to its fate, notwithstanding our promises to support them against their powerful neighbour.

They entirely ignore the fact of our having made overtures to the French Government to join us in assisting Denmark against the unjust aggression then made on her, and satisfy themselves by loudly asserting that a simple demonstration on our part would have sufficed to prevent the war from taking place.

The ill-feeling thus existing displayed itself in all its force by a series of violent articles in the "Dagblad," on its becoming known that Her Majesty's Government had refused to join the five powers in presenting to Turkey Prince Gortchakow's memorandum of the 13th of May last, and this rancour continued until the revolution in Constantinople had proved that the policy of England was justified in holding back from joining the three northern powers in forcing reforms on Turkey, which it now appears that the new Government of that country is willing take the initiative of themselves introducing and carrying into practical operation. Public opinion here is very fairly represented by the metropolitan Press; for the Danes feel convinced that their only hope of ultimately regaining that portion of North Sleswig, which should undoubtedly belong to them, will consist in the powerful support of Russia, which they one day hope to obtain.

This view of the case is more or less entertained by the Government, whilst at the same time they cannot but feel the greatest dread of any collision between Great Britain and Russia, for should Germany go with us, the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic will then inevitably take place between that Power and Russia, the result of which, whatever it may be, must prove disastrous to one or other of the two Scandinavian Powers; should Russia triumph, Sweden's independence would be seriously menaced, whilst the same fate would await Denmark, should Germany get the upper hand. England they leave entirely out of the question, from their entertaining the conviction that we only think of our own direct interests, and that we should therefore leave them to their fate as we did in their struggle with Germany in the year 1864.

The supposition that we should remain inactive under such circumstances proves that they take a very short-sighted view of the question, for our commercial interests in the Baltic are of such a nature as to render it impossible that we should see with indifference the supremacy in those waters of either Germany or Russia, the former of which, by the possesion of Kiel, already possesses a preponderance in these regions which she ought never to have been allowed to have.

This danger looming in the future justifies, I venture to think, the suggestions I have had the honour of making in my former correspondence with your Lordship, as to the prudence of anticipating such possible embarrassment by timely action in a matter which might be quietly arranged now, but which it would be impossible to settle on the eve of a great conflict, in which the passions of all parties concerned would be aroused.

The Danish Government is most anxious to know what is the real policy of Her Majesty's Government in the crisis through which we are now passing; but I am, of course, unable to inform them of more than I gather from a perusal of the English newspapers' statements with reference to this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES LENNOX WYKE.

No. 385.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 385.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 14, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a translation of an extract of a letter dated Cettigné, which has appeared in the "Politische Correspondenz" of this day, on the subject of the relations between Turkey and Montenegro.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 385.

Extract from a Letter published in the "Politische Correspondenz."

(Translation.)

REPORTS received from Cettigné describe the situation in Montenegro as being far less critical than it was a week ago. It appears certain that a warning came from Ems that all possible care should be taken to prevent a rupture with the Porte, and it was decided that the well-meant advice of Russia should be followed. The first result of this determination has been that all the Serdars and captains have received orders not to allow any Montenegrin to cross the frontier; and the Montenegrin troops concentrated on the frontier have been strictly prohibited from making any demonstration against the Turkish forces. In consequence of the advice he has received from Russia, Prince Nicholas will henceforth restrict himself *de facto* to the position of a neutral observer of events. The special Envoy from Russia, who is expected here, will thus find all ready for his mission of peace. In any case the Prince will await the result of the direct negotiations which are about to be opened between the Porte and the insurgents, provided that they are not frustrated by the new expedition which Moukhtar Pasha intends to make to Niebsich. Should these negotiations prove successful, then Montenegro will have finished her part. Should the contrary be the case Prince Nicholas will act according to circumstances. In the present, however, Montenegro retires to the position indicated to her by the counsels of the Czar. If the Turkish troops should be withdrawn from the Montenegrin border, Prince Nicholas would be enabled to give the same orders to the Montenegrins concentrated on the frontier. By taking the initiative the Porte would render far easier the Prince's transition from the position of an armed to that of a peaceful neutral, and this appears to be the wish of the Cabinet, who are determined to maintain the interests of peace.

Prince Nicholas has sent a congratulatory telegram to the new Sultan, wishing him a long, happy, and glorious reign.

No. 386.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 430. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 16, 1876.*

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches Nos. 599, 600, and 601, all of the 14th instant, stating the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the present state of the negotiations respecting the Eastern question, and particularly with regard to the draft notes which had been put into my hand by the Duc Decazes. Moreover, I had this morning the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 611 of yesterday, inclosing a copy of the despatch marked No. 378 and dated the 11th, in which you have given Lord Augustus Loftus an account of a conversation which you had had with Count Schouvaloff, respecting the policy of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the insurrection in Turkey.

I went this morning to the Duc Decazes, and gave him to read the despatch (No. 599) in which your Lordship has stated the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the notes proposed by him.

The Duke expressed his satisfaction at the handsome acknowledgment which the

despatch contains of the goodwill shown by the French Government in endeavouring to obtain the co-operation of Her Majesty's Government in the concerted action of the other Great Powers. As for his draft notes, he did not, he said, at all hold to the wording of them. He had mentioned to some of my colleagues that, in order to put his ideas into form, he had drawn up these drafts and given them to me, but he had not shown the text of them to anyone but me. Nor, indeed, had he any decided preference with regard to the form in which the concert of the six Powers should be re-established; but he did think it of the utmost importance that it should be made clear to all the world that this concert existed. Without it neither could any satisfactory settlement of the troubles in Turkey be obtained, nor could the anxiety and uncertainty which were doing so much harm in Europe be set at rest. He begged me to urge this on his behalf most earnestly in writing to your Lordship, and to say that he was quite ready to agree to any form which Her Majesty's Government might prefer, if only they would suggest some mode in which their union with the other Powers might be clearly established.

The Duke proceeded to express an anxious desire to understand correctly the exact views of Her Majesty's Government on the present phase of the Eastern question, and he put forward several suppositions on the subject, asking me if they were correct.

I said that it was certainly no part of the system or policy of Her Majesty's Government to take up a position of isolation on Eastern matters. They had indeed found it impossible to assent to the policy indicated in the Berlin Memorandum; but that document had, it appeared, been virtually set aside, at all events action upon it had been indefinitely postponed. There was, therefore, it seemed, no present cause of difference between the views of Her Majesty's Government and those of the other Powers. All the Powers appeared to agree that time should be allowed to the new Sultan to deal with the insurgents by direct negotiation; and while the success or failure of this negotiation remained uncertain, no further step could well be decided upon.

Supposing the negotiation now in progress between the Porte and the insurgents to be successful, and to end in a pacification, the object of the Powers would be attained and there would be no need for them to do or say anything more. Supposing it to fail, the possibility of any effectual interposition of the Powers at that moment seemed very doubtful, unless, indeed, they were prepared (which Her Majesty's Government were not) to use force against one or other of the parties. The views of the two parties would have been shown by the failure of the negotiation to be irreconcilable. The insurgents would in fact have manifested a determination to be content with nothing short of independence or of some sort of autonomy, while the Porte would certainly not concede autonomy in the present state of the struggle.

If either party should obtain a decided advantage over the other, the Powers might, I said in conclusion, be in a position to mediate usefully and effectually, but the time for the mediation did not appear to Her Majesty's Government to have yet arrived.

Having read with great attention, just before I went to the Duc Decazes, the account of the language used by your Lordship in your conversation with Count Schouvaloff, I used as nearly as possible the same language in speaking to the Duc Decazes.

The Duke did not make any objection to the views of Her Majesty's Government, as thus expressed, but he urged that the hopes of a speedy pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina would be very much increased, if it could be made apparent both to the Porte and the insurgents that there was complete accord between the six Powers.

I said that it appeared to me that the success of the present overtures of the Porte to the insurgents depended mainly upon the degree in which Russia and Austria really exercised their influence to restrain Austria and Montenegro. It was, I observed, plain that Montenegro was the focus of the insurrection, while the military efforts of the Turkish forces were baffled by the injunction given to the Porte not to attack that Principality. On the other hand, politically, any arrangement between the Porte and the insurgents was discouraged effectually by the projects continually put forward with the object of making the revolted subjects of the Sultan look to foreign Powers, and not to their own Government for protection and guarantees. I added that, while the insurgent chiefs found a safe retreat and base of operations in Montenegro, and while the prospect of political advantages to be procured for them by foreign Powers was held out to them, it was vain to hope that the districts could be

pacified, even though a large number of the inhabitants (as appeared to be the case) were desirous of returning to their homes and willing to submit to the Porte.

The Duc Decazes answered that there was, in fact, a great deal that was incomprehensible in the conduct of the Russian and Austrian Governments. He believed that the Emperor of Russia was perfectly sincere in his professions of desiring to promote a pacification and to restrain Servia and Montenegro. But the influence on public opinion of the societies at Moscow and elsewhere embarrassed the Russian Government and disposed it to act quietly rather than openly and decidedly; he did not think that it would oppose the Slavs with *éclat*. On the other hand, the Austrian Government seemed to be very badly served by its authorities on the frontier, who were led by their Slav sympathies to evade the execution of the orders of their Government. The Duke cited as an instance of this the recent landing of a large quantity of arms for Montenegro at Cattaro. He had, he told me, sent a telegram *en clair* to the French Ambassador at Vienna, directing him to ask explanations of the Austrian Government and to express a hope that the accounts received could not be true. He had been informed in answer that the facts were as stated, but that an inquiry would be instituted in order to ascertain how the arms could have been allowed to pass.

I said that it rather appeared from the latest accounts I had seen from Vienna, that the arms had been allowed to pass, with the express sanction of the Austrian Government, on the ground that the Prince of Montenegro had done nothing to provoke a suspension of the ordinary law, which permitted the passage of arms through Austrian territory, and their exportation. I added that it seemed also that the Russian Government had made a representation in this sense to the Government of Austria.

At this point in the conversation, a telegram, received by the Havas Agency, was brought to the Duke, which gave him the news of the assassination of Hussein Avni Pasha and Rashid Pasha at Constantinople. The Duke had not yet received any official intelligence on the subject, and the bearer of the Havas telegram informed him that a somewhat obscure addition to it seemed to imply that the two Ministers had been murdered by the Softas.

Under this impression the Duke said that this last deplorable event made him feel more than ever the urgency, not only of virtual accord between the six Powers, but of a public and unmistakable manifestation of that accord. He must, therefore, once more beg me to impress upon Her Majesty's Government his anxious desire that some means might be devised of making a declaration of the union of Great Britain with the other Powers.

I promised to report to your Lordship what he had said.

I send a copy of this despatch, confidentially, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople by messenger this evening, under flying seal to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 387.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 16, 1876.*

IT appears to be established that the murder of the Ministers was entirely an act of personal revenge, and had no political object. The assassin has avowed that he only intended to be revenged upon the Seraskier, and that he killed Rachid Pasha because, when he saw him get up, he thought he meant to fall upon him. He acted like a wild beast, and before he was secured had killed seven persons and wounded eight others and endeavoured to set fire to the house.

No. 388.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 16, 1876.*

SOME of my colleagues seem much alarmed at the state of things, and may perhaps be disposed to recommend their Governments to have the fleets sent to Constantinople. There is nothing just now to justify such a measure, which ought not

to be resorted to unless rendered indispensable for the protection of foreign subjects in case of a state of anarchy, of which there is at present no appearance.

No. 389.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 17, 1876, 4·10 p.m.*

DO your utmost to discourage the idea of sending for the fleets under present circumstances.

No. 390.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 17, night.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 17, 1876.*

GRAND VIZIER, whom I saw this morning, hopes that Governments friendly to Turkey will allow the Porte time to elaborate its plans for improvement of condition of the provinces without embarrassing it at present by fresh suggestions or demands.

No. 391.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 128.)

My Lord, *Athens, June 10, 1876.*

THE reports which have reached Athens from Belgrade during the last few days have been of so warlike a nature as to cause some uneasiness here, and fears are entertained in some quarters that if Servia declares war against the Porte the Greeks will make common cause with the Christians in Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, against the Turks.

I do myself the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of an article from the "Messager d'Athènes" of this evening in which sympathy is expressed with the insurgents, and calculations are made as to the number of fighting men Greece could put into the field.

M. Coronéos, whose name is mentioned in this article, is the same person who took a leading part in the Cretan revolution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

Inclosure in No. 391.

Extract from the "Messager d'Athènes" of June 10, 1876.

LES nouvelles de Belgrade sont toujours à la guerre. On affirme même que la Proclamation du Prince Milan suivra de près la Proclamation du Conseil Municipal, que tout est prêt pour une entrée en campagne. L'esprit général, l'opinion courante dans ses élans, dicte la loi au Prince comme au Gouvernement à bout d'expédients pour contenir l'ardeur belliqueuse du peuple Serbe.

Mais peut-être nous trompons-nous. Ce n'est pas seulement, en effet, par leur passé unis pas aussi par un sentiment exact de la situation intérieure, que les hommes aujourd'hui aux affaires voient le salut dans les partis extrêmes. La mobilisation d'une partie des milices, les secours donnés à l'insurrection ont puisé les ressources de la Serbie, amené dans les affaires ce marasme qui a nécessité des mesures financières dans le genre de celles qui ont tué le crédit de la Turquie et de l'Égypte. De plus, les partisans de Carageorgévich sont là, toujours prêts à dénigrer Milan quelque parti qu'il prenne, à le rendre responsable d'événements qu'il n'était peut-être pas en son pouvoir de prévenir, comme du mal qu'il ne saurait empêcher.

Ne nous aveuglons donc pas. La guerre peut éclater d'un moment à l'autre en Orient, car de même que l'Angleterre a déjoué toutes les intrigues de la Russie en

précipitant la révolution à Constantinople, le Cabinet St. Pétersbourg peut déjouer toutes les combinaisons de la diplomatie Anglaise en poussant à la guerre à Belgrade où les partisans de la paix n'osent plus se prononcer dans la crainte d'irriter encore davantage les esprits exaltés par les succès partiels des insurgés.

En effet, l'insurrection vainc en Bulgarie, où les Turcs se sont livrés aux derniers excès, résiste victorieusement dans les districts montagneux de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine. Les renforts du dehors suffisent à combler les vides que la mort, la lassitude ou les maladies font dans les rangs des insurgés, que leur proximité du Monténégro met à l'abri du danger d'être enveloppés par les forces supérieures des Osmanlis. Dans ces conditions l'insurrection peut se prolonger jusqu'au jour où la Russie dira aux Serbes et aux Monténégrins d'envahir les provinces soulevées.

L'avénement de Mourad n'améliorera pas d'une manière sensible la situation intérieure de la Turquie, ne lui donnera pas, dans tous les cas, les ressources dont elle a besoin pour réprimer l'insurrection, pour maintenir son armée sur le pied de guerre afin de contenir les deux peuples vassaux. Il viendra donc un moment où la guerre sera désirée des deux côtés comme le seul moyen de se tirer d'embarras.

La Grèce ne peut se désintéresser des questions qui agitent les peuples de la presqu'île des Balkans. Aussi l'opinion est-elle unanime à demander au Gouvernement l'organisation militaire du pays, l'application de la loi sur la Garde Nationale en attendant que le service obligatoire puisse être voté. Une Commission, composée de MM. Coronéos, Sapountzaki, et Vlassis, trois de nos officiers supérieurs les plus distingués, s'est prononcée dans ce sens tout en déclarant que ce n'est là qu'un expédient, et qu'il est urgent d'adopter le service militaire obligatoire pour tous les citoyens de vingt à quarante ans aussitôt que les circonstances le permettront.

"L'Aion" croit savoir que la Grèce peut, sans décréter la levée en masse, sans faire revivre la loi sur la Garde Nationale, mobiliser 31,000 de bonnes et solides troupes. Ce n'est pas assez. Aussi crierons-nous toujours que rien n'est fait tant qu'il reste encore quelque chose à faire, que, dans l'état actuel de l'Orient, les dépenses que l'on doit regretter le moins sont les dépenses destinées à l'entretien d'une armée nombreuse et disciplinée.

No. 392.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 18, 1876, 3 p.m.*

I MENTIONED to Count Andrassy to-day that Sir H. Elliot was apprehensive that a question might be raised as to present state of things making it expedient to call fleets to Constantinople for the protection of foreigners, and that as he is of opinion that no sufficient cause for such a measure is likely to arise, your Lordship had instructed him to do everything in his power to discourage its adoption.

No. 393.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 18, 1876, 3·15 p.m.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 16th instant on the subject of Sir H. Elliot's suggestion that the Prince of Montenegro should send a representative to Constantinople, Count Andrassy has stated to me to-day that the conflicting pretensions of His Highness and the Porte as to his independence offer serious objections to such a measure.

His Excellency therefore considers that it would be highly desirable if the Porte were, through Ali Pasha or a special agent, to acquaint His Highness with the amnesty granted to the insurgents, and to express a hope that he will co-operate with Turkish authorities in bringing about the pacification of the provinces, in which case in any future arrangements for the delimitation of the frontier, regard will be paid, in consideration of his services, to any claims he may make in the interests of the Principality.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Constantinopl, Rome, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 394.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 18, 1875, 4·30 p.m.*

SULTAN is suffering from severe boils, and coronation ceremonial is therefore indefinitely postponed.

For the same reason it may be some time before His Majesty can grant me an audience to present my credentials.

No. 395.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 18, 1876.*

AN opinion appears to have received credence generally abroad that Servia has given up every intention to make war upon Turkey. This is not (the?) case, however. My (Russian?) and also Austrian collegue anticipate (complications?) shortly as unavoidable. Reinforcements sent to frontier. Armed bands preparing to cross Bosnian frontier. Montenegrin alliance completed.

Much reliance may have been placed on the conciliatory telegrams exchanged with the Grand Vizier, but it is, I find, generally believed here that the Servian Special Envoy will be instructed to make certain offers to the Porte concerning Bosnia, about nature of which secrecy is observed, but which, if they should be made, would be rejected, and therefore would hostilities (ensue?).

No. 396.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18, at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 18, 1876.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has received similar intelligence to that reported in my despatch No. 380 of the 15th instant, respecting the purposes of Servia. He believes Prince Milan will ask for the civil Governorship of Bosnia, and that it is too late for Russia to prevent war if it is refused, although she now appears to be honestly endeavouring to do so.

No. 397.

Mr. St. John to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 65. Political.) *Bucharest, June 8, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of the 3rd instant, reporting the seizure of the Austrian steamer "Raditzki" on the Danube (by a band of Bulgarians), I have the honour to transmit the accompanying copy of a correspondence between M. Cogalniceano, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bucharest, and the Governor-General for the Vilayet of the Danube, with regard to the steps taken to prevent a repetition, and showing the good understanding now existing between the Government of these Principalities and the Suzerain Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. ST. JOHN.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Constantinople, Rome, and St. Petersburgh.

Inclosure 1 in No. 397.

M. Cogalniceano to the Governor-General of the Vilayet of the Danube.

(Télégraphique.) *Le 31 Mai, 1876.*

SUR ma demande depuis Giurgevo en amont les bateaux de passagers et de commerce, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, ne toucheront plus rive Bulgare. Sont exemptés les bateaux accélérés. C'est à votre Excellence de m'avertir quand cette disposition peut être revoquée.

Inclosure 2 in No. 397.

The Governor-General of Vilayet of the Danube to M. Cogalniceano.

M. le Ministre, *Le 2 Juin, 1876.*

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception du télégramme que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 31 Mai, et je la remercie pour les dispositions qu'elle a si sagement prises au sujet de la non-acceptation des Bulgares aboard des bateaux de passagers et de commerce.

L'insurrection commence à toucher à sa fin si ce n'est que l'incident qui s'est opéré dernièrement à Caslalina, situé entre Pahova et Lour. Sûr, ce le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé la prohibition provisoire des bateaux Autrichiens en général, sauf les accélérés, de toucher les échelles de la rive droite. Cette mesure a été mise en vigueur depuis Mardi passé, et hier d'après un ordre télégraphique que j'ai reçu et à la suite d'une entente entre la Sublime Porte et l'Ambassade Austro-Hongroise à Constantinople, la dite décision a été abolie.

Pourtant je prierai votre Excellence de vouloir bien maintenir pour le moment les dispositions qu'elle a bien voulu prendre jusqu'à ce que je puisse avoir l'honneur de l'avertir.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Gouverneur-Général,
(Signé) M. ASSIM.

No. 398.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 19.)

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Buda-Pesth, June 14, 1876.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 91 of the 7th instant (and as I have some reason for believing that the Belgrade letters to the "Pester Correspondenz" are based upon information from a good source), I beg to give to your Excellency the following nearly literal translation of a letter in that sheet yesterday on the determination of Servia to attack Turkey within a few days.

The war against Turkey, it says, is unfortunately only deferred, not abandoned.

Every unprejudiced observer who knows the real state of affairs is astonished at the more favourable view taken of it abroad. It is true that the foreign representatives intervened on behalf of peace, but it is not less true that they only obtained in reality a delay of fourteen days. No disarmament is possible; and M. Karzow's instructions from Ems are not to be taken too literally. He only declared that Russia did not wish her plains to be crossed by Servia, but he had nothing to say about Russia wishing Servia to disarm. The preparation for war continue with undiminished zeal, and in fourteen days hostilities will break out. It must again be repeated that the Government, even if it wished, or even if defeat in the field were certain, could not now carry out a policy of peace, unless the Porte grant the demand for Bosnia which it is impossible to grant, and to which neither England nor Austria could assent.

After some remarks on Prince Wrede's former counsels of peace, which were so badly received, the letter concludes by asserting that M. Ristics will retire and leave the direction of the war to his colleagues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 399.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 19.)

Sir, *Buda-Pesth, June 14, 1876.*

IN reply to interpellations addressed to him on Eastern affairs, M. Tisza this morning replied that, as to whether or not the Oriental policy had been pursued with the knowledge and assent of Hungary, "The Hungarian Government recognizes its duty, and had both exercised the lawful influence which devolved upon it, and been met with the greatest forethought on the part of the Foreign Ministry, so that in this respect everything has happened as, according to the spirit of the law, it should happen."

"As regards the actual Eastern question itself and the accomplished transformation in Constantinople, it was impossible to foresee the full results, but I can for my part say that the first result of that transformation justifies the tendency of the Austro-Hungarian policy, inclusive of the Berlin interview which forms part of the interpellation, for that policy had no other aim than to bring about reforms, so that peace might be re-established. And now the Ruler of Turkey himself enters upon reforms."

As regards the future, his Excellency said, "I can answer that the events in Constantinople may change the procedure and the time, according as the one or the other course is there followed; but the main direction of our foreign policy, what has been kept in view from the very beginning, does not alter, and cannot be altered. This direction consists in working in accord with the other European Powers to prevent the disturbance of the peace of Europe under any circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 400.

Mr. Strachey to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *Dresden, June 15, 1876.*

THE Saxon comments on Turkish affairs are such mere echoes from foreign journals, that I need not reproduce any of them in detail.

The national Liberal organs chiefly relate facts, or what they suppose to be such, and praise the Triple Alliance, to which they still profess to look for the continuance of peace, and for an adequate solution of Eastern questions, in spite of the oppositional policy which Great Britain has thought fit to set up.

The "Nachrichten" writes in a style more gratifying to English pride, but their flippancy and ignorance outweigh the soundness of their views. The Liberal Particularist organ says, that it was a characteristic piece of Russian insolence to assume the rôle of reform on the Bosphorus, when there was no comparity of Ottoman slackness, opacity, and corruption which could not be matched by a like Muscovite abuse. Thanks to the energy with which Britannia has slipped her blue-jackets, and brandished her trident at the Bear, Turkey was now free from the mischievous pressure lately put upon her, and the situation was cleared by the revolution so well planned and executed by British diplomacy. The results obtained by Her Majesty's Government put to shame the so-called Great Military Powers, whose supposed inexhaustible strength and influence collapsed at once when boldly faced by statesmen with no armies behind them, but full of audacity and foresight.

The "Fortschritt Presse" says, in more serious style, that the satisfaction with which the friends of peace saw the centre of European international gravity shifted from Paris to Berlin was of short duration. The Ministry of the German Foreign Office shook confidence in the Imperial policy, and it soon appeared that the Czar, not the Kaiser, held the issues of Continental peace and war. Under the mask of the league of the Three Emperors Germany was doing Russian errands, and it was very fortunate that England's wisdom should have checkmated the Triple Alliance. The risk of an eventual solution of the Turkish question in conformity with Russia's traditional policy is thus averted for the time, but the danger must reappear unless the European alliances are reorganized on the basis of a recognition by Germany of the fact that England is her natural confederate, and that it is not the mission of a culture-people like the Germans to carry the train of half-barbarous Russia.

I should remark that the belief is general that the Sultan was dethroned, and probably murdered, in accordance with a deliberate programme of Her Majesty's Government. Statements like those recently published in the Aug. "Allgemeine Zeitung" at once find universal acceptance in Germany. The Germans have a natural dislike of simple facts and explanations, and they are easily persuaded by hypotheses in which we should see designs too deep for calculation, and contrivances too complicated for execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. STRACHEY.

No. 401.

Mr. Strachey to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Dresden, June 15, 1876.*

THIS evening I dined with the Royal Family at the Chateau of Pillnitz, famous for the Declaration of 1791.

In reply to my remark that he might now presumably expect to pass a quiet summer, the King of Saxony said: "We have to thank you for that. Your Government has again shown rare dexterity and energy, this time doing Europe a great service. It is to them that we owe the altered aspect of affairs. I am rejoiced that England is the country which has done this work, and very glad that the honour of the success should belong to a Conservative Administration."

The Austrian and Prussian Ministers, and several leading Saxon civil and military authorities, offered me their congratulations, which were accompanied by some direct abuse of Russia. The belief prevails that General Ignatiew has been completely "crumpled up," and that our influence at Constantinople will now be decisive.

I hear on high authority that both the Emperors—Alexander and William—have been deeply agitated by the Turkish catastrophe. The complaint of the Russian Emperor (ossification of the aorta) is believed to be making dangerous advances.

The Duchess of Genoa, accompanied by the young Duke, has just arrived on a visit to her relations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. STRACHEY.

No. 402.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 388.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 15, 1876.*

A NOTICE in the democratic journal, the "Tag-Blatt" of this morning, complaining, although Count Andrassy had assured the Delegations at Pesth that there was no danger of the disturbance of tranquillity on the eastern frontier of the Empire, a Circular was addressed yesterday by the Government to the local telegraph offices in Vienna, ordering that no secret and private telegrams are to be received from, or forwarded to, telegraph stations in Dalmatia and Montenegro; and the editor of the paper also received a telegram, dated yesterday, from Ragusa, informing him that a similar instruction had been addressed to the telegraph office there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 403.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 389. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 15, 1876.*

THE person from whose correspondence on the affairs of Servia I have recently had the honour of transmitting extracts to your Lordship, called on me to-day, and endeavoured to satisfy me of the correctness of the information with which he has furnished me.

He says, however, that he believes the Memorial, mentioned in his letter of the 9th instant, proposing the annexation of Bosnia to Servia will not be delivered until the result of the Mission of the Agent recently sent to Constantinople is known.

With regard to the guns expected from Germany, he declares that he has himself seen the contract, which provides for the delivery of eleven batteries of six guns of 8 centim. calibre, of which three are to be furnished in a fortnight, and eight in the course of two months, together with 30,000 hollow shot fitted with a self-exploding cap; 10,000 empty schrapnel shells, and 6,000 loaded ones.

The price to be paid for each battery without the caissons is 30,000 francs, payable in three instalments: the first on delivery, the second at three months afterwards, and the third three months later. The expenses of transport are also to be defrayed by the Servian Government.

My informant stated that he had travelled in the same carriage with three Turkish officers on their way to Temesvar to purchase 1,500 horses for the Turkish artillery, and who said that 2,000 more will be required in the course of the summer.

These officers estimated the Turkish troops at Nisch at 50,000. Count Andrassy, however, said to me some days ago, on the authority of Prince Wrede, that this force had been reduced to 35,000, in consequence of a part of it having been detached to act against the insurgents in Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 404.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 392.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 15, 1876.

WITH references to Mr. St. John's despatch No. 64 of June 8, on the subject of the seizure of a band of Bulgarians of the Austrian steamer "Radetzky," I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the "Wiener Zeitung" publishes to-day information received from Widdin, from which it appears that the band of insurgents, numbering 200, who effected the seizure, was attacked and all killed by Turkish troops, with the exception of ten who are imprisoned.

Six companies of redifs and two squadrons of cavalry have been since sent to Lom and Rahowa, and two small Turkish armed steamers have been stationed on the Turkish bank of the Danube, to prevent any landing hereafter of bands from Roumania.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 405.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 393.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 15, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this morning's issue of the "New Free Press" has been confiscated, in consequence of its containing an article criticizing Count Andrassy's Eastern policy, in which he is represented to have been the dupe of Russia, and which states that, had it not been for the attitude taken by Great Britain the East of Europe would now be in a state of conflagration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 406.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 394. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 15, 1876.

WITH reference to my Confidential despatch No. 372 of the 13th instant, respecting Count Andrassy's wish that the Prince of Montenegro should use his influence with the insurgents to promote the restoration of tranquillity in the Herzegovine, Baron Hofmann told me to-day that no answer has yet been received from Cettigne.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 407.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 395. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 15, 1876.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, forwarding one from Sir Henry Elliot of the 13th instant, I am told here that no information as to orders having been given to the Turkish military authorities, as alleged by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Scutari, to pursue insurgents into Servia and Montenegro, has ever been received at the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 408.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 397.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 15, 1876.

IT is reported this evening from Zara that General Rodich is to proceed from thence to-morrow to the southern district of Dalmatia, and it is presumed that his journey will be undertaken with a view to communicating with the Herzegovinian insurgents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 409.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 402.)
My Lord,

Vienna, June 17, 1876.

THE intelligence received here yesterday of the assassination of the Turkish Ministers produced a very painful impression, but the opinion entertained at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was that the deplorable event was entirely attributable to private revenge; and as the only information received to-day refers to the nomination of the successors of the murdered Ministers, it is believed that no mischievous consequences are likely to result from the crime which has been committed.

On the contrary, it is thought that there is reason to hope that the question under discussion at the Porte will be more easily arranged now that the policy of Midhat Pasha will have no longer to contend with the opposition of the late Minister of War.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 410.

The Earl of Derby to Consul-General White.

(No. 9.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 19, 1876.

I APPROVE the communication made by you to the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs representing the great value attached by Her Majesty's Government to the preservation of peace, and how much the Servian Government would put itself

in the wrong by departing from a pacific policy, as reported in your despatch No. 58 of the 8th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 411.

The Earl of Derby to Consul-General White.

(No. 10.) *Foreign Office, June 19, 1876.*

Sir,

I APPROVE your having urged the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs to send a proper reply to the Grand Vizier in answer to his Highness' notification of the accession of Sultan Murad V, as reported in your despatch No. 61 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 412.

The Earl of Derby to Consul-General White.

(No. 11.) *Foreign Office, June 19, 1876.*

Sir,

I HAVE to approve the language used by you in conversation with Prince Wrede upon the subject of urging the Servian Government to adhere to a pacific policy, as reported in your despatch No. 56 of the 7th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 413.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, June 19.)

Ems, le 7/19 Juin, 1876.

M. le Comte,

J'ai répondu à l'expédition confiée par votre Excellence à M. le Comte Adlerberg et qui a précédé votre entretien avec Lord Derby.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur a vu avec satisfaction l'initiative que M. Disraeli a prise vis-à-vis de vous et le retour de confiance qu'il témoigne à notre égard. Nous ne croyons pas en avoir démérité et nous y répondrons avec une complète réciprocité.

Dès l'origine des troubles de l'Orient notre Auguste Maître n'a pas eu d'autre but que d'en arrêter le développement et de prévenir une conflagration générale en Turquie. Nous ne croyons pas plus que M. Disraeli à la durée indéfinie de l'état de choses anormal que présente l'Empire Ottoman. Mais rien n'est encore préparé pour le remplacer et sa chute subite risquerait d'ébranler l'Orient et l'Europe. Il était donc désirable de maintenir le *status quo* politique par une amélioration effective du sort des populations Chrétiennes qui nous paraissait et nous paraît encore une condition indispensable de l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman.

Nous avons pensé que ce résultat pourrait être atteint par une entente générale des Grandes Puissances intéressées comme nous à la tranquillité de l'Orient et de l'Europe et par une action conciliatrice qui s'exercerait des deux côtés avec fermeté et modération.

Telle a été la marche que nous avons adoptée et le but que nous n'avons pas cessé de poursuivre. Ces efforts n'ont pas été infructueux puisque la lutte a été circonscrite tout en se prolongeant et l'adhésion des deux parties acquise en principe aux bases de pacification.

Il restait à trouver les garanties indispensables pour amener l'application de ces bases et réaliser l'œuvre de l'apaisement en rendant possible le rapatriement des réfugiés et l'exécution des réformes.

Tel a été l'objet de l'échange d'idées qui a eu lieu à Berlin sous la pression des événements et dont le résultat a été porté à la connaissance des autres Cabinets afin d'obtenir leur coopération.

Nous avons vivement regretté la résolution prise par le Cabinet de Londres d'y refuser son concours.

L'efficacité de l'action diplomatique à laquelle nous nous sommes associés reposait sur l'unanimité des Cabinets. A défaut de cette unanimité, qui avait seule pu contenir les passions en présence sur le sol de l'Orient, une explosion était à prévoir,—elle ne s'est pas fait attendre.

Nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui en présence d'une situation nouvelle qu'il est encore difficile d'apprécier.

Au fond, le changement survenu à Constantinople ne nous paraît pas modifier essentiellement les éléments du problème qui se pose devant l'Europe.

Nous croyons qu'aujourd'hui, comme il y a huit mois, il n'y a pas lieu de souhaiter l'explosion d'une crise décisive en Orient, les choses n'étant pas suffisamment mûres pour une solution.

D'autre part l'Europe ne saurait se désintéresser de ces graves événements qui la touchent de trop près, ni abandonner les choses à leur cours naturel.

Il ne reste donc qu'à reprendre les efforts de pacification.

Si le Cabinet de Londres a en vue des moyens pour y arriver, soit sur les bases déjà proposées, soit par des solutions plus complètes, sans s'exposer à provoquer une conflagration générale, peut-être une guerre d'extermination en Orient, nous sommes prêts à accueillir toute idée dont il nous ferait part avec le sincère désir d'une entente.

En tout cas nous tenons à ce que Lord Derby considère l'exposé qui vous est fait des vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur comme étant adressé directement au Cabinet de Londres et comme un témoignage du désir de notre Auguste Maître de voir une grande Puissance telle que l'Angleterre occuper la place qui lui est dûe dans le concert Européen.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture de la présente à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique et lui en laisser copie si son Excellence le désire.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 414.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 19.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 18, 1876.*

At an interview to-day with Count Andrassy, I acquainted him verbally with the substance of language as reported in your Lordship's despatch to Lord A. Loftus, No. 378, which you recently held to Count Schouvaloff respecting the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Herzegovine question.

His Excellency said that Count Beust had already communicated to him by telegraph what he had learnt from Count Schouvaloff of the views you had expressed to him, and that he had sent a reply to Count Beust which appeared to have been favourably received by your Lordship.

He stated to me that in his opinion the insurgents are not fighting for autonomy. Many of them had returned, and all would do so if the Porte proceeded energetically to carry out the reforms. But if the six weeks are allowed to pass without an arrangement, a war would begin supported by Servia and possibly by Montenegro which would last for years as neither party would be willing to acknowledge defeat.

He therefore considered that all Powers should therefore (unofficially) urge the Porte to facilitate a pacification, and should act as far as lay in their power upon the insurgents, and on Servia and Montenegro.

He read a telegram from Count Corvoly stating that Prince Gortchakow thought favourably of your Lordship's "proposals," which I said were rather explanations of your policy, and as M. de Nowikoff is instructed to communicate to him Count Schouvaloff's report of your Lordship's language. I said that I would request Mr. Ffrench to read to him to-morrow confidentially an extract of that part of your Lordship's despatch to Lord A. Loftus, in which you state your opinions on the course most expedient to pursue under present circumstances.

Very Confidential.—It appears to me that his Excellency is very doubtful as to expediency of accepting proposals which Prince Gortchakow had approved.

In consequence of an observation made to me by Count Andrassy on the danger of England holding aloof, and leaving things to take their course, I said I felt assured

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

that Sir H. Elliot would not fail to give friendly advice to the Turkish Government in favour of their promptly carrying out the reforms which have been promised, and which are indispensably called for by the interests of the Empire.

No. 415.

Consul Sandwith to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 20.*)

(No. 10. Political.)

Canea, Crete, June 5, 1876.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency Sir Henry Elliot, accompanying a full translation of the modifications which the Christian Deputies of the General Assembly desire to see introduced into the Organic Law of Crete.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

Inclosure 1 in No. 415.

Consul Sandwith to Sir H. Elliot.

Canea, Crete, June 5, 1876.

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 28th ultimo I had the honour to report to your Excellency the changes which the Christians of Crete, speaking through their chosen representatives, desire to see introduced into the Organic Law.

A translation of the entire Minutes of Proceedings, of which I then gave an extract, I have now the honour to annex, embodied with which is a translation of an address to the Grand Vizier, drawn up in very outspoken language, which forms a sort of "pièce justificative" for their boldness in proposing these changes in the Organic Law. The imperfect manner in which that Law has been carried out, and the abuses of an Administration which have brought about a general and deep-seated discontent, are not obscurely hinted at in this latter document, in which reference is made to the Report addressed to the ex-Sultan by the late Aali Pasha, where that Statesman announced to his sovereign the granting of the Organic Law to Crete. His Highness there speaks of the new Law as having conferred self-government on the Cretans; the whole Report being much more liberal in its tone than the Law itself, the provisions of which, even if loyally carried out, are far from answering to the idea conveyed by the term "self-government."

Last week having been given up to feasting and rejoicing, the sittings of the General Assembly have been momentarily suspended. The ordinary duties of that body are now to be proceeded with, but the Christian Deputies, I understand, expect an answer to their demands before proceeding to the election of the members of the Administrative Council, the relative numbers of which, as representing the two creeds, the new propositions brought forward by the Christians will materially modify.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 415.

Changes to be introduced into the Organic Law of Crete, as proposed by the Christian Deputies of the General Assembly.

(Traduction.)

Chapitre I.—*Modifications sur le Chapitre Ier du Statut Organique, soumis d'un commun accord par tous les Députés Chrétiens aux Délibérations de l'Assemblée Générale.*

Article 1. L'ASSEMBLEE Générale, ayant pour base la proportion de la population Musulmane et Chrétienne de l'île, est désormais composée des représentants des différents cantons et des trois villes de la Canée, Rethymo, et Candie, lesquels représentants sont convoqués au chef-lieu du vilayet le 1er Mai de chaque année.

Chaque canton ou ville doit élire quatre Députés dont les deux seront Musulmans et les deux autres Chrétiens, si le canton ou la ville est habité exactement par autant de Musulmans que de Chrétiens; mais si la population d'un canton ou d'une ville appartenant à l'une de ces deux religions est supérieure en nombre à l'autre, dans ce cas la première élira trois Députés et la moins considérable un seul. Les cantons habités exclusivement par des Musulmans ou des Chrétiens, choisiront quatre Députés, qui seront Musulmans ou Chrétiens.

L'Article 2 est compris dans l'Article 1.

Art. 3. Dans chaque canton ou district l'élection des Députés se fait par les Démogérondes des villages convoqués à cet effet le 1er Avril de la même année par circulaires des Gouverneurs ou sous-Gouverneurs. Le mode d'élection dans les villes sera le même que par le passé et conforme aux usages locaux. Toutes les élections en général doivent être terminées le second Dimanche du mois d'Avril.

Art. 4. La réunion des Démogérondes ainsi que des électeurs dans les villes, ne sera considérée comme légalement et dûment constituée et elle ne pourra procéder à l'élection des Députés, si les deux tiers au moins de ses membres Chrétiens ou Musulmans ne s'y trouveraient présents. Dans le cas contraire, les Gouverneurs ou les Sous-Gouverneurs devront ajourner l'élection jusqu'à l'autre Dimanche, en prévenant les électeurs par écrit que les élections auront absolument lieu, quelque soit le nombre des électeurs présents.

Art. 5. L'Assemblée des Démogérondes dans les cantons comme dans les villes, sera toujours présidée, dans les chefs-lieux de districts ou de cantons, par les Gouverneurs ou les Caïmacans qui, sous aucun prétexte, ne doivent jamais intervenir dans les élections; ils veilleront seulement à l'ordre des discussions, du vote et à la prompte et régulière rédaction des procès-verbaux de l'élection de chaque Député.

Art. 6. Les Démogérondes Chrétiens éliront les Députés Chrétiens et les Démogérondes Musulmans leurs Députés coreligionnaires. L'élection de chaque candidat a lieu séparément par voie de scrutin, et on doit prendre en considération la pluralité des voix.

Art. 7. Les Députés sont élus pour une période de deux ans.

Art. 8. Les Députés qui auront fini leur temps peuvent être réélus pour une autre période. Dans le cas où quelque député donnerait sa démission, viendrait à mourir, ou bien aura été mis, par quelque empêchement, dans l'impossibilité de remplir sa mission, l'Assemblée des Démogérondes devra pourvoir à son remplacement.

Art. 9. Sont éligibles tous ceux qui sont inscrits sur les listes mentionnées dans l'Article 8 du Règlement Administratif et dressées par les Gouverneurs et les sous-Gouverneurs. Il n'est point indispensable qu'un Député habite dans le canton où il a été élu; il suffit qu'il soit domicilié en Crète.

Art. 12. Les Députés doivent se réunir à la Canée le 1er Mai de chaque année. Dans le cas où un Député ne se trouvera pas présent à la date susmentionnée, ou il ne s'empressait pas de justifier son absence par quelque empêchement plausible, le Gouverneur-Général, d'un commun accord avec la majorité de l'Assemblée, doit inviter le Gouverneur ou le sous-Gouverneur de la circonscription à procéder à l'élection d'un autre Député, si le représentant absent continuerait à ne pas comparaître jusqu'au 7 Mai.

Art. 13. Le candidat qui serait élu Député dans deux circonscriptions différentes devra opter pour l'une ou pour l'autre dans l'espace de cinq jours, à dater du jour où il aurait reçu communication du procès-verbal de sa seconde élection. Dans le cas contraire, le Gouverneur-Général et l'Assemblée Générale ordonnent une autre élection conformément à l'Article précédent.

Art. 14. Tous les Députés recevront de la caisse du Gouvernement chacun 1,000 piastres pour chaque session, et 15 piastres par jour depuis le 1er Mai jusqu'au jour où l'Assemblée terminerait ses travaux.

Nul employé recevant un traitement quelconque ne pourra être élu Député, à moins qu'il ne renonce par écrit à son emploi trois mois avant les élections.

Chapitre II.

Art. 15. Le jour fixé pour l'ouverture de l'Assemblée Générale, c'est-à-dire le 1er Mai, les Députés sont convoqués sous la présidence du Gouverneur-Général, qui annonce le commencement des travaux par écrit après avoir reçu les mandats de tous les Députés.

Si la validité de l'élection de quelques Députés venait à être contestée, le Gouverneur-Général et les Députés légalement élus procèdent à la vérification des pouvoirs

contestés. Et si l'élection est reconnue valable par la majorité de l'Assemblée, le nom du Député est inscrit sur la liste contenant les noms de ses collègues ; dans le cas contraire, l'élection est annulée et on procède au remplacement du Député irrégulièrement choisi, conformément à l'Article 12.

Art. 16. Les séances de l'Assemblée Générale sont publiques. L'Article 17 reste sans modification.

Art. 18. Les séances générales de l'Assemblée sont présidées par le Gouverneur-Général ou par son Conseiller, en cas d'empêchement. Dans les séances partielles les représentants Chrétiens ou Musulmans choisissent leur Président et leur bureaux.

Art. 19. Les séances générales ou partielles ne peuvent être considérées comme légalement constituées si la moitié plus un des Députés ne s'y trouveraient présents.

Attributions du Président de l'Assemblée.

Art. 20. Le Président de l'Assemblée Générale dirige les séances générales, veille à l'ordre qui y doit régner, donne la parole à chaque Député à tour de rôle et impose silence, s'il y a lieu, aux Députés et à l'auditoire.

Art. 21. Aucun Député ne peut prendre part à la discussion avant de s'être fait inscrire et y avoir été autorisé par le Président.

Art. 22. Lorsqu'il y a divergence d'opinion sur une question quelconque, le Président a recours aux scrutins et la question est résolue par la majorité des voix.

Art. 23. Les discussions se font en Grec et en Turc.

Art. 24. Les procès-verbaux de l'Assemblée, qui seront rédigés en Grec et en Turc, doivent être lus dans la séance suivante et après que l'on aura fait en marge, s'il y a lieu, les corrections nécessaires, on passera à l'examen d'autres questions.

Art. 25. Immédiatement après la vérification des pouvoirs et la constitution légale de l'Assemblée, le Gouverneur-Général et les Députés déposeront sur les bureaux du Président les divers projets qui devront être examinés et discutés durant la session. Ainsi constituée l'Assemblée Générale procède à la formation de Commissions Mixtes composées de sept membres pour l'examen de chaque question ; elle fixe aussi, par pluralité de voix et pour cause d'urgence, la discussion sur certaines questions. L'élection des membres du Conseil Administratif et du Tribunal d'Appel auront lieu cinq jours avant la clôture de l'Assemblée. Ces Conseillers et Magistrats seront choisis séparément par leurs députés co-religionnaires.

Art. 26. Chaque session de l'Assemblée Générale doit durer quarante jours ; mais si la majorité de cette Assemblée demande une prorogation de dix jours, on pourra la lui accorder par Ordonnance Impériale.

Chapitre III.—*Compétence de l'Assemblée Générale.*

Art. 27. L'Assemblée Générale est compétente pour examiner et discuter tout ce qui se rapporte directement ou indirectement au bien-être de l'île et à la stricte application de la part du pouvoir exécutif de ses résolutions. L'Assemblée s'occupera aussi de tout ce qui concerne les voies de communication, les travaux d'utilité publique, les fondations de banques agricoles et commerciales, conformément à la teneur du Firman Impérial du 16 Zilhidjé, 1287 (28 Février, 1868), ainsi que d'autres objets qui ont pour but le développement du commerce et de l'industrie, de l'agriculture et de l'instruction publique. L'Assemblée a également le droit de contrôler le budget de l'île pour l'exercice de l'année passée et de l'année prochaine. A l'Article 28 est ajouté seulement, après les mots fonctionnaires religieux, "à l'érection et réparation."

Art. 29. Sans modification, Article 30, idem ; Article 31, idem ; Article 32, idem.

Art. 33. Un résumé des débats et des procès-verbaux doit être publié par le Secrétaire de l'Assemblée dans le journal officiel du vilayet.

Art. 34. A cet Article est ajouté " toute contravention sera qualifiée par la majorité de l'Assemblée."

Art. . Article dernier. Toutes les fois que la majorité de l'Assemblée croira devoir procéder à la révision et à la modification des présentes lois organiques, l'autorisation lui en sera accordée par Décret Impérial.

Chapitre I.—*Démogéronties centrales Chrétiennes.*

Dans chaque chef-lieu de Gouvernement (Moutessarifilik) il y aura une Démogérontie pour les habitants Chrétiens. Chacune de ces Démogéronties est composée du Chef Spirituel du District, qui en est aussi le Président, et de quatre membres choisis pour

une période de trois mois, parmi les habitants Chrétiens du district convoqués à cet effet le 1 Avril, et qui doivent élire quatre fondés de pouvoir. Un nombre égal de procureurs est aussi choisi par les villes de la Canée, Rethymo et Candie de la même manière dont sont élus les Députés de l'Assemblée Générale. Tous ces électeurs qui sont convoqués au chef-lieu du district le 20 Avril, procèdent à l'élection des quatre membres qui doivent composer la Démogérontie. Dans les districts où il existe plusieurs siéges épiscopaux, le Président de la Démogérontie sera désigné par son Eminence le Métropolitain.

Les Démogéronties centrales sont réglées uniformément par un règlement qui sera élaboré par les cinq Démogéronties centrales de l'île sous la présidence de Monseigneur le Métropolitain.

Chapitre II.—*Compétence et attributions des Démogéronties Centrales.*

Les Démogéronties Chrétiennes qui seront instituées dans les chefs-lieux des districts auront vis-à-vis de tous les Chrétiens les mêmes attributions que les Démogéronties de villages. Elles doivent principalement juger d'après les lois ecclésiastiques Chrétiens en vigueur tout différence en matière de succession qui surgirait entre Chrétiens sans que le Mehkémé ou l'Efcap puissent en aucune manière y intervenir. Les Démogérontie connaîtront, aussi comme par le passé, de tout ce qui a trait au droit Chrétien sur l'hoirie; comme donations, etc. ; elles dresseront les actes de donations et les testaments des Chrétiens, jugeront toutes contestations qui surgiraient entre ces derniers et administreront la fortune pécuniaire des orphelins Chrétiens et de ceux qui se trouvent en état d'interdiction. Les jugements émis par les Démogérontie centrales, dans les limites de leur juridiction et compétence s'ils sont prononcés en dernier ressort, doivent être exécutés par les Tribunaux Civiles de l'île sans aucun délai ni intervention, et sans que le pouvoir exécutif puisse s'ingérer dans tout ce qui se rapport à des questions d'hoirie. Les Démogérontie dont il s'agit décident en dernier ressort tout procès jusqu'à la somme de 5,000 piastres, au contestation dont il ne serait pas possible de déterminer la valeur. Les décisions qui seraient rendues pour une somme dépassant les 5,000 piastres, sont appellables. Pour les jugements de cette catégorie il sera institués un Tribunal d'Appel sous la présidence de son Eminence le Métropolitain de Crète.

L'élection et les attributions des membres de ce Tribunal d'Appel, son siége et la durée de ses travaux, ainsi que les émoluments de ses membres et de son secrétaire, seront fixés dans un autre règlement qui sera élaboré par les membres des cinq Démogérontie et par un délégué spécial de chaque canton qui sera choisi par les habitants. Cette Commission de délégués sera placée sous la présidence du Métropolitain.

Indépendamment de l'appel, les décisions des Démogérontie Centrales pourraient être revoquées par le Conseil National Mixte siégeant auprès du Patriarcat de Constantinople, mais jusqu'à ce que le Tribunal d'Appel sus-mentionné soit institué, les décisions des Démogérontie seront appellables par devant le Patriarcat, comme par le passé.

Les cinq Démogérontie Centrales seront régies par la même procédure civile en vigueur dans les Tribunaux de Première Instance pour ce qui concerne les délais, la révision, la suspension, et les autres formes juridiques.

Articles derniers.

Comme les Mehkémés de cette île n'ont le droit de connître que seulement de quelques procès entre Musulmans, ils ne pourront, en aucun cas, empiéter sur les attributions et la juridiction ci-dessus indiquées des Démogérontie Centrales Chrétiennes.

La correspondence entre les Démogérontie et les cantons se fera toujours en Grec ; en outre tout acte officiel devra leur être communiqué en traduction Grecque dûment légalisée.

Les Démogérontie Chrétiennes ont le droit d'avoir à leur service deux gendarmes payés par le Gouvernement.

Caisses des Orphelins Chrétiens.

La fortune des orphelins est administrée dans chaque district par une caisse spéciale placée sous la surveillance et agissant sous la responsabilité des Démogérontie.

Ces caisses seront régies par le règlement qui a été élaboré par les cinq Démogérontïes Centrales et soumis à la sanction de la Sublime Porte.

Les obligations pour prêts sur gages des caisses dont il s'agit seront écrites en Grèc devant la Démogérontie et sur papier timbré, comme cela se pratique depuis treize ans, sans aucune espèce d'intervention de la part des Mehkémés. Ces obligations devront seulement être légalisées par les Conseils Administratifs des districts, qui y apposeront leurs cachets après avoir fait comparaître les débiteurs et leurs garants. Ainsi légalisés, ces actes auront la même valeur que les hadjets émanés des bureaux du Mehkémé. Cette procédure sera observée jusqu'à l'institution dans l'île des bureaux de notaires mentionées dans les derniers Firmans Impériaux.

Il sera payé par les emprunteurs à l'office des Démogérontïes un droit de un sur mille, qui servira à couvrir une partie de frais des Démogérontïes et du Tribunal d'Appel qui devra être institué.

Les contrats de location pour les biens immeubles des orphelins et des monastères seront dressés en langue Grecque sur papier timbré; ils devront seulement être légalisés sans frais par les municipalités des districts. Le droit de 5 piastres qui est perçu pour la légalisation et celui de 1 pour cent sera prélevé par les Démogérontïes Chrétiennes pour couvrir une partie des frais de ces Démogérontïes et du Tribunal d'Appel.

Article dernier.

Pour ce qui concerne seulement les devoirs de tuteurs et la gestion de la fortune des mineurs, les Démogérontïes sont placées sous la surveillance immédiate du Conseil Administratif du Gouvernement Général et sous celle prescrite par le Règlement Spécial sur les Démogérontïes.

Chapitre I.—*Règlement sur les Conseils Administratifs Mixtes.*

Article 1. Sans modification.
Art. 2. Idem.
Art. 3. Idem.
Art. 4. Idem.

Art. 5. La gestion des affaires administratives pour toute l'île en général est confiée à un Gouverneur-Général nommée par Ordonnance Impériale et choisi parmi les fonctionnaires Musulmans ou Chrétiens Orthodoxes de la Sublime Porte. L'administration des districts ou Mouteserrifliks est confiée à des Gouverneurs nommés également par Ordonnance Impériale et dont la moitié sont choisis parmi les fonctionnaires Musulmans et l'autre moitié parmi les fonctionnaires Chrétiens de l'Empire. Chaque canton est administré par un Caïmacam nommé par le Gouvernement Impérial et choisi parmi ses employés Chrétiens ou Musulmans. Ces sous-Gouverneurs devront être nommé toujours sur la base du nombre des habitants des deux races; ils peuvent être déplacés, en cas de besoin, sur la proposition du Gouverneur, adopté par le Conseil Administratif.

Dans les cantons dont la population est entièrement Chrétienne ou Musulmane, les Caïmacams seront Chrétiens ou Musulmans.

Art. 6. Sans modification.

Art. 7. Le Gouverneur-Général est assisté d'un Conseil Administratif et d'un Conseiller nommé par Ordonnance Impériale et qui remplace le Gouverneur-Général en cas d'empêchement. Si le Gouverneur-Général est Musulman, son Conseiller doit être Chrétien, et si le Gouverneur-Général est Chrétien Orthodox son Conseiller doit être Musulman. Et comme le Gouvernement de la Canée n'a point de Gouverneur ni de Conseil Administratif, c'est le Gouverneur-Général et le Conseil Administratif du Vilayet qui remplissent ces fonctions.

Art. 8. Chaque Gouverneur de district a auprès de lui un Conseil Administratif et un Aide, qui remplace le Gouverneur en cas de besoin, et est nommé par Décret Impérial. L'Aide du Gouverneur Musulman doit être Chrétien, et celui du Gouverneur Chrétien doit être Musulman. Et puisque le canton où réside le Gouverneur n'aura point de Caïmacam ni de Conseil Administratif spécial, le Gouverneur doit remplir les fonctions de Caïmacam et son Conseil tiendra lieu de Conseil Cantonal.

Art. 9. Sans modification.
Art. 10. Idem.

Chapitre II.—*Elections et Attributions du Conseil Administratif du Gouvernement Général.*

Art. 11. Le pouvoir exécutif appartient exclusivement au Gouverneur-Général, qui doit l'exercer avec l'assistance des Gouverneurs, sous-Gouverneurs et Démogérontes, conformément aux lois de l'Empire, au statut organique, et aux instructions qu'il aurait reçues.

Art. 12. Le Conseil Administratif qui se trouve placé sous la présidence du Gouverneur-Général ou de son Conseiller, est composé de six membres élu par l'Assemblée Générale, et dont les quatre doivent être Chrétiens et les deux autres Musulmans. La moitié de ces membres tant Musulmans que Chrétiens est renouvellée chaque année.

Art. 13. Le Conseil Administratif ne pourra sous aucun prétexte exercer aucune des fonctions du pouvoir exécutif ou judiciaire. Ses attributions doivent être purement administratives. D'après le principe qui doit régler les rapports et les devoirs entre le Conseil Administratif et le Gouverneur-Général, l'action, l'exécution, l'initiative, la correspondence directe avec les autorités subalternes, ainsi que l'émission des ordres, appartiennent exclusivement au Gouverneur-Général; tandis que d'un autre côté, la discussion, la délibération et la décision sur les objets judiciaires, entrent dans les attributions du Conseil Administratif sus-mentioné. Par conséquent lorsqu'il ne s'agit pas de l'exécution pure et simple de quelque disposition de loi générale de l'Etat ou de quelque règlement spéciale concernant la Crète, mais de mesures qui demandent à être discutées, examinées et arrêtées, ces mesures doivent être soumises au Conseil Administratif.

Art. 14. D'après ce qui précède, le Conseil aura le droit de discuter, avant leur mise en exécution, toutes les mesures administratives qui peuvent avoir ou non une durée déterminée. Aucune mesure administrative, telle que organisation de municipalités, d'établissements de bienfaisance, constructions, ou suppression de marchés ou de cimetières, achat, vente, échange ou cession provisoire des terrains ou propriétés publiques, le soin de faire revenir les habitants qui se sont expatriés, les récompenses promises pour cet effet, &c., aucune de ces mesures ne doit être exécutée dans l'île directement ou indirectement par les Gouverneurs ou sous-Gouverneurs avant d'avoir été préalablement discutée et arrêtée par la majorité du Conseil Administratif. Ce Conseil peut modifier, s'il le juge nécessaire, les mesures proposées par le Gouverneur à ce sujet. Les ordres ainsi discutés ou modifiés seront mis sans retard en exécution par le Gouverneur-Général, à moins que leur sanction par le Gouvernement Impérial ne soit indispensable. Dans le cas où le Gouverneur-Général croirait devoir ordonner l'exécution de quelqu'un des ordres ci-dessus mentionnés, sans accepter les modifications qui y auront été apportées par le Conseil Administratif, ou malgré que l'ordre a été rejeté par ce Conseil, le Gouverneur-Général ne pourra alors procéder à l'exécution de cet ordre qu'en y étant autorisé par une Ordonnance Impériale.

Le Gouverneur-Général peut former au sein du Conseil Administratif des Commissions chargées d'examiner les objets susindiqués, et d'en faire un Rapport qui doit être soumis à ce Conseil.

Art. 15. Sans modification.
Art. 16. Idem.

Art. 17. Le Conseil Administratif du vilayet repartira par Gouvernements tous les impôts directs dont la perception aura été ordonnée par quelque loi ou décision légale de l'Assemblée Générale de l'île; il réglera aussi le mode de perception des impôts directs fixé par cette même Assemblée, et approuvée conformément à l'Article 13 du Firman Impérial qui accompagne le Statut Organique.

Art. 18. Sans modification.
Art. 19. Idem.

Art. 20. Le Conseil dont il s'agit doit présenter et justifier devant l'Assemblée Générale le Budget de l'année passée et prochaine, en général pour toutes les dépenses, recettes, et frais extraordinaires de l'île; le Budget sera rédigé en Grec et en Turc.

Art. 21. Sans changement.
Art. 22. Idem.

Art. 23. Le Conseil Administratif est spécialement chargé de recueillir tous les éléments propres à constituer un travail statistique exact et régulier pour toute l'île, qui sera publié chaque année par le journal du vilayet.

Art. 24. Ce Conseil susmentionné a le droit de faire des observations au Gouver-

neur-Général toutes les fois que ce dernier s'écarterait de ses devoirs ci-dessus indiqués envers le Conseil.

Art. 25. Sans changement.

Art. 26. Idem.

Art. 27. Idem.

Art. 28. Aucune séance ni décision de ce Conseil ne pourra être considérée comme légale si la moitié plus un au moins de ses membres ne prendraient part aux délibérations.

Art. 29. Les Membres du Conseil Administratif sont élus par l'Assemblée Générale; les Musulmans doivent choisir les Conseillers Musulmans, et les Chrétiens les leur parmi les habitants les plus capables de l'île. La durée de leur service est de deux ans.

Art. 30. Sans modification.

Art. 31. La moitié des Membres du Conseil seront remplacés chaque année.

Art. 32. Sans changement.

Art. 33. Les Membres du Conseil Administratif du vilayet recevront chacun 1,250 piastres per mois.

Article dernier.

Les Caïmacams, leurs aides, les Présidents de Tribunaux, les Premiers Secrétaires du Gouvernement Général et des sous-Gouvernements, les Procureurs et sous-Procureurs, ainsi que les Juges d'Instruction, doivent être nommés par les autorités compétentes, par Ordonnance Impériale, et sur la proposition du Gouverneur-Général et de la majorité du Conseil Administratif. Les employés subalternes seront nommés par le Gouverneur-Général et le Conseil Administratif, sur la proposition du Gouverneur et du Conseil Administratif de leur districts. Les Caïmacams et leurs mouavins doivent être pris parmi les habitants les plus honorables et les plus capables de l'île, et parmi ceux qui se distinguent par l'intégrité de leur caractère; ils doivent surtout avoir de l'instruction.

Chapitre III.—*Elections et Attributions des Conseils Administratifs de Gouvernements et sous-Gouvernements.*

Art. 34. Dans les districts dont la population est mixte les Conseils Administratifs sont formés par le Gouverneur ou Président et par six membres élus par les habitants Chrétiens et Musulmans de tout le district de la manière suivante:—

Dans les districts dont la population est mixte d'une manière égale, il y aura trois membres de chaque religion; et là où les habitants de l'une des deux religions sont supérieurs en nombre, ceux-ci éliront quatre membres et les autres qui seront en minorité seulement deux. Dans les districts habités exclusivement par des Chrétiens ou par des Musulmans tous les six membres doivent être Chrétiens ou Musulmans.

Art. 35. Les Conseils de Cantons présidés par le Caïmacam se composent de lui et de six membres Chrétiens ou Musulmans habitant le canton. Leur élection se fera sur la base qui a été fixée pour l'élection des membres des Conseils de Gouvernements.

Art. 36. Les Gouverneurs et les sous-Gouverneurs bien qu'ayant une juridiction déterminée et qu'ils représentent le Gouverneur-Général, néanmoins toutes les fois qu'il s'agira de mesures qui échappent à leur compétence, ils sont tenu de soumettre ces mesures à l'examen et à la décision du Conseil Administratif du Gouvernement ou du sous-Gouvernement, qui décide par majorité.

Art. 37. Les Conseils des Gouvernements et des sous-Gouvernements ne doivent sous aucun prétexte s'immiscer dans les affaires judiciaires.

Art. 38. Au contraire si la mesure que vent appliquer le Gouverneur ou le sous-Gouverneur est de celles qui exigent un examen et une discussion préalables, les Gouverneurs en décideront d'un commun accord avec la majorité du Conseil la mesure, fût elle-même adoptée par le Gouverneur-Général et son Conseil, conformément aux Arts. 13-21. Et de même que les Caïmacams dépendent hiérarchiquement des Gouverneurs, de même les Conseils des Cantons dépendent des Conseils de Districts. Par conséquent lorsqu'il s'agit de mesures qui n'appartiennent pas exclusivement au pouvoir exécutif, les Gouverneurs et Caïmacams sont tenus de les soumettre à la délibération de leur Conseil.

Art. 39. Sans modification.

Art. 40. Idem.

Art. 41. Idem.

Chapitre IV.—*Elections et Attributions des Conseils de Gouvernements et de sous-Gouvernements.*

Art. 42. Les membres des Conseils de Gouvernements et ceux du Tribunal Mixte du District sont élus par les habitants des cantons et des villes par l'entremise de quatre délégués choisi par les habitants de chaque canton ou ville, qui se réunissent à cet effet dans le chef-lieu du canton ou dans la ville le premier Dimanche du mois d'Avril. Tous ces délégués réunis le troisième Dimanche du mois d'Avril dans le chef-lieu du Gouvernement, procèdent à l'élection des membres du Conseil Administratif et du Tribunal Mixte par pluralité de voix, après toutefois que chaque ville ou canton aura désigné quelques candidats parmi ceux dont les noms sont inscrits sur les catalogues des villes et des cantons. L'élection doit se faire de manière à satisfaire chaque ville et chaque canton. Les électeurs Chrétiens choisissent les membres Chrétiens et les Musulmans les leurs. L'élection des membres des Conseils de cantons, tant Musulmans que Chrétiens, doit être faite par les Démogérontes convoqués au chef-lieu du canton le second Dimanche du mois d'Avril.

Art. 43. La durée des fonctions des membres du Conseil de Gouvernements et de sous-Gouvernements est de deux ans; ils sont remplacés par moitié et à tour de rôle chaque année et reçoivent, ceux des Conseils de districts un traitement de 750 piastres par mois, et ceux des Conseils de cantons 200 piastres.

Composition, Attributions, et devoirs des Démogérontes de Villages.

N.B.—L'Article 66 du Chapitre XI du Règlement sur les Tribunaux Mixtes, est transféré au Chapitre IV du Règlement sur les Conseils Administratifs Mixtes.

Art. 44. Chaque village doit être directement administré par une Démogérontie. Les limites de chaque village seront fixées par la Loi Communale qui sera élaborée.

N.B.—L'Article 68 du Chapitre XII du Règlement sur les Tribunaux Mixtes, est transféré au Chapitre IV du Règlement sur les Conseils Administratifs Mixtes.

Art. 45. Pour ce qui concerne la partie judiciaire, les Démogérontes de villages constituent une autorité arbitrale dont les décisions ne sont valable qu'autant que les parties en litige auront consenti par écrit à se soumettre à l'arbitrage de la Démogérontie. Dans tous les cas les décisions émanées de ces Démogérontes de villages ne sont exécutoires qu'après avoir été légalisées par le Tribunal Mixte du canton dont fait partie le village.

Art. 46. Une loi spéciale devra fixer les limites des Communes.

L'Assemblée Générale doit soumettre au Gouvernement Impérial un Projet de Loi Communale, mais jusqu'à la promulgation de cette loi, les villages seront administrés comme par le passé par les Démogérontes.

Supplément.

Comme la grande majorité des habitants Chrétiens et Musulmans ne sachant pas la langue Turque, parle en général le Grec, cette dernière langue sera introduite également comme le Turc dans tous les bureaux publics, tribunaux, et conseils. Par conséquent le nombre d'écrivains Chrétiens dans ces bureaux sera égal à celui des Musulmans, afin que tous les documents, sans exception, tels que sentences, procès-verbaux, enquêtes, et tout autre travail d'écriture soient aussi rédigés en Grec.

Pour cette même raison tous les ordres administratifs ou judiciaires seront également rédigés en Grec.

La direction de ce travail est confiée, dans chaque district, à un Secrétaire-Général Chrétien possédant cette langue. Vu le besoin toujours croissant de donner plus de développement à l'instruction publique, le Gouvernement Impérial, outre la subvention de 3,000 piastres par mois qu'il a alloué aux écoles de la Canée, Rethymo, Candia, Sphakia, et Lassithi, prêtera aussi tout son appui moral à l'extension des lumières en exhortant et en stimulant le zèle des habitants par l'entremise des Gouverneurs, et surtout des Caïmacams. Il s'ensuit que l'instruction doit être obligatoire pour les enfants au-dessus de cinq ans et pour ceux qui n'auront pas encore dépassé leur quatorzième année, sous peine d'amende imposée aux parents ou tuteurs de ces enfants par les Conseils des Cantons.

Tous les procès civiques ayant trait à des terres en friche, à des prairies, ou à des droits de voisinage (pavalés) seront jugés par les Conseils Mixtes sans que le Mehkémé ait jamais à y intervenir.

Conformément au dernier Firman Impérial relatif aux réformes, il sera institué

dans l'île un nombre suffisant d'offices de notaires qui seront chargés de dresser tous les titres de propriétés, transferts, actes d'hypothèques, et en général tout autre document notaire, sans aucune espèce d'ennixion de la part du Mehkémé ou de l'Évcaf.

Le corps de gendarmerie sera composé, en proportion de la population, de simples soldats et d'officiers Chrétiens et Musulmans indigène jusqu'au grade de Colonel (Miralai).

Nul n'est frappé d'exil et ne subit un emprisonnement préventif sans une décision judiciaire.

Les blasphèmes ou offences contre la religion d'une des races habitant dans l'île, cas qui étaient jusqu'ici punis de bannissement, seront désormais jugés par les tribunaux réguliers et punis d'après le Code Pénal; la peine du bannissement sera par conséquent abolie.

Tous les enfants trouvés, à quelque religion qu'ils appartiennent, sont entretenus jusqu'à leur sevrage aux frais du Gouvernement.

La Caisse Publique doit aussi pourvoir aux frais d'enterrement des pauvres qui meurent dans l'île, comme cela se pratique pour les Musulmans.

Le Gouvernement ne doit rien négliger pour le développement du commerce, de l'industrie et de l'agriculture. Il poursuivra par conséquent activement la construction des routes centrales, de ponts et la réparation des principaux ports de l'île. Dans ce but il sera affecté annuellement des revenus de l'île une somme suffisante pour les travaux publics conformément au Firman Impérial qui accompagne le Statut Organique.

Le commerce sera aussi l'objet de toute la sollicitude du Gouvernement, qui aura soin de bien organiser les Tribunaux de Commerce dans les villes pour la prompte expédition et l'équitable solution des affaires commerciales.

On fera également tous les efforts possibles pour développer l'agrienlture, en instituant surtout une police rurale afin de prévenir les dommages et les dégats qui sont occasionnés aux agriculteurs.

Le Gouvernement accordera des privilèges suffisants aux fondateurs d'établissements industriels ou de banques agricoles et commerciales dans l'île.

Les décisions émanées des autorités ecclésiastiques du pays dans les limites de leur compétence, et sur des affaires purement spirituelles ou ecclésiastiques, seront exécutées par les autorités civiles sans aucune espèce d'intervention, conformément d'ailleurs aux dispositions du Hatti-Houmaïun et des bérats dont sont munis le Patriarche et les Archevêques. On prêtera en outre aux autorités ecclésiastiques toute assistance possible dans les limites des rapports qui doivent exister entre les autorités civiles et religieuses et qui sont consacrés par les lois.

Attendu que le Dieu adoré dans les mosquées est le même Dieu tout-puissant qui est aussi adoré dans les églises des Chrétiens, ces derniers peuvent en toute liberté ériger, réparer et restaurer leurs temples notamment les chapelles en ruines qui sont disseminées dans les champs. Et pour prévenir des inconvénients la délimitation de ces temples et l'entendue de leurs enceintes seront fixées par le Conseil Administratif du Vilayet.

Une pleine et entière liberté de conscience est laissée à tous les habitants de l'île d'après la teneur du Hatti-Houmaïun; par conséquent l'expatriation forcée qui était infligée aux rénégats, est désormais abolie.

L'âge de majorité pour les mineurs est fixé à vingt-un ans, et ce n'est qu'à cet âge qu'un jeune homme ou une jeune fille peuvent être admis à faire la déclaration de leur apostasie, après avoir toutefois passé quelques jours chez le chef spirituel de la religion à laquelle appartenait le rénégat avant son abjuration.

Attendu que le privilége de se gouverner eux-mêmes accordé aux habitants de l'île leur donne assurément le droit d'avoir une Administration Nationale, on aura soin d'appeler aussi aux importantes fonctions administratives, telles que celles de secrétaires généraux et de collecteurs, les indigènes Chrétiens et Musulmans dont la capacité, l'honorabilité et l'instruction ne laisseraient rien à désirer.

Tous les réfugiés Crétois se trouvant en Grèce ou ailleurs, et qui ont été expatriés sans un jugement préalable des tribunaux du pays, retourneront tous sans exception dans leurs foyers. Leurs propriétés leur seront restituées quand même il y en aurait parmi eux qui auront changé de religion.

L'institution d'imprimeries et de syllogues ainsi que la publication de journaux particuliers sont autorisées dans l'île, conformément aux lois en vigueur de l'Empire.

Toute Ordonnance ou Ordre Véziriel qui contreviendrait les présentes lois organiques ne saurait être désormais exécuté dans l'île de Crète.

Pour assurer la fidèle et rigoureuse exécution des présentes lois il sera procédé à un recensement général de tous les habitants de l'île d'après la loi communale qui sera élaborée par l'Assemblée Générale.

Adresse des Membres Chrétiens de l'Assemblée Générale de la Crète à son Altesse le Grand Vézir.

Canée, le 1/13 Mai, 1876.

Altesse,

Il est incontestable que ni l'agrienlture, ni l'industrie, ni l'instruction publique, ni aucune œuvre d'utilité publique, ne saurait se développer et faire des progrès dans un pays privé d'institutions qui règlent les relations entre gouvernants et administrés et qui répondent aux besoins de ces œuvres d'utilité générale; dans un pays dépourvu d'Administration composée de personnes honnêtes, intelligentes, éclairées et spéciales dans chaque branche du service; en un mot, d'une Administration comprenant sa mission, remplissant fidèlement son devoir et exécutant avec impartialité et franchise les lois établies et les ordres et instructions qui lui sont transmis.

Sans ces conditions essentielles, nulle amélioration, nul progrès n'est jamais possible. Toute action est paralysée par la marche irrégulière, sciemment ou involontairement adoptée par les gouvernants; la confiance si utile et indispensable des administrés envers le pouvoir est anéantie, la confusion et le désordre règnent partout, et ce triste état de choses ne tarde pas à avoir pour conséquence naturelle et inévitable une malaise et un relâchement général qui entraînent les maux et les calamités inculpables de la réaction.

Il n'est donc pas surprenant que la population de cette île ait vu avec regret le soin que les Gouverneurs-Généraux ont toujours mis à ne pas laisser les représentants du peuple sortir des limites étroites qu'on leur avait assignées et qui, d'après ces fonctionnaires, se résumeraient dans les mots commerce, agrienlture, industrie et instruction publique; comme si le succès de ces œuvres pouvait dépendre de la seule évocation de ces mots ou de la seule expression d'un vœu, comme si toutes ces promesses pouvaient être réalisées sans bonne volonté, sans les organes et les moyens nécessaires, et que le progrès ou la prospérité d'un pays pût être obtenu sans une bonne administration et de bonnes institutions!

Mais l'expérience n'est-elle pas là pour nous dire que ce système de restriction imposé aux délégués du peuple pendant les sessions précédentes de l'Assemblée Générale, n'a jamais contribué à améliorer le mauvais état du pays et qu'on s'est épuisé en vains efforts pour trouver un remède aux phénomènes symptomatiques du mal sans avoir jamais songé à le combattre dans sa racine ou à en chercher la cause primordiale: que de fois les Députés n'ont-ils pas fixé l'attention des autorités sur l'état défectueux et précaire de plusieurs œuvres d'utilité publique. Que de fois n'ont-ils pas indiqué les moyens d'y remédier et n'y ont-ils pas invoqué la sollicitude et l'équité du Gouvernement! Que de fois n'ont-ils pas demandé l'exacte et sincère application des lois en vigueur!

Si on se donnait la peine de jeter un coup d'œil sur les demandes soumis par les représentants des différents cantons, si l'on examinait les procès-verbaux des discussions qui ont eu lieu pendant les sessions précédentes, on aurait acquis la conviction que le pays n'a jamais manqué de signaler tout ce qui avait besoin d'être redressé.

En attendant, le système suivi dans l'île par quelques individus qui faisaient si peu de cas des remontrances du peuple et méconnaissaient si étrangement les intentions bienveillantes et les ordres du Gouvernement de notre auguste Souverain, a été un système stérile en résultats, rétrograde, oppressif, et qui a beaucoup contribué à augmenter le malaise du pays, malgré les bonnes dispositions de notre Gouverneur-Général actuel.

Dans son désir de réparer les désastres et les dégats occasionnés dans l'île par les derniers événements et de satisfaire aux vœux légitimes de cette population, Sa Majesté le Sultan avait doté la Crète d'un Statut Organique Spécial qui était alors considéré par le monde civilisé comme une garantie réelle d'un meilleur avenir pour ce pays. De son côté, dans le rapport qu'il présenta le 1 Mai, 1868, à Sa Majesté le Sultan, le Grand Vézir Aali Pacha, en analysant les dispositions de cette charte, déclarait à son Souverain et au monde entier que le système politique et administratif inauguré en Crète était celui du self-Gouvernement, dans l'acception la plus démocratique du mot. En entendant cette assurance de la bouche même du Chef du Cabinet Ottoman, on était en droit de croire que la fidèle exécution du Statut Organique imposée par l'esprit de justice qui, dans ces circonstances exceptionnelles, avait dicté ses différentes dispositions, aurait en effet justifié l'attente de l'éminent homme d'État. Un peu plus loin et dans le même rapport à Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Altesse ajoutait

que si la population Crétoise se montrait digne des nouveaux droits qui lui étaient prodigués, Sa Majesté trouverait la récompense de tant de bienfaits dans le dévouement et la reconnaissance de ce peuple.

Les Crétois n'ont pas démenti cette conviction d'Aali Pacha par leur conduite pleine de dévouement pour Sa Majesté Impériale. Mais fort de leur droit octroyé par ce même Souverain, il leur est pourtant impossible de ne pas déclarer hautement qu'ils sont loin de jouir des avantages de l'égalité en justice et des priviléges qui leur furent sanctionnés par des Firmans successifs et confirmés par le Grand Vézir de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Une longue expérience a prouvé à cette population que le Statut Organique ne répond ni à l'esprit ni à la lettre des Ordonnances Impériales relative à l'égalité, qu'il ne satisfait point aux besoins des Chrétiens, et ne s'accorde pas avec les progrès réalisés par le pays.

Persuadé que si sa voix pouvait parvenir jusqu'au Trône Impérial, elle serait écoutée avec bienveillance et appellerait la haute sollicitude de Sa Majesté, le peuple Crétois n'a pas hésité à déclarer, par l'intermédiaire de ses représentants et en pleine séance de l'Assemblée Générale, que cette institution a besoin d'être modifiée sur des bases plus larges qui répondent aux magnanimes intentions de notre Souverain, aux besoins du pays, et aux exigences de l'époque. Le peuple pense qu'il faut à la Crète une administration paternelle, impartiale, honnête, tolérante, juste, éclairée, et active ; qu'elle soit fondé sur les principes d'une égalité parfaite et sur les droits imprescriptibles de la majorité des deux races habitant l'île ; en un mot, une administration librement choisie par le peuple sur la base du self-gouvernement qui a été solennellement reconnu et proclamé. Sur la base sus-indiquée et l'autorisation qui nous en a été accordée nous nous sommes d'autant plus empressés de soumettre à votre Altesse, par l'entremise de son Excellence Réouf Pacha, les modifications que nous a semblé comporter le Statut Organique, qu'en agissant ainsi, nous sommes persuadés d'aller au devant des intentions paternelles de notre auguste Souverain et de faire participer tout le peuple sans exception aux inappréciables avantages d'une égalité réelle. En ne nous écartant point de ce principe salutaire, nous avons posé les bases d'un édifice solide et durable qui assurera, nous en sommes persuadés, le bien-être et la prospérité de notre patrie.

En terminant nous prions le très-haut pour la longévité et la gloire de notre auguste Souverain Abdul Aziz, et nous renouvellons à votre Altesse l'assurance du dévouement du peuple Chrétien de la Crète envers Sa Majesté Impériale.

Nous avons, &c,

(Suivent les signatures des 42 Députés Chrétiens.)

Règlement sur les Tribunaux Mixtes.

Chapitre I.—*Composition des Tribunaux Mixtes dans les Cantons.*

Article 1. Chaque Canton aura un tribunal mixte.

Art. 2. Ces tribunaux seront composés d'un président et de quatre juges.

Art. 3. Les présidents des sus-dits tribunaux sont nommés, destitués et rétribués directement par le Gouvernement Impérial par Ordonnance Impériale conformément à l'Article dernier, Chapitre II, des présentes Lois Organiques sur l'élection et la juridiction du Conseil Administratif du Vilayet.

Art. 4. Les membres de ces tribunaux sont choisis parmi les personnes dont les noms figurent sur les listes dressées par les Caïmacams et les Gouverneurs.

Art. 5. Le Caïmacam ou le Gouverneur dressera à cet effet une liste nominative de tous les habitants de son canton qui, ayant accompli leur vingt-cinquième année, ne sont pas compris dans les cas ci-après indiqués qui entraînent la récusation.

Art. 6. Sont récusables et ne peuvent être inscrits sur la liste dont il s'agit :

1°. Tous ceux qui ne savent ni lire ni écrire.

2°. Les domestiques.

3°. Ceux qui ont été entièrement ou en partie privés de leurs droits civiques conformément à la loi pénale et par décision judiciaire.

4°. Tous ceux qui ayant fait faillite n'ont pas été réhabilités par décision judiciaire.

5°. Tous ceux qui ne jouissent pas de toutes leurs facultés intellectuelles ou qui sont en tutelle.

6°. Ceux qui sont accusés de quelque crime ou délit et les contumaces.

7°. Ceux qui ont été condamnés pour crime, vol, gain illicite, abus de confiance, corruption de mœurs, ou pour tout autre délit et qui ont subi un emprisonnement de plus d'une année.

Art. 7. Ne peuvent être également portés sur la liste sus-indiquée les employés civils ou militaires payés par le Gouvernement.

Art. 8. Cette liste doit être publiée et affichée le 1er Mai de chaque année ; elle doit être écrite en Grec et en Turc. (La suite de cette Article reste sans changement.)

Art. 9. Seront effacés chaque année de la liste les noms des individus morts l'année dernière. (Le reste sans modification.)

Art. 10. Le 1er Avril le sous-Gouverneur invitera les habitants Chrétiens et Musulmans de chaque canton à procéder à l'élection des quatre membres du Tribunal Mixte. L'élection se fera toujours sur la base de la majorité de la population Chrétienne et Musulmane de chaque canton et parmi les personnes inscrites sur les catalogues. Mais dans les cantons habités exclusivement par des Chrétiens ou par des Musulmans, les juges susmentionnés doivent être tous Chrétiens ou Musulmans. Le procès-verbal de l'élection sera cacheté par le Caïmacam et copie légalisée devra en être transmise au Président au Tribunal Mixte pour être déposée dans ses archives.

Art. 11. Les membres de ces tribunaux de cantons recevront un traitement mensuel de piastres 450. La durée de leur service sera d'un an.

Au commencement de chaque année, le Président du Tribunal Mixte du canton aura soin de publier un programme où seront indiqués les jours et heures de travail du Tribunal pour toute l'année. Ce programme doit être légalisé par le Tribunal devant lequel sont appelées les décisions du Tribunal Cantonal.

Art. 12. Sans changement.

Chapitre II.—*Composition des Tribunaux Mixtes de Gouvernements.*

Art. 13. Sans modification.

Art. 14. Idem.

Art. 15. Les Présidents de ces Tribunaux sont nommés, destitués et rétribués directement par le Gouvernement Impérial, d'après l'Article dernier du Chapitre II relatif à l'élection et à la juridiction du Conseil du Vilayet.

Art. 16. Les membres des susdits Tribunaux sont élus d'après les prescriptions de l'Article 14 du Chapitre III du présent Statut Organique sur l'élection et la juridiction des Conseils Administratifs des Gouvernements et des sous-Gouvernements.

Art. 17. Cet Article a été supprimé.

Art. 18. Les quatre juges ainsi choisis par les électeurs Chrétiens et Musulmans devront servir pendant deux ans, après lesquels on procède à d'autres élections. Dans le cas où quelqu'un parmi eux viendrait à mourir ou à donner sa démission, on en choisira un autre de la manière ci-dessus indiquée.

Art. 19. Sans changement.

Art. 20. Les membres des Tribunaux Mixtes des Gouvernements ("Mouissarrilliks") recevront chacun un traitement de 9,000 piastres par an.

Au commencement de chaque année le Président du Tribunal Mixte fixera dans un programme les heures et jours de travail du Tribunal pour toute l'année. Ce programme devra être légalisé par le Président du Tribunal d'Appel du Vilayet.

Art. 21. Sans changement.

Chapitre III.—*Organisation du Tribunal Mixte d'Appel siégeant dans le Chef-lieu du Vilayet.*

Art. 22. Dans le chef-lieu du vilayet il y aura un Tribunal Mixte d'Appel.

Art. 23. Sans modification.

Art. 24. Le Président de ce Tribunal Supérieur est choisi, destitué et rétribué directement par le Gouvernement Impérial et de la manière indiquée dans l'Article dernier, Chapitre II, relatif à l'élection et à la juridiction du Conseil Administratif du Vilayet.

Art. 25. Les membres de ce Tribunal d'Appel seront élus par l'Assemblée Générale ; il y en aura deux de chaque religion. Les Députés Chrétiens éliront séparément les deux juges Chrétiens et les Députés Musulmans leur deux juges coreligionnaires, conformément à l'Article 25 du Chapitre II relatif à la session annuelle de l'Assemblée Générale. La durée des fonctions de ces magistrats sera de trois ans.

Art. 26. Cét Article à été supprimé.
Art. 27. Sans changement.
Art. 28. Chacun des juges ci-dessus mentionnés recevra 1,500 piastres par mois.
Art. 29. Sans changement.
Art. 30. Idem.

Chapitre IV.—*Juridiction Générale et Spéciale des Tribunaux Mixtes de différentes degrés siégeant dans le Chef-lieu du Vilayet.*

Art. 31. Sans modification.

Juridiction Générale.

Art. 32. Sans changement.
Art. 33. Idem.
Art. 34. Idem.
Art. 35. Idem.

Chapitre V.—*Juridiction des Tribunaux Mixtes de Gouvernements.*

Art. 36. Les Tribunaux Mixtes de Gouvernements jugent en premier ressort—
(1.) Les procès de leur juridiction conformément à l'Article 32 du Chapitre IV du Statut Organique, relatif à la juridiction générale des Tribunaux Mixtes du Gouvernement.
(2.) Sans changement.
Art. 37. Sans changement.
Art. 38. Idem.

Chapitre VI.—*Juridiction Spéciale des Tribunaux Mixtes de divers degrés.*

Art. 39. Sans modification, il y est seulement ajouté: "Les affaires de succession, tant que le partage n'aura pas été fait, sont portées par les créanciers devant les Démogéronties Centrales du lieu où était domicilié le défunt, lors même que ce dernier serait en état de faillite." Le reste de l'Article n'a pas subi de changement.
Art. 40. Sans modification.

Chapitre VII.—*Prescriptions applicables aux Tribunaux de tout degré.*

Art. 41. Sans modification.
Art. 42. Idem.
Art. 43. Idem.
Art. 44. Idem.
Art. 45. Tous les jugements rendus par les Tribunaux Mixtes devront être exécutés par des huissiers expérimentés appartenant aux deux religions, après que les présidents auront revêtu les décisions du Décret suivant: "Il est enjoint à tout huissier d'exécuter la présente et aux autorités civiles et militaires d'y prêter leur assistance en cas de besoin." De leur côté, le Gouverneur-Général, les Gouverneurs et les sous-Gouverneurs, ordonneront l'exécution de ces jugements par l'injonction: "Qu'il soit exécuté." Toute instance légale contre le jugement sera examinée par le Tribunal qui aura rendu la décision.
Art. 46. Le Conseil Administratif du Vilayet fixera les droits judiciaires qui devront être perçus sur tous les procès jugés par les Tribunaux Mixtes.
Art. 47. Sans modification.
Art. 48. Idem.
Art. 49. Idem.
Art. 50. Idem.

Articles derniers.

L'élection et la nomination des Présidents des Tribunaux Mixtes dans les cantons devront se faire sur la base de toute la population de l'île. Les Caïmacams ainsi que les Présidents pourront être déplacés sur la proposition des Conseils Administratifs approuvée par la majorité du Conseil Administratif du Vilayet, conformément à l'Article dernier du Chapitre II relatif à l'élection et à la juridiction du Conseil

Administratif du Vilayet. Dans les cantons dont la population est exclusivement Chrétienne ou Musulmane, les Présidents seront tous Chrétiens ou Musulmans. Mais dans les chefs-lieux des Gouvernements, c'est-à-dire là où les Gouverneurs sont Musulmans, tous les Présidents des Tribunaux seront Chrétiens, et là où les Gouverneurs sont Chrétiens les Présidents devront être Musulmans.

Aucun Naïb ne pourra être nommé Président d'un des principaux Tribunaux de l'île.

Il y aura des Procureurs, des sous-Procureurs, et des Juges d'Instruction auprès de chaque Tribunal de l'Ile. Le Tribunal d'Appel aura un Procureur et un sous-Procureur. Auprès de chaque Tribunal Mixte il y aura un Procureur et un Juge d'Instruction, conformément à l'Article dernier du Chapitre II, relatif à l'élection et à la juridiction du Conseil Administratif du Vilayet.

Chapitre VIII.—*Tribunaux de Commerce.*

Art. 51. Sans changement.
Art. 52. Idem.
Art. 53. Idem.
Art. 54. Les Présidents des Tribunaux sus-mentionnés sont nommés, destitués et rétribués directement par le Gouvernement Impérial, d'après les prescriptions de l'Article dernier du Chapitre II, relatif à l'élection et à la juridiction du Conseil Administratif du Vilayet.
Art. 55. Sans changement.
Art. 56. Idem.
Art. 57. Idem.
Art. 58. Idem.
Art. 59. La durée du service des membres des Tribunaux de Commerce sera de deux ans; mais ils peuvent être réélus pour une autre période. En cas de décès ou de démission, les électeurs Chrétiens et Musulmans pourvoiront au remplacement du Juge décédé ou démissionnaire.
Art. 60. Sans changement.
Art. 61. Idem.
Art. 62. Les Juges du Tribunal de Commerce recevront chacun 4,800 piastres par an.

Chapitre IX.—*Compétence des Tribunaux de Commerce.*

Art. 63. Sans changement.
Art. 64. Les jugements rendues par les Tribunaux de Commerce seront exécutés conformément à l'Article 45 du Chapitre VIII.
Art. 65. Sans modification.

Article dernier.

La cause des agriculteurs est comprise dans les prescriptions de l'Article 39 du Chapitre X, relatif à la juridiction spéciale des Tribunaux Mixtes de différentes dégrés.

Article Additionel.

Les membres du Tribunal d'Appel, les Procureurs, sous-Procureurs, et les Juges d'Instruction, doivent être des personnes instruites, capables, expérimentées et honorables; ils doivent aussi parler la langue Grecque. Les Présidents doivent avoir de l'instruction, de l'expérience et de l'intégrité.

Action contre des Juges ou des employés judiciaires en général.

Lorsqu'un Juge ou un employé judiciaire aura causé, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, quelque préjudice aux intérêts d'une des parties en litige, soit par négligence ou de propos délibéré, soit par déni de justice, etc., si l'inculpé est Président d'un Tribunal Mixte ou Juge, il sera cité devant le Tribunal d'Appel à la Canée, et s'il est Président ou membre du Tribunal d'Appel, il sera justiciable de la Cour de Cassation siégeant à Constantinople, où il sera condamné à indemniser la partie lésée. Le demandeur pourra se réserver le droit de poursuivre ultérieurement l'accusé devant les Tribunaux réguliers, conformément à l'Article 103 et les suivants du Chapitre VI du Code Pénal. On en agira de même à l'égard de tout employé civil.

No. 416.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 20.*)

(No. 55. Political.)
Ragusa, June 11, 1876.

My Lord,

I AM informed that the local authorities here, shocked at the high rate of mortality which has recently shown itself among the refugees, have caused an investigation to be made into their condition. The report of the medical men charged with the duty was received the night before last; and it states, in effect, that the typhus fever which has for some time been prevalent among the refugees has been accelerated in its action by insufficient nourishment.

No diminution in the amount of subsistence granted to the refugees by the Austrian Government has been officially authorized; but it is alleged that the allowances are made very irregularly; that is to say, as far as I can understand, that the irregularity is on the part of the Government, and not on the part of the local authorities. An idea prevails that the Government would like, by indirect pressure, to force the refugees to return home, which, I am assured by those in constant communication with them, they would rather starve than consent to do.

The Relief Committee here declare that they cannot comply with any further demands for aid; and M. de Wesselitsky informed me yesterday that, as the means at his disposal here were totally inadequate to meet the increasing necessities of the situation, he meant to bring the question to a head by withdrawing altogether to Cettingé. He had, he said, received a telegram announcing the arrival of 2,000 famishing Bosnians, and the imminent approach of 3,000 more, in the district of Kuin; and he was utterly unable to authorize the purchase of the bread of which they stood in want.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 417.

Mr. Ffrench to the Earl of Derby.[a]—(*Received June 20.*)

Vienna, June 20, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated (your despatch 7) to Sir A. Buchanan.

I read this morning the extract from Lord Derby's despatch to Lord A. Loftus to Count Andrassy.

His Excellency was pleased with its tone, but objected to the possibility of autonomy or independence for the insurgent provinces where the population is semi-Christian, semi-Turkish. They would immediately commence fighting among each other, having no conditions of homogeneity, like Servia or Roumania.

Whether annexed to Servia or governed by a Prince, neither have the means of controlling or governing them.

Servia has now 94,000 men under arms, with provisions rotting away, and only awaits opportunity to depose Prince and join insurgents; thus Turkish troops might be worsted at first, and war continued for years.

He thinks that Turkish Government should be supported by common accord and advised to take initiative of reforms to prevent risk of hostilities, and influence used to separate Servians and Montenegrins from other insurgents.

No. 418.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 626.)
Foreign Office, June 20, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 430, Confidential, of the 16th instant, in which you record a conversation which you have had with the Duc Decazes in regard to the views of Her Majesty's Government, as set forth in my despatches Nos. 599, 600, and 601 of the 14th instant, in the present state of the negotiations respecting the Eastern question, and particularly with reference to the

[a] Repeated to Constantinople, Rome, and St. Petersburgh.

draft notes which had been communicated to your Excellency by the Duc Decazes; and I approve of the language held by your Excellency on this subject, as reported in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 419.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 21.*)

(No. 24.)
Scutari, June 10, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch this day addressed by me to Sir Henry Elliot. I furnish his Excellency with a copy of a telegram forwarded by me last night, and reporting the orders received by the Turkish Commanders to drive back and pursue in their own territories any Montenegrin or Servian insurrectionary bands found on Turkish ground.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure in No. 419.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Scutari, June 10, 1876.

Sir,

LAST night I had the honour to forward the following telegram to your Excellency in cypher:—

"Governor informs me confidentially that the Porte has instructed the military Commanders on the frontiers of Montenegro and Servia to drive back and pursue in their own territory any hostile bands from those countries found on Turkish ground. Military preparations going on both here and Montenegro. Governor left this afternoon for an inspection of the coast forts."

For some days past information has reached this that large bodies of Montenegrins are collecting in the neighbourhood of Spuz, and the Commandant at Podgoritza telegraphed on the 7th instant that he believed a general attack against the Turkish lines was in course of preparation.

Achmed Hamdy Pasha at once put himself in communication with the mountain tribes of this district, and directed them to send to Scutari their promised contingents immediately upon hearing the signal of three guns fired from the citadel. The Pasha is not quite certain that the Koutchi and the Slavs of the Krajna, bordering Montenegro, do not meditate a revolt, and he hopes that the summons of the tribes to Scutari will at once place him in a position to know who are and who are not enemies; but I believe that even the well affected tribes will abstain from furnishing contingents for carrying on an offensive war against Montenegro, as they will prefer keeping their strength intact to defend their own mountains in case the Slavs get the upper hand.

Considerable agitation prevails amongst the Christians of Scutari, as the Mohammedan portion of the population is somewhat excited at the prospect of the speedy commencement of hostilities with Montenegro; but I do not think that, for the present, the Moslems are likely to confound the Christians of this district with the Slavs near and over the border.

The visit to the coast forts and towns, upon which the Governor-General is now engaged, is in completion of the inspection undertaken at the end of April last, and which was suddenly stopped by superior orders, as reported in my despatch of the 29th April.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 420.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, June 21.)

(No. .) *Buda-Pesth, June 15, 1876.*

Sir,

IN to-day's "Pester Lloyd" the present position of the Eastern question is examined in special connection with the attitude of England.

Turkey, having accepted the note of December last, and having forestalled, by the armistice and amnesty, the important points of the Berlin Memorandum, has resumed its free liberty of action, probably less in consequence "of the very unselfish and very friendly, but also very unfruitful, and, to all appearances, very platonic exhortations of England, than in consequence of attention to the wishes of the Three Emperors' alliance and the other Powers thereunto joined." For the Porte, however, the important question of the Vassal States can scarcely be regulated by ideas from London. Neither at Belgrade nor at Cettingé, nor on the insurgents has England exercised any important influence. "The project of giving to the rebel prisoners a thorough autonomy is of English origin; neither against the application of the Lebanon Statutes to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, nor against the erection of independent Vassal States, nor against the settlement of certain ties between those territories and Servia or Montenegro has any express exception been taken in London. In the policy of the Tory Ministry the Oriental question is limited to the question of the possession of Constantinople." So long as the capital and its intimate dependencies remain under Osman rule, it matters little what portions of Turkey are broken off, as the English policy in Crete and Egypt shows how all this may be quite right from an English point of view, but for the Porte and the other Powers it has only a limited value. Austria-Hungary has a much greater interest in preventing war with the Vassal States, and in the success of the efforts to bring about pacification. "The action of the Three Emperors' alliance, therefore, is not contrary to the English conception, but completes it." The centre of action is now in Belgrade, and there the demonstration of the English fleet has less influence than at Constantinople, and than the representations of the Emperors of Russia and Austria.

Thus far the article in the "Pester Lloyd." Although the Hungarian press has published numerous articles, applauding the attitude of England and showing great distrust in Russia, I have not troubled your Excellency with any details of them, but the above article seemed worthy of more notice.

I may add that many persons of political eminence have expressed their satisfaction at England's position in the Eastern question, though some have qualified their opinion by saying, in the words of the Spanish proverb, "We do not care so much for your words, if we cannot have your hands."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 421.

Mr. Hill to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 36.) *Munich, June 17, 1876.*

My Lord,

SINCE I wrote my preceding despatch, the "Augsburg Allegemeine Zeitung" has published several articles on Turkish affairs. I trust the following summary of two of them may not be uninteresting at the present moment.

In the first article "On the Eastern Policy of Russia and her position in the Alliance of the three Emperors," she alone, of all the Great European Powers, is not credited with an honest desire for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, founded indeed not upon love for her, but upon a perception of the troubles which her break-up would occasion. Russia alone could hope to profit by such an event, and the same ideas which led her into the Crimean War are looked upon as the mainspring of her subsequent diplomacy. In the steady though unavowed pursuit of her aims upon Constantinople, she entered the triple alliance, hoping by this outward profession of peaceable and quiet-loving views to cover her eastern intrigues. At first a silent member of the league; her utterances grew louder and more clear as her views seemed nearer realization; and while Germany and Austria were honestly anxious for peace, Russian agents and Russian gold were working to stir up insurrection in Bosnia,

Bulgaria, and the Herzegovina, while Servia and Montenegro were held like blood-hounds in the slips, ready at any moment to be loosed upon the Turkish prey.

The consciousness that this policy was being pursued by their colleague weighed heavily upon the other two Powers, who felt that the value of the union depended on the sincerity and mutual confidence of its members. A coolness arose, which public opinion was not slow to mark, and which at the moment of the Berlin Conference had greatly endangered the existence of the alliance. However, the desire to maintain it weighed more with Germany and Austria than all else; hoping that Russia would be more loyal and moderate in future, they confined themselves to the attempt to minimize her power of action, while securing to themselves the maximum possible of unfettered liberty.

Fortunately, at this juncture, England made her appearance upon the scene, and by her open and courageous policy strengthened the calming advice of Germany and Austria, and cleared the lowering atmosphere. The two Powers rejoiced that Russia had been plainly shown to what her double-faced policy was leading her, and could now urge moderation with increased weight.

But what effect, asks the writer, is this likely to have on the alliance? He hopes and believes it will not endanger it. Russia, the country of the future, whose attempt to reach Constantinople by diplomacy has proved as premature as that to reach it by force, can afford to wait; she will learn from this lesson that public opinion in Europe is opposed to her intriguing policy, and will, in future, play a more proper and honest part in the alliance of the three Emperors; and this, and not the dissolution of that alliance, is what Germany wants.

The second article considers the respective relations of England and Russia to Turkey.

The writer compares the present state of things to that which existed when Abdul Medjid came to the Throne. Then, as now, England was moved by Russian intrigues to intervene; then, as now, were her counsels at once accepted and all-powerful at Stamboul. Sketching the intervening events, the death of Aali Pasha is taken as the beginning of an era of Russian ascendancy, during which England's policy of non-intervention led Prince Gortchakow into the error into which the Czar Nicholas had fallen. "But England was slumming dead and let matters come to a head, when all at once she utters her *quos ego*, and all is changed.

"England blows lightly on the house of cards which the policy of Russia, or, we would rather say, of Ignatiew, has been building so carefully for years, and it falls down to show very different results from those which had been striven for."

The difference between the English and Russian policy is that, while the one pretends to be only trying to protect the Christian races, while really promoting insurrection and furthering Russian aims, England, with a juster appreciation, aims at an amelioration of the whole system of Government.

The Article ends as follows:—

"Those Powers which are interested in setting limits to overgrown Panslavistic tendencies and the extension of Russia, would do well to support the efforts of England to bring about the adoption of the universal principles of civilization throughout the Ottoman Empire, instead of groping aimlessly in the dark, and being involuntary supporters of the Muscovite policy of conquest."

I have, &c.

(Signed) CLEMENT H. HILL.

No. 422.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.—(Communicated confidentially to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, June 21.)

Ems, le 15/27 Juin, 1876.

M. le Comte,

SA Majesté l'Empereur a lu avec un vif intérêt la dépêche de votre Excellence rendant compte de son entretien avec Lord Derby.

Notre auguste Maître se félicite de voir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a, comme nous, la conscience des devoirs imposés aux Grandes Puissances Européennes par la crise Orientale.

Sa Majesté Impériale reste convaincue que l'accord de tous les Cabinets est possible et désirable pour amener une solution satisfaisante de ces complications.

C'est dans ce sentiment que l'Empereur a accueilli les déclarations de Mr. Disraeli et Lord Derby, et m'ordonne d'y répondre en toute franchise.

Le fait seul d'une lutte entre la Croix et le Croissant rend l'abstention difficile, parcequ'il imprime à un pareil conflit un caractère d'acharnement et de dimensions exceptionnelles et qu'il engage la conscience et l'honneur des Puissances Chrétiennes.

C'est par ce motif que nous devons objecter à l'idée, émise par les Ministres Anglais, qu'une solution pratique ne peut être cherchée que quand la force aura prononcé.

Au contraire, nous avons toujours pensé que les Puissances devaient faire tous leurs efforts pour prévenir une guerre d'extermination fanatique. Les conséquences en seraient incalculables, non-seulement pour l'humanité, mais aussi pour leurs intérêts. Elle ruinerait les vainqueurs et les vaincus, et étoufferait dans son germe la prospérité avenir de ces contrées, que l'Europe a tout l'avantage à gagner à la civilisation.

C'est dans ce but que nous avons cherché à réunir les Grandes Puissances. Malgré la tendance actuelle des Cabinets pour le principe général de non-intervention, nous croyons que la sollicitude de l'Europe devra longtemps encore s'exercer en Orient pour modérer les passions et faire entrer les intérêts dans une voie de progrès pacifique.

Cette tâche peut être remplie si les Cabinets s'unissent loyalement en vue de ce but commun.

Quant aux remèdes à la situation présente nous croyons, comme Lord Derby, que les meilleurs sont ceux qui contiendraient les solutions les plus pratiques. C'est pourquoi nous préférerions la combinaison des autonomies vassales et tributaires. Elles n'altéreraient pas le *status-quo* politique et territorial de la Turquie, et allègeraient le fardeau qui épuise aujourd'hui les ressources financières de la Porte.

Le plan auquel nous avions adhéré tendait indirectement au même but. Peut-être vaut-il mieux formuler nettement ce principe. Il satisferait les provinces insurgées et donnerait aux Puissances le droit et les moyens de les restreindre au respect de cette solution.

Elle serait plus complète si en même temps la Porte accorderait au Montenégro la cession d'un port et de quelques parcelles de territoire adjacentes, et à la Serbie celle du petit Zvornik.

Ces Principautés seraient ainsi intéressées au maintien des rapports pacifiques avec la Turquie. On aurait créé une situation tolérable dont les Cabinets n'auraient plus qu'à assurer le maintien de part et d'autre.

Nous n'entendons nullement exercer une pression indue sur le Gouvernement Ottoman. Mais, si ces idées étaient recommandées par les Puissances et, plus particulièrement par l'Angleterre, qui est en position de se faire écouter à Constantinople, nous y donnerons notre entière adhésion.

Veuillez les communiquer à Lord Derby.

Il objecte, non sans raison, à l'insuffisance des compromis.

Nous craignons que le règlement Crétois, comme dernier mot des concessions de la Porte, n'ait le même caractère. En Crète même ce règlement est loin d'avoir satisfait le pays. Il est douteux que les insurgés de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine s'en contentent.

S'ils prolongent la résistance il n'est pas probable que les Turcs se prêtent à des concessions, une fois maîtres de l'insurrection. Lord Derby admet, en pareil cas, l'action de l'Europe pour arrêter l'extermination des Chrétiens.

Cette action deviendrait donc inévitable. Peut-être s'exercerait-elle avec plus d'utilité en prévenant ces situations extrêmes par des propositions précises soutenues avec unanimité.

Le temps ne manque pas pour les offrir. Sans placer trop de confiance dans le nouveau Sultan déjà débordé par les partis en lutte autour de lui, nous croyons ses intentions bonnes et ne demandons pas mieux que de les laisser se produire.

Nous avons consenti à ajourner toute démarche collective sans fixer de terme précis. Lord Derby parle de trois à quatre semaines. Sans y objecter, nous ne croyons pas qu'on doive se lier d'avance à ce délai. Il dépendra des Cabinets de déterminer le moment où ils croiront utile d'agir en commun lorsqu'ils auront acquis des preuves suffisantes quant au programme du nouveau Gouvernement.

Il serait désirable qu'ils profitent de l'intervalle pour s'entendre entre eux sur les combinaisons à faire prévaloir.

C'est pourquoi l'Empereur voudrait que Lord Derby ne persistât pas dans l'intention de subordonner aux éventualités le développement des pourparlers ultérieurs, mais qu'il voulût bien vous faire part, dès à présent, des vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur les considérations contenues dans la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 423.

Memorandum communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, June 21, 1876.

ON a tort de croire que les insurgés n'ont en vue que la séparation des provinces insurgées de la Turquie et leur indépendance. Un nombre assez considérable d'entre eux est déjà rendu à des occupations pacifiques et parmi les réfugiés le désir prévaut de rentrer dans leurs foyers. Les journaux ont prétendu que les insurgés insistaient sur une déclaration d'indépendance. Les faits ne sont pas conformes à ces relations. Au contraire plus que jamais le moment actuel permet d'espérer un succès d'une tentative de pacification et particulièrement à la suite de l'attitude qu'a prise le Cabinet de Saint James et qui est faite pour décourager de trop grandes prétentions des insurgés.

D'un autre côté une appréciation qui condamnerait les Puissances à un rôle passif, qui tendrait à laisser les deux parties aux prises, ne servirait qu'à les endurcir et à favoriser les desseins de leurs amis.

Accepter ce point de vue ce serait reconnaître indirectement que l'indépendance des provinces insurgées sera la prime de leur résistance il s'en suivrait que la Russie ne pouvant pas être plus Turque que l'Angleterre toutes ses influences dans la presqu'île des Balcans tourneraient d'elles-mêmes contre une pacification au lieu de la faciliter. Sans aucun doute la question renaîtrait au bout de six semaines dans des conditions infiniment moins favorables. A quoi alors aurait servi la résistance du Gouvernement Anglais contre les derniers arrangements?

Aujourd'hui une attitude modérée et bienveillante des Puissances envers la Turquie, en supposant que celle-ci tienne compte de leurs vœux, est infiniment plus facile qu'elle ne le sera au bout de six semaines, alors que l'appui des Puissances lui faisant défaut, il sera constaté que le Gouvernement Turc n'a réussi ni à pacifier les provinces ni à accomplir les réformes promises.

Il y aura alors de nouveaux prétextes pour faire face aux exigences de la situation par l'emploi de moyens plus radicaux et les chances d'une solution pacifique seront considérablement diminuées.

Voilà pourquoi il semble que les six semaines d'armistice ne doivent pas être entendus de manière à admettre que dans cet intervalle les Puissances resteront passives et accepter les faits qui se seront accomplis pendant ce temps. Au contraire on doit profiter de cet intervalle pour faciliter et pour hâter les tentatives de pacification émanant de la Porte. Si le Gouvernement Anglais veut adopter le même point de vue, il n'y aura pas à craindre quant à présent une opposition de la part du Cabinet Russe, l'Empereur Alexandre désirant sincèrement la paix. Si au contraire on ne met pas à profit le moment actuel pour tirer parti des chances favorables qu'il nous offre, il sera très difficile en présence d'un insuccès de la Porte de contenir les ardeurs de l'opinion publique en Russie et d'échapper aux conséquences de la pression qui en résultera de la part du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Peut-être suppose-t-on que le Gouvernement Ottoman sortira vainqueur du renouvellement des hostilités. Il semble en effet que telle est l'appréciation qui prévaut à Constantinople, ce qui explique en grande partie l'attitude du Gouvernement Turc. Mais suivant des rapports dignes de foi la Turquie n'a à mettre en campagne que 40,000 hommes contre la Servie et le Monténégro, tandis que la Servie seule dispose de 60,000 hommes. Donc un calcul qui porterait sur une victoire certaine de la Turquie pourrait bien se trouver être erroné.

Dans tous les cas il sera non-seulement désirable mais même nécessaire de savoir quelles sont en définitive les vues du Gouvernement Anglais. Si son intention est de laisser aller les choses nous saurons en prendre notre parti, fermement convaincus que quant à nos intérêts réciproques il ne saurait y avoir une différence de principes et que dans la plupart des différents cas qui se présenteront il sera facile de nous entendre. Il va sans dire que si le Gouvernement Anglais veut travailler avec nous à la pacification nous en serons encore plus contents. Entre les deux extrêmes, c'est-à-dire une pacification énergiquement poursuivie et une abstention absolue, il semble que la politique Anglaise doive faire son choix, et il est de son intérêt aussi bien que du nôtre que de l'une ou de l'autre manière on arrive à des décisions positives, et qu'on parvienne

à éviter des oscillations préjudiciables au commerce et à l'industrie et onéreuses pour les pays limitrophes.

No. 424.

Memorandum communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, June 21, 1876.

(Private.)

THE British Ambassador has, by order of his Government, communicated an extract of a telegram from Sir H. Elliot to me, according to which he would think it advisable to prevail upon the Prince of Montenegro to follow the example of Servia in sending a special Envoy to Constantinople to congratulate the Sultan, in which case the Porte might perhaps be inclined to make concessions to Montenegro. As I am afraid that Prince Nicolas would look upon this proposition as an attempt to obtain from his part an indirect acknowledgment of vassalage towards the Porte, and also on account of the line taken by Servia, I do not think it advisable to follow up the above English proposition. I believe, however, that it would be possible to attain the same end by other means, and have, therefore, sent the following telegraphic instructions to Count Ziehy:—

"According to my informations Servia is preparing for war more actively than ever; the Servian Government have ordered 50,000 Chassepots to be delivered in ten days, and have also ordered eleven batteries of artillery from Krupp; they are to be delivered as soon as possible, and are to be imported by way of Roumania. It seems to me to follow, therefore, that Servia is preparing for immediate warlike action if her propositions were to be rejected at Constantinople. I hear from the English Government that it would be thought useful at Constantinople if the Prince of Montenegro were to be prevailed upon to imitate the example of Servia, and to send an Envoy to congratulate the Sultan. I do not believe that it will be possible to induce the Prince to adopt such a course. On the other hand, however, the antagonism between Servia and Montenegro undoubtedly is as strong as ever at the present moment. It might, therefore, be possible to attain the end Sir Elliot had in view by a communication from the Grand Vizier to Prince Nicolas to about the following effect:—

"'The Porte having granted an armistice of six weeks, and being resolved to keep all the promises she has made in favour of the Christians, relies on the Prince exerting his moral influence with the insurgents in order to attain the pacification of the revolted provinces.'

"At the same time a further communication ought to be made to the Prince through the Governor of Scutari, or some other proper person, conveying a promise of the Porte that if through his agency the pacification were effected the Porte promises to attend to his demands and wishes, as far as at all possible, when the question of the delimitation of the frontier will be taken up again."

I think it would be for the interest of England, and at the same time most welcome to me, if the British Government were to support this proposition at Constantinople.

No. 425.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 21.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Mostar June 21, 1876.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF has telegraphed here that he has reached Nichsich, and amply revictualled that place without opposition.

No. 426.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 610.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 12, 1876.*

ON receiving Sir Andrew Buchanan's telegram of the 7th instant, I spoke to Rashid Pasha of Count Andrassy's hope that the Sultan's recent Proclamation to the

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

insurgents in Bosnia and the Herzegovina will be followed by a declaration that the Porte will abide by its previous engagements with regard to them.

His Excellency informed me that orders in that sense had already been sent to the authorities in the insurgent provinces, and that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna had been instructed to inform Count Andrassy of the fact.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 427.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 612.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 12, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a report from Mr. Sandison, respecting the answer given by Prince Milan to the inquiries of the Grand Vizier, as to the motives of the military preparations in Servia, which has greatly pleased the Porte by its conciliatory character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 427.

Mr. Sandison to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Therapia, June 10, 1876.*

IN answer to the Grand Vizier's telegram to Prince Milan, the Porte has received most satisfactory assurances to the effect that though Servia could not well help providing for defensive measures in presence of the Turkish forces concentrated on her frontiers, she was far from having any hostile designs; that she considered she had to rely for her existence on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and that she would soon send a Delegate to Constantinople, who would convey further assurances of peace and feelings of good neighbourhood towards the Sublime Porte.

Rashid Pasha observed that the Prince of Servia is not known to have used such conciliatory language before.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. SANDISON.

No. 428.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 56. Political.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, June 14, 1876.*

THE revolution at Constantinople and the discomfiture of Russian policy in the east of Europe, seem to have produced a sort of stupefaction among the Slavs; and the resolute attitude of Her Majesty's Government, coupled with the language of the French and Italian press, and the unmistakable current of public opinion not only in France and Italy, but also in Austria and Hungary, have intensified the discouragement which has fallen upon the partisans of the insurrection. None the less actively, however, continues the telegraphic correspondence between Cettigné and Ems, by way of the Russian Consulate here. The town of Ragusa has, during the last week, been more full of Russian agents than at any period since my arrival in Dalmatia; and all my information goes to prove Montenegro is hastening her military preparations, and profiting to the utmost by the opportunity that Austrian indecision affords her.

To one who, like myself, is a near spectator of the progress of the insurrection, the overt assistance given to those who foment the movement is utterly irreconcilable with the professions of the Government that the Imperial Government has no other object in view than a speedy pacification. The port of Cattaro has recently been reopened for the disembarkation of military stores destined for Montenegro, which Principality is, as the Government at Vienna is well aware, virtually at war with Turkey; and Prince Nikita's troops are being armed with rifles purchased from the Austrian War

Département, and transported to their destination in vessels chartered from a mercantile Company enjoying an Imperial subvention. The town of Ragusa is daily visited by armed insurgents who are at Vienna represented to be peaceable Dalmatians from the rural districts, or Montenegrins on their travels, whose costume would be incomplete without the traditional carbine and poniards. Some time ago, it is true, the communal authorities, at the instance of the central Government, ordered that all arms found in the possession of the refugees should be confiscated, but it is notorious that the weapons so seized were restored to those of the refugees who undertook to join the ranks of their insurgent brethren in the field. During the period in which the export of munitions of war was suspended, the contraband traffic was openly carried on at Ragusa and Megline without hindrance from the Government officials; cases of dynamite were passed over the frontier to be used for the destruction of the Turkish forts and blockhouses; and it is alleged that certain military stores having been furnished to the insurgents at Grebzi, by way of Ombla, an inquiry into the transaction was hushed up to avoid the scandal which would have been produced by the discovery of the complicity of officials of high rank who were concerned in the matter. The share taken by Austrian subjects in the late battles at the Donga Pass is notorious; it is now known that 179 Crevosians were killed during the three days' fighting; but, as far as I am aware, no measures have been taken by the Government to prevent a repetition of such violations of neutrality. I doubt, indeed, whether any such measures would be effectual as long as the ambiguous language and attitude of the Government encourages the Dalmatian authorities to disobey, or to translate in the sense which they prefer, the instructions sent from Vienna.

With these obstacles to contend against, it is not surprising that the large force of Turkish troops, badly officered, insufficiently clothed, half-starved during the winter and spring, and destitute as they are of a proper transport service, has been unable to suppress an insurrection which, in regard to its origin and the number of *bonâ fide* insurgent combatants, may fairly be termed "factitious." My own conviction is, that had it not been for the money spent by Russia and by the Dalmatian Panslavist Committees upon certain influential Chiefs, the insurrection would long since have collapsed. The mass of the population of the revolted districts would probably from the outset have been contented if they could have obtained a hearing for the agrarian grievances under which they undoubtedly laboured. As it is, a large proportion of them have not resorted to arms; and those who are now combatants belong to the exceptionally privileged districts, such as Zoubci, Banjani, and Piva, where the taxes, supplemented by a subvention from the Porte, are devoted wholly to the maintenance of a corps of Pandours, and where no Mussulman Tribunals were in existence to provoke complaints of perversion of justice. Of the 60,000 Latin Christians living in the neighbourhood of Mostar, it is declared that not ten individuals have joined the insurgent camp: whilst the inhabitants of the district of Popowo, who emigrated in a panic, caused by the massacre of seven Christians by the Bashi-Bazouks, appear to be only restrained from returning home by the influence of the Slav Committees and the fear of Montenegrin vengeance; and have for some time, as I have recently reported to your Lordship, daily crossed the frontier to work in their fields, which are now in a fair state of cultivation. In fact, the purely agrarian population of the insurgent districts, comprising that portion whose grievances are well founded, are almost entirely refugees; the combatants are from the districts conterminous with Montenegro, and are by no means numerous, not exceeding, I should say, 5,000 men, their fighting strength being made up, as occasion requires, by reinforcements of Montenegrins and Dalmatians, and directed by a few Russian volunteers.

If these considerations are correct, as I honestly believe them to be, it is clear that, as far as the Herzegovina is concerned, a great step in the suppression of the insurrection would be effected if the Austrian Government would dissolve the Panslavist Committees, enforce a strict surveillance of the frontier, and would absolutely forbid and put down the export of arms and ammunition to Montenegro.

Any such expedient as is said to be contemplated of gradually starving the refugees out of Dalmatia, appears to me fallacious. The women and children would perish, and the men, in desperation, and under the terrorism of the Committees, would join the insurgents in the field.

It is well understood here that the refugees are not to be allowed to return home; and I fear that all the efforts of Wassa Effendi, and any amount of promises of food and safety will not tempt them across the frontier in defiance of the warnings of the Panslavist Committees, and of what they believe to be the wishes of Baron Rodich and the sentiments he represents. They have been encouraged to look for the armed inter-

vention of Europe in their behalf, and they will not expose themselves to the vengeance of the insurgent combatants by taking any step to diminish the chance of such intervention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 429.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 57. Political.)
My Lord, *Ragusa, June 14, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the text in Turkish and Slav of the Proclamation issued at Mostar by Ali Pasha on the 29th May/10th June, 1876, together with a translation of the same.

Your Lordship will already have been apprized of the nature of the Proclamation, which offers to the insurgents a term of six weeks wherein to make their submission; and states that during that time no military operations other than the revictualling of Nichsich will be undertaken by the Turkish troops.

The bulk of the insurgent force is now collected in the district of Banjani, close to the Montenegrin frontier. It is generally believed that that force will oppose no resistance to the revictualling of Nichsich.

The Turks persist that the insurgent Chief Socica has died of the wounds he received during the battles of the Donga last month. The Russian Consulate, however, informs me that, although Socici has been very ill with typhus, he is now recovering.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 429.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

HIS Imperial Majesty, Sultan Murad Han, our August Sovereign and Lord, in order to give a proof of his high bounty and benevolence, has deigned to grant a general amnesty to all his subjects in Bosnia and the Herzegovine, who have fallen into the paths of disobedience.

That you may be enabled to submit yourselves and return to your homes with the object of laying your complaints and bringing your demands before the local authorities, His Majesty is pleased to accord you a term of six weeks from the date of this Proclamation.

Orders have been given to the functionaries of the Government to listen with kindness and equity to your complaints; and to take all the measures necessary to assure the safety of those families which have not yet returned to their homes. Orders have also been given to the Commanders of the Imperial troops to suspend all military operations with the exception of those undertaken for the revictualling of Nichsich.

Such are the sentiments of kindness and tenderness which His Majesty the Sultan has been pleased to make known to you through our instrumentality.

The Imperial Commissary,
(Signed) ALI.

Mostar, 29th May/10th June 1876.

No. 430.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 305. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 22, 1876.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called to-day and said that he was instructed to communicate to me confidentially the

views of his Government on the present state of the question of the insurgent Turkish provinces.

It would be a mistake, he said, to suppose that the insurgents had no other object in view than the separation of the revolted provinces of Turkey and their independence. A considerable number of insurgents had already returned to their peaceful occupations, and among the refugees the prevailing desire was to return to their homes.

The public press represented that the insurgents would insist on a declaration of independence. The facts were not in accordance with these statements; on the contrary, the present time was more favourable than ever for an attempt at pacification, particularly after the attitude that Her Majesty's Government had assumed, and which had the effect of discouraging any excessive pretensions of the insurgents.

On the other hand, a resolution which would confine the Powers to a passive policy, and which would tend to leave the two parties in conflict, could only serve to give them courage, and to favour the designs of their friends. To admit this point of view would be to recognize indirectly that the independence of the revolted provinces would be the reward of their resistance. It would then follow that Russia not being able to take up a position more favourable to Turkey than England would naturally turn all her influence in the Balkan Peninsula away from any attempt of pacification, instead of facilitating it. Without doubt the question would be raised again at the end of six weeks under circumstances infinitely less favourable to a solution. Of what use then would have been the resistance of Her Majesty's Government to these recent arrangements?

At the present moment, he continued, a moderate and benevolent policy of the Powers towards Turkey, supposing that the latter paid attention to their wishes, was infinitely easier than it would be at the end of six weeks, when failing the support of the Powers it would be made apparent that the Turkish Government had neither succeeded in pacifying the provinces nor in accomplishing the promised reforms.

There would then be new pretexts for meeting the exigencies of the situation by the employment of more radical methods, and the chances of a specific solution would be considerably diminished.

These were the reasons why the six weeks' armistice should not be understood as an admission that during this interval the Powers would remain passive and accept as conclusive the events which might take place during that period. On the contrary, advantage ought to be taken of the interval to facilitate and hasten the attempts at pacification which might proceed from the Porte.

If Her Majesty's Government, he said, would adopt this point of view, there need be no fear for the present of any opposition on the part of Russia, as the Emperor Alexander sincerely desired peace.

If, on the contrary, no advantage were taken of the present moment to make use of the favourable opportunity which it offered, it would be very difficult, in view of a failure on the part of the Porte, to repress the violence of public opinion in Russia, and to escape from the results of the consequent pressure on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

Perhaps it might be supposed that the Ottoman Government would come off victor on the renewal of hostilities; it would appear, indeed, that this was the view prevailing at Constantinople, and explained in a great measure the attitude of the Turkish Government. But according to trustworthy reports Turkey had only 40,000 men to put into the field against Servia and Montenegro, whilst Servia alone could dispose of 96,000 men. Thus, any calculations based upon a certain victory for Turkey might very probably turn out erroneous.

In any case it would be not only desirable but necessary to know definitely what were the intentions of the British Government. If its intention were to leave matters alone the Austrian Government would take its own course, on the firm conviction that, as regards the reciprocal interests of the two countries, there could be no difference of principle, and that in the greater number of cases which might present themselves it would be easy to come to an understanding. If, on the other hand, the British Government would endeavour in concert with Austria to bring about a pacification, the Austrian Government would be better satisfied. Between these two extremes, that is to say a scheme of pacification energetically carried out and an attitude of absolute non-interference, it would appear that the British Government should make its choice, and it was its own interest no less than that of the Austrian Government, that a positive decision should be arrived at in one way or the other with the view to avoid a wavering policy prejudicial to commerce and industry, and inconvenient to the surrounding countries.

His Excellency then adverted to the question of Montenegro, and said that he was informed by Count Andrassy that the British Ambassador at Vienna had, by order of Her Majesty's Government, communicated to him an extract of a telegram from Sir H. Elliot, who, it appeared, thought it would be advisable to prevail upon the Prince of Montenegro to follow the example of Servia in sending a Special Envoy to Constantinople to congratulate the Sultan, as in this case the Porte might perhaps be inclined to make concessions to Montenegro.

Count Andrassy went on to say, being afraid that Prince Nicholas would look upon this proposition as an attempt to obtain from him an indirect acknowledgment of the Suzerain rights of the Porte, and in view also of the line taken by Servia, did not deem it advisable to act upon this proposal of Her Majesty's Government. He believed, however, that it would be possible to attain the same end by other means, and had therefore sent the following instructions to Count Zichy by telegraph:—

"According to information he had received Servia was preparing for war more actively than ever. The Servian Government had ordered 50,000 Chassepots, to be delivered in ten days, and had also eleven batteries of artillery from Krupp, which were to be delivered as soon as possible, and to be imported through Roumania. It seemed to him that from this it was to be inferred that Servia was preparing for immediate and hostile action in the event of her proposals being rejected at Constantinople. He heard from the English Government that it was thought likely to be beneficial at Constantinople if the Prince of Montenegro could be prevailed upon to imitate the example of Servia, and to send an Envoy to congratulate the Sultan. He did not believe that it would be possible to induce the Prince to adopt such a course. On the other hand, however, there was no doubt that the antagonism between Servia and Montenegro was as strong as ever at the present moment. It might therefore be possible to attain the end Sir H. Elliot had in view by causing a communication to be made by the Grand Vizier to Prince Nicholas to the following effect:—'That the Porte having granted an armistice of six weeks, and being resolved to keep all the promises it had made in favour of the Christians, relied on the Prince exerting his moral influence with the insurgents with a view to effecting the pacification of the insurgent provinces.'"

At the same time a further communication should be made to the Prince through the Governor of Scutari or some other fit person, conveying a promise from the Porte that if the pacification were effected through Prince Nicholas' agency, his demands and wishes would be attended to, as far as possible, when the question of the limitation of the frontier was again brought forward.

His Excellency concluded by stating that Count Andrassy said that it would be most agreeable to himself, and, he thought, in the interests of England, if Her Majesty's Government would support this proposal at Constantinople.

With reference to the question put to Her Majesty's Government by Count Andrassy whether Her Majesty's Government intended to move in Eastern affairs or to let them take their course, I stated to Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government have never laid down as a rule for themselves a policy of isolation or of non-interference in these affairs. Her Majesty's Government accepted the propositions contained in Count Andrassy's note of the 30th December last, and would have been prepared to accept also the Memorandum drawn up at Berlin, but for the objections to its substance, which were clearly stated at the time.

Her Majesty's Government, I said, are ready to take part in the work of pacification when they see a chance of doing so with effect. If they now abstain it is only because they see nothing to be done. When circumstances lead them to alter that opinion their inaction will cease.

The Government of Austria-Hungary appeared to take a more sanguine view of the prospects of pacification than Her Majesty's Government have been led to do, and I could not but be glad of it, and hope that they were right.

I said that I would let his Excellency know hereafter the opinion which Her Majesty's Government might form with regard to Montenegro.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 431.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 22, 1876.*

Take an opportunity of informing Prince Bismarck, confidentially, of the representations which Sir H. Elliot has been instructed in my despatch No. 381 of the 13th instant to make to the Sultan, with regard to the necessity for the prompt execution of measures of reform.

No. 432.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 180.) *Foreign Office, June 22, 1876.*

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 472 of the 14th instant, I forwarded to your Excellency copy of the despatch which I addressed to Sir H. Elliot on the 13th instant, in which, while impressing on him the importance of entering without delay into the closest official relations with the Sultan and the newly-instituted Government, I instructed him to urge the necessity of taking advantage of the present opportunity to establish the administration of the country on a sound footing, and pointed out to him the language which he should use in expressing the opinions of Her Majesty's Government. I should wish your Excellency to communicate confidentially to Prince Bismarck the substance of this despatch, so that he may clearly understand the nature of the representations which Sir H. Elliot has been directed to make.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 433.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 22, 1876.*

PUBLIC schools all closed. Hospitals prepared. Nurses sent out to the camps. The whole militia and the reserve called out for next week.

Sending of an Envoy to the Porte apparently given up. No reason assigned for this.

No. 434.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 229.) *Rome, June 16, 1876.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 332 of the 1st instant, giving an account of your Lordship's conversation with the Italian Ambassador relative to the affairs of the East, I have the honour to report that, in the course of an interview which I had with M. Melegari yesterday, I took an opportunity of endeavouring to ascertain what were his Excellency's views in regard to a future arrangement for the insurgent provinces.

I did not allude to your Lordship's conversation with General Menabrea, and I said we must of course all hope that the Porte, by its own spontaneous action, would be able to come to terms with the insurgents, and establish the future government of the provinces upon a satisfactory basis; but, in the event of such not being the case, and of the measures to be applied becoming again the subject of diplomatic communication, it would, I was sure, be interesting to Her Majesty's Government to know the ideas of the Italian Government as to what those measures should be. Were they in favour, I inquired, of granting autonomy to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

M. Melegari replied that, if it were found possible to grant autonomy to these provinces, either separately or united, he should think it would perhaps be the best

* Repeated to Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

way of settling the question, but he doubted very much whether it would be possible for the Porte to agree to such an arrangement. At all events, he considered, he said, that it would be attended with very great difficulties in execution. If the population of the two provinces were homogeneous, nothing could be easier; but, as in Bosnia the Mussulman population preponderated over the Christian, he was afraid that, as far as that province at least was concerned, the system of self-government would not be applicable.

To one thing, his Excellency said, the Italian Government would be always opposed, viz., the creation of a Slav State independent of the Porte. Such a State, if composed of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would eventually be swallowed up by Austria; or if united with Servia and Montenegro, would become dependent on Russia. In either case, it would be a bone of contention between those two Powers, consequently a constant menace to the peace of Europe; in either case it would tend to the extension of the power of Austria or Russia along the shores of the Adriatic, and this would be a result which would affect the most important interests of Italy.

Prince Milan, his Excellency continued, had just now openly acknowledged, in his letter to the Grand Vizier, the great importance which accrued to his Principality from its connection with the Porte; it was evident that such connection was equally important to any other State similarly situated.

In conclusion, M. Melegari said that the fundamental principle of the policy of the Italian Government in regard to the East was the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire; and, provided this was upheld, it did not very much matter to the Italian Government by what internal measures the Sultan secured the allegiance of his subjects.

I replied that I was very glad to hear these views, which gave me great hopes that Great Britain and Italy would be able for the future, as they had done up till quite lately, to act together.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 435.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 236.) *Rome, June 19, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that in an interview which I had yesterday with M. Melegari, his Excellency read to me some telegrams which he had received from the Italian Minister at Constantinople since the assassination of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of War.

Count Corti, in his first telegram, states that this horrible event had created a perfect panic, but he does not hint even at the advisability of the fleet coming up. M. Melegari indeed seemed much astonished when I said I believed such an idea had been mooted by some of the foreign Representatives.

In subsequent telegrams Count Corti reports that perfect tranquillity prevails.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 436.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 22, 1876.*

AT the Russian Embassy some serious occurrence seems anticipated.

General Ignatiew sends away his children to-day with his mother-in-law, and I am told that other arrangements for departure are made.

The wives of most of the other members of the Embassy have left or are leaving, supposing that a massacre of the Christians is threatened.

I am not sure whether this fear is really felt, or whether it is for the purpose of creating a panic which might lead to the disturbance that General Ignatiew would be glad to see.

There is an uneasy feeling afloat in reference to the constitutional reforms in

preparation; but I entirely disbelieve in the existence of a fanatical hostility towards the Christians.

No. 437.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

Foreign Office, June 23, 1876, 3·10 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

WHAT is thought at Constantinople of the menacing preparations of Servia? Is it supposed that war is seriously intended?

No. 438.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, June 23, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BEUST told me on the 21st that Count Andrassy advised that a communication should be made by the Grand Vizier to Prince of Montenegro to the following effect:—

The Porte having granted an armistice of six weeks and being resolved to keep all the promises she has made in favour of the Christians, relies on the Prince exerting his moral influence with insurgents in order to attain pacification of revolted Provinces. At the same time a further communication ought to be made to the Prince through Governor at Scutari, or some other proper person, conveying a promise of the Porte that if, through his agency, the pacification were effected, the Porte promises to attend to his demands and wishes as far as at all possible, when the question of the delimitation of the frontier will be taken up again.

I saw Count Beust to-day, and stated to him in reply to his inquiry as to our opinion that Her Majesty's Government saw no objection in principle to the proposal of his Government that the Porte should be encouraged to negotiate directly with the Prince of Montenegro, on the understanding that if the Prince assists in work of pacification he will receive some territorial concessions in recognition of his services. But I have pointed out that the language of the Austrian communication is extremely vague as to the nature and extent of the concessions in question.

No. 439.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 305.)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1876.

Sir,

COUNT BEUST called upon me to-day and read to me two telegrams which he had received from Count Andrassy, and which contained unsatisfactory information as to the intentions of both Servia and Montenegro.

According to these despatches it had been reported by the Imperial Agent at Belgrade that the mobilization of the whole of the first class of the Servian militia, consisting of almost 60,000 men, had been ordered. This news had been confirmed from the frontier. It was calculated that the armaments would be completed during the course of the present week, when Prince Milan would start for the frontier and issue his Proclamations. The commencement of hostilities had been fixed for the first week in July; but it was the intention of Servia to endeavour to provoke an attack on the part of Turkey.

The reports from Montenegro were, Count Beust said, equally discouraging. The situation was stated by Count Andrassy to have changed for the worse. The insurgents were still ready to submit but were not at liberty to do so, their decision depending upon the wish of the Prince of Montenegro. Count Andrassy had endeavoured to influence the Prince to support the policy of pacification, but his reply, given through the President of the Senate, M. Petrovich, at present at Vienna, had been that Servia was alone to act, and that when she did so it would be impossible for him, in face of the existing feeling in Montenegro, to avoid joining the movement. The Prince had, indeed, given the assurance that he would be ready to act in the sense of pacification if Servia were prevented by a European intervention from going to war; but Count Andrassy was of opinion that such an intervention was no longer possible, as the recent representations of the Powers at Belgrade had been fruitless.

The centre of gravitation was, Count Andrassy observed, at Belgrade; and he had promised to inform Count Beust what course appeared to him to be practicable under the circumstances, as soon as he should have had time to consider a proposition which had been communicated to him by the Russian Ambassador, and which apparently was founded on a conversation which I had had with Count Schouvaloff.

I thanked Count Beust for the perusal of these telegrams. His Excellency then inquired whether I would inform him of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Montenegro, which I had promised to communicate to him in our conversation of the previous day. I stated that Her Majesty's Government saw no objection in principle to the proposal of the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Porte should be encouraged to negotiate directly with the Prince on the understanding that if he assisted in the work of pacification he should receive some territorial concessions in recognition of his services. I pointed out, however, that the language of Count Andrassy's communication to Count Zichy was extremely vague as to the nature and extent of the concessions which it was suggested that the Porte should make in return for the Prince's assistance, and observed that the Porte might hesitate to commit itself without a clearer conception of the sacrifices which it might be called upon to incur.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 440.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 23, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, June 23, 1876.

NEWS has been received that Moukhtar Pasha has reoccupied Nichsich and returned to Gatzko without opposition.

No. 441.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 131. Confidential.)

Athens, June 12, 1876.

My Lord,

I CALLED this afternoon upon the Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs, and found him, I think, satisfied on the whole with the turn events appear to be taking. I asked him whether he had any news as to the state of the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus, and as to that of the Greek provinces adjoining the Turkish frontier. He answered that he heard the Turkish authorities were rather uneasy as to the possibility of a rising on the part of the Christians, but that in Greece the population was quiet at present, and that the Government were doing all in their power to prevent them from joining in any disturbances, and, he added, were even going so far as to say they would oppose them if they joined in any outbreak against the Government of the Porte.

I replied I was glad to hear the Hellenic Government were pursuing such a wise course, and I then asked whether the revolutionary societies in Athens had much influence. He appeared not to attach much importance to their machinations. He said, however, that he believed they counted certain Servians amongst their number, and that if a rising took place in Servia he thought the Cretans would immediately resort to arms.

I afterwards called upon M. de Sabouroff, the Russian Minister, who said that the President of the Council of Ministers, M. Comnoundouros, had told him that so long as the insurrection was confined to the Herzegovina the Greeks, he thought, would remain quiet, but that if the insurrection spread to Servia he would not answer for the Greeks keeping the peace.

I may mention, with reference to this question, that Russian agents are reported to have been using their efforts to incite the Greeks to rise, but I think that a general rising in Greece at the instigation of Russia is highly improbable, as great distrust of her exists in this country; but it is possible that, were the Servians and Montenegrins

to take the field with any prospect of success, the Greeks might think that unless they took some active part in support of the Christians in Turkey the interests of the Hellenic race would be completely sacrificed to those of the Slavs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 442.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 133. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Athens, June* 1 , 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 131, Confidential, of yesterday's date, I should, perhaps, state to your Lordship that it was M. Contostavlos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who mentioned to me that Russia would gladly see Greece take part in movement against Turkey; I was much struck, therefore, on seeing the Russian Minister shortly afterwards, to hear from him that M. Counoundouros had informed him that, in the event of Servia rising, it would be impossible for the Government to prevent the people of Greece taking an active part in aid of the Christian population in Turkey, and M. de Sabouroff, in mentioning this to me, said that Photiadés Bey was aware of this, and that he had informed his Government of it.

I called upon Photiadés Bey this morning, and he told me that he had learnt from M. Counoundouros and M. Contostavlos, with the greatest surprise, of this possible change in the attitude of Greece; that the Greek Government had till now always assured him that it was as much in the interest of Greece as in that of Turkey that there should be a good understanding between the two countries, and that he did not understand why an exception should be made, in the event of hostilities breaking out in Servia, and that it made him suspect that, if there was no actual Treaty between Servia and Greece, as has been reported in a telegram from Berlin, there might be some understanding ("rapprochement") between the two States, and that some inducement might have been lately held out to cause the Hellenic Government to hint at a departure from the friendly attitude they have hitherto maintained in their relations with the Porte.

It certainly is remarkable that the Hellenic Government, which has hitherto been able effectually to prevent all participation on the part of the population of Greece in the insurrection in the Herzegovina, should suddenly profess to be unable to do so in the event of Servia resorting to hostile measures against the Government of the Sultan.

I think the Government of Greece feel rather aggrieved at the long-delayed settlement of the naturalization question, but that can hardly be a motive for embarking in a policy which would probably entail much misery upon the population, and involve the country in greater financial difficulties than it is in already.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 443.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 135. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Athens, June* 15, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I called this morning upon M. Contostavlos, Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told him that I had seen in the newspapers various rumours as to Greece being about to increase her forces, &c.; and that the language which I had learnt from two sources M. Counoundouros, the President of the Council, had held, viz., that in the event Servia declaring war, it would be impossible to prevent Greece from rising, had, taken in connection with reports in the papers, led me to speculate as to whether the Government had any motive in changing their policy.

He said that the Government had the firm intention of continuing at present a friendly policy towards Turkey, but that he could not say whether the course of events which it was impossible to foresee, might not necessitate a change, and that at any

rate they must be prepared for all emergencies, and were endeavouring, therefore, to place their army upon an efficient footing ("compléter leurs armements"), and that they were purchasing some rifles ("fusils").

I remarked that M. Counoundouros' language must have given great satisfaction to the Russian Minister, as I had understood from him (M. Contostavlos) that Russian Agents were endeavouring to get Greece to join in a movement against Turkey. He replied that doubtless the Russian Minister must have been gratified; but he added that he had no certain data as to Russian Agents, but that he understood there were certain Servians who were intriguing in Greece.

In conclusion, I thanked him for his explanation, and expressed to him the hope that he did not think that I wished to interfere in the affairs of the Greek Government, but that having heard those various reports, I was anxious to hear from him whether the policy of the Hellenic Government had undergone any modification.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

P.S.—I have forgotten to mention that I observed to M. Contostavlos, in the course of my conversation, that I had seen in this morning's paper, the "Stoa," a report that the Government intended raising a further provisional loan of 2,000000, drachmas. He told me that the amount of the loan was not decided upon yet; but that it was to meet current expenses for which the taxes hitherto collected were insufficient.

H. W.

No. 444.

Rauchid Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha June 24.)

Le 14 Juin, 1876.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-près, pour votre information, copie d'un Rapport de la Légation Impériale à Athènes et la traduction d'un télégramme du Gouverneur-Général de Yanina ayant trait aux agissements des Comités formés en Grèce, en vue de troubler la tranquillité de quelques-unes de nos provinces.

La Sublime Porte n'a pas manqué d'appeler sur cet état de choses la plus sérieuse attention du Cabinet d'Athènes et de donner aux Autorités Impériales des instructions appropriées à la circonstance.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) RACHID.

Inclosure 1 in No. 444.

Photiades Bey to Rauchid Pasha.

Athènes, le 17 *Mai*, 1876.

POUR répondre au télégramme que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 13 de ce mois, et afin de compléter des informations que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui faire parvenir dans mes précédents rapports, au sujet de la formation des comités secrets à Athènes et de leurs agissements, je m'empresse de l'informer que l'action des comités, dont le nombre augmente tous les jours, se réduit pour le moment à des délibérations sur la tactique et les moyens qu'ils devraient employer pour arriver à leurs fins. Les plus actifs parmi ces comités sont ceux de l'Epire et de Crète. Si mes informations sont exactes, ils se seraient concertés pour ne rien entreprendre ouvertement avant de connaître le résultat de l'entrevue des Empereurs et de la réunion des trois Chanceliers à Berlin.

D'un autre côté, la marche de l'insurrection Bulgare influera beaucoup sur les dits comités, en ce qui concerne la précipitation de la mise à exécution de leurs projets de soulèvement. Il est aujourd'hui hors de doute que, si cette insurrection prenait de plus grandes proportions, les comités d'Athènes se mettraient à l'œuvre pour soulever immédiatement non-seulement l'Epire et la Thessalie mais aussi la Macédoine, qui est à la fois l'objet de convoitise des Hellènes et des Bulgares.

Des émissaires sont déjà partis pour les susdites Provinces afin de préparer le

terrain et jeter le brandon de la révolte au premier signal qui serait donné de la part des comités d'Athènes.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique, qui continuait à tenir une attitude de réserve, a modifié son langage depuis les derniers événements de la Bulgarie.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce a dit à plusieurs de mes collègues et l'a répété à moi-même que l'extension du mouvement insurrectionnel en Bulgarie sera fatale pour la Grèce, car alors rien ne pourra empêcher les comités de mettre à exécution leurs projets de soulèvement dans les Provinces frontières. Selon lui, le Gouvernement lui-même, dans son impuissance à résister à l'action des comités, se verra débordé et entraîné. En présence d'une déclaration aussi catégorique, je me suis appliqué d'abord à atténuer l'importance qu'on se plaisait à attribuer à l'échauffourée de Tatar Bazartzik et ensuite à rappeler à M. Contostavlos les devoirs que le Gouvernement Hellénique est tenu de remplir quand même vis-à-vis d'un Etat voisin qui lui a donné tant de preuves d'amitié et de bienveillance.

D'autre part, il me revient que le Gouvernement Hellénique a déjà envoyé en toute hâte des officiers supérieurs à Berlin et à Bruxelles pour acheter des armes et qu'il est en négociations avec la Banque Nationale d'Athènes pour contracter un emprunt considérable en vue de pourvoir à la mobilisation de l'armée et à l'armement national. En outre, il serait question de se procurer deux bâtiments cuirassés.

Veuillez, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 444.

The Governor-General of the Vilayet of Yanina to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.)
(Télégraphique.)

Le 25 Avril (o. s.), 1876.

J'ETAIS déjà informé que le Comité révolutionnaire qui, à la suite des événements de l'Herzégovine, s'était formé à Athènes sous le nom de "Comité des amis des Slaves," avait envoyé à Salonique un certain docteur Epaminondas Lakétharios; que, sur une lettre reçue de ce dernier, Nicolas Mavrocordato, fils du fameux Mavrocordato, membre de ce Comité, ayant avec lui une somme considérable, était parti immédiatement d'Athènes et qu'il était arrivé à Salonique; qu'en fin son but était d'essayer de provoquer tant de ce côté que du côté de Yanina des troubles par des actes de brigandage et autres méfaits. Une lettre que je viens de recevoir maintenant de notre Consul à Vonitza confirme le fait en donnant tous les détails y relatifs, et m'informe en même temps qu'il en a avisé la Légation Impériale à Athènes.

J'ai pris les mesures nécessaires et expédié partout des instructions voulues pour assurer la tranquillité publique. Je m'empresserai de signaler à la Sublime Porte tout incident qui pourrait survenir.

No. 445.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 58. Political.)

Ragusa, June 16, 1876.

My Lord,

IT is understood here that Moukhtar Pasha has started on another victualling expedition to Nichsich, and intends dividing his force and moving upon that fortress in parallel lines. Also that the insurgents will not oppose him, having other operations in view.

M. Wassiltchikoff, who has been for some six months or Gettigné as Superintendent of the Russian Ambulance, has arrived this day at Ragusa, and will remain here until the return from Ems and Vienna of M. Jonine, the Russian Consul-General. M. Wassiltchikoff has recently been to Souari to investigate the military preparations which the Turks have been making for an attack on Montenegro.

I am assured that the Austrian Government has reduced the daily allowance to the refugees to ½ kreutzers a head.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 446.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 448. Confidential.)

Paris, June 23, 1876.

My Lord,

IN a conversation which I had with the Duc Decazes this morning, he again urged the importance of establishing a complete accord between the six Great Powers on the Eastern question, and of making that accord apparent.

He said that it had occurred to him that the object might be attained by the six Powers uniting and giving to Servia a strong and solemn warning to forbear from making war upon the Porte.

Such a warning was, the Duke proceeded to observe, very much needed at the present moment, and it might, he thought, have the effect of preventing the spread of the conflagration which was menacing Turkey in Europe. In fact, the accounts he received from the Herzegovina gave him reason to suppose that the armistice granted by the Sultan had produced a virtual suspension of hostilities. The Ottoman troops appeared to have revictualled Nichsich without meeting with any resistance; and the recent acts of violence had been confined to seizures of cattle, which might be the work of robbers as well as of insurgents; and, indeed, there did not seem to be any incompatibility of character between the two. There was, moreover, a manifest disposition on the part of large numbers of the refugees to return to their homes, if only they could be sure of protection from the insurgents who remained in arms. In this state of things, there appeared to be a fair hope that a pacification might be effected, if only Servia and Montenegro could be kept quiet. As for the movement in Bulgaria, it seemed to have already subsided, and, indeed, the Duke had, he said, for his own part, always looked upon it as factitious and unimportant. But all the intelligence he received from Servia showed that preparations for war were being continued with the greatest activity, and that hostility to the Porte was on the increase. Very firm and distinct language on the part of all the six Powers might, however, suffice to restrain Servia, while means might be found of conciliating Montenegro.

With reference to this last point, the Duc Decazes told me that he had received from the Comte de Bourgoing, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, a report of a conversation which he had there with the Grand Vizier, the late Rashid Pasha, and another Turkish Minister on the subject of Montenegro. M. de Bourgoing had, it appeared, suggested that the Prince of Montenegro might be detached from the enemies of the Porte by a grant to him of some accession to his territory. The Turkish Minister had, however, replied that they did not attach any undue importance to the possession of territory which is little more than rock, or to sovereignty over villages of which the inhabitants were none of them Mussulmans, and from which the Government received more rifle-shots than revenue. The Porte could not, however, reconcile it to its feelings or its dignity to be the first to go to Montenegro and offer advantages to the Prince, whose unjustifiable conduct had been the principal cause of the continuance of the insurrection. M. de Bourgoing had, it seemed, urged that this was acting from temper instead of from considerations of sound policy, but had found it impossible to convince Mehemet Ruschdi Pasha, the Grand Vizier. The notion of making some concessions if the Prince of Montenegro sent to ask for them, did not, however, appear to be altogether rejected by the Turkish Ministers.

Having given the above account of M. de Bourgoing's Report, the Duc Decazes observed that it had been suggested that a very good effect would be produced if the Prince of Montenegro would send an Agent to Constantinople to congratulate the new Sultan on his accession. It appeared, however, the Duke added, that the Prince of Montenegro was not at all disposed to do this, and, indeed, that the Prince of Servia, who had originally intended to send to congratulate the Sultan, had now abandoned the idea.

The Duke went on to say that, notwithstanding all this, means could no doubt be found of influencing both Montenegro and Servia, if only the six Powers acted in concert for the purpose. Nor did there seem to him to be any great difficulty in establishing at this moment an agreement between England and Russia. The Emperor Alexander was, the Duke knew, very much gratified by the sentiments expressed by your Lordship and by Mr. Disraeli in conversations with Count Schouvaloff; and, as it appeared to result from those conversations that His Imperial Majesty's views and those of Her Majesty's Government were very much in accordance as to the way in which the

questions must be solved in the end, the Emperor would naturally not feel very impatient with regard to the steps to be taken at the present moment.

The one thing, however, to which the Duc Decazes himself attached importance was, he said, the adoption of some measure in common, which would make the union of the six Powers evident. A collective warning to Montenegro had occurred to him as a measure useful in itself and conducive to this end; but, in truth, the form in which the union of the Powers manifested itself was with him a very secondary consideration if they would only unite to say "Good morning" in concert, his main object would be attained.

The Duc Decazes did not show any knowledge either of the despatch from Prince Gortchakow, dated the 7th instant, which was put into your Lordship's hand by Count Schouvaloff, or of the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government, as stated to your Lordship by Count Beust yesterday, and recorded in your Confidential despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan No. 305 of that day, nor did I make any allusion to either of these communications.

I send by the messenger, Captain Hare, this evening a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, under flying seal to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 447.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.[a]—*(Received June 24.)*

Therapia, June 23, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE strongly advised the Porte to endeavour to detach Montenegro from Servia.

I represented that as the Commander-in-chief had just accomplished his expedition without opposition the Porte might send a message to the Prince of Montenegro saying that it saw he was exerting his influence over his subjects, and that when tranquillity was restored it would be willing to see what it was possible to do in regard to matters which he has at heart.

No. 448.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

Therapia, June 23, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE sent the following to the Consul-General at Belgrade:—

"I am told that the Turkish force along the Servian frontier is not much less than 100 battalions.

"In the event of an attack from Servia the Turks will enter the Principality at the most convenient points.

"In addition to regular force above mentioned there will probably be from 20,000 to 30,000 Albanian and Circassian irregulars.

"Porte has no intention to attack Servia, but if attacked will turn all its available resources against Principality.

"The employment of irregulars will no doubt be accompanied by excesses, but the Porte declares that those who provoke the conflict will be responsible for them."

No. 449.

Sir C. Wyke to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24.)

Copenhagen, June 24, 1876.

(Telegraphic.)

KING OF GREECE has just sent his private secretary to inquire whether I believe in the substance of a telegram which His Majesty has received this morning from the Greek Minister at Constantinople to the following effect:—

[a] Repeated to Berlin, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

"It is reported here that the second [reserve] of the Servian militia has been called out, thus placing whole male population there under arms; it is also said Servian Agent recently sent to Constantinople on a mission of peace has been recalled."

Can your Lordship give me any information on this subject to calm the King's anxiety?

No. 450.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1876, 9·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I APPROVE the advice you gave to the Porte to endeavour to detach Montenegro from Servia, as reported in your Excellency's telegram of the 23rd instant.

No. 451.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1876, 4·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

INFORM Count Andrassy of language held by Sir H. Elliot to the Porte respecting Montenegro as reported in his telegram of 23rd instant.

No. 451[a].

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1876.

(No. 309.)

Sir,

ASSUMING the correctness of the information contained in Mr. Monson's despatch No. 56 of the 14th instant, which has passed through your Excellency's hands, it is clear that Dalmatia is still the main basis for the transport of supplies to Montenegro, destined ultimately for the use of the insurgents, and those acting with them in their operations in Herzegovina. Mr. Monson states that the port of Cattaro has recently been re-opened for the disembarkation of military stores on their way to Montenegro; that Prince Nikita's troops are armed with rifles, purchased from the Austrian War Department, and brought on board vessels chartered from a Company enjoying an Imperial subvention; that Ragusa is daily visited by armed insurgents; that it is notorious that Austrian subjects took part against the Turks in the battles at the Douga Pass; and that the insurrection is fomented by the Panslavist Committees, who, under the shelter of Austrian territory, collect and forward munitions of war, and exert their influence to prevent the refugees who are willing to return to their homes from re-crossing the frontier.

If these reports are to be trusted, and it is difficult to believe that an intelligent observer can be mistaken who speaks of what is daily passing under his own eyes, it is obvious that should the Austrian frontier be effectually sealed, and the Panslavist Committees be suppressed, the work of pacification, which Count Andrassy so earnestly wishes to promote, would be much simplified; if the insurgents in arms found themselves thrown upon their own resources, and the refugees who were willing to return, saw the path open to them, there would unquestionably be a better prospect than there can be under present circumstances of the armistice being profitably employed.

I have already instructed your Excellency to call Count Andrassy's attention to the reports of the landing of munitions of war at Cattaro; I should wish you to speak to him on the subject, mentioning in detail the nature of the reports which have been received; and to assure him, that Her Majesty's Government, while perfectly aware of the difficulties in which the Austrian authorities are placed, who have to watch an irregular and extended frontier, would yet earnestly urge the importance of such steps being taken as would prevent the open transport of supplies through Dalmatia, would cause the frontier to be more vigilantly guarded, and would check the mischievous action of the insurrectionary Committees.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 452.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 310.)

Foreign Office, June 24, 1876.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 308 of yesterday, in which I informed your Excellency of the language which I have used to Count Beust respecting Count Andrassy's suggestions as to the communication to be made by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro, I have to request you to state to Count Andrassy that Sir H. Elliot has reported by telegraph that he had strongly advised that steps should be taken with the view of endeavouring to detach Montenegro from Servia. He had represented that, as Nicsich had been revictualled without opposition on the part of the insurgents, a favourable opportunity had offered itself for the Turkish Government to send a message to the Prince of Montenegro, to the effect that they recognized the fact that he was asserting his influence over his subjects to prevent their joining in the conflict, and that they would, when tranquillity should be restored, be willing to consider what it might be possible to concede in regard to matters which he had at heart. These representations have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 453.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 24, at night.)

Constantinople, June 24, 1876, 2.30 p.m.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of yesterday about Montenegro was despatched before the receipt of your Lordship's.

I doubt whether the Porte would consent absolutely to promise to make concessions of territory to the Prince; but a communication implying willingness to do something in that direction might be made with advantage.

There are districts bordering upon Montenegro which it would be to the decided benefit of the Porte to place under the administration of the Prince.

The Turks exercise no authority over them, and it is their inhabitants alone who now keep the insurrection alive; but the Prince cannot be held directly responsible for their proceedings (? as he would be if the districts were placed under his rule.

No. 454.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—Received June 24, at night.)

Constantinople, June 24, 1876, 4·45 p.m.

(Telegraphic.)

IN answer to your Lordship's telegrams of yesterday:—

Most of my colleagues consider it certain that Servia means to attack.

General Ignatiew alone says that he disbelieves it.

The Turks push on their preparations with all energy; but the Ministers whom I saw yesterday seemed to doubt that Servia will venture upon an invasion which would lead to immediate occupation of the Principality.

They appear to me much too confident of the ease with which they could dispose of that Principality; but to admit the difficulty of operations against Montenegro.

No. 455.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 25, at night.)*

Constantinople, June 25, 1876, 4.30 p.m.

(Telegraphic.)

YESTERDAY, by order of his Government, the Italian Minister made a communication to the Porte recommending the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Servian frontier.

* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome.

The answer was what was to be expected.

Grand Vizier declared that, in face of the open preparations for hostilities made by the Servian Government, the Porte must take the stategient measures that it thought fit.

It would not provoke a rupture; but if attacked would retaliate without hesitation.

His Highness added that foreign Powers, instead of advising the Porte to leave its frontier open to attack from Servia, would do better to warn the Principality of the consequences to which it might expose itself.

General Ignatiew spoke to me yesterday in deprecation of the measures taken here, which he considers likely to bring about a collision, and it was evident from his language that he wishes the anticipated attack from Servia to have the appearance of being caused by some act of the Turks.

There cannot be much doubt that the extraordinary advice given by the Italian Government was prompted from St. Petersburgh.

No. 456.

Consul Blunt to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 30. Political.)

Salonica, June 12, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for the information of your Lordship, a copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Sir Henry Elliot relative to the sense of insecurity which prevails in the interior in consequence of the alleged insubordination of the Redifs, and reporting the suggestion which I, in concert with my Italian colleague, have offered to the Governor-General in the interest of order and tranquillity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

Inclosure in No. 456.

Consul Blunt to Sir H. Elliot.

Salonica, June 12, 1876.

Sir,

ALTHOUGH the Christians in this city have in a very great measure recovered from their alarm; and although the accession of Sultan Murad has very much contributed to draw together the leading men of all classes of the inhabitants, and to attenuate the disturbing effects produced by the recent occurrences at this place, still, in the interior, I am informed, there is a feeling of insecurity among the Christian inhabitants, which is growing in intensity under the alleged insubordination of the Redif troops.

There are many reports abroad that these Redifs perpetrate disorders in the Christian villages through which they pass, and cause much anxiety and inconvenience to the peasantry.

I cannot yet report whether these complaints are based on well avered facts, but as there are parties who are industriously trying to promote ill-feeling between Mahomedans and Christians in order to disturb and subdue the good effects which have so far resulted from the deposition of Sultan Aziz and the Proclamation of Sultan Murad, I proposed to my Italian colleague, who has acted cordially with me throughout the recent events, to call together on the Governor-General and unofficially invite his attention to these reports, and offer some suggestions in the interest of order and tranquillity.

M. Foscarini approved of my suggestion, and we both waited on his Excellency the Governor-General on Saturday afternoon the 10th instant, and, after assuring him and Vahm Effendi, the Imperial Commissioner, who was present at the interview, that the object of our unofficial visit was not dictated by any intention to interfere in the local administration, and after receiving from their Excellencies every encouragement to communicate freely our views, I referred to the reports in question, and pointed out to them how easily they are seized by designing parties and made use of in a way to give them more importance in the present political circumstances of the Empire.

His Excellency Eshref Pasha observed to us that he had received several complaints of the insubordinate conduct of the Rediff men while proceeding from their homes to the depôts, and that he had caused an inquiry to be made into their conduct, which, however, he had reason to think was exaggerated by public rumour.

I proposed, with a view to promote confidence among all classes of the peasantry, and to check disorders, that a notification should be addressed to the inhabitants, announcing the good relations which had been promoted between the Mohamedans and Christians in the capital and other cities of the Empire, by the Proclamation of Sultan Murad, and calling upon the peaceable and loyal inhabitants to act cordially together in the interest of order and quiet, warning, at the same time, all evil-intentioned persons who may attempt to foment ill-feeling and disturbances, that they will be pursued and severely punished; that circular instructions should be addressed to all the provincial and district Governors (Mutessarifs, Kaimakams, and Mudirs), enjoining them to follow a line of policy in accordance with the above notification, and to take all necessary precautions to protect the people from disorders, especially to superintend the enrolment and movements of the Rediff detachments; and, as it is the practice when there is a call of Rediffs to send to the several villages, through the civil authorities of every district and sub-district, the muster-roll of the men who are liable to service, with orders to these men to proceed to their respective depôts, and as these men are not attended on their way by any officers or persons in authority, I also suggested that the sub-Governors should cause the "Muhtars" (Primates) of the villages to take charge of the men called out, and accompany them to their depôts, using their influence and authority to prevent them from committing disorders.

Eshref Pasha thanked us cordially for our visit, and expressed his appreciation of the motives which prompted it. Moreover, he appeared to enter into the spirit of our suggestions, and promised to carry them out.

Indeed he summoned his secretary, and in our presence dictated a Circular instruction to the subordinate Governors in the sense I recommended.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

No. 457.

Consul Blunt to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 26.*)

(No. 31. Political.)

Salonica, June 19, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith inclosed a copy of a Report, with one inclosure, which I have this day addressed to Sir Henry Elliot, upon the pursuit of the Bulgarian insurgents by the Ottoman troops in the Balkans; and upon the failure of the efforts which have been made to excite a rising of the Bulgarians in the Province of Macedonia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 457.

Consul Blunt to Sir H. Elliot.

Salonica, June 13, 1876

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract of a letter from Tchtimun, dated May 26, 1876, furnishing some information on the pursuit of the Bulgarian insurgents by the Ottoman troops in the Balkans.

Tchtimun is a small town between Sofia and Tatar Bazarjik.

The efforts which have been made, as I telegraphed to your Excellency on the 22nd ultimo, to extend the insurrectionary movement in the Bulgarian districts of Macedonia have failed, owing to the prompt and energetic action of the Turkish military authorities, and also to the indisposition of the people to join the movement.

Some Servian emissaries, with about thirty insurgents, made an irruption into the mountainous district of Malish, burnt some Bulgarian houses, hoping thus to force

the Bulgarians to rise, and massacred some Mahomedans, but they were dispersed, and I now hear that several of them have been apprehended.

The Governor-General of Salonica informs me that he continues to receive satisfactory accounts of the quiet disposition of the Bulgarian peasants in his province.

I am also informed that the secret agents of the authorities have discovered traces of a "Bulgarian Comité" in this town, under the direction of foreign influence, who employed emissaries to foment disturbances in the interior.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

P.S.—It is said that a priest, who acted as the official representative of the local Bulgarian community, and who is suspected of being a member of the "Comité," left this place on Friday, the 9th instant, in the same steamer by which the Russian Consul, M. Hilarianow, took his passage for Constantinople, on his way to his new post at Jerusalem.

J. E. B.

Inclosure 2 in No. 457.

Extract of a Letter from Ichtiman, dated May 26, 1876.

NOUS partîmes de Nish à marche forcée en passant par Sofia et Ichtiman. Nous nous rendîmes sur les Balkans qui conduisent à Bazarjik, où nous attendait Hassan Pacha, notre actuel Commandant. A peine un peu reposés nous nous divisâmes en trois corps. D'un côté mon bataillon et un autre (2nd Réserve), une compagnie de Chasseurs avec deux canons tirés par de robustes mulets et dix conducteurs Circassiens qui devaient nous conduire de montagne en montagne en face à l'ennemi retranché dans une espèce de forteresse provisoire. De l'autre Hassan Pacha parti aussi avec un bataillon et deux canons pour se rendre au haut d'une autre montagne pour défendre notre retraite, ou bien pour empêcher la fuite aux insurgés. Après deux heures de marche par des endroits les plus difficiles nous fûmes surpris par de coups de fusils tirés sur nous d'un forêt. Mon bataillon répond par une décharge générale.

On se met à l'assaut, et on ne trouve plus personne. Nous reprenons notre marche; après deux heures nous nous rencontrons avec Hassan Pacha et vers 7 heures nous voici devant le fort plein de Bulgares.

Selon le Pacha cinquantes hommes courageux et déterminés auraient suffi à nous donner la défaite, mais c'était de lâches!

A peine avions nous tirés quelques coups de canons que le fort tombe et plus de 2,000 Bulgares se donnent à la fuite. Nous les suivons en déchargeant sur eux nos fusils et nos canons.

Ceux qui échappèrent à notre décharge furent accueillis au haut de la montagne par la décharge de l'autre bataillon.

Un petit nombre seulement se sauva par la fuite; les autres, trois prêtres y compris, trouvèrent la mort.

A 11 heures, sans avoir perdu un seul homme, nous arrivions victorieux sur un autre Balkan. Le lendemain nous nous remîmes en marche, brulant sans pitié quelques villages qui se trouvaient sur notre chemin et nous emparant des animaux.

Nous envoyâmes 10,000 bestiaux à Sofia; un nombre égal à Bazarjik, sans compter ceux que chaque bataillon avait pour se nourrir.

Après huit jours de marche, nous arrivâmes avec deux canons à Belova, où les insurgés se rendirent sans résistance et furent faits prisonniers.

Maintenant nous voici de retour ici, tranquilles pour le moment. Le Pacha est reparti avec deux bataillons et demi de Cavallerie pour Samakof, Kenstendil et Usenp.

No. 458.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 18. Political.)

My Lord, *Bosna Serai, June 15, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Haidar Effendi has issued a proclamation of amnesty, of which I inclose copy herewith. A similar proclamation has been published by Ali Pasha and Wassa Effendi in the Herzegovina. I have only to remark that this measure is not likely to have the slightest effect on the insurgents in arms, who, except on the occasion of the attack on them near Nevessine, when they were assembled to hear the declaration made to them by myself and my Russian and French colleagues, have never been molested by the Turkish troops. It will not affect either the condition of the refugees, as the insurgents are not bound by it, and will be as free as ever to prevent their return to their homes. As regards the interests of Turkey it can have no beneficial result, as during six weeks the war expenses of the troops will continue, and their provisions decrease, while the insurgents will have the same time to recruit and complete all their arrangements for prolonging the insurrection.

On the 10th Moukhtar Pasha left Mostar for Gatzko, and it is believed that he will at once proceed to Nichsich. Of his further movements I have as yet no information.

On the 6th the authorities at Mostar announced to Baron Rodich the fact that 1,800 cases of rifles and their cartridges were being landed at Cattaro for the Montenegrins.

On the 9th Baron Rodich thanked them for the information, and said that he would order an inquiry into the matter and punish any illegality. Of course the arms will all be at Cettigné before he commences.

On the 8th a band of insurgents from Popovo, under the command of Mussich, appeared at Razno, whose inhabitants had returned to their homes, and drove off all their cattle, some 2,000 head.

Surely it would be much better for the Turkish authorities to cease their efforts to bring back the refugees, and declare the simple truth—that it is impossible either to provide for them or to protect them until tranquillity is restored.

Moukhtar Pasha requires all the means of transport for the army, and has declared that he cannot weaken himself by sending any troops to protect the returning refugees until a pacification is effected.

The north of Bosnia still continues the theatre of constant collisions between the Turks and the insurgents. A battle is said to have been fought a few days ago at a place between Priedar and Banialuka, in which, as usual, the Turks, according to official accounts, were the victors, and the insurgents dispersed.

There is very great uneasiness here on account of reports from Servia, and people believe that an invasion from the Principality is imminent. I do not think, however, that anything of the kind will take place at present.

The news of the engagement in the Servian service of the Russian General Chernieff has added much to the popular agitation. Bands of Bashi-Bozouks are being sent off in the direction of the Servian frontier.

I think that the conduct of the Mussulman population in the interior of Bosnia has hitherto been most praiseworthy, but they are becoming wearied and exasperated by seeing matters going from bad to worse—by the numerical insufficiency of the troops sent here, and by the incapacity and mendacity of their authorities. It is indeed high time that more energetic measures be adopted, and that a Governor-General, more capable than Ibrahim Pasha of inspiring confidence, be sent to Serajevo.

Haidar Effendi seems in exactly the same position as Wassa Effendi—unable to do anything in the present disordered state of affairs.

The general impression throughout these countries is that the only means of terminating the present disastrous situation are, that the European Powers should force Montenegro to abandon the tactics she has so long employed, or that Turkey should either make the concessions necessary to induce her to give the signal for pacification; or, as the only remaining alternative, declare war against her at whatever cost and risk.

People imagine that the late events at Constantinople will have furnished the necessary funds to do so effectually, and that any risk would be better than the

certainty of utter ruin, and, perhaps, effusion of blood, in which the prolongation of the present situation, and the growing despair of the population, is likely to result.

Several Mussulmans have admitted to me that, in talking amongst themselves, there has been sometimes a disposition to take measures into their own hands, in utter despair, and either to perish or to drive the Christians out of the country. I have endeavoured to persuade them of the insanity of such a proceeding, which might result in their total subjugation to other races, which could do them no real good, and would certainly deprive them of all the sympathy which their hitherto patient and dignified conduct obtains from all who understand their real position.

To people residing in these countries, and who know the real state of parties, and the true nature of the insurrection, the idea of securing pacification by concessions to the insurgents appears simply absurd. In the first place, reforms and concessions cannot be executed until pacification is obtained, and, in the next, for reasons I have frequently explained to your Lordship, those who are in arms, and who keep up the insurrection, care nothing about them; they have other objects and other interests. It is clear, therefore, that other means of pacification must be sought for, and knowing that the conduct of Montenegro is at the root of the matter, I really cannot see any other than those above indicated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 459.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 138. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Athens, June 16, 1876.*

WITH reference to my Nos. 131, 133, and 135, of the 12th, 13th, and 15th of June respectively, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that M. de Sabouroff, the Russian Minister at this Court, called upon me to-day, and said that he hoped no "false interpretation" had been put upon what he had said to me with regard to the opinion expressed by M. Coumoundouros, that in the event of Servia declaring war it might be impossible to prevent the Greeks joining in a movement against Turkey, for this expression of opinion did not, he thought, indicate any change of policy on the part of Greece. He also said that Photiades Bey had called forth the above statement on the part of M. Coumoundouros by asking him whether the policy of the Greek Government would under all circumstances continue the same with regard to Turkey; and that the President of the Council had replied that he could not say what it would be in the event of a general conflagration in the East, and that he then expressed the above-mentioned opinion with regard to what might happen in the event of Servia declaring war.

This explanation which M. de Sabouroff has given to me as to how this question arose alters its aspect, as I had certainly been led to understand that the Hellenic Ministers had taken the initiative in the matter, and that it indicated a sudden change of policy on their part.

M. de Sabouroff concluded his remarks by saying that he understood it was the intention of the Government of Greece to continue to maintain a friendly attitude towards Turkey, which policy, he said, he thought was the best they could pursue; and I told him that I had learnt the same from M. Contostavlos yesterday, and that I had duly reported it to your Lordship.

I am happy to be able to state that, as far as I can learn, perfect tranquillity prevails throughout Greece, and I do not think much importance is to be attached at present to the reorganization of the National Guard; to which, in particular, I should add, with reference to my No. 135 of the 15th instant, M. Contostavlos alluded when he spoke of the purchase of rifles and of the completion of the military organization of the kingdom.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 460.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 140. Very Confidential.)

Athens, June 17, 1876.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my Nos. 135 and 138 of the 15th and 16th instant, I have the honour to report that M. Merlin, the Manager of the Ionian Bank, informed me this afternoon that the Greek Government were endeavouring to raise a provisional loan, which was thought to be the forerunner of a larger loan to be proposed on the meeting of the Chambers. He said that the amount at present required was about 1,600,000 to 2,000,000 drachmas, and that he believed the object in raising this money was the purchase of arms.

M. Merlin stated that the Ionian Bank, not feeling that the Government could give them any adequate security for the money they had been requested to advance, had declined to enter into any negotiation on the subject. He said he did not know what course the Government would adopt; perhaps, he said, they would endeavour to use coercive measures to oblige the Bank to comply with their wishes.

I told M. Merlin I was very glad indeed to hear that he had refused to negotiate the proposed loan, especially as it was suspected of being raised for the purpose of buying arms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

P.S.—I understand that the Greek Government is about to sign a contract at Berlin for the purchase of several thousand Chassepot rifles. Mr. Stuart, in his despatch No. 99 of the 13th ultimo, mentioned to your Lordship that Colonel Manos had been sent to Germany and Belgium with a view to buying arms.

H. W.

No. 461.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 141. Confidential.)

Athens, June 18, 1876.

My Lord,

I SAW Photiades Bey yesterday evening, and as he adverted to the language lately held by the Greek Ministers with regard to Servia, I asked him how the question had originated, without of course telling him what M. de Sabouroff had said to me. He said, as I had first been led to suppose by both M. Sabouroff and himself, that it had been commenced by the Greek Ministers, MM. Coumoundouros and Contostavlos, who had called upon him and reproached him with the non-settlement of the naturalization question, and had then said that a rising was imminent in Crete, and that if Servia declared war it would be impossible to prevent the Greek nation from rising also against Turkey. I asked him if he was quite sure that he had not asked what the policy of Greece would be under certain circumstances, and he said positively that he had not done so, and that the language held by MM. Coumoundouros and Contostavlos had been entirely unprovoked by him. I mentioned to your Lordship, in my despatch No. 133 of the 13th instant, that the Greek Government felt much aggrieved at the naturalization question not being settled; and the language lately made use of by the Hellenic Ministers would now seem to have been held with a view to induce the Porte to hasten its solution.

Photiades Bey said he was glad that I had called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had questioned him upon the subject, and that he had since received assurances from the Government that they intended to adhere to a friendly policy towards Turkey, and that they, moreover, had denied having any understanding with Servia.

I suspect that the Greek Government, finding that their language had attracted attention, explained the matter to M. de Sabouroff in the sense in which I have reported to your Lordship in my No. 138 of the 16th instant, but I am inclined to think that the explanation given by Photiades Bey is the true one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 462.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 270.)

St. Petersburgh, June 20, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship extracts in translation by Mr. Michell from the Russian press on Eastern affairs.

The "Golos," referring to Mr. Disraeli's speech respecting the Berlin Memorandum, states that the document has not been withdrawn, but is only temporarily in abeyance, and evinces it disappointment by bitter remarks against England.

The "Birjekie Vedomost" considers that there will be no war, although England has done everything to render it possible.

The "Novoe Vremia," answering an article from the Berlin "National Zeitung," that Russia was unprepared for war, observes that: "We are not ready, but we are strong." The Russian giant at previous epochs has never been ready, but the Russian strength springs from the force of inspiration, from the popularity of an idea, from the bravery of her army, and the devoted patriotism of her people. It asks that if the idea of universal Slavonian liberty and of emancipating the Slavonic race is becoming more and more popular, and if there is not, and never will be, a more favourable moment for accomplishing it, why then, we ask, do we hesitate?

The "Moscow Gazette" replies to the correspondent of the "Times" as to the isolation of Russia at the present crisis, and states that Russia is stronger than is supposed; that she has shown her readiness to act with Austria and Germany, and with the whole of Europe, without abandoning her national policy or her sympathy for the Christians in the East.

England bases her position on non-interference; if so, and Turkey refuses to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Powers, no alternative remains but to leave her to herself. The Christian populations do not ask for help, but they are justified in demanding that their hands should be left free, and that Europe should not assist their oppressor.

The "Russki Mir" is the only organ which defends the policy pursued by England in the Eastern question, and asserts its opinion that it is necessary that Russia should at all hazards ally herself closely with England, even at the price of certain concessions in Central Asia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 463.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 271.)

St. Petersburgh, June 20, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in translation from the Russian Text by Mr. Michell, a letter addressed by General Chernaieff to the "Russki Mir," of which he is the proprietor.

After stating the object of his proceeding to Servia, General Chernaieff refers to the organization of Committees for aiding the independence of the Bulgarians along the whole course of the Danube, from the Russian frontier to the Servian boundary, and to the vast preparations made in Bulgaria for an insurrection against the Porte.

Passing from Bucharest to Belgrade, the General states that he found that preparations for war were being advanced, and that the Servians, relying on Russia, had remained passive for 11 months, thus enabling the Turkish Government to concentrate along their extended frontier an army of 60,000 men.

He likewise refers to the hopes which the Bulgarians placed in their Russian brethren, adding that the sympathy of the Servians for Russia is much stronger.

The General then explains the motive for his taking service in the Servian army, observing that, had he refused after his inspection of the Servian advanced position, his departure would have been interpreted by the enemies of the Slavs as a conviction on his part of the fruitlessness of the contemplated struggle.

He states that his conviction is entirely in a contrary sense, and that Servia can muster 125,000 well-armed troops, with 200 rifled guns and 24,000 cavalry, in addition

to being able to provide 100,000 armed men for the protection and defence of the country.

The General closes his letter with expressing the hope that his countrymen will not condemn his taking service in the Servian army in the impending struggle for the emancipation of the Balkan Christians from the Turkish yoke.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 463.

General Chernaïeff to the "Russki Mir."

(Translation.) *Belgrade, May* $\frac{14}{26}$, 1876.

I PROCEEDED to Servia with the object of making myself acquainted with the real state of affairs in the Turkish territories, in order that in communicating information to my own newspaper* I might be enabled to appreciate correctly the intelligence which is transmitted to Russia chiefly through the Austrian press, which is hostile to all Slavism generally. I chose the route by way of Kishenelf and the Danube, along the whole course of which, commencing from the Russian frontier to the Servian boundary, Committees were formed, towards the end of last year, for organizing the plans of the Bulgarians in their approaching struggle for independence.

Commencing from Bolgrad (a Bulgarian colony which fell away from Russia and became incorporated with Roumania by virtue of the Treaty of Paris), I everywhere heard the same thing, which was to the effect that all had been done that was possible by the people for the impending struggle. All the arms that could be found in Roumania had been bought up; many rifles which had been distributed by the Turkish Government among the Mussulman population had been obtained by the Bulgarians; and that powder was being manufactured in many places by the people themselves. Considerable stores of provisions had been removed to the Balkans and properly secreted under ground.

"We only expect," I was told, "a general signal for attacking the Turks after first removing our families and cattle to the mountains; we still, however, require leaders and unanimity. We are keeping the people back so as to avoid useless sacrifices by a premature rising!"

I doubted the correctness of this information and particularly as regards the enthusiasm of the Committees being shared by the Bulgarian people across the Danube. The subsequent outbreak, however, confirmed the statements made to me. At the present moment, and now that a fortnight has elapsed since the first commencement of hostilities, the insurgent Bulgarians may, according to information possessed here, be numbered by thousands. Their movements are regulated by a fixed programme. The Bulgarian military organization is based on a gradual scale, commencing from a desiatka (10 men); 10 desiatkas form a cheta, 10 chetas a voevodstvo; 10 voevodstvos a head voevodstvo, the command over which will be intrusted to a Commander-in-chief. Seniority among the commanders will be reckoned from the day of their taking part in the insurrection. Until the people are seasoned under fire, all the military movements will be confined to partizan attacks on the communications; consisting chiefly in the destruction of railways, telegraphs, interception of courriers, posts, &c. An attack of Turkish detachments will only be allowed under specially favourable circumstances and under a considerable superiority of strength over the enemy. The first acts of the insurgents have been in strict accordance with this programme.

After quitting Bucharest I reached Belgrade, where I found that preparations for war were being pushed forward. As is known, the military force of the Principalities consists of militiamen (of regular troops there are only 4,000 or 5,000), who can be all mustered in fourteen days. The Servians, relying on Russia, remained quiet for eleven months, enabling the Turks to concentrate along their extended frontier about 60,000 men, a considerable quantity of Krupp artillery, and to form several fortified camps. The justice of their complaints against diplomacy can thus be understood. You will readily perceive why my arrival excited such sympathy. Not only at Belgrade, but also during my excursion into the interior, which I undertook with the sanction of Prince Milan for the purpose of examining, amongst other things, the state of the fortresses, did I hear of the strong hopes which the Bulgarians placed in their Russian brethren. This feeling of sympathy expressed may be, with greater strength at the

* General Chernaïeff is the registered proprietor of the "Russki Mir."—J. M.

present critical moment, always exists in the hearts of the Servian people, as is proved by the presence in every peasant's hut and wayside station of the portraits of our Emperors side by side with those of their esteemed Princes of the house of Obronovitch. Wherever I passed the people shouted "Long life to our Russian brethren! Long life to our orthodox Russian Tsar!"

On my return to Belgrade a proposal was made that I should enter the ranks of the Servian army. All vacillation on my part would, of course, have been misplaced; a refusal would have been tantamount to a desire to avoid the danger which threatened a kindred country from all sides. After the survey made by me of the advanced positions my departure from Servia would have been interpreted by the enemies of the Slavs, who are very numerous, in the sense that I had become convinced of the impossibility of the contemplated struggle. My examinion, however, of the real state of matters assured me of the contrary. Servia can muster 125,000 well-armed popular troops, with 200 rifled guns and 24,000 horsemen for scout and outpost duties. In addition to this, the country is able to command 100,000 armed men for the protection and defence of their families and dwellings. It may generally be said that Servia possesses many conditions for a successful struggle against the Turks; victory, however, is in the hands of God. The nation is fervently devoted to the Obronovitch dynasty and to its present representative Milan IV. Everything that we hear in Russian about the Karageorgevitch party, which is secretly supported by Austria, proceeds from the Austrian press, and every true Servian regards the few partizans of that party, who are in the pay of Austria, with the greatest contempt.

The communistic outbreak at Kragouevatz, which has been purposely magnified by the Austrian press with the intention of frightening Europe, is regarded by every Servian as a childish manifestation made by a few ignorant young men for obtaining political notoriety. The danger that threatens the Servian Government is not from this quarter. Every Servian, from the peasant to the senator, comprehends the importance of the present moment for the future of his country. It is universally felt that a struggle is as necessary to Servia for her moral justification as a duel is for the protection of a man's honour. I conclude this letter by expressing the hope that my countrymen will not condemn my determination to place myself in the ranks of the Servians in the impending struggle for the emancipation of the Balkan Christians from the degrading and insupportable Turkish yoke.

No. 464.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 277. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 21, 1876.

ON inquiring from Caboull Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at this Court, I learnt that he had communicated only verbally to M. de Giers the orders sent by the Porte to the Governors of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, proclaiming an amnesty for all insurgents, and the cessation of military operations during a period of six weeks, to allow them to make their submission, reserving at the same time the right of revictualling the forts.

On Caboull Pasha receiving from his Government the official notification that Sultan Murad V held to all the engagements taken by his predecessor in regard to the promised reforms, I suggested to him that he should communicate a copy of this document to M. de Giers, and that he should profit at the same time of the opportunity (in referring to his previous verbal communication) to forward copies of the orders sent to the Turkish Governors of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

His Excellency has taken this step, and has forwarded to M. de Giers written copies of these documents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 465.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 278.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1876.*

WITH reference to Sir H. Elliot's telegram of the 14th instant, and those of Sir A. Buchanan of the 16th and 18th instants, respecting the expediency of an Agent being sent to Constantinople by the Prince of Montenegro, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I spoke a few days ago to M. de Giers, suggesting this course.

His Excellency replied very much in the same terms as Baron Hofmann, stating that the question of etiquette might become a delicate one, as the Porte had never acknowledged the independence of the Prince. If, therefore, any question of this nature should be raised, more harm than good might result from the Mission.

I said I thought that an unofficial Agent might be charged by the Prince with a letter to the Sultan, and that an opportunity might thus be given for an exchange of friendly opinions which might give the opening for a better understanding.

At all events, I observed, it was an opportunity which might not soon occur again, and ought, therefore, to be turned to account.

M. de Giers said that he would mention the subject to Prince Gortchakow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 466.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 281. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1876.*

I HAD some conversation with M. de Giers to-day in regard to the attitude of Servia.

His Excellency stated that his late intelligence from Belgrade was not so satisfactory; that the military preparations still continued, and that since the return of the Russian Consul from Ems, when he had held very strong admonitory language to Prince Milan, the Servian Government had become cold and reserved, and no longer treated him with the same confidence and frankness as previously.

M. de Giers confessed that the present moment of calm rather filled him with alarm, as being the precursor of a storm. Both parties, viz., the Turks and the Servians, appeared to be preparing for the coming struggle.

In reply to my inquiry, M. de Giers said that he did not believe in the existence of any binding Treaty between Montenegro and Servia, but it was evident that if the one took up arms the other would follow.

I observed that, if Montenegro should join in hostilities against the Porte, the Porte would be perfectly authorized to attack Montenegro, and no other Power could call her to account for doing so. To this M. de Giers entirely assented, saying that it would be most imprudent for either of those Principalities to risk hostilities with the Porte.

I am persuaded that Russia is most anxious to prevent the present insurrection from extending and assuming larger proportions, and that, should such be the case, Russia will not interfere herself, nor will she permit any other foreign Power to interfere.

She will advocate the principle of non-intervention, and will be satisfied to let the parties fight it out, in the confident hope that the Christian element will come out victorious.

Russia will not draw the sword herself, but she will withdraw the restraint she has hitherto exercised on Servia and Montenegro, which has hitherto been to the advantage of Turkey.

I am inclined to believe that this course is the one which would be most suitable to her own views, and most in harmony with the national feeling, if she could be assured that the conflagration would not extend beyond certain limits, and that it would cause no danger to the general peace of Europe.

Russia is in no way prepared for war, and will not willingly be drawn into war; on the other hand she has interests which cannot be safely sacrificed, even to her necessity for peace. Her alliance with Austria is strictly based on the maintenance of *the status quo* in the East, and it remains to be seen how far the interests of Austria and Russia could harmonize if the present *status quo* should be changed.

A mistrust of Austria has already shown itself in certain quarters here, even in official circles, but the perfect confidence of the two Emperors is unshaken, and so long as this continues, the two Governments will continue to act in harmony.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 467.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 282. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 21, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's telegram in cypher of yesterday's date instructing me to take an opportunity of informing Prince Bismarck, confidentially, of the representations which Sir Henry Elliot has been instructed, in your Lordship's despatch No. 381 of the 13th instant, to make to the Sultan with regard to the necessity for the prompt execution of measures of reform.

In the absence of Prince Bismarck and of Herr von Bülow, I called at the Foreign Office on Herr von Radowitz, and having told him, confidentially, of the substance of the instruction addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, I begged that he would have the goodness to communicate what I had said privately to Prince Bismarck.

M. de Radowitz promised that he would take the first opportunity of doing so. At present, he said, Prince Bismarck, who was at Kissingen, had left positive orders at Berlin not to send him any work or communication relating to public business until his cure was over.

In this case, however, an exception should be made to the rule.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 468.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 26, noon.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 26, 1876, 11·30 A.M.*

ALL the available forces to the last man mobilized. Selection of considerable numbers sent to frontier of Principality towards Nish and Novi-Bazaar.

Prince Milan going to head-quarters in a few days.

No. 469.

Mr. Efrench to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received June 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 26, 1876; 12·15 A.M.*

I COMMUNICATE following to Sir A. Buchanan:—

"Went to Schönbrunn; saw Count Andrassy this evening.

"He had sent instructions to Count Zichy three weeks ago, but fears that it is now too late to hope for any effect.

"I asked what the Austrian Government intended to do as frontier State, should the conflict extend around Servia. He answered that it would 'sauvegarder' its interests; and having asked how, he said, according as circumstances should dictate."

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.
† Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.

No. 470.

The Earl of Derby to Sir C. Wyke.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 26, 1876, 1 P.M.

IN reply to your telegram of yesterday, you may tell the King of Greece that the reports of the Servians having prepared for war are correct. Her Majesty's Government have not heard of recall of the Servian Agent.

The real intentions of the Servian Government are not known, but their attitude is very menacing.

No. 471.

Mr. Efrench to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June* 27, 3·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 27, 1876, 3·35 P.M.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from Monson to-day:—

"There is constant interchange of telegrams between Russian and Montenegrin Governments through the Russian Consulate here.

"I am assured that attitude of Montenegro is most warlike, and that Crivisciens and inhabitants of the Boeche di Cattaro are arming."

No. 472.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received June 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June* 20, 1876, 7·30 P.M.

RUSSIAN Ambassador has informed the Porte that in consequence of the menacing attitude adopted towards Servia he has been instructed by Prince Gortchakow to remind the Porte of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris debarring it from attacking the Principality.

Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that it was perfectly well known that Turkey had no intention of attacking, but had taken measures to repel aggression. If Servia disarmed, the troops would be withdrawn, but not before. There was no occasion, he said, to warn the Porte of its Treaty obligations; but the vassal States might with advantage be required to observe a proper attitude towards the Suzerain.

No. 473.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.†—(Received June 26, *at night.*)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 26, 1876, 4 P.M.

MINISTER for Affairs tells me that Prince of Montenegro has replied to a communication from Count Andrassy that, although happy to act as mediator and pacificator, the feelings of the Christian population are too excited, and the moment is not therefore propitious. He is evidently aware of the intended Servian movement, and awaits result.

General Ignatiew telegraphs that a collision with Servia is inevitable, and fears that it will stimulate fanaticism of the Turks, and render the position at Constantinople untenable.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.
† Repeated to Embassies.

No. 474.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June* 26, *at night.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June* 26, 1876, 9:30 P.M.

GRAND Vizier has sent a telegram to the Prince of Montenegro saying that the Sultan has seen (in the?) absence of opposition to the expedition of the Turkish Commander-in-chief evidence that his Highness has been exercis(ing?) a salutary influence, and that His Majesty will take this into consideration at the proper time.

No. 475.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 60. Political. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, June* 20, 1876.

IN my despatch No. 55 of the 10th ultimo, I reported to your Lordship that M. Yonine, the Russian Consul-General here, had been summoned by telegraph to Vienna, and, as you are doubtless aware, he accompanied the President of the Montenegrin Senate to Berlin, and has since then been with the Czar at Ems. A telegram was received from him yesterday, stating that he was still detained at Vienna; and if I am to credit what I have heard from a Russian friend of M. Yonine's, just arrived from thence, his present detention at that capital has been arranged in order to give colour to the assertion that the course of the insurrection is in no way influenced by him. M. Schatokhine, the Secretary now in charge of the Consulate here, is a young man of twenty, an Attaché of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburgh. He tells me that he receives instructions by telegraph almost daily from M. Yonine, as well as from M. de Novikow, and from General Ignatiew; so that, although the former is not at his post, he continues to control the correspondence with Cettigné, to which place a special messenger, with an important communication for the Prince, was dispatched by M. Schatokhine the day before yesterday.

In spite—or perhaps I should say, because—of his youth, M. Schatokhine is exceedingly discreet, and though I hear from him that Prince Nikita is not a little dissatisfied that so young a man should at this crisis be left in charge of the Diplomatic Agency, I confess that in my opinion the Russian Government are justified in the confidence which they clearly repose in him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 476.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 61. Political.)

My Lord, *Ragusa, June* 20, 1876.

THE Slavophil party in Dalmatia has been re-inspirited by the recent news from Constantinople. The death of Hussein Avni Pasha is regarded by them as a serious blow to the new Government; and although the contrary has been expressly asserted by telegraph, every one here is persuaded that the late Minister of War fell a victim to political, and not to private, vengeance.

The ultra-Slavophils regard the policy of Her Majesty's Government as actuated solely by antipathy to, and dread of, Russia; and some of them speak to me as if it were incredible that England could have any real sympathy for the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey. There are, however, even among the Slavophils, many who are better informed, and these cherish the hope that Her Majesty's Government may be induced to give their countenance to what they assert is the only practicable solution of the present difficulty, namely, the conversion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina into a vassal State, with an autonomy as extensive as that enjoyed by Servia and the Roumanian Principalities. They know that a not uninfluential portion of the English press has long advocated such an arrangement; and they invariably

* Repeated to Embassies.

declare that the Austrian Government is only prevented by sheer ignorance of the real condition and sentiments of the population from giving its adhesion to the plan. I do not think that there is much general sympathy with the ambition of Montenegro; and I should say that the policy of Russia, and the objects it is intended to serve, are thoroughly understood and appreciated.

As for the Italian party, their organs in the press express the utmost abhorrence of Russian intrigue and duplicity, and the most cordial sympathy with the efforts of English diplomacy; but the strength of the Italian party is to be found in North and Mid Dalmatia—in Ragusa and in the Boeche di Cattaro it is voiceless, and almost powerless.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 477.

Mr. St. John to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, June 26, 1876, 11·15 P.M.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs requests Her Majesty's Government to intervene with the Porte, so that in the event of hostilities with Servia Turkish ships of war might not come up the Danube to that part separating Roumania from Servia, as Roumania desires neutrality, and shot fired across would provoke hostilities.

No. 478.

Mr. Malet to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, June 27, 1876.*

WITH reference to the advice given by Italian (Minister at Constantinople?) to the Porte to withdraw its troops from the Servian frontier, Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that he had at the same time advised the Government of Prince Milan to withdraw their forces from the Turkish frontier.

No. 479.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 407.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1876.*

IN the course of conversation I recently mentioned to the Turkish Ambassador at this Court that Her Majesty's Government strongly advised the Turkish Government to endeavour to make terms with Montenegro, which they fully believed to be possible.

A slight rectification of frontier might be promised in the event of the Prince of Montenegro exerting his influence to put an end to the insurrection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 480.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 643.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1876.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 449 of the 23rd instant respecting your conversation with the Duc Decazes on the subject of the murders at Salonica, and I approve of the reply which your Excellency returned to certain remarks made by the Duke in regard to Mr. Blunt's conduct upon that occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 481.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 645. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1876.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 448, Confidential, of the 23rd instant, in which you report that in the course of a conversation which you have had with the Duc Decazes his Excellency again urged the importance of establishing a complete accord between the six great Powers on the Eastern question, and pointed out the manner in which, in his opinion, this object could be attained, principally, as it appears to his Excellency, by a strong and solemn warning being given to Servia to forbear from aggressive measures towards the Porte.

I have to request that your Excellency will explain to the Duc Decazes, in accordance with the correspondence already in your possession, what has taken place in regard to the advice already given to Servia by Her Majesty's Government on the invitation of that of Austria.

Your Excellency will state to the Duc Decazes that Her Majesty's Government have no objection to repeat that advice, if the other Powers, whose influence over Servia is so apparent, are also ready to do so, and to show the reality of their sentiments by firmly discouraging the incentives to hostile measures against Turkey, which Servia is receiving from foreign agitators and agents of Slav Committees.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 482.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 311. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1876.*

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me to-day, and repeated to me the substance of a telegraphic message which he had received from Count Andrassy, stating that in his opinion the idea of autonomy is not capable of realization for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and giving briefly the reasons which have led him to that conclusion. In the first place, Count Andrassy said the circumstances of the country itself are opposed to such a plan. There is a mixed population of Christians and Mussulmans living together in every village; and, in the present state of feeling, an attempt to establish any form of self-government would be followed by a struggle between the two religions, ending in mutual extermination.

Other Provinces of European Turkey, on the other hand, such as Bulgaria, which is ripe for autonomy, would equally demand it, and the insurrection would spread instead of dying out.

Nor would Servia and Montenegro be restrained by a concession of this kind made to the insurgent Provinces. These Principalities are preparing to take the field, not to conquer autonomy for the two Provinces, but with the ultimate object of annexing them.

The Porte, on the other hand, in face of the Servian and Montenegrin armaments, would not consent to withdraw its troops, feeling sure that instead of localising the movement, such withdrawal would only serve to extend it.

Count Andrassy went on to observe that he agreed in the opinion I had myself expressed that, if beaten, the insurgents would be content with the reforms already proposed, provided there were proper guarantees for their execution. Any proposals going beyond those reforms would be attended, he thought, by the following disadvantages:—

1. The Porte must be expected to refuse to agree to them, and the refusal would give strength and encouragement to the fanatical party at Constantinople.

2. The insurgents, on the other hand, would be equally encouraged to increase the demands, and would be less amenable than ever to advice.

3. The movement, now confined to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, would too probably extend over the whole of the Ottoman dominions in Europe.

For all these reasons Count Andrassy believes that it would be better to wait awhile, and let events clear themselves up ("laisser les événements se débrouiller")

before trying any fresh diplomatic action, which could lead to no useful result, and would only compromise our future policy.

This, Count Beust said, was only Count Andrassy's personal opinion. He could not give it officially as the view of the Austrian Government, the Emperor's assent not having yet been obtained. Count Andrassy desired, however, that I should be made aware of it. The Austrian Government, Count Beust said, wished to consult us at every step, and were anxious to see the British Government draw closer to Russia.

Though more closely interested in the present question than any other Power, Austria did not wish to throw obstacles in the way of any plan which might bring together the Cabinets of England and Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 483.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 312. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1876.*

IN the communication from Count Andrassy of which I have given the substance in my previous despatch No. 311 of this day, reference was made to a despatch addressed to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh in October last, as giving in detail the objections which the Austrian Government saw to the proposal of granting to Bosnia a position of autonomy such as is guaranteed to the Principalities of Servia and Roumania.

Count Beust read to me the passage referred to, the substance of which is as follows:—

Leaving out of the question the fact that the proposal went further than what there was any chance of obtaining from the Porte, it did not in itself appear to be practicable.

Whoever might be the Chief chosen to direct the new State, he would find himself in face of difficulties which might well be called insurmountable. If his dominions were to be restricted to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, it is difficult to imagine that a semi-independent Prince, called upon to govern 600,000 Mussulmans and about the same number of Christians of both rites, should be able to acquit himself of the task to the satisfaction of both parties. He would be compelled to rely on the support either of the former or the latter, and would infallibly lose on one side what he gained on the other. If, on the other hand, it were proposed to extend the power of the Prince of Servia or of Montenegro over Bosnia, he would have no choice; he would be compelled to sacrifice the Mahommedans, on penalty of seeing his former subjects revolt against his authority. As to the idea of confiding the Government of Bosnia to a hereditary and quasi-independent Pasha like the Khedive of Egypt, there was no reason to expect that such a measure, if put in practice, would improve in any way the condition of the Rayahs.

Whoever knows anything of the internal condition of Bosnia and the Herzegovina would admit that, in consequence of the extent to which the population is divided by religious animosities, these countries are less adapted than most others for a position of autonomy such as is possessed by the two vassal States of the Porte. On the other hand, while the conditions necessary for such a position are entirely wanting in these two provinces, the Ottoman Empire contains other countries where they exist. Bulgaria is an instance, inhabited almost exclusively by a Christian population, peaceable, devoted to agriculture, and whose perseverance has already succeeded in procuring the establishment of a national church. Supposing Bosnia, therefore, to be granted an autonomian Government, not only will this measure be powerless to remedy the evils which exist there, but the fact that it has been yielded to a mere display of force will seem to give to other countries a right to demand a similar concession. To grant a position of independence and autonomy, therefore, to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, would be an act of moral compulsion on the Bulgarians to imitate the action which had procured such results for the neighbouring provinces. Such an example would certainly act as a stimulus to the whole of the East. It is more than probable that Roumania would have no alternative but to demand complete independence. Would the Princes of Servia and Montenegro be able to maintain their authority over their subjects if they did not set about obtaining for them an equal position? It is doubtful whether in

Greece even a Government would be strong enough to restrain the nation from joining in the conflict, when experience had shown that efforts so feeble had been attended with such success.

In one word, the despatch goes on to say, the plan of autonomy, if put in execution, so far from re-establishing security, would only serve to shake to its foundation everything that it was desired to consolidate. If ever there was a case in which the cure might be said to be worse than the disease, this would be it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 484.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 28, 1876, 3·20 P.M.*

EXPRESS satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the conciliatory message sent by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro, as reported in your telegram of the 26th instant.

No. 485.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Scutari, June 17, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch I have this day addressed to Sir Henry Elliot. I furnish his Excellency with the copy of a telegram forwarded to him by me on the 15th instant, and give fuller information regarding the declaration of the Prince of Montenegro to the Porte on the subject of the investment of his frontiers by Turkish troops, and about the march of Moukhtar Pasha towards Niehsich.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure in No. 485.

Consul Kirby Green to Sir H. Elliot.

Sir, *Scutari, June 17, 1876.*

THE day before yesterday I had the honour to forward to your Excellency the following telegram in cypher:—

"Prince of Montenegro has declared to the Porte that the investment of his frontiers forces him to take steps to secure safety of his country.

"Moukhtar Pasha has marched to-day to relieve Niehsich."

The declaration of the Prince of Montenegro to the Porte was made by telegraph, and, after enumerating at great length the annoyance and loss suffered through the concentration of Turkish troops on the frontiers, and asserting that neutral obligations had been hitherto loyally observed by the Montenegrins, His Highness concluded by intimating that the maintenance of the Turkish forces on his borders would oblige him to adopt measures to make them withdraw.

No further news has reached this of the progress of Moukhtar Pasha towards Niehsich, but all the troops on the southern frontier of Montenegro were yesterday kept in the field, manœuvring under the orders of Salem Pasha, and last night they camped out on the extreme limits of the Turkish territory. Should information arrive that Moukhtar Pasha has been attacked from the side of Montenegro, they would at once invade the Principality, and thus endeavour to create a diversion in his favour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 486.

Count Schouvaloff to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 28.*)

Le 27 Juin, 1876.

IL est urgent mon cher Comte, que ni vous ni vos collègues n'ayez en ce moment aucun doute sur la loyauté et la sincérité de la politique qui ne peut être pacifique à Londres et belliqueuse à Belgrade ou Raguse.

Je m'écarte donc je crois des traditions diplomatiques en prévant au hazard quelques communications de nos agents en Servie et au Monténégro. Je ne possède pas les documents de ne genre les plus récents parceque l'on n'a pas eu le temps de me les envoyer, mais je suis certain que nous poursuivons avec la plus grande énergie nos exhortations pacifiques aux Princes Nicolas et Milan.

Veuillez parcourir les pièces et me les rendre quand vous n'en aurez plus besoin.

Je vous remercie pour l'entrevue que vous m'accordez demain.

Votre toute dévoué,
(Signé) SCHOUVALOFF.

Inclosure in No. 486.

Communications received from Russian Agents in Servia and Montenegro.

Télégramme Secrète de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire à M. Novikow, à Vienne, le 3 Février, 1876.

RECU télégrammes d'hier. Prescrivez à Yonine et Kartzow de déclarer aux Princes Nicolas et Milan que si, lorsque les Grandes Puissances font un essai énergique pour améliorer le sort des Chrétiens de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, un essai que pour le moment offre de bonnes chances, le Monténégro et la Servie se livrent à des démonstrations hostiles, ils jouent le jeu de leurs propres ennemis, s'aventurent à leurs risques et périls et ne devront compter ni l'un ni l'autre sur l'appui de la Russie. Informez Saburnow de la tentative projetée à Athènes.

Télégramme Secrète de son Altesse M. le Chancelier de l'Empire à M. Novikow, à Vienne, le $\frac{1}{13}$ Mars, 1876.

Au clair.—Reçu télégramme d'hier. Courrier parti aujourd'hui.

En chiffres.—Prescrivez à Yonine de faire savoir au Prince Nicolas que l'Empereur n'ignore pas les dernières ouvertures à la Servie, et que Sa Majesté avait appris avec autant de surprise que de regret, les décisions aussi dangereuses pour le Monténégro que contraires aux assurances que nous prodigue le Prince Nicolas.

Notre auguste Maître ne devait pas s'attendre à cette ingratitude contraire à la bienveillance constante dont le Prince avait été l'objet.

Demandez une explication catégorique, ajoutant que son caractère décidera de nos relations ultérieures.

Rapport de M. Kartzow à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, Belgrade, le 14 Mai, 1876.

Mes rapports personnels avec le Prince Milan se sont bien rapidement ressentis des influences funestes qu'il subit depuis l'avénement au pouvoir du Ministère Omladiniste actuel.

Les entrevues fréquentes, je dirai presque quotidiennes, que j'avais eues auparavant avec Son Altesse servaient peut-être de contre poids aux effets que ne manquaient de produire sur son impressionable nature les suggestions alarmantes et bien calculées des hommes de son nouvel entourage.

Ceux-ci auront, à coup sûr, cherché à agir sur sa pusillanimité pour le menacer du prétendant Karageorgévitch, toujours aux portes de la Serbie, ainsi que d'une révolution intérieure, s'il hésitait encore à embrasser franchement leurs tendances.

Je ne tardai pas à m'en apercevoir à ma dernière visite au Palais. A cette occasion je dois reconnaître que sans doute il répugna au Prince d'imiter l'exemple de son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, en souillant sa bouche par le mensonge; aussi fut-il avec moi d'une réserve insolite. Dès lors je crus inopportune de continuer avec lui des relations d'amitié purement personnelle qui auraient pû, aux yeux du public, m'exposer à être moralement solidaire d'une ligne de conduite que je ne cesse de désapprouver.

En conséquence, malgré quelques réproches que Son Altesse a déjà bien voulu me faire parvenir par l'entremise d'un de ses intimes, je ne l'ai plus revu depuis plus de 15 jours, et son dernier procédé dans l'affaire Chernaieff ne me semble guère de nature à m'encourager dans l'abandon de la froide réserve que j'ai cru devoir adopter à son égard.

Je suis, &c.

Rapport de M. Kartzow à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, Belgrade, le 14 Mai, 1876.

Le Général en retraite Chernaieff, arrivé à Belgrade dans les derniers jours d'Avril, se présenta chez moi en qualité de touriste et de rédacteur du "Syeckieu Mipre." Il se proposait, me dit-il, de faire un voyage d'étude à travers la Serbie, dans le but d'y recueillir, pour son journal, des notions précises sur l'état actuel de ce pays.

Je ne pus m'empêcher de lui observer que son arrivée ici, dans les circonstances présentes, ne manquerait pas d'être interprétée dans un sens peu en harmonie avec l'attitude bien accentuée du Cabinet Impérial à l'égard de la Principauté.

Il m'en objecta, qu'étant simple particulier, il ne trouvait aucun inconvénient à entreprendre en Serbie les mêmes études que venaient d'y faire le député Magyare ex-Général Eber, l'Agent Militaire d'Angleterre à Vienne, et tant d'autres.

Néanmoins, pour le soustraire, en tant que possible, à l'action de faux commentaires je lui conseillai de ne pas se tenir à l'ombre et d'imiter les personnes citées par lui-même, et qui, une fois à Belgrade, s'étaient présentées dans tous les cercles diplomatiques de cette ville.

Instruit de son arrivée ici, le Prince Milan se hâta de le recevoir avec une bienveillance marquée; au sortir du Palais le Général m'annonça son prochain départ pour un voyage dans l'intérieur, pendant lequel il tâcherait de concilier les intérêts de son journal avec la prière que lui avait adressée Son Altesse de savoir à lui donner, au retour, l'appréciation exacte de l'armement et des travaux de défense au point de vue du métier militaire.

Je revis Chernaieff le 11 Mai. Il me dit avoir été, dans sa tournée, accueilli par des démonstrations enthousiastes. En toute confidence il me la conta, qu'avant d'arriver en Serbie, il s'était arrêté à Bukarest, où les Comités Bulgares l'avaient vainement supplié de prendre le commandement en chef de l'insurrection. Mais ces quelques jours qu'il venait de passer au milieu du peuple Serbe l'avaient complètement acquis à la cause Slave, qu'il ne se sentait plus le courage d'abandonner dans un moment aussi critique.

Cependant il me fit promesse de ne pas pousser les esprits de la guerre, de rester en simple observateur des événements et de ne prendre ici du service que si la lutte devenait imminente et non sans en aviser le Gouvernement Impérial.

Pour justifier son séjour à Belgrade, ainsi que ses intentions ultérieures, il allait, me dit-il, en référer au jugement de M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Potapoff.

Le lendemain je reçus la visite de Ristitch. Après de nombreuses périphrases ce Ministre m'annonça que dans la matinée même Chernaieff, après avoir changé de nationalité, venait de prêter serment, en qualité de Général Serbe.

Je répondis à cette communication en chargeant mon interlocuteur de déclarer au Prince Milan que je trouvais son procédé fort peu courtois à mon égard et de tout point irrévérencieux de la part de Son Altesse vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Impérial.

Quant à Chernaieff, qui parut chez moi peu d'instants après, je me permis seulement de l'inviter à suspendre ses relations entre nous jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Ici je n'oserais passer sous silence le désastreux effet que cet incident produit dans les rangs, déjà trop clair-semés, des partisans de la paix. Il risque d'amener des conséquences de la plus haute gravité en accréditant dans le naïf peuple Serbe la conviction erronée, que le moment d'agir est enfin survenu, puisque la Russie elle-même lui envoyait un de ses Généraux pour le conduire au champ de bataille.

Quant à mes collègues, je dois avouer que tous me semblait pleinement édifiés sur

la portée réelle de la démarche Chernaieff, mais le gros du public est là pour interpréter toute chose au gré de ses plus chères aspirations nationales.

Je suis, &c.

Dépêche Secrète de M. Kartzow au Chancelier de l'Empire, en date de Belgrade, le 16 Mars, 1876.

Par mon télégramme secret du 27 Février, j'ai déjà eu l'honneur d'informer votre Altesse de l'aveu fait par le Prince de Servie que non-seulement il n'était plus le maître de la situation, mais qu'il se sentait lui-même fatalement entraîné par les événements.

Depuis la situation personnelle n'a pas cessé d'empirer en ce sens.

Faisant ici un retour vers le passé, je prendrai la liberté de remémorer à votre Altesse que lorsque au mois d'Août de l'année dernière, je fus appelé à transmettre au Prince Milan un avertissement au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, il s'empressa de se conformer à la volonté de notre auguste maître, et s'appliquer de tout son pouvoir à opposer une digue au courant belliqueux qui s'était emparé de son peuple.

Le voyant mal secondé dans cette tâche par le Cabinet Ristitch, il n'hésita pas à le congédier, et, quelque honteux que se soit pour la Serbie, je ne saurais cependant m'empêcher de constater qu'à cette occasion il fut impossible à Son Altesse de trouver un noyau d'hommes honnêtes et assez courageux pour accepter dans les circonstances du moment le lourd fardeau de la responsabilité Ministérielle, par devant une Assemblée formée des éléments les plus subversifs.

Ayant vainement frappé à toutes les portes, le Prince dut arrêter son choix sur cette Pléiade d'hommes tarés et d'incapacités qui constituent son Cabinet actuel.

Pour se maintenir au Gouvernement le Ministère Kaliéwitch se vit réduit à flatter servilement les tendances démagogiques de la Skouptchina, et à lui faire les concessions les plus larges au préjudice du pouvoir, telles que les lois sur la liberté de la presse et sur l'autonomie des communes. De son côté, Son Altesse fut obligé d'exercer sur les membres de cette Assemblée la pression de tout son prestige personnel pour les détourner momentanément de leurs projets agressifs contre la Turquie.

Mais la persistence de l'insurrection, d'une part, les excitations du Monténégro, de l'autre, enfin de nombreuses violations du territoire Serbe par des bandes Musulmanes et l'attitude menaçante des troupes du Sultan aux frontières, toutes ces circonstances offrèrent bientôt les bons effets de l'action pacificatoire du Prince Milan.

Des députés se séparant sous l'impression de leur vote spontané du budget de la guerre et de l'emprunt intérieur, contribuèrent également à communiquer leur ardeur patriotique à tout le pays.

Pendant ce temps, les organes de la presse Slave de l'Autriche ne discontinuaient pas de qualifier les Ministres Serbes de faux frères, et le Prince lui-même de traître, s'ils abandonnaient la cause nationale. De leur côté, quoique plus modérées dans leurs attaques personnelles, les feuilles quotidiennes de la Principauté ne cessaient à prêcher dans le même sens.

Sentant le terrain lui manquer de plus en plus, Son Altesse convia le 1 Mars, à son Conseil des Ministres, les Représentants de tous les partis du pays, tels que Ristitch, Shéfetcha et Gronitch, Libéraux; Tzénitch, Conservateur; enfin, Toutchanatz et Niyatowitch, de la fraction dite "jeune-droite."

En présence de cette réunion, le Prince débuta par un exposé de la situation déplorable de la Serbie, et du développement toujours croissant de ses dispositions belliqueuses.

A son avis l'excitation des esprits ne pouvait être qu'alimentée par les préparatifs militaires, dont l'urgence paraissait cependant commandé par l'attitude peu rassurante des Turcs.

L'incertitude actuelle tuait complètement le commerce du pays, et arrachait même une bonne partie de la population rurale aux travaux des champs. Cet état de choses peu normal semblait bientôt devoir se compliquer encore par la prochaine immigration de nombreuses familles de réfugiés Bosniaques qui, expulsés de la Croatie, viendraient demander un asile à la Serbie.

Dans ces graves conjonctions, le Prince faisant un appel au patriotisme des chefs politiques, les exhorta à se grouper autour de lui en oubliant leurs discussions et leurs griefs réciproques. Son Altesse conclut en les priant de donner leur appréciation sincère sur l'alternative suivante: fallait-il achever les préparatifs militaires pour être à même d'adopter au plutôt une attitude agressive contre la Turquie, ou bien se

prononcer franchement pour la paix et remettre à des circonstances plus favorables la poursuite de l'œuvre nationale?

L'assistance fut unanime à appuyer auprès du Prince le programme suivant: Tout en évitant soigneusement ce qui pourrait amener une rupture avec la Porte, continuer avec persévérance le complément de l'organisation militaire, afin de ne pas être pris au dépourvu dans le cas où une guerre deviendrait inévitable.

En cherchant à recueillir l'avis des hommes les plus éminents de la Serbie, le Prince tendait avant tout à mettre à couvert sa propre responsabilité vis-à-vis de sa nation. Mais il eut à cette même occasion la déception de se convaincre que désormais il ne trouverait plus personne pour le seconder dans une politique strictement expectative.

Sur ces entrefaites le sort sembla un moment sourire à Son Altesse en ramenant à Belgrade M. Marinovitch, qui venait de passer l'hiver en Italie. Reçu par le Prince à bras ouverts, le respectable ex-Président ne se fit pas défaut de donner au jeune Chef d'Etat les plus sages conseils de prudence et de modération; toutefois il ne contesta pas la nécessité de persévérer quand même dans les préparatifs militaires en prévision d'un avenir trop incertain.

Malheureusement des affaires de famille l'appelant à Bucharest, il ne put offrir à son Prince un concours plus actif.

Quant à moi, au moment de son départ, j'eus l'extrême regret de recueillir de sa bouche la confession très-intime que lui aussi ne voyait désormais pour Son Altesse aucun moyen de sortir heureusement des difficultés inextricables dans lesquelles les circonstances l'avaient si funestement entraîné.

J'ai, &c.

Lettre Particulière du Chancelier de l'Empire à M. Novikow, en date de St. Pétersbourg, le 7 Février, 1876.

Je profite du retour de M. Petrovitch à son poste de Vienne pour lui confier mon expédition du jour.

Vous trouverez dans le dossier tous les renseignements à ma disposition jusqu'au moment actuel.

La rade d'Odessa étant prise par les glaces le Général Ignatiew m'a expédié un courrier par Bucharest, Lemberg, et Vienne. Si ce courrier arrive à temps vous aurez copies des dépêches de notre Ambassadeur.

Autant que nous pourrons juger d'après les apparences, la Porte, se pliant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, veut procéder à l'application immédiate sur place des promesses faites en faveur de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine. Si elle tient parole et s'astreint à une exécution consciencieuse nous sommes obligés de nous occuper aussi loyalement du soin de faire accepter ces faveurs par les insurgés.

Deux circonstances rendent cette tâche difficile:—

1. La présence dans les rangs des insurgés d'aventuriers étrangers poussant à la grande idée. Wesselitzky prétend que les masses indiquées ne partagent pas ces rêves exagérés et que, livrées à elles-mêmes, elles se contenteraient d'une existence matérielle sensiblement améliorée et garantie.

2. Les excitations Serbes et Monténégrines faisaient prévoir une levée de boucliers au printemps qui pourrait aboutir à l'indépendance.

Des deux causes la seconde me paraît la plus grave et c'est pourquoi, d'ordre de l'Empereur, je vous ai expédié le télégramme avec des admonitions sévères aux Princes Nicolas et Milan.

Je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que vous fassiez part de cette démarche à M. le Comte Andrassy.

Sa Majesté a accueilli avec satisfaction l'assurance que la position de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie est ferme, malgré les intrigues qui s'agitent autour de lui. Nous espérons que la confiance de l'Empereur François Joseph restera inébranlable. Il ne saurait douter de la sincérité de celle qu'il nous inspire.

Recevez, &c.

Rapport à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de M. Novikow, Buda-Pest, le $\frac{14}{26}$ Mai, 1870.

Notre Agent Diplomatique à Belgrade étant arrivé ce matin à Pesth de passage pour Ems, j'ai tenu, vu la gravité des nouvelles qui affluent de la Serbie, à l'aboucher personnellement avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche comme juge compétent de la situation.

J'ai voulu surtout le mettre dans le cas de narrer l'incident Chermieff, dont le rétentissement dans l'opinion publique a eu un écho aux Délégations, où le Comte Andrassy est menacé d'être interpellé à ce sujet d'une manière assez indiscrète.

Le Conseiller d'Etat Actuel Kartzow a fait au Ministre un exposé lucide de l'état aggravé des esprits dans la Principauté, des défaillences du Prince Milan, et de l'ascendant exercé aujourd'hui sans partage dans les conseils du Gouvernement Serbe par le parti de l'Ouladina.

Le Comte Andrassy est parfaitement renseigné sur les allures indépendantes de l'ex-Général Chermieff, et ce n'est certes pas lui qui aurait le soin d'être converti à la foi dans notre loyauté; mais j'ai cru comprendre, en causant avec lui qu'un désaveu formel de la conduite de notre compatriote lui serait le bienvenu pour combattre victorieusement à la tribune des suspicions toujours prêtes à se dresser entre la Russie et l'Autriche.

En général le Ministre a fait ressortir la nécessité d'un langage énergique à tenir à Belgrade si l'on ne voulait pas que l'œuvre de pacification fut compromise par les écarts de la Serbie qui entraînerait fatalement le Monténégro.

D'après des nouvelles explications qu'il vient de recevoir de Constantinople les Représentants des Puissances, tout en se concertant entre eux, n'avaient pas encore, on l'absence d'instructions, établi une action commune. Mais, au dire du Comte Zichy, l'urgence de l'armistice était appréciée par Rashid Pacha avec l'espoir de la faire aboutir à moins d'une attitude contraire de l'Ambassadeur Britannique et d'intrigues hostiles de Khalil Chérif.

Le Comte Andrassy se voit confirmé ainsi dans ses premiers aperçus sur la nécessité de faire prévaloir avant tout l'idée de l'armistice. Des communications Françaises et ses propres données puisées dans de récents entretiens avec Sir A. Buchanan, le renforcent d'ailleurs dans la certitude que si l'Angleterre n'en soutiendra pas le projet, en revanche elle ne fera rien non plus pour le contrecarrer à Constantinople. Même Hussein Avni Pacha, ce chef du parti militaire, naguère si fougueux dans ses idées d'agression contre la Serbie et le Monténégro, lui est représenté comme ayant renoncé à les plans d'offensive dans les circonstances modifiées du moment. Avec la Montagne Noire concourant franchement aux vues des Cabinets, et la Serbie rappelée au respect de ses devoirs internationaux, l'armistice pourrait, dans l'opinion du Ministre, passer sans trop de difficulté de l'état de vœu à celui de réalité.

Je suis, &c.

Télégramme à M. de Gontaut-Biron, Paris, le $\frac{13}{25}$ Mai, 1876.

M. le Comte de Kuefstein m'a écrit que les Gouvernements de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg avaient fait parvenir au Prince Milan de pressants conseils de modération, et que le Comte Andrassy me demandait d'agir dans le même sens. J'ai répondu que j'avais déjà fait la veille une démarche très-pressante, et que je la renouvellerai avec insistance.

Abstract of a Telegram (Secret) from M. Novikow to M. Youine, dated Vienna, January $\frac{18}{30}$, 1876.

I CANNOT hide from you that the explanations of Prince Nicolas appear to me not clear, and unsatisfactory. The Prince regrets the tone of his note, but that is not the question, but his action with regard to Servia, which, from authentic information, we learn is being led on, and every fresh step is said to be justified by engagements made by us. At the same time, he is prodigal of pacific assurances to us. The Chancellor remarks that "Prince Nicholas is playing a double game," and one wanting in *bona fides* as regards Russia.

Telegram (Secret) from M. Youine to M. Novikow, dated Ragusa, January $\frac{14}{26}$ 1876.

(Translation.)

PRINCE NICOLAS telegraphs:—

"It would be painful to me if His Majesty considered my trip to Belgrade as a wish to be importunate, taking advantage of the difficult state of affairs in the Herzegovina. My object, on the one hand, was to concert with Servia a common line of action in view of the gravity of events; and, on the other hand, if that were impossible, to receive permission to act according to circumstances. Shakhovsky, with whom I spoke for a long time on the subject, must have already informed you. Assure the Prince Chancellor that, as I replied in my note, I wish to be friends with Servia, and not to embarrass the action of the Great Powers."

Secret Telegram from M. Novikow to the Chancellor of the Empire, dated Vienna. February $\frac{7}{19}$, 1876.

(Translation.)

KARTZOW telegraphs to your Highness on Sunday:—

"In accordance with your instructions, I delayed the despatch of the Servian Delegate to Montenegro, in order not to imperil the success of the negotiations of Europe with the north. However, in view of their termination, Prince Milan and his Ministers, on the strength of the arrangement already come to between the Principalities, does not think it possible to postpone the Mission, and sends to day to Cettigné Senator Ranco Alimtock, with a letter from Milan to Nicholas, proposing a War Convention and Secret Treaty of Alliance on the bases of entire mutual 'solidarité,' and obligation in the event of war to be ready at the end of March."

Secret Telegram from M. Novikow to M. de Giers, dated Buda-Pest, May $\frac{17}{29}$, 1876.

(Translation.)

SCHATOKHINE telegraphs from Ragusa yesterday, for transmission to your Excellency:—

"Prince Nicolas telegraphs: 'I beg you inform your Government that Servia, from pressure of circumstances, perseveringly proposes to me an alliance for common action. Although not in a position to act against the national duty, by declining a preliminary agreement, I do not wish to negotiate with Servia without informing Russia, in order not to incur the reproaches for similar appeals in former negotiations.'"

Secret Telegram from M. Novikow to the Chancellor of the Empire, dated Buda-Pest. $\frac{\text{May }31}{\text{June }12}$, 1876.

(Translation.)

SCHATOKHINE telegraphs from Ragusa yesterday:—

"The Prince requests me to transmit the following reply to the Chancellor:

"'I have as yet decided nothing with Servia, and I shall prolong the negotiations, but a formal refusal to come to an understanding is not possible.'

"In accordance with the advice of His Majesty I am endeavouring to avoid everything compromising, and to preserve my present relations with Austria, and those of tolerance (snocnoide) with Turkey. However, decisions may be come to at Constantinople which oblige me, from simple prudence, to be prepared."

Secret Telegram from M. Novikow to the Chancellor of the Empire, dated Buda-Pest. $\frac{\text{May }31}{\text{June }12}$, 1876.

(Translation.)

LADYJERSKI telegraphs from Belgrade yesterday:—

"Having obtained an interview with Prince Milan, I communicated to him the contents of your telegram respecting the 'démarches' of the Ambassadors. He doubted whether they could be made yesterday at Constantinople in the middle of the revolution.

"The Prince passed over in entire silence the advice of the Emperor and thereupon closed the audience."

Secret Telegram from M. Novikow to M. de Giers, dated $\frac{\text{May 26}}{\text{June 7}}$, 1876.

(Translation.)

KARTZOW telegraphs from Belgrade yesterday :—

"Prince Milan was visibly disturbed by my severe criticisms on the impropriety of his silence with regard to the advice given him on May 19, in the name of the Emperor.

"He justifies himself by the difficulty of giving any promise with regard to so important a communication, without previously considering the possibility of keeping it.

"He asks me now, in reply to the complaints of His Majesty, to express his sense of deep gratitude for all His Majesty's solicitude regarding Servia.

"The Prince and Ristich promised unanimously to follow his pacific advice to the furthest point.

"I stated to them decidedly that they must not count on any assistance whatever from Russia."

No. 487.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 393.)

Foreign Office, June 28, 1876.

My Lord,

HIS Excellency Count Schouvaloff called at the Foreign Office to-day to speak to me respecting the despatch which he had communicated to me from Prince Gortchakow, and I said that he should have a written answer in a day or two.

A long conversation followed on the subjects treated of in that despatch. I pointed out that Prince Gortchakow had made three proposals :—

1. As to Montenegro.

2. As to Servia, and—

3. As to the institutions to be given to the provinces in revolt.

With regard to Montenegro, I said that Her Majesty's Government had to a considerable extent anticipated the action recommended by Prince Gortchakow; they had found other Governments, and especially the Austrian, disposed to advise that an attempt should be made to reconcile Montenegro with the Porte, and believing that there was a reasonable prospect of success, they had counselled the Porte through Sir H. Elliot and Musurus Pasha to endeavour to detach the Prince of Montenegro from the insurgents and to hold out to the Prince a prospect that, if he were to assist in the pacification of the insurgent provinces, his good offices would be borne in mind in a future delimitation of frontier.

As a consequence of this step Her Majesty's Government had ascertained that a conciliatory message had been sent by the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro; Her Majesty's Government were not in a position to say whether any or what results would ensue, but it was evident that there was nothing more to be done at present, and so far as Montenegro was concerned, the views of the two Governments were in accordance.

As to Servia, I said it appeared to me that the situation and position of affairs had greatly changed since Prince Gortchakow's despatch was written. Reports all pointed to the probability of war being declared by Servia; whether this was to happen or not, unquestionably the attitude of Servia towards the Porte was one of menaces and almost of open hostility. His Government must feel as we did that, in such a state of things it was impossible for the Porte to make a spontaneous offer of cession of territory however small; such a step could not fail to be regarded as evidence of weakness rather than of friendly feeling or simple desire for peace.

Count Schouvaloff did not dissent from this expression of opinion on my part, but said he was doubtful as to the reality of the warlike intentions ascribed to Servia, and that in any case he saw no reason why hopes should not be held out to the Prince of such a concession at a later date.

I said that if, notwithstanding all that had passed, the Prince of Servia were at the last moment to change his attitude, to withdraw from all appearance of menace, and gradually to disarm, I would not say but that, in such a case, he might not be held to have acquired a moral claim on the Porte and the Powers for some acknowledgment of so desirable a change of policy. It was impossible to speak at present definitively on the subject, and in any case it must be understood that no more than

No. 487*.

The Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government have given their most careful consideration to the despatch from Prince Gortchakow, the contents of which your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me on the 21st instant. They have seen with satisfaction the proofs afforded by this communication of the desire of the Russian Government to act in concert with them, and to enter into friendly and frank explanations upon the questions to which the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina has given rise.

Her Majesty's Government are most willing to enter into the exchange of sentiments which his Highness invites, and they cordially share his anxiety that there should be a complete agreement among all the powers as to the policy to be pursued in the present state of affairs in Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government are as much alive as that of Russia can be to the importance of securing the religious and other liberties of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, nor have they failed on all fitting occasions to counsel the Porte to give entire execution to the various measures which have been proclaimed by the Sultan with this object. They have taken the earliest opportunity on the accession of Sultan Mourad to instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to speak in this sense, and they have especially pressed for the effectual realization, at as early a date as circumstances allow, of the reforms promised to the insurgent provinces.

Her Majesty's Government cannot, however, regard the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina as being exclusively or principally a struggle directed against local oppression, whether in religious or civil matters.

The reports which they have received show that it arose from other causes, and is now fomented and maintained for purposes which are obviously of a general and political, rather than of a local and administrative character. In support of this view I may mention the fact that the Roman Catholic population have not taken part in the movement, and that those Christians who have not joined the insurgent bands have continued throughout the recent troubles to live unmolested.

It also appears that numbers of those who had never quitted their villages at the outbreak of the insurrection are ready and willing to return to them, and are deterred from doing so not by fears of their Mahomedan neighbours, but by the action of the insurgents, who drive away the cattle and destroy the goods of the returning refugees.

It is obvious that, while this state of things is allowed to continue, the efforts of the Powers in recommending schemes for the better administration of these districts must be fruitless. It was in this conviction that I have stated to your Excellency my opinion that the insurrectionary movement must be suppressed and order restored before any such schemes can be advantageously treated.

Her Majesty's Government agree with that of Russia that the best remedies are those which would afford a practical solution of the difficulties to be dealt with, without altering the political and territorial *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire. They do not, however, clearly understand what is the particular plan which the Russian Government have in view; nor do they think it easy under any circumstances for a foreign Government to frame a scheme of administration for a Turkish province. There are local peculiarities, tendencies, and customs which must be taken into account, and which only local knowledge can provide for. It is for this reason, among others, that Her Majesty's Government see so much objection to pressing on the Porte at the present moment, and without close and careful inquiry, projects of reform going beyond those already promised. Such projects, if embodied in vague and general terms, are apt to be differently understood by the various parties concerned in promoting them; while the task of working them out in detail is one for which foreign advisers, however able or well-intentioned, can hardly be competent.

Her Majesty's Government will at the same time willingly join with those of other Powers in considering and advising such ameliorations in the existing administration of the two Provinces as, on full examination, they may believe to be practicable, and they see with pleasure that Prince Gortchakow expresses his conviction, in which they fully share, of the good intentions which animate the present Sultan.

His Highness, however, thinks it improbable that the Turkish Government could be willing to make any further concessions if the insurrection were at once subdued,

and seems to have misinterpreted some remark of mine as expressing an opinion that in that case the action of Europe might be necessary to prevent the extermination of the Christians. I am not aware of having used any such phrase, and must therefore explain that Her Majesty's Government have no reason to anticipate that the suppression of the insurrection would be followed by the extermination or persecution of the Christian races. There are no signs of any such intention on the part either of the Porte or the Mahommedan population, and Her Majesty's Government do not believe that any apprehension of the kind need be entertained.

I pass to Prince Gortchakow's further suggestion that the Sultan should cede to Montenegro a port and some adjacent territory, and that at the same time Little Zvornik should be handed over to Servia; with the view of offering to those States an inducement to maintain peaceable relations with the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government would willingly co-operate in endeavouring to establish more satisfactory relations between Montenegro, Servia, and the Porte.

They have already used their best efforts in this respect with regard to Montenegro, and have learned by telegraph on the 27th instant from Sir Henry Elliot that the Turkish Government have taken a step in this direction.

A message has been sent from Constantinople to the Prince of Montenegro, stating that the Sultan has seen, in the absence of opposition to the expedition of the Turkish Commander-in-chief, evidence that the Prince has been exercising a salutary influence, and adding that His Majesty will take this fact into consideration at the proper time. This message, however vague in terms, cannot but be regarded as evidence of an inclination to come to a friendly understanding; and it is for the Prince of Montenegro to consider whether he will not be ready to meet half-way the overtures thus made.

The menacing attitude assumed by Servia, notwithstanding the recent counsels of the Powers, renders it manifestly inopportune to urge upon the Porte under present circumstances, the adoption of a similar course towards that Principality.

The Sultan cannot be expected to forget the concessions made to Servia under the Protocol of the 4th of September, 1862, and the evacuation of the fortress of Belgrade and other Servian fortresses under the Firman of the 10th of April, 1867. It was with the object of securing friendly relations with Servia that these large concessions were agreed to by the Porte, and the result of the policy thus adopted does not seem encouraging for the future.

The despatch of Prince Gortchakow was written before the attitude of Servia had become so decided, and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that his Highness will concur with them in the view which they take of the present situation.

It may possibly not yet be too late for the Powers, and especially for the Russian Government, whose influence at Belgrade is so apparent, to make a further effort to induce Prince Milan to abandon his policy of aggression.

It is desirable that the Servian Government should be warned that if they attempt to secure territorial aggrandisement under the pretext of Sclavonic sympathies, they must not expect to be protected from the consequences of failure and defeat.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that if this were done in a tone which did not admit of misconstruction, and the Turkish insurgent provinces were freed from the instigations to revolution of the foreign Slav Committees and agitators, the work of pacification would be so greatly advanced as to render the completion of it an easy task.

Her Majesty's Government have expressed themselves thus explicitly, in order to meet the wishes of that of Russia for a full statement of their opinions. They observe with pleasure that in many respects the two Governments are agreed, and they trust that the effect of frank and unreserved discussion may be to bring about a still closer approximation of their respective views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

Little Zvornik could be asked. This concession, while it might serve to gratify Servian feeling, would appear to involve no substantial loss or injury to the Porte. Nothing could, however, be said until the Prince had given clear proof of having abandoned the warlike projects ascribed to him.

We then passed to the third subject under discussion, viz. the question of granting administrative autonomy, or local self-government in some form, to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much discussion followed on this point. I informed Count Schouvaloff confidentially of the objection which I understood to be entertained by the Austrian Government to any such proposal, and of the reasons on which they were based. I added that, so far as the interests of European policy were concerned, I should see no objection to a change which would give to Bosnia and Herzegovina a large measure of real freedom, but that I doubted whether any concession of the kind would satisfy the insurgents now in arms. I was not prepared to put forward a plan for the government of these provinces without at least knowing what the opinion of the Porte would be in regard to it. I could not but feel that the difference of religion and the natural animosities existing between the two sections of the population placed a serious obstacle in the way of the working of free institutions; and, finally, I pointed out to him the extreme inconvenience which might arise from the use of vague and general terms, such as that of "local autonomy," which each party, using them in conversation, was apt to construe in a different sense, and which, therefore, led to mutual misunderstandings when details came to be discussed. On the other hand, I was certainly not prepared to draw up a constitution in detail for the Turkish provinces; and on the whole, therefore, I thought it premature to say more than that Her Majesty's Government would gladly concur in any practicable proposal for the amelioration of the local government of these provinces.

Count Schouvaloff, in reply, urged the importance of strengthening the hands of the Prince of Montenegro if he was to be usefully employed in endeavouring to dissuade the insurgents from continuing the war. I said that if the Prince of Montenegro could only be induced to stand aloof and take no part in the quarrel, and prevent his subjects from engaging in it, that was all that was required from him, and further co-operation with Turkey on his part was unnecessary.

Reverting to the subject of Servia, I said that I did not believe that any considerations of general policy would now be effectual to prevent Prince Milan from declaring war. What was urgent was to impress on him the imminent risk which he incurred of defeat, and the disastrous consequences which might ensue to himself and his country. Without pretending to measure the strength of the respective forces, I did not believe that Servia was prepared in regard either of men or money to enter into a campaign against the power of Turkey. I mentioned further to Count Schouvaloff the belief generally entertained that Prince Milan intended to ask for the Governorship of Bosnia, a request which he must know would be refused, and which could only therefore be meant as a pretext for war.

Count Schouvaloff assured me he had never heard of any such intention on the part of the Prince.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 488.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—[*Received June 29.*)

(No. 62: Political.)

Ragusa, June 21, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translation of a Supplementary Proclamation respecting the reforms in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, issued in the Turkish and Slav languages at Mostar by Ali Pasha on the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 488.

Supplementary Proclamation. Dated Mostar, June 7/19, 1876.

(Translation.)

BY a Special Proclamation the amnesty granted to the insurgents of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by His Majesty the Sultan Mourad V, our august Sovereign, has been promulgated.

If in this Decree no formal mention has been made of the reforms accorded to the inhabitants of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, the reason is that the Imperial Government had already transmitted their orders and their instructions to the Commissaries and to the Presidents of the Reform Councils, for their immediate application.

Orders have been given by a Vizierial telegram to the authorities of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to execute in their entirety and with efficacity all these reforms; and also that all demands founded in equity be favourably received when presented by my Delegates whom the claimants may designate.

(Signed) ALI.

Mostar, June 7/19, 1876.

No. 489.

Mr. Monson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 29.*)

(No. 63. Political.) *Ragusa, June 21, 1876.*

My Lord,

MOUKHTAR Pasha has reached Nichsichs without opposition on the part of the insurgents; and has passed in the convoy of provisions, said to consist of 1,800 horse-loads. It is officially stated, however, that another victualling expedition will be necessary.

General Jovanovics observed to me this morning that, in his opinion, all Moukhtar Pasha's operations were conducted with great skill. He particularly approved of the Marshal's keeping his forces together, considering that a general distribution of them over the Herzegovina would expose them to be perpetually attacked in detail by the insurgents.

Two large frigates passed Gravosa yesterday, making for the southward. None of the signal-stations could distinguish their colours. They were at first supposed to be part of the Austrian squadron under orders for the Levant, but the Town-Major informed me this morning that from subsequent reports there was reason to believe that they were Turkish vessels, which in company with a transport and an "aviso" had been landing troops at Klek.

I understand that one of these vessels was unprovided with the proper papers, certifying that the troops on board did not come from plague-infested districts, and that some difficulty had therefore arisen between the Turkish and the Austrian local authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 490.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 29.*)

(No. 116.) *Gastein, June 25, 1876.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the "Correspondance Autrichienne," containing translations of articles which have appeared in the "Fremdenblatt" and the "Presse," the latter generally considered a semi-official organ of the Cisleithanian Ministry, and which are apparently intended to prepare the public for more active military measures on the part of the Austrian-Hungarian Government in the event of Servia and Montenegro engaging in hostilities with Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 490.

Extract from the "Fremdenblatt."

EN présence des velléités belliqueuses qui semblent, suivant des nouvelles arrivant de plusieurs côtés, se manifester de nouveau en Serbie, le "Fremdenblatt" conseille aux hommes appelés à jouer les premiers rôles à Belgrade de réfléchir mûrement avant de précipiter leur pays dans des aventures dont nul ne pourrait prévoir les conséquences. Si la Serbie, dit cette feuille, se laissait entraîner à une agression contre la Turquie, elle se rendrait coupable d'un acte de félonie vis-à-vis de la Puissance suzeraine et d'une grave perturbation de la paix Européenne. Quant à la manière de voir des Puissances en ce qui concerne une semblable éventualité la Serbie ne saurait avoir aucun doute à cet égard, ces dernières n'étant rien moins que disposées en faveur d'une levée de boucliers; dans de telles conditions le succès de celle-ci serait déjà compromis d'avance. Le "Fremdenblatt" continue en ces termes: "Peut-être la Serbie compte-t-elle trop sur le secours effectif des 'frères' à l'étranger, notamment en Croatie et en Russie; mais elle oublie que ce serait alors un devoir impérieux pour notre Gouvernement de prendre les mesures les plus rigoureuses en vue de fermer la frontière, de couper toute communication et de réprimer, même, s'il le fallait, par la proclamation de l'état de siége, toute agitation dans les districts limitrophes. La situation et le soin de nos propres intérêts feraient paraître cette action de notre Gouvernement tellement naturelle que les Serbes n'auraient pas lieu d'être étonnés s'ils voyaient, aussitôt le premier pas fait sur la voie des aventures belliqueuses, la frontière Hongroise se présenter à eux comme une côte inhospitalière hérissée de baïonnettes et garnie de canons. Une fois cette communication coupée pour eux il est plus que douteux que la Serbie puisse, avec toutes ses milices, non pas battre les forces Turques mais simplement les arrêter à la frontière et se préserver d'une invasion. La Russie seule pourrait la sauver, et il n'est pas impossible qu'à Belgrade on s'abandonne, sur la foi de promesses plus ou moins captieuses, à des espérances qui ne seraient que trop promptement déçues. La Serbie peut compter sans doute sur les sympathies des Slaves Russes, elle peut espérer l'envoi de secours de tous genres, le concours d'officiers et de volontaires Russes qui parviendraient à pénétrer dans la Principauté. Mais il serait absurde de prêter à l'Empereur de Russie, ne fût-ce qu'un instant, l'intention d'abandonner la haute et forte position qu'il occupe en ce moment à côté des Souverains d'Autriche et d'Allemagne pour se précipiter dans une action isolée, en vue d'ouvrir une liquidation qu'il est plus avantageux pour la Russie que pour tout autre Etat Européen d'ajourner aussi longtemps que possible. L'Empereur Alexandre a donné de trop solides garanties de sa ferme volonté de prévenir, d'accord avec l'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Allemagne, tout danger d'une guerre générale pour que les Serbes puissent espérer un seul instant qu'il les seconderait dans leur folle entreprise. C'est lui qui est le véritable prince de la paix en Europe, et tant qu'il dirigera les destinées de son immense Empire, il ne faillira point à la grande et noble mission dont il s'est chargé et qu'il a si souvent et si solennellement proclamée."

Nous trouvons des appréciations analogues dans la "Presse." Cette feuille ne croit à la possibilité d'une intervention des Puissances que pour le cas où la Serbie et le Monténégro, qui marcherait avec elle, dit-on, remporteraient des succès importants sur les forces Turques et compromettraient par là l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, pour le cas où les deux pays auraient, par suite des avantages remportés, quelque chance d'agrandir leur territoire, ce que pourrait être prélude de la formation de nouveaux Etats. "Alors," continue la "Presse," "il serait temps pour l'Europe, d'intervenir sérieusement. Avant tout et en première ligne c'est l'Autriche qui aurait, cette éventualité venant à se réaliser, à sauvegarder ses propres intérêts. Aucun homme d'Etat Autrichien ne pourrait permettre qu'il se fût le long de notre frontière Croate-Dalmate, sans le consentement de l'Autriche, des changements qui n'auraient lieu qu'au détriment de notre tranquillité."

No. 491.

Mr. Macdonell to the Earl of Derby.[a]—*(Received June 29.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, June 29, 1876.*

THE German Government have agreed with that of France to support the opinion of their Delegates at Salonica inquiry. They demand that the heaviest sentence possible short of pain of death must be passed. The threat of breaking off relations I believe to be unfounded.

No. 492.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, June 29, 1876.*

PRINCE MILAN just gone to head-quarters of his army with his staff. War considered imminent now. Is your Lordship likely to accede to request contained in my private letter of the 6th to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by sending me some safe person to assist me at this time? There is immense need of one. Presence of British military officer in Servia during this might be desirable with a view to a more correct appreciation of passing events. Military Attaché at Vienna might be perhaps available. Am I at liberty to disburse anything extra to obtain war information?

No. 492[a].

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 29, 1876, 1·15 P.M.*

THOSE who see most of General Ignatiew are convinced that, finding his own position here untenable, he is doing his utmost to bring on a rupture, so that he might leave Constantinople without personal humiliation.

I may remind your Lordship that it is a very short time since the General declared that he would at any time undertake to find a sufficient *casus belli* within two hours if he wished.

No. 493.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 29, 1876, 3 P.M.*

FOLLOWING telegram was received from Bucharest, dated 26th instant:—

"Minister for Foreign Affairs requests Her Majesty's Government to intervene with the Porte, so that in the event of hostilities with Servia Turkish ships of war might not come up the Danube to that part separating Roumania from Servia, as Roumania desires neutrality, and shot fired across would provoke hostilities."

What are the intentions of the Porte? Advise conciliatory attitude towards Principalities.

No. 494.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. St. John.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 29, 1876, 3·10 P.M.*

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople instructed to ascertain what are the intentions of the Porte as to sending a vessel of war up the Danube to the Servian

[a] Repeated to Paris, Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh

frontier. His Excellency will counsel a conciliatory attitude towards the Principalities.

Point out to the Roumanian Government the importance of not allowing themselves to be drawn into the menacing policy of Servia.

No. 495.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, June 29, 1876, 6·45 P.M.*

I HAVE spoken to Duc Decazes in the sense of your despatch No. 645 of yesterday, and have read to him the last paragraph.

He said that it might not yet be too late to stop the Prince of Servia, and that he should at once make known by telegraph to the other Powers the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, and invite them to join in a solemn warning to Servia.

No. 496.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 469.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 29, 1876.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your having spoken to Raschid Pasha, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 610 of the 12th instant, on the subject of Count Andrassy's note that the Sultan's recent proclamation to the insurgents in Bosnia would be followed by a declaration that the Porte will abide by its previous engagements with regard to them, and they have learnt with satisfaction that orders in that sense have been sent to the Turkish authorities in the insurgent provinces.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 497.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.[a]*—(Received June 29.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 29, 1876, 11·55 P.M.*

SERVIAN agent here has communicated to the Porte a despatch from his Government, in which it is stated that the only mode of pacifying the insurgent provinces is to place them under the administration of the Prince of Servia.

There is also, I understand, another letter from the Prince to the Grand Vizier recapitulating list of grievances against the Porte.

No attention will be paid to either.

No. 498.

Mr. Malet to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 245.)

My Lord, *Rome, June 27, 1876.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I went to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, in order to hear what M. Melegari might have to say with regard to the advice given by Italy to the Porte to withdraw its troops from the Turkish frontier, as reported by Sir Henry Elliot in his telegram of the 25th instant.

M. Melegari said that this advice had been offered on the part of Italy with a view to impress upon the Porte the great responsibility which would rest upon her if her troops were even by accident to cross the frontier, which was very ill-defined, and were thereby to provoke a collision.

I asked his Excellency whether he had received any intelligence which had led him to suppose that the Turks had any intention to cross the frontier. He replied in the negative, saying that the advice had been purely tendered in the interests of peace,

[a] Repeated to Embassies.

and that similar advice had been at the same time sent by him to the Government of Prince Milan. He added, that of course he had no intention to recommend the Porte to withdraw its troops before an advance of the Servians, but he conceived that if both armies were further removed from the frontier, the danger of a chance collision would be diminished. He said that Russia was now apparently doing her best to restrain Servia, but that Russian influence in Servia must not be over-estimated; that sometimes "ideas" were stronger than the restraining powers of Governments, and that we must not forget what had happened in Italy when Garibaldi headed and carried to a successful issue a movement which the Italian Government had done its best to discountenance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD B. MALET.

No. 499.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 610.)
Therapia, June 13, 1876.

My Lord,

MR. KIRBY GREEN having telegraphed from Scutari that the Turkish military authorities had received orders to pursue across the frontiers of Servia and Montenegro any armed bands found upon Turkish territory, I have inquired from Rashid Pasha as to the truth of the report.

His Excellency stated that, on the contrary, stringent orders had been given to respect the territories of the Principalities, unless the Imperial troops should be attacked by a regular force coming from them. It is only in the case of an organized invasion that the troops are authorized to pursue the invaders across the frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 500.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 622.)
Therapia, June 14, 1876.

My Lord,

I BELIEVE that great benefit would be likely to result from the mission to Constantinople of a special Agent of the Prince of Montenegro bearing His Highness' congratulations to the Sultan, if he could be induced to follow the example of the Prince of Servia in this respect.

The Porte, while naturally declining to make the first overtures of concessions to Montenegro, does not seem altogether indisposed to listen to any reasonable request that the Prince may wish to make.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 501.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 628. Very Confidential.)
Therapia, June 15, 1876.

My Lord,

I LEARN very confidentially from a sure source that the substance of the telegram from the Prince of Montenegro to the Grand Vizier, in answer to the inquiries of the Porte as to the cause of his armaments, was to the following effect:—

Sufficient consideration has not been given to the trial to which the people, as well as the Government of Montenegro, have been exposed by the insurrection in the Turkish provinces ever since its outbreak, in addition to the expense imposed upon them by the maintenance of their neutrality, and to the losses which they have necessarily incurred in supporting the sick and wounded, the women and children, who claim from them a shelter which they cannot refuse. The Government of Montenegro, says the Prince, are continually the object of unfounded accusations, and

although their repeated denials of any connection with the insurrection have been accepted with perfect civility, they daily receive proof of the suspicion in which they are held. The measures taken with regard to Montenegro, in consequence of this persistent suspicion have lately assumed a threatening aspect; the frontiers have, without previous notification, been put into a state of blockade; Turkish troops in greater numbers than is necessary for the preservation of order have been massed in Herzegovina and Albania; and although the Prince received from the Porte satisfactory assurances that these measures should be withdrawn, the concentration of troops continues, and causes great distress in some districts of Montenegro.

The frontier is still very effectively blockaded, notwithstanding the declarations of the Governor-General of Scutari to the contrary.

In consequence of these facts and of the regretable disposition which they seem to reveal, His Highness declares that he was only doing his duty in openly taking precautionary measures, which, however, he sincerely hopes will prove to be unnecessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 502.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 635.)
Therapia, June 17, 1876.

My Lord,

THE murder of the two Ministers produced at first an intense uneasiness and apprehension among all classes, for it could not be believed to be the act of a solitary assassin, animated with personal motives, and it was supposed that there must be a great political conspiracy likely to bring the country into a state of anarchy.

If that had occurred the presence of ships of war at Constantinople might have become necessary for the protection of the foreign subjects.

Some of my colleagues showed so much apprehension that I was not without fear that they might suggest such a step to their Governments before the circumstances were such as to warrant a measure that ought not to be contemplated except on an extreme emergency.

I inclose the copy of a telegram that I sent to Admiral Drummond to inform him of the state of things, saying that it was possible a state of anarchy might occur, which would necessitate the ships coming up, and asking whether, if I thought it was necessary, he could send up some supernumeraries to Her Majesty's ships "Bittern" and "Antelope" for the protection of the Government buildings.

There proved to be no necessity for any measure of precaution whatever, and that the alarm was needless, but public confidence received a shake, from which I do not expect it very quickly entirely to recover.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 502.

Sir H. Elliot to Admiral Drummond.

(Telegraphic.)
Therapia, June 16, 1876.

THE Minister of War and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were killed, and the Minister of Marine wounded, while in council last night at Midhat Pasha's house.

The assassin was arrested, and his motives are not yet known, but he is understood to be an officer lately degraded, and it is believed that he was revenging himself on the Minister of War.

If anarchy should take place, the presence of foreign ships of war at Constantinople may, perhaps, become necessary for the protection of their subjects.

Would it be possible for you to find means of sending up a few men as supernumeraries to the "Bittern" and "Antelope," if I should think it desirable for the protection of British lives and property?

No. 503.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 637.)
My Lord,

Therapia, June 18, 1876.

IN my conversation with the Grand Vizier yesterday, I told him that if he hoped to secure the sympathies of the Western Powers he must lose no time in convincing them that there had not been a mere change of Sovereigns in Turkey, but that the Porte was resolved to carry out a complete modification of the system of government upon the principle of perfect equality of all the Sultan's subjects.

He assured me that he and his colleagues had already gone far towards the elaboration of a system which he was convinced would satisfy Her Majesty's Government.

Momentous changes were not, however, to be decided upon or carried out in a day, and he earnestly trusted that the Governments, which he regarded as friendly to this Empire, would give the Porte time to make known the measures which it proposed to adopt without embarrassing it with proposals or demands in reference to the insurgent Provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 504.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 638.)
My Lord,

Therapia, June 18, 1876.

WHILE I was with the Grand Vizier yesterday he received a letter from the Prince of Servia, couched in the most unexceptionable terms, requesting him to convey his congratulations to Sultan Murad.

His Highness seemed to me to put more confidence than they deserved in the declarations of the Prince and his Government, that they entertain no hostile designs against Turkey, and even to doubt the correctness of the opinion I expressed that there could not be a war with Montenegro without Servia at once joining in it.

With regard to Montenegro, he showed little expectation of being able to come to an understanding; "for," he said, "as you doubtless know quite well, the Prince of Montenegro is under the absolute control of Russia, and does exactly as he is told by that Power."

That this is the literal truth no one would venture to deny, and therefore by the line that will be followed by Montenegro we may acquire a tolerably accurate appreciation of the intentions of the protecting Power.

The pacification of the Herzegovina, without more being obtained than an unguaranteed improvement in the administration of the Province, and without any material benefit to Montenegro, would be a result which Russia would accept with reluctance, but which she might nevertheless, perhaps, be obliged to accept.

If, on the other hand, she encourages Montenegro to provoke Turkey into an attack on the Principality, the maintenance of her influence over the Slav nationalities will almost force her to active intervention.

The Grand Vizier spoke with a confidence, which surprised me, of the ease with which the Turks could overrun the Principality, or at least give it ample occupation without leaving it the means of supporting the Herzegovina insurrection, which, deprived of that assistance, would be speedily brought to an end.

Mehmet Rushdi Pasha is anything but a rash and adventurous statesman, but his conviction seems to be that, as long as Montenegro is to be regarded as a sanctuary from which the insurrection is directed with impunity, tranquillity cannot be established.

If, therefore, the present armistice expires without the insurgents having come to terms, a war with Montenegro, with all its possible complications, appears to me almost inevitable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 505.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 641. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Therapia, June 19, 1876.

UPON the death of Rashid Pasha few people doubted that he would be succeeded by Ahalil Sherif Pasha, although his long antagonism towards Russia, and the consequent disfavour with which he is regarded by that Power, and also the extremes to which he is inclined to insist upon Turkey, rejecting all foreign interference, would not have tended to inspire confidence in the maintenance of good relations with the different Governments.

He is unquestionably an abler man than Safvet Pasha, but the moderate and conciliatory disposition of the latter renders him at the present moment the safer minister of the two, and his selection must be taken as evidence of the anxiety of the Porte to avoid giving cause of complaint to an foreign Power.

Nevertheless, the loss of Rashid Pasha will be severely felt, for his successor is greatly wanting in initiative and resolution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 506.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 642.)
My Lord,

Therapia, June 19, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch No. 378 of the 9th instant, inclosing the Queen's letter accrediting me as Her Ambassador to His Imperial Majesty Sultan Murad V.

I this afternoon presented a note to Safvet Pasha requesting him to obtain for me the honour of an audience of the Sultan, that I might place Her Majesty's letter in his hands, but owing to the indisposition from which His Majesty is suffering, caused by severe boils, I think it probable that some days must elapse before he is able to grant me an audience.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 507.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 643.)
My Lord,

Therapia, June 19, 1876.

YOUR Lordship has received Mr. Consul Reade's report of the cruelties with which the suppression of the Bulgarian insurrection has been accompanied; and the accounts from other quarters are still more distressing, although no doubt many of the revolting details that are given are either purely imaginary, or at least grossly exaggerated.

I have again spoken very seriously to the Grand Vizier on the subject, and remarked that the manner in which his colleagues had just been murdered by a Circassian gave an idea of what must be the position of unarmed populations left absolutely at the mercy of hordes of those savages.

The Grand Vizier, after alluding to the exaggeration of the reports sent here and to the omission of all mention of the horrors practised upon the Mussulmans by those who had attempted to get up the insurrection, by inflaming the two populations into a state of exasperation, assured me that it would be impossible to add to the stringency of the instructions which he has sent to put an end to the disorders, and to disarm the Circassians, the Imperial authorities being ordered to do this by force if they resisted.

Mehemet Rushdi Pasha added that the emergency had been so great as to render it indispensable at once to stamp the movement out by any means that were immediately available.

It was found to have originated in a conspiracy combined abroad, and upon such an extensive scale that, if not immediately suppressed, he believed that the insurrection would have quickly extended nearly to the gates of Constantinople.

The Government had resorted with repugnance to the services of the Circassians, but under the circumstances they had no choice.

I have already informed your Lordship that information was sent to Mahmoud Pasha of what was in preparation in ample time to have allowed measures to be taken which would have effectually prevented any rising, and your Lordship will also recollect how, when it did occur—a fortnight sooner than its organisers intended—General Ignatiew endeavoured to lull the Porte into a delusive security, and used every exertion to inspire the belief that there was nothing more than a movement of discontent among the Railway workmen.

Raschid Pasha having complained that the Russian Consul at Philippopoli, whois a native Bulgarian, was implicated in the conspiracy, General Ignatiew has ordered an inquiry to be made into his conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 508.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 649.)
Therapia, June 20, 1876.

My Lord,

THE unanimity which prevailed among all classes of Mahommedans at the moment of the late Sultan's deposition has, as was to be expected, proved of short duration, and a strong reactionary current has set in against allowing the Christians that perfect equality in the new institutions to be established, which was the basis upon which the leaders of the movement proposed to build them.

When we recollect the passions which were aroused in our own country at no very distant date upon the question of the admission of Roman Catholics to political rights, we may rather feel surprised in a Mahommedan country that the principle of putting the long-despised Christian on an equal footing with the true believer should be so powerfully supported, than that it is resisted by the ignorant and fanatical.

Upon this question the Government are greatly in advance of the people, and it will be necessary for them to proceed with much caution.

The establishment of a constitutional control, in which the elective principle is, at least to a limited extent, admitted has become indispensable to satisfy the public expectation and to prevent the administration from falling into the state in which it has of late been, and, judging from the language of the principal Ministers, this would appear to be resolved upon, but an attempt at once to endow this country with a constitution on any European model, or with a Chamber possessed of large attributions, could lead to nothing but confusion.

What is above all necessary is that it should be seen that something is absolutely given, and not merely promised.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 509.

Consul Sandwith to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 17. Political.)
Canea, Crete, June 12, 1876.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency Sir Henry Elliot, giving further particulars of the panic which lately prevailed at Candia and Rethymo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

Inclosure in No. 509.

Consul Sandwith to Sir H. Elliot.

Canea, Crete, June 8, 1876.

Sir,

IN my despatch of the 2nd instant I attempted to describe the effect produced in Crete by the Proclamation of Sultan Mourad V. I there stated that a panic had existed at Candia and Rethymo which I was inclined to believe was not justified by the conduct of the Mussulmans.

The post which came in on the 6th instant brought me reports from the Vice-Consuls of those towns, and from the facts there related I regret to say that the attitude of the Mussulmans was such as to warrant, if not a panic, at least considerable apprehension on the part of the Christians.

At the former town the first two days of the fête passed without any hostile demonstration, but on the third day the Mussulmans began loading their guns with ball, and ostentatiously to sharpen their yataghans. One of the officers of police secretly warned some Christian shopkeepers of the danger, and advised them to shut their stores, an advice they were not slow to follow, and at the same time several families presented themselves at some of the Vice-Consulates asking for protection. It was then that the British Vice-Consul sent me the telegram which was embodied in my last despatch.

When I communicated the news to Réouf Pasha, his Excellency knew absolutely nothing of what was passing at Candia, and not until he had telegraphed to the Mutessarif Pasha of that town did the latter bestir himself to allay the dangerous excitement.

One Mussulman woman was accidentally wounded by the discharge of a loaded gun, and while several people, as stated, ran to the Vice-Consulates, a few left the town and took refuge in the villages in the interior. Here it is asserted the Christians besieged their Mussulman neighbours in their houses, and kept them there as hostages until they saw that no harm had befallen their brethren in Candia.

Towards the evening the Mutessarif, the Greek Archbishop, and two Government employés exerted themselves in common to repress the excitement of the Mussulmans and to reassure the Christians, encouraging the latter to fire off guns themselves in emulation of their fellow townsmen, and thus the night wore away without any disaster occurring.

This account is confirmed by a gentleman who has been spending some months in Candia, and was a passenger by the steamer which brought the news of these events. He said there was no mistaking the animus of the Mussulmans, who boasted that the new reign was to usher in a new régime; that they had enough of concessions to the Christians, their favourite expression being *ὁ καλὸς καιρὸς ἔρχεται*, by which they meant the good old times before the reforms introduced by Sultan Mahmoud removed the badges of servitude from the Christians.

Great apprehensions are entertained of a renewal of these disorders on the day which shall be fixed for the reading of the Firman proclaiming the new Sultan, and Réouf Pasha tells me that the Mutessarif of Candia is anxious that his Excellency should himself be present when that ceremony takes place.

In Rethymo the same scenes occurred, but the crowds congregated were not so formidable, the town being much smaller, and no mention is made of the sharpening of yataghans. Leaden bullets, however, seem to have been distributed among the crowd, who showed them to the Christians by way of menace. A Capuchin monk was hooted, and spat upon in the streets by some lads of from 15 to 20 years of age, who further proceeded to throw stones at the French flag displayed at the Catholic Church, and defaced the arms over the door of the Church. For this insult the Mouavin, or Governor's Deputy, waited on the Priest to express his regret. In the cafés of the town, the Consular Agent reports that the Musulmans boasted that Sultan Murad would soon bring the infidels to order, so that all things considered, it is not to be wondered at if the latter were intimidated.

The conduct of the Mussulmans in Canea was not marked by any such exhibition of fanaticism, there was no whetting of yataghans, and no firing off of guns. The presence of a large garrison and of the Vali Pasha kept such feelings in due restraint. That they existed in a milder form, however, I am led to believe by the occurrence of a few trifling insults offered to Christians, which have since come to my ears, and by expressions significative of the same idea of putting down the Christians, an extreme illustration of which I reported as having been told me by one of my own servants.

Great agitation moreover, as I have since heard, existed in some villages situated less than an hour from the town, the inhabitants of which were preparing to fly to the mountains.

It seems difficult to account in these occurrences for the sudden conception of the idea that with the accession of the new Sultan is to begin an era of humiliation and abasement of the Christians, a feeling which translates itself in the common phrase, "The good time is coming." I suspect it to be due to the influence of the Dervishes, who are most numerous and powerful in Candia, wield considerable influence at Rethymo, and have latterly given signs of life here by by the erection of a Téké for their religious exercises. I certainly did not imagine that so much latent fanaticism existed, and though I am far from thinking that it will culminate in any fearful tragedy, it will not be because the desire is wanting, but because it is restrained by fear of punishment, and by the knowledge that any injury inflicted on the Christians in the towns would be the signal for a terrible retaliation on those Mussulmans living in the country.

There is a special reason why the temper of the Mussulmans at the present moment should not be made light of, and that is that the answer of the Porte to the demand of the Christian deputies is shortly expected to arrive. Should that answer be favourable to their pretensions it will create an immense feeling of bitterness against them on the part of the Moslems, who will see that instead of the new reign ushering in the good old times they fondly hoped for, it will mark an epoch in their history when they were compelled to part with the remnant of the superiority which they still practically enjoy. On the other hand, should the Christians be disappointed of their wishes, their deputies will return to their homes smarting under a sense of defeat, and keenly alive to the injustice done them. Ten days yet remain before the forty days allotted for the sittings of the General Assembly expire, but there is an implied understanding between the President and the Christian deputies that they shall not be dismissed before the answer to their demands is received.

I have learned with great satisfaction that his Excellency Réouf Pasha intends to be present at Candia and, perhaps, also at Rethymo, when the Firman proclaiming the new Sultan is read. His presence of itself will suffice, I confidently believe, to preserve order. I observe that the Vice-Consuls at both those towns are desirous to see a British man-of-war stationed within easy reach. It is not the first time that they have expressed such a wish, but hitherto I have not seen sufficient ground for concurring in it. Under present circumstances, however, and in view of the expected reply from the Porte to the Christian demands, I beg to submit that the appearance of one of Her Majesty's vessels off the towns of Canea, Rethymo, and Candia, particularly at the latter town, would tend to calm the agitation which the march of events might possibly create there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS B. SANDWITH.

P.S.—June 12.—I beg leave to add that in suggesting that a man-of-war show itself for a day or two off the Cretan ports I would not be understood to mean that its appearance there is necessary, but merely expedient as a measure of precaution, and one calculated at once to give confidence to the native Christians, and to make a salutary impression on Moslem insolence. Your Excellency is the best judge how far the exigencies of the naval service in the Mediterranean will admit of the temporary detachment of a vessel for such a purpose. The presence of a man-of-war in Suda Bay is scarcely known to the mass of the inhabitants of the towns, and even if known, as sight is more impressive than hearsay, I have ventured to recommend the appearance of one off the towns themselves, where the anchorage at this season is not dangerous.

With reference to the firing of muskets at Candia and Rethymo and not at Canea, I think it important to add that I am told that this noisy demonstration of joy is customary with the Mussulmans at the former towns and not at the latter, only the loading with ball being a dangerous novelty.

T. B. S.

No. 510.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 145.)
Athens, June 22, 1876.

My Lord,

IN my despatch to your Lordship No. 141 of the 18th instant, I concluded by saying that I thought it possible the Hellenic Ministers had used language with regard to the effect which a declaration of war on the part of Servia might have in Greece with a view to hastening a solution of the naturalization question. I still think that this may have been partly the motive of the Greek Government in speaking in this sense to the Turkish Minister; but I do not intend to convey the impression that this was the only reason for so doing, for there is no doubt that there had been considerable uneasiness, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 128 of the 10th instant, as to the effect which a declaration of war by Servia might have upon Greece, and that the Greek Ministers, aware of this, may have thought it a useful lever to apply towards the attainment of their wishes with regard to the naturalization question at the same time that they conveyed a warning to the Turkish Minister of their possible inability under certain circumstances of controlling popular feeling, and of consequently continuing the same policy they had hitherto pursued.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH WYNDHAM.

No. 511.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, June 30.)

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 28 Juin, 1876.

VOUS savez que les armements qui se poursuivaient activement en Servie depuis le commencement de l'insurrection de l'Herzégovine, avaient pris dans ces derniers temps des proportions telles qu'il était devenu impossible à la Sublime Porte de rester indifférente devant un déploiement de forces si considérable et si en dehors de toute proportion.

En présence de cette situation anormale, et s'inspirant de ses dispositions bienveillantes pour la Principauté, le Gouvernement Impérial s'est adressé au Prince Milan pour lui demander des explications franches et précises sur les motifs et le but de ces préparatifs de guerre extraordinaires.

Les précédentes communications de mon Département vous ont fait connaître les télégrammes échangés à ce sujet entre son Altesse le Grand Vizir et le Prince de Servie.

Malgré les assurances données par le Prince, assurances qui ne s'accordent nullement avec les faits qui les démentent à chaque moment, les nouvelles les plus récentes ne nous permettent plus de douter que la Servie ne soit résolue à entrer prochainement en campagne.

Quoique le Gouvernement Impérial n'ait cessé de respecter scrupuleusement l'autonomie garantie à cette Principauté par le Traité de 1856, et qu'il ait évité avec soin de donner jusqu'ici au Gouvernement Servien le moindre motif légitime de mécontentement de nature à l'amener dans la nécessité de se révolter contre la Cour Suzeraine, la Sublime Porte ne s'en voit pas moins menacée par la Servie d'une agression que rien n'a provoqué et que rien ne justifie.

Tout le monde connaît les efforts faits par la Principauté et les moyens illégaux qu'elle n'a cessé d'employer pour fomenter d'abord, et soutenir ensuite, la malheureuse insurrection de l'Herzégovine. On connaît également toute la longanimité dont la Sublime Porte a usé vis-à-vis de ces agissements incessants. Bien qu'en droit de répondre par des actes aux provocations du Gouvernement Servien, nous avons poussé le désir de la conciliation jusqu'à éviter même de lui faire des remontrances pour le rappeler à l'observation de ses devoirs. Nous aimons pourtant à espérer que cette attitude calme et pleine de sollicitude du Gouvernement Impérial envers le peuple Servien, égaré par des ambitieux et des hommes remuants, sera dûment appréciée, et que les conseils de modération finiront par prévaloir à Belgrade.

Mais si cet espoir était déçu et si une invasion armée était tentée contre le territoire Ottoman, le Gouvernement du Sultan, fort de son bon droit, ne reculerait pas devant l'emploi de la force pour repousser une attaque si injuste, et se croirait dès lors

pleinement autorisé à prendre les mesures dictées par les circonstances. Nos troupes entreront, s'il y a lieu, dans la Principauté afin de la faire rentrer dans les justes limites de sa véritable position.

Ce droit de légitime défense appartiendrait au Gouvernement Impérial même vis-à-vis d'une Puissance indépendante; il peut à plus forte raison le revendiquer à l'encontre d'un Etat qui, abusant de la situation privilégiée que lui font les Traités, se porte à des actes d'hostilité contre lui sans y être aucunement provoqué.

Veuillez communiquer ce qui précède au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité.

No. 512.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Musurus Pasha:—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, June 30.)

Constantinople, le 29 Juin, 1876.

(Télégraphique.)

JE vous transmets ci-dessous, pour votre information personnelle:—1. Un télégramme Véziriel adressé au Prince du Monténégro; 2. La réponse du Prince Nicolas; et 3. La réplique de son Altesse le Grand Vézir.

(No. 1.)

"*Le 11 Juin*, 1876.

"Votre Altesse sait que la Sublime Porte s'était préoccupée des armements qui se faisaient depuis quelque temps au Monténégro. Les assurances formelles et réitérées que votre Altesse avait bien voulu nous donner à ce sujet avaient fort heureusement dissipé nos inquiétudes. Aujourd'hui, cependant, je dois constater avec regret que ces préparatifs, loin d'avoir cessé, continuent au contraire dans des proportions telles que l'armée Monténégrine se trouve prête à entrer à toute heure en campagne. Votre Altesse comprendra facilement combien cet état de choses est de nature à préoccuper la Sublime Porte. Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, qui entoure de sa plus vive sollicitude le repos et la tranquillité des populations que la Providence a placées sous son sceptre paternel, a été justement ému de cette situation, et des intentions agressives qu'elle semble attribuer au Monténégro. D'ordre de mon auguste Maître, qui tient à cœur de voir se conserver invariables les bons rapports entre la Sublime Porte et la Principauté, je m'adresse à votre Altesse pour la prier de nous donner des explications franches et précises sur les motifs et le but réel de ces armements."

(No. 2.)

"*Le 21 Juin*, 1876.

"En réponse à la dépêche de votre Altesse, reçue hier, je viens lui donner les explications franches qu'elle désire.

"L'insurrection des provinces Turques a été, dès l'origine, pour le Monténégro et pour son Gouvernement, la source d'épreuves dont on ne se rend pas assez compte. Outre les charges que lui impose le maintien de sa neutralité, et les sacrifices qu'il est forcé de faire pour les blessés, les infirmes, les femmes et les enfants qui viennent chercher chez lui un asile qu'il ne peut refuser, il se voit perpétuellement en butte à des accusations sans fondement. Quoique ses dénégations répétées de toute immixtion dans l'insurrection aient été accueillies avec la plus parfaite civilité, il acquiert chaque jour la preuve qu'il est tenu en suspicion. Les mesures dictées à son égard par ce soupçon persistant ont pris depuis quelque temps un caractère menaçant; les frontières ont été, sans notification préalable, mis en état de blocus; des forces Turques supérieures aux besoins de la répression se sont massées en Herzégovine et en Albanie. Sur les représentations que j'ai fait parvenir à la Sublime Porte, j'ai reçu de votre Altesse et de son prédécesseur des assurances satisfaisantes sur le retrait de ces mesures, mais j'ai le regret de constater que les concentrations continuent, et que, ce qui cause une vraie détresse dans quelques districts Monténégrins, mes frontières restent bloquées d'une façon très effective, malgré les déclarations contraires du Gouverneur-Général de Scutari. En présence de ces faits et de la tendance regrettable qu'ils semblent révéler, il est de mon devoir strict de prendre des mesures de précaution que je ne dissimule nullement, tout en ayant le vif désir et le ferme espoir qu'elles resteront inutiles.

(Signé) "NICOLAS."

(No. 3.)

"*Le 25 Juin*, 1876.

"J'ai reçue le télégramme responsif que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'adresser ce 21 Juin. Nous n'avons jamais élevé des soupçons touchant le but vers lequel tendaient les efforts de votre Altesse. La continuation de la malheureuse insurrection Herzégovinienne prouve d'une manière évidente que nos forces militaires, que votre Altesse trouve supérieures aux besoins de la répression, n'étaient pas numériquement suffisantes pour cette tâche. Elle se serait pourtant accomplie, si l'action de nos troupes ne s'était trouvée entravée et arrêtée à tout moment par des obstacles et des circonstances particulières à la position du pays. Pour ce qui est d'une concentration de troupes dont parle votre Altesse, et qui irait s'accentuant chaque jour davantage, je n'aurai pas de peine à la rassurer entièrement à ce sujet. A part nos troupes en Herzégovine, dont le nombre varie suivant les exigences stratégiques, sur aucun point de la ligne de démarcation, il n'y a eu ni concentration ni modification des forces militaires. Je rappelerai même ici que, nonobstant la décision prise précédemment de réunir, par simple mesure de précaution, un corps d'armée de 20,000 hommes à Scutari d'Albanie, la Sublime Porte y a renoncé à la suite des assurances données par votre Altesse, les dernières informations reçues du vilayet de Scutari portant même que l'effectif des garnisons des fortins du côté de Monténégro n'a pas été augmenté d'un seul homme depuis huit mois. Je dirai enfin, mon Prince, que nos autorités n'ont jamais eu l'intention d'empêcher les communications de la Principauté avec le dehors. La preuve en est que ces communications continuent sans interruption; et que les Monténégrins vont en toute liberté, et sans être aucunement inquiétés, à Spouze, à Podgoritza et à Scutari. Par ce qui précède votre Altesse verra que la Sublime Porte n'a adopté aucune mesure qui doive préoccuper ni inquiéter le Monténégro. Nous sommes donc persuadés, mon Prince, que, malgré les insinuations tendantes à ébranler sa confiance dans les sentiments et les intentions bienveillantes de la Sublime Porte, votre Altesse continuera à contribuer pour sa part à l'œuvre de pacification poursuivie par le Gouvernement Impérial en Herzégovine. Nous en trouvons une preuve dans les nouvelles transmises par notre Commandant-en-chef en Herzégovine. En effet, Moukhtar Pacha nous annonce qu'il a ravitaillé Nichsich sans rencontrer dans sa marche aucune résistance de la part des insurgés, et que son retour à Gatchko a eu lieu également sans obstacle. La Sublime Porte aime à attribuer ce résultat aux dispositions prises par votre Altesse pour retenir les réfugiés qui se trouvent au Monténégro et les empêcher d'aller se joindre aux insurgés, de telle sorte que ces derniers, se voyant isolés, n'ont pas osé inquiéter le passage des convois de vivres et des troupes qui les accompagnaient. Ainsi votre Altesse peut-elle être assurée que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan apprécie dûment cette nouvelle preuve des sentiments loyaux de votre Altesse, et qu'il tiendra compte en temps et lieu de la ligne de conduite suivie par elle en cette circonstance."

No. 513.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Wyndham.

(No. 59.)

Foreign Office, June 30, 1876.

Sir,

I APPROVE your having inquired of M. Contostavlos, with reference to various rumours as to Greece being about to increase her armaments, whether the policy of the Hellenic Government towards Turkey had undergone any modification, as reported in your despatch No. 135 of the 15th instant.

It is important that you should keep Her Majesty's Government, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informed of the policy of Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 514.

*Mr. Ffrench to the Earl of Derby.**—(*Received June* 30, 5·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 30, 1876, 4·10 P.M.

THE following telegram has been received from Monson to-day:—

"Russian Consul-General arrived this morning from Vienna. Will go on to Montenegro on Sunday, to remain some time. He gives me to understand that Russia leaves Prince Nicholas complete liberty of action; and he seems surprised to find that he has not already declared war."

No. 515.

Mr. Macdonell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, June* 30, 1876.

IN consequence of the communication made by Mr. Ffrench to Count Andrassy, in your Lordship's despatch No. 378 to Lord A. Loftus, Count Karolyi informs me confidentially that he has been instructed to communicate with German Government and express disapproval and objection of his Government at the possible autonomy for the insurgent Provinces.

His Excellency asked me if contents of above despatch had been communicated by Her Majesty's Embassy to German Government. I replied in the negative.

No. 516.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 397.)

Foreign Office, June 30, 1876.

My Lord,

ON the 23rd instant, the Russian Ambassador informed me that he had received a telegram from Prince Gortchakow at Ems, stating that Russia would continue to exert her efforts to restrain Servia and Montenegro; but that the latest news was of a disquieting nature, and it was to be feared that a conflict was imminent.

His Excellency took that opportunity of expressing a hope that the proposals contained in Prince Gortchakow's note, a copy of which I forwarded to your Excellency in my despatch No. 385 of the 28th instant, would meet the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 517.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 398.)

Foreign Office, June 30, 1876.

My Lord,

ON the 26th instant Count Schouvaloff informed me that he had heard fr . Prince Gortchakow explaining his meaning in making use of the expression "a - nomie vassale et tributaire," in allusion to the future of the insurgent Provinces.

He considered that autonomy did not mean sovereignty. That the sovereignty of these Provinces should remain with the Sultan intact; and that the eventuality of a Sovereign Prince over Bosnia and Herzegovina was not comprised in his project.

Count Schouvaloff explained that what the Prince desired was simply an administrative autonomy, and he thought that if the Sultan yielded this point the struggle would cease the same day.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* Repeated to Paris, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.